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“Theorizing Religion in the Global Age: A Typological Analysis”

Un document produit en version numérique par Jean-Marie Tremblay, bénévole,
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A Typological Analysis”.**



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SUMMARY

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This article is a partial response to the problems of the theorizing of religion and globalization that have arisen in recent studies about the subject. I am seeking to open the discussion about the theorizing of religion in the Global Age through the development of a typological analysis centered on the different *religious positions in the Global Age*. I will expose the four major religious positions that are an integral part of the Global Age, in the following order : intransigent, conservative, pluralist and relativist. In each case, I will make a brief description of the positions, followed by empirical reflections on them. The object of this research is to develop an operationalizable tool of analysis of religion in the context of the diverse globalization processes.

KEY WORDS : Religion ; globalization ; modernity ; Global Age ; intransigent ; conservative ; pluralist ; relativist.

There is a lot of confusion around the theorizing of religion in regards to the process of globalization. Most general theories about globalization consider religion mostly as a fundamentalist reaction to modernity. Sociologists of religion, with the notable exception of Beyer (1994) and Robertson (1992), have been investigating seriously the subject of religion and globalization only in the last few years. This article is a partial response to the problems of the theorizing of religion and globalization that have arisen in those recent studies about the subject. I am seeking to open the discussion about the theorizing of religion in the Global Age through the development of a typological analysis centered on the different *religious positions in the Global Age*.

In order to pursue my analysis, I will first need to address the theoretical problems one usually meets in trying to theorize the phenomenon of the globalization of religion. There are two major challenges to this task that I will have to face : first, I will have to show what the difference is between religion and religiosity, and secondly, I will have to resolve the problem of the definition of modernity in a globalized world. After this, I will describe the four major religious positions that are an integral part of the Global Age, in the following order : intransigent, conservative, pluralist and relativist. In each case, I will make a brief description of the positions, followed by empirical reflections on them. The object of this research is to develop an operational tool of analysis of religion in the context of the diverse globalization processes.

Some early theories about religion and globalization

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Peter Beyer (1994) and Roland Robertson (1992) have been the first two sociologists to seriously tackle the question of the theorization of religion and globalization. For the purpose of my research, I will mainly focus here on Beyer's theory. His position on the subject has evolved over the last ten years, but it remains deeply rooted in what I would call a structural-functionalist vision of religion in the Global Age.

For Beyer (1994), contemporary religion is a "type of communication based on the immanent/transcendent polarity" that functions as an "independent subsystem" in the highly differentiated social structure of "late modernity." As a function of a marginal subsystem in global society, the purely religious communication (rituals, mass, prayer) of "systemic religion" is slowly, but surely, losing its influence on the public space because globalization is structurally favoring the privatization of religion. But the globalization process can also provide fertile ground for the renewed public influence of religion, especially if it transforms itself into what Beyer calls "performance religion." When religious communication is applied to problems created by other subsystems, it is "performing" in the public space in order to gain political, social and cultural influence. Under conditions of globalization, there are only two possible approaches towards society for religion, one that takes on the global system from the perspective of a particular, but isolated, subglobal culture, and another that invests itself in global culture as such by performing as much as possible in the public sphere. For Beyer, the future of religion lies more in performance religion than in systemic religion : "(...) if pure religion is at a disadvan-

tage in modern global society, if there is pressure toward the privatization of religion, then the solution lies in finding effective religious "applications", not in more religious commitment and practices" (Beyer, 1994 : 80).

Reducing religion to a type of communication may be a great way to make it fit into an abstract analysis of its development in the context of globalization, but it certainly doesn't take into account the complexity of religion as a social phenomenon. Beyer's definition of performance religion revolves only around political concerns ; he even goes so far as using the very politically Americanized terms of "liberal" and "conservative" to describe religion. Those two terms do not have the same meaning outside of the American political arena, where they barely exist at all. I argue, as Beckford (1989) did, that religion is also a cultural resource which can be used, or which can perform, in any subsystem. Recently, Beyer has refined somewhat his normative vision of religion with a fourfold typology about the "social forms of religion" in global society : 1) organized religion ; 2) politicized religion ; 3) social movement religion and 4) communitarian/individualistic religion (Beyer, 2003 : 54-58). Again, the first three types seem to be evolving mainly around the political arena. But resistance and/or integration of religion in the Global Age do not manifest themselves only in the political arena, since some religious groups or movements even stay far away from it. How can we account for those manifestations with Beyer's politically normative definition of religious performance ? It seems that Beyer makes a common mistake that many general theories about globalization make when they try to discuss the place of religion in the Global Age. They just cannot see what is going on outside of religious groups that are not minimally organized, because they still think inside a modern frame of mind. The binary normative mode of Beyer's theoretical reflection does not take into account the complexity of religion, because it reduces it to its interaction with the political sphere. However, I think his conceptualization of "performance religion" is accurate in many ways, even if it's too close to rational theory for my taste.

Another more recent book on religion and globalization (Bastian, Champion et Rousselet, 2001), published in French, demonstrates with a series of empirical studies that religion is more than just a form of communication. It is also a cultural resource. For the editors of this book, the globalization of religion is produced mostly by the transition of culture from the international to the transnational sphere. They say that the expansion strategies of religious groups no longer depend on their relationship with the state, and that those strategies are becoming more autonomous. The empirical studies of this book show very well how religion is "performing" on the global stage. But the French, and also many authors who write in English, seem to have great difficulty in thinking outside of the modern project's frame of reference. There are as many different uses of the word modernity as there are authors in this book and in many other books. I will now discuss the problem of the definition of modernity in regards to the question of religion and globalization.

The transition of multiple modernities in the global age

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In practically all theorization on globalization, there seems to be a lack of consensus among scholars about what type of "modernity" we are presently in. And since most theorizing about the globalization process usually defines it as some kind of reaction to "modernity," it appears that it is very important to have a clear definition of what modernity is and try to think of the globalization process outside a modern frame of mind.

Since there is no consensus about modernity, most theorists of religion and globalization use as many as ten current conceptual ver-

sions of modernity, when they don't simply invent new ones. Whether it be "liquid modernity," "hypermodernity," "ultramodernity," "advanced modernity" or "post-modernity," some scholars go as far as using two or even three of these terms in the same text, without even bothering to define any of them with anything more than a reference or two.

Shmuel Eisenstadt (2000) gives a partial response to this endless reshaping of the modernity concept when he submits that modern theorists do not have a unified definition of modernity anymore, and that there are multiple versions of modernity that coexist and are also in competition with each another. For him, the modern program is defined by the autonomy of man. This autonomy offers modern man a greater possibility to play different social roles. The coexistence of those multiple modernities in a constant state of flux would explain why there are as many definitions of modernity as there are social scientists. But like many general theoreticians of globalization, Eisenstadt looks mainly at religion through a political angle, mostly as a fundamentalist reaction to modernity. And his explanation of what comes next remains unsatisfactory. But still, through his conceptualization of multiple modernities, we are starting to get a clearer picture of a possible theorization of globalization.

What comes after modernity ? Martin Albrow (1996) calls it "the Global Age" and says that what we are living presently is a "change of epoch." We are, more precisely, in transition between the "Modern Age" and the "Global Age." For him, the materialist vision of Marx has been replaced by a "limitless modernity." The Modern project has developed in two major directions : rationality and universalism. For Albrow (1996 : 33), rationality is "the imposition of practical rationality upon the rest of the world through the agency of the state and the mechanism of market," and universalism is "the generation of universal ideas to encompass the diversity of the world." Rationality is considered to be at the service of power and has, as a corollary, produced the extension of the dichotomy rationality/irrationality. In the framing

of the Modern project, irrationality is closely associated to religion because of the highly emotional content many religious groups, especially new religious movements, have been displaying in the last part the 20th century. Albrow demonstrates very adequately the passage of religion from the Modern Age to the Global Age when he says that :

(...) globality has replaced rationality as the dominant characteristic of the age. (...) rationality is a set of principles and globality a material frame of reference. (...) It is more like one day being a Catholic and the next a Muslim, without being able to find a common concept of religion. (...) Globalist movements operate through symbolic acts of protest, networking rather than creating authority structures, demonstrating the political dimension of everyday life, opposing dominant power structures whether in the clothes worn, the food eaten, or in sexual relationships. Membership of a global movement is a matter of demonstrating to like-minded people significant commitment through a range of symbolic acts, from wearing badges and insignia at the simplest level, through the choice of a completely alternative lifestyle. (...) The Unification Church of Sun Myung Moon is a typical product of the Global Age, global millenarianism. Born, on their own terms, out of confrontation with godless world communism, they concentrate on forming a new sociality focused on saving the world, and organize and communicate worldwide accordingly (Albrow, 1996 :136 and 142).

In a world where the nation-state is undermined by globalization processes, religion can be as much an institution as a social movement, depending on the religious position it adopts toward secular society. A conservative or pluralist position will tend to be politically closer to the nation-state because it usually has a more institutional form and is more willing to compromise. An intransigent or a relativist position will have a tendency to distance itself from the state because of the "social movement religion" or the "sect" form it usually takes, which makes them less likely to compromise with institutions. But all four religious positions have a definite role to play in the globalization process. My hypothesis is that *religion has a major role to play in the passage from the Modern Age to the Global Age because it is a socio-cultural agent that mostly functions outside of the influence of the nation-state. Four types of positions have been developed by*

religion towards society in the state of flux of the competing multiple modernities which have been provoked by the globalization process ushering in the Global Age.




Fig. 1. Religious positions in the Global Age.

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Usually, the term "religion" is associated with organized religion, which in turn is closely associated to the conservative and pluralist positions in my typology. As for religiosity, it is a concept that mostly corresponds to a religious sentiment that we find mostly in the intransigent or relativist position. By position, I mean the place a religious ideology occupies in the global society's public space. After having said that we rely too much on politics and economy to evaluate the role of religion in the globalization process, it is now time to put in place my own explanation of religion as a cultural resource. In the second part of this article, I will explain the four religious positions in the Global Age by illustrating each one of them with an ideal-type example : intransigent, conservative, pluralist, relativist (Fig. 1).

This typology was inspired by a slightly different one that was constructed by French philosopher Gaston Fessard (1962) and an earlier version by Vaillancourt and myself (Vaillancourt and Geoffroy, 1996 and Geoffroy, 1999a, b). The figure shows that the four positions are not totally closed, there are areas shared by at least two positions at a time : intransigent/conservative, conservative/pluralist and pluralist/relativist. Depending on the topic, a religious group or a religious ideology can be placed in one position or another in this typology. Through time or in different geographical areas, some groups can be slowly slipping from one position to another. For example, a group that is considered conservative in the US will probably be considered intransigent in a very secularized country like France for instance. From a historical point of view the intransigent position could be associated loosely to the premodern epoch, the conservative to early modernity, the pluralist to late modernity and the relativist to post-modernity (or the Global Age).¹ As all ideal-types in the weberian tradition, these positions have only an illustrative value. They are not empirical facts, but a theoretical tool to analyze empirical facts. In the second part of this article, I will use this typology to present case studies of globalized religious organizations and movements.

The intransigent position

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Since the beginning of the nineteen sixties, we have seen a rapid rise in the number of extremist religious groups and networks. They are a kind of reaction to the generalized erosion of systemic ultimate meaning systems around the world and a response to the failure of non-religious ideology. Some theorists even say that they are against the major values of modernity (Tincq, 1995) : secular values and eth-

¹ For a more detailed description of each epoch, see Albrow (1997).

ics. This rejection of secular society is characterized by an *intransigent position* towards society. Even if intransigent groups tend to be ideologically premodern, they usually practice their own selective brand of modernity.

The common tread in all intransigent groups is the defense of a selective orthodoxy of dogma. In the case of the Catholic integrist, it is the defense of a selective memory of the power and tradition of the institutional church (Geoffroy, 1999a, b, 2002). And in the case of the Protestant fundamentalist, it is the promotion of the Bible as the ultimate truth. The source of power may differ from one religion to another, but the question of absolute authority is always central in an intransigent position. This position is like a meta-framing of the mind that goes way beyond the internal theorization the groups construct about themselves. Their extreme rigidity produces a situation where they simply cannot perceive the links between them and other religious groups. The search for absolute authority, whether it is in the literal interpretation of the Bible or in a selective view of the Catholic Church *magisterium*, is motivated by a one-sided interpretation of reality and an intemporal vision of history. Catholic theologian Pierre Lathuillière (1995) says that this thinking process is a kind of "religious positivism" because it refuses to consider faith as a mystery, taking it instead as fact, as the irrefutable proof of the existence of religious realities. This cognitive process is responsible for the conflictual situation that these groups are in most the time. The conflict, often of apocalyptic proportions in the minds of the adepts or groups, helps to reaffirm the authority of charisma or of the rational-legal structure. The main objective of this process is to close permanently the barrier between the secular and the religious world. This "closing" of the mind characterizes the cognitive process of those involved locking them in a binary mode of "us and them" and "right and wrong."

Inside the intransigent position, there is a distinction that needs to be made between the terms *fundamentalism* and *integrism*. The historical sources of fundamentalism are very different from those of in-

tegrism : integrism is mostly Catholic. It emerged in 19th century Spain, and then in Italy and France. Fundamentalism is mostly protestant and started in the US at the beginning of the 20th century (Geoffroy, 2002). But the most important distinction between these two intransigent positions is a doctrinal one that affects all the conceptualizations about them. Fundamentalism focuses on a selectively literal interpretation of the Bible and integrism on a selectively traditionalist interpretation of the Catholic *magisterium* and theology. Modern fundamentalism takes the Bible's corpus as an absolute, thus provoking a separation with the rest of the world. It finds its origin in the cultural pole of revivalism, which seeks a temporal rupture produced by a sudden conversion. There is the time *before* the conversion, a time of error, sin and pain, and the time *after*, the time of salvation and of the "blessed joy" of the discovery of the truth. This staging of conversion as a rupture is also the ritualization of a departure from the world of the "others," those who are in error because they don't know the Bible. Integrism will be more likely to insert itself in the social pole of traditionalism, putting emphasis on the continuity of time in a fixed catholic *magisterium* or in canon law.

But these two sub-types have indeed something in common : an intransigent religious position towards society, not to be confused with a strictly political orientation. This common intransigent position can be perceived on a cognitive level in the univocity and duality of their perception of reality. A theoretical denial of evolutionism and a practical refusal of human history are both their common expression. This enables them to make temporary political alliances on certain topics like anti-abortion and pro-life campaigns, or in the recent fight against gay marriages for example. But those alliances are only strategic and very much punctual because fundamentalism rejects the sacramental principle of Catholicism for a direct experience and contact with God through the Bible. There is no human mediation between the Bible and the faithful. The Pope and the institutional church as an idealtype authority structure obsess Catholic integrists. They interpret the sacred text through the most rigid traditions of the Catholic *magisterium*, so

the authority of Catholic canon law becomes the central point of reference. The intransigent groups, whether they are fundamentalist or integrist, have a dualistic vision of the world. They share a certain tendency to structure their thoughts in a polemical and proselytizing form. They proclaim that there are the "true Christians" (them) and the "nominal ones" (all the others). But, as we have just seen, this dualism is expressed very distinctively.

In the province of Quebec in Canada, which until the fifties was mostly a French Catholic society where church and state were intertwined, the "Quiet Revolution" brought about the "trial of tradition" that paved the way to a secular state and a religiously pluralistic modern society.² Today, more than 80% of the Quebec population is still, at least nominally, Catholic. But it is for all practical purposes an institutionally freer brand of Catholicism, since religious practices and vocations have dropped dramatically in much of the western world. The secularization of the state has opened the door to American Protestant fundamentalism, which is very much active today in Quebec and in the rest of the world, especially the Evangelicals, the Pentecostals, the Mormons and the Jehovah's Witnesses. Catholic integrist groups are also part of the contemporary intransigent landscape, whether it be in Quebec, in the US, in France, or in Latin countries.

A good example of a transnational Catholic integrist group is the St-Pius X Fraternity, founded by the late French Archbishop Lefebvre in the early seventies. It is present in his homeland of France, but also in the US and Canada (Geoffroy, 2002 and Cuneo, 1996). As much as the first Vatican council was a blow to liberalism in the Catholic church, the Vatican II council was perceived by Bishop Lefebvre's followers as the biggest defeat of the "true tradition" of the *magiste-*

² The Revolution was deemed "quiet" because through most of the sixties, the Quebec State and society achieved much spectacular reform like the secularization of school and hospitals and the nationalization of electricity (Quebec main natural resource) without bloodshed.

rium. The Fraternity wants to preserve the tradition of Vatican I over the novelties "imposed" by Vatican II. They are opposed to the collegiality principle in the *Lumen Gentium* constitution. Collegiality as a principle was supposed to produce a decentralization of some powers from the Pope and the high hierarchy of the church to all the Bishops, and also to voluntary assemblies of priests and lay people. The followers of Bishop Lefebvre are vigorously opposed to any form of democratization in the church ; they prefer instead the strict respect of a highly authoritarian hierarchy in which the Pope is an absolute and infallible ruler. They are against democracy and for the absolute authority of the church. They think that the church has lost its credibility and authority since the Vatican II council. In 1988, this group became so intransigent that it was officially excommunicated by the Catholic church, mainly for the ordination of new bishops without the Vatican's consent. After many attempts to reintegrate the Fraternity in the church, the group remains today outside of the church.

The conservative position

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The conservative and the pluralist are the two more moderate positions in my classification of religion in the contemporary globalized world. Conservatives and pluralists are people who are able and willing to live inside the dominant social frame of mind of their society. These two positions create a precarious balance that enables religious diversity to exist in a democratic society. The delicate balance between a mild religious defense of the status quo and a moderate ecumenical style of tolerance, permits better social cohesion. Conservatives and pluralists are forces that complement each other even if they don't often acknowledge it.

Religious conservatism is a moderate form of religion because it does not oppose de facto modernity or globality but seeks to integrate both in the project of an institutional religion. By refusing to create any rifts, the conservatives will try to slow down pluralism's progress in society by seeking more control over public and religious institutions. They will use democratic political and economic institutions to get their conservative message through more efficiently. A good example of a global conservative organization would be the *Opus Dei* organization. Officially a respected group inside the Catholic Church, *Opus Dei* is a very controversial conservative association of lay people that has worldwide ramifications. Jose Escrivà De Balaguer, a young Spanish priest, created it in 1928. He conceived *Opus Dei* as an instrument of sainthood and apostolate expressed through professional work in everyday life. Since 1982, the organization has the official status of a personal prelature, which means it is like a non-territorial diocese which answers only to the Pope, not to local Bishops since it has no territorial limits. The group is truly a transnational conservative Catholic group since it has many active members on all continents : Europe (47 000), Americas (28 000), Asia and Oceania (4 500), Africa (1 500). (Source : Opus Dei Information Center)

The central belief of the *Opus Dei* is the achievement of sainthood through the "perfection" of a person's work in everyday life. This distinctive philosophy has a lot in common with what Max Weber called "Protestant asceticism." This work ethic has indeed a very modernist ring to it that is not usually found in the Catholic tradition. "The road to sainthood" that is proposed by the prelature is organized around the valorization of professional work as a "performance" of sainthood. In fact, it is an adaptation of the Catholic doctrine to certain aspects of modernity that takes its origin in Protestant asceticism. The "human perfection" as a goal to be attained through the promotion of professional competence at its optimum is certainly one of them. This emphasis on the value of knowledge is similar to the one that was described by Weber (1967 : 205-208) concerning the Puritans. The rational and systematic pursuit of perfection, similar to the Methodists'

position (Weber, 1967 : 166), is expressed through a life of prayer and sacrifice. The disciples of *Opus Dei* regularly practice meditation, spirituals retreats, confession to a spiritual director, recitation of the rosary and daily mass attendance. This exaltation of the ascetic discipline at work is similar, on many accounts, to the one practiced by the Baptist and the Methodist sects described by Weber after his trip to America. The German sociologist has shown that the passage from a type of religious asceticism to a secular one has brought about the domination of the capitalist ideal upon the world. *Opus Dei* tries to operate a historical reversal inside Catholicism by promoting a religious asceticism with a Catholic stamp of approval on it.

The pluralist position

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Pluralism is more difficult to define because it is often confused with the social norm in many societies. The pluralist position favors membership in one major religious tradition as a cultural anchor, while maintaining an open interfaith dialogue with "other" religions. In the pluralist position, it is difficult to talk about any single religious truth because of the desire to recognize the richness of the diversity of religious cultures from around the world. It accepts that the human condition does not have complete access to a global vision of reality. The recognition of the truthfulness of other faiths becomes then some sort of act of humility in the face of the limits of a person's own beliefs. Pluralism involves a limited application of tolerance, which means that the interfaith dialogue is only possible under certain conditions. If the beliefs and practices of others clash too much with the ambient social norm, the dialogue can be cut at any time. It is very different from relativism, which advocates complete tolerance of every individual's religious beliefs and practices.

Many confessional Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) could well be considered as having a pluralist position towards society. The Baptist World Alliance (BWA) is a good example of a confessionally linked NGO working in many countries around the world. Founded in 1905 by English and American Baptists, the BWA considers itself to be an "evangelical and human fraternity." With its 32 million members present in more than 200 countries around the world, the BWA has its home base in Church Falls, Virginia. It is interesting to see how confessional NGOs like the BWA have adapted their discourse and their action in the field to fit in with the objectives of the United Nations. At their international Toronto conference in 1980, the BWA adopted many resolutions closely related to the objectives of the UN Charter : liberty of religion, human rights, the life of the family and the rights of children, the question of refugees, ecological protection and hunger in the world (Shurden, 1985 : 243). For the Baptists, human rights and liberty of religion are closely linked. As a good pluralist group, the BWA works with secular institutions as well as with other religious organizations like the Catholic Church for example. An interfaith dialogue is always possible between the BWA and other faith-based organizations.

The relativist position

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Until recently, relativism was debated mainly in philosophy, so most of the literature about the subject comes from this discipline. There are many forms of relativism, including cultural relativism that is prominent mainly in anthropology. But there is also moral relativism, which is the direct result of a relativist religious position. Relativism claims that there are different moral conceptions in the world, one for each individual for that matter, and that they change from one place to another. The relativists think that there can be no universal

moral standards, religious traditions or religious belief applicable to all cultures. One can only judge through one's own cultural code or personal ethics. As a philosophical concept, relativism is closely associated to postmodernism. In matters of morality, postmodernists defend the relativity of values. They are generally anti-dogma and against any form of constraint or control of their ideas. While an intransigent religious position puts limits and constraints, the relativist seeks to eliminate them all. In postmodern morality, all values are considered to be equivalent. An absolute tolerance of all systems of ultimate meaning is the main characteristic of the relativist position. Here again, as in the intransigent position, modernity is accused of all the evils of the contemporary world, especially instrumental rationality. Of course, the discourse of the two positions originates from a different point of view ; but it is similar in the radicality of its approach.

The best example of a relativist position can be found in the New Age Movement. The "Aquarian Conspiracy" feeds on a globalized spiritual supermarket where the supreme value is the integral respect of individual choices. Véronique Vaillancourt (1993) has shown the links between New Age and the postmodern ideals : individualism, the creation of a personal truth, unlimited choice of values and beliefs, a new vision of tradition, anti-institutionalism, and the primacy of experience. York (1995) has shown the emergence of a network of individuals and groups with a polycentric structure of power, where authority is no longer lodged in one person or group but in many changing spokespersons over a period of time. I have been developing for many years the concept that the New Age is a socio-religious movement (Geoffroy, 1999a,b 2000, 2001). Beyer (2003) has recently called the New Age a "social movement religion" and Beckford (2003) has made similar links between the New Age and new social movement theory. In a relativist position, there can only be a social movement form that does not allow for any form of institutionalization. If this happens, it is because the group or person is slipping into a pluralist position. Heelas (1996) has argued that many elements of the New Age are still modern, so the movement cannot be closely associ-

ated with postmodern ideals. My typology resolves this debate by showing that the New Age Movement is floating between a pluralist and a relativist position on some issues, but that for the most part it has a relativist position that is linked to some of the postmodern ideals. In the state of flux of the multiple modernities in the Global Age, it is only normal that a globalized religious movement such as the New Age moves between the competing definitions of modernity.

CONCLUSION

[Content](#)

As I have shown in this article, the insertion of religion in the globalization process is a very complex phenomenon that needs further theorizing in order to analyze the empirical data related to it. My contribution here is expressed in the construction of a typology of four basic religious positions towards society in the Global Age. Because of the abstract nature of the globalization process, it is necessary to develop an analytical tool that permits further theorizing of religion and globalization. This typology is made possible through the development of some existing theories concerning religion and globalization. Based on Eisenstadt's and Albrow's theories, we have shown that we are presently in a period where there are multiple definitions of modernity competing with each other as we slowly enter the new epoch of the Global Age.

This typology is a tool of research that will serve to classify the different case studies of religious groups and movements that I plan to continue to observe in the next few years. I have observed that the different religious position's towards society are all reactions and adaptations to the globalization process. As Beckford (2003) said in the case of religion, the globalization paradigm is certainly "good to think with." No more, no less.

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