Edited by
Françoise Lieberherr-Gardiol
and Germán Solinís
(2014)

CITIES
INTO THE FUTURE

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Françoise Lieberherr-Gardiol and Germán Solinís

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
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SUMMARY

Introduction
The Urban, a complex and open figure
by German Solinís

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The city is immediately perceptible but hard to understand. Urbanisation goes back to antiquity but driven by history, it evolves constantly and is powered by a vision of society. At a time when the world is mainly "urban" and urbanisation has become global, we are in an "urban" civilization, but what sort of civilization is that? How should we understand the city?

The introduction refers to several problems where immediate knowledge is opposed to in-depth knowledge concerning the notion of "urban civilization". In order to tackle difficulties in understanding this notion, the article analyses its complexity and suggests three levels of understanding: the more technical, artistic or expert approach with its disciplines; the epistemological approach mainly composed of the social sciences and humanities; and the empirical approach which produces common knowledge in the street.

Along with these three approaches, the city can also be understood thanks to the three dimensions that constitute it: through time, as a historical fact, through functions, as a useful factor in its economy and through space, which grants it its social identity in physical forms, social relationships, meaning and discourse.

Finally, the approaches and dimensions of the urban phenomenon are elaborating today the "urban paradigm", putting together characteristics that make an adjective out of its name: "the city is urban", defines at the same time the mythical power of place and territories and the ideal of future. These qualifications ensure *urbanity* through a city in the form of a speech and/or a drawing, as a founding symbol. In this way, the city is linked to the urban as is urbanization to society. Even if the city is superseded by the urban (in its physical, juridical and functional limits), it remains its archetype, its symbolic and ideal reference, enabling the urban to project on a horizon of utopian hope.

As a result, the introduction raises the "urban issue" as an open question requiring transdisciplinary analysis of which the methodology is under permanent making.

The Urban Agenda, a journey from Vancouver to Nairobi, Istanbul and Medellin

By Daniel Biau

According to Daniel Biau, the urban agenda is too broad to be an international priority. This explains why during the last three decades, the United Nations system has tried to give it some focus and to link it to clearer or simpler priorities such as sustainable development, democratic governance or poverty eradication. This has not worked very well in terms of resource mobilization and overall visibility. But it has allowed better understanding of the on-going urban transition, to identify and highlight local policy options and to advise a number of governments on the best ways and means to develop and implement housing and urban strategies.

Daniel Biau argues that the urbanization process of the developing world has been less chaotic than expected by the media. Many countries are managing their urban development relatively well, particularly in Asia, the Arab States and Latin America. Ideas and good practices have been shared, adapted and successfully applied in a number of emerging economies. Of course many other countries, particularly the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), are lagging behind and are unable to address the slum crisis. But the urbanization of our planet should not be seen as an outright disaster. It has both positive and negative features. The United Nations has always stressed the negative to raise awareness while not placing enough emphasis on the positive role of cities, including their impact on rural development.

Daniel Biau tries to address this imbalance in a comprehensive overview. He describes the major milestones of the international urban debate over the last 34 years, from the viewpoint of a UN manager and expert who has been personally involved in many stages of this journey.

Daniel Biau concludes that the Urban Agenda covers by essence a cross-sectoral and multi-disciplinary field, and has to be related to many aspects of the economic, social, environmental, cultural and political life. It has to provide the territorial or spatial dimensions of a number of societal challenges that the UN system tries to bring together at the global level, in an often scattered but consensual manner. This might be the weakness of the urban agenda: because it is too broad it cannot stand on its own and needs to be subsumed under -or associated with- more popular and fashionable topics (such as climate change). But then it loses its explanatory power, its comprehensiveness, its political value. Therefore urban specialists have no choice but to continue the struggle and frequently restructure this agenda in various ways to reach the world leaders.

Urban policies and the globalization crisis

By Gustave Massiah

The globalization crisis puts a new perspective on the issue of urban transformation. After considering some aspects of the connection between globalization and urbanization, we will return to urban policies and urban models before going on to repeat the importance of urban social movements. We will then go into the effects of the crisis on urban policies and end with alternative policy proposals, initially restricted to local policies.

The crisis of neoliberalism puts into perspective recent decades and the close link between globalization and urbanization. Urbanization has changed and is no longer an extension into the South of the 19th century urban revolution. It now corresponds more to a breakdown in urban development. The evolution of globalization upsets the geopolitical system and calls into question the very nature of States. It alters the links between local, national, regional and global; between rural and urban; and between individual and universal.

Therefore the author reviews the transformation of the world's population through migrations and   explosion of cities, the evolution of urban models and urban policies in the North and the South, as well as the development of urban social movements with the demand for inhabitants' participation in democratic processes. While the dangers of the general crisis linked to globalization are known (poverty, housing, violence, insecurity), the opportunities are not, and the author presents examples of them. The challenge is that of asserting rights and their inscription in urban policies and in the generation of cities, including the right to the city for everyone. With a description of different alternative local policies in their challenges and strategic lines, the author introduces the importance of the linking of levels and scales, between the local, the national, the large regions and the global. Urban and spatial thinking must combine the responses to balanced, multipolar geopolitics, to social justice, to the ecological urgency and to respect for liberties.

Governances, from global to urban – between innovation and revamping

by Françoise Lieberherr-Gardiol

From a context of ideological and geopolitical transformation, whether globalization, neo-liberalism, opening up to a multipolar world and environmental crises, governance has asserted itself as a new founding paradigm of the late 20th century. In sum, three elements interact : partnerships between public and private actors, negotiation of rules of the game, collective decisions, which can be made at several levels from local to transnational and from an organization to a region or State. In this context the World Bank launched its normative concept of *good governance* as a model of effective public administration which becomes the main reference for development. The principal criticisms aim at the application of a development model created in Western societies and marked by the dominating neoliberal current with criteria and norms in cultural gaps with other contexts, which turn into the development conditionality.

Urban governance falls into the sphere of application of cities involving local government, as process of readjustment in the exercise of urban power in a context of fragmentation of spaces, proliferation of institutions and networks intervening in one area, diversification of actors with divergent value systems and interests.

Through three experiences of urban governance linked to decentralization in Burkina Faso, administrative reforms in Viet Nam and local democratization in Bulgaria, we propose to examine how this Western product is interpreted, adapted and implemented in very different cultural and geopolitical contexts. We conclude that there are multiple forms of governance, whose adaptation varies depending on the specific situations. Far from operating as a simple management tool, they show themselves to institutional and organizational outcomes shaping community action and made up of multiple and hybrid values and attitudes. We talk of the fabrication of urban governance because it is set at the centre of socio-economic and democratic transitions, of exogenous and endogenous dynamics, of the emergence of new actors, of the construction of new rules and contracts for living together, and of the creation of a collective identity. Imprinted on them are movements of resistance and rejection, conflicting and divergent interests, development phases and phases of regression, and paralysing routines, all largely underestimated in projects for the promotion of governance.

Participatory democracies:
a slow march toward new paradigms
from Brazil to Europe ?

by Giovanni Allegretti

Since the echo of Porto Alegre experience started to gain space and emulations around the world, during the 90s, Participatory Budgeting (PB) became one of the most respected and analysed typologies of participatory democracy processes, due to the radical horizons it often poses, and the clear principles that forge its peculiarities. At present, with more than 1500 experiences of Participatory Budgeting existing in different countries of the world, it raises an interesting debate which explicitly poses the question whether or not a unique sequential logic in conceiving the relationship between representative democratic institutions and spaces of participatory decision-making exists. The essay starts looking at Participatory Budgeting practices as a barrier to what can be described as the "double disease of liberal democracies" (DDD) through the creation of "hybrid models" of participatory institutions which could involve a tight dialogue between delegated decision-making and direct participation of citizens in the framing of government acts. PB is analysed not only as a central *tool* of new experiments seeking to successfully renovate public policies at a local level, but also as a *perspective* from which it is possible to understand some features and challenges of a needed major "shift" in facing the convergent crises that affect several countries.

Seen not as a "model", but rather as an "ideoscape" (using an Appadurai definition), Participatory Budgeting is red as a political and contextualisable "set of principles" which travels globally through cross-pollination networks, but only exists through local appropriation, especially in urban areas. The essay describes "pure models" and some "hybrids" that merged the most common principles of Latin American PBs together with features which are typical of "deliberative democracy" experiments, as the Chinese example of Zeguo. Beyond the multiple and differentiated direct effects on investments, Participatory Budgeting is valorised for its pedagogic added value on citizens' civic engagement and maturation, its capacity to strengthen and spread a "pedagogy of solidarity", and for the complementary integration with the benefits of other participatory programmes, often interrelated with it. Specific references are done to concrete examples where PB contributed to guarantee a better level of sustainability to local public policies.

In the end of the article, the author underlines some examples (in Spain, Italy, France, Congo, India or Brazil) which are showing the challenges of "scaling up" of Participatory Budgeting to higher institutional levels than the municipal ones,

also fighting against the fragility and volatility that have – up to now – affected several experimentations around the world.

Security
– a permanent challenge for cities

by Franz Vanderschueren

This article highlights the historical links between the challenges of urban security and the evolution of urbanization since the industrialization at the beginning of XIX century until today. It shows the successive crisis of the policies of security in different urban changing contexts.

The uprising of metropolis at the beginning of the XX century put in evidence the lack of the criminal justice system and introduced the need for social and community prevention. But it is mainly during the sixties, with the consumer society and the exponential growth of crime within almost all countries, that the urban security policies were affected by important changes. The causes of this crisis are socioeconomic but also urban (individual rather than public means of transport, double-income families and the predominance of the nuclear family, separation of working places from homes and leisure spaces, badly-equipped poor districts). However the urban causes are not linked to the size of the cities but to their management capacity.

The crisis became deeper with the globalization. It is characterized by a more diversified criminality, the globalization of organized crime, the awareness of the social relevance of domestic violence, the growth of cyber crime, new types of violence (school and urban violence). This crisis generates some responses such as the multiple and heterogeneous police reforms, justice reform and the timid search for an alternative justice, the implementation of situational prevention, the growing of the private security systems and mainly the partnership between civil society and local authorities.

This present crisis happens in a new urban context with the urban sprawl, the increase of new third world metropolis, the protected gated communities, the extension of semi public areas, the decline of public spaces and the fragmentation of cities

Therefore the issue of security, as shown by numerous promising practices, has to be considered within the framework of urban governance which request the complementarities of prevention and control and which is based on the need of security networks.

Urban Environment in the Context of Development: The Case of Southeast Asia

by Adrian Atkinson

In various times and places in history cities have been planned and built in ways that eliminated the kinds of problems we see in the burgeoning cities of the South today. In the Occident, deteriorating conditions in the growing industrial cities in the 19th Century were confronted by social movements that forced changes in political decision-making that brought adequate resources to bear to solve most of the environmental problems that were then being experienced. The present liberal sensibilities that are influencing those responsible for planning and management of cities in the South are, however, poorly oriented to dealing with the environmental problems that are arising.

Today, in the global South, urbanisation is rapid with inadequate attention or resources being directed to combating deteriorating urban environments. On the one hand the influence of the northern environmental movements is not directed towards urban issues because these are seen as largely solved in the North. Furthermore, development agencies have hitherto focused little attention or available resources to solve urban environmental problems.

Typically, southern cities suffer from inadequate and insanitary water supply, poor sanitation, frequent flooding and poor solid waste management, all of which contribute to poor health conditions particularly amongst low-income groups. Escalating traffic problems combine in some cities with industrial emissions resulting in air pollution that also affects local health conditions negatively.

The paper looks in some detail at the current efforts to ameliorate urban environmental problems in cities of two Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia and Vietnam. Here one can see some attempts to improve matters in a situation where, however, urban growth is outrunning human and financial capacities to create healthy and environmentally pleasant cities. There is also some political resistance to accepting low but adequate standards due to unrealistic hopes that in the near future the resources will be available for the expensive solutions that have been applied in Singapore and cities in the North which, however, have far more resources they can devote to solving urban environmental problems.

Finally, almost no attention is yet being paid to looming longer-term sustainability problems. Particularly, many of the major cities in Southeast Asia that are already chronically flood-prone will not be able to withstand the impacts of sea level rise as a result of global warming. Furthermore, rising energy prices to be expected in the coming decades due to depletion of resources are likely to create

havoc in the local economies and may well jeopardise the viability of these cities at a quite fundamental level.

Democratic Decentralisation at the Crossroads.
A Case Study of India

by Isabelle Milbert

Decentralisation policies, implemented at the heart of state structure, have been unanimously praised for 30 years. They are meant to be able to bring democracy and participation at the local level, thus enabling a new approach of citizenship and public life in urban centres. The history of the implementation of decentralization policies shows that the decision makers (cooperation agencies, States, funding authorities) have anticipated that the transfer of functions and funds to the local level and training of municipal staff would result in a local government more accountable to the people.

The Indian example illustrates particularly well the Central government's goodwill and the positive impact of decentralisation on democracy. Citizens' participation has found new avenues for development. However, a number of prerequisites could not be achieved: the strengthening of mayors' status, functional clarity, the transfer of essential functions and funding and staff training have not reached a sufficient level of achievement. Often there is dissatisfaction about the very uneven and usually poor performance of urban local bodies in the main fields of urban management, such as town-planning, habitat, environment, fight against poverty, heritage conservation in particular. In many cases, citizens associations and private structures have come to position themselves as the representatives of a local efficient management, in opposition to the municipal methods of management.

Possibilities, challenges, and lessons from the urban reform process in Brazil
Edesio Fernandes

This article describes the main aspects of the process of urban reform in Brazil. Following a brief account of the historical context, the article will discuss the new legal-urban order that has been created in Brazil since the promulgation of the 1988 Federal Constitution; special emphasis will be placed on the provisions of the internationally acclaimed 2001 City Statute. The article will then describe the new institutional apparatus that resulted from the creation of the Ministry of Cities and the National Council of Cities in 2003, as well as discussing some of the main problems affecting these new institutions since their creation. As a conclusion, it will be argued that, while significant progress has already been made towards the realization of the urban reform agenda in Brazil, the socioeconomic, political, institutional and legal disputes over the control of the land development processes have increased. The renewal of social mobilisation at all governmental levels is crucial for the consolidation, and expansion, of this new inclusive and participatory legal-urban order.

Above all, the Brazilian experience clearly shows that urban reform requires a precise, and often elusive, combination of renewed social mobilisation, legal reform, and institutional change. This is a long, open-ended process, the political quality of which resides ultimately in the Brazilian society's capacity to effectively assert its legal right to be present and actively participate in the decision-making process. The rules of the game of urban development and management have already been significantly altered ; what remains to be seen is whether or not the newly created legal and political spaces will be used at all governmental levels in such a way as to advance the urban reform agenda in the country. There is still a long way to go in Brazil, and many are the serious obstacles to be overcome.

Planetary urbanisation
with or without cities
by Thierry Paquot

Through the analysis of the different kinds of global urbanisation and the examination of the connected challenges, the author describes three phases in the history of cities. In sum, the first phase is the creation of cities sustained by agricultural surplus. The second phase corresponds to the globalisation of capitalism and of trade cities connected to the transcontinental network. The third one begins with industrialisation and supports the expansion of the modern world, which bears witness to the process of urbanisation across continents – primarily in industrial countries and then in the third world, with or without industrialisation.

Although our planet is now fully urbanised, the shape this takes varies widely. One may categorise five main forms of human establishments: the slum, the megacity, the global city, the gated community and the medium or intermediate city. Clearly, these five forms of urbanisation are not mutually exclusive and easily hybridize themselves, and become inextricably linked. They translate the *urban issue*, one of the four issues that world inhabitants have to solve at the onset of the twenty-first century. The other three are the *social issue,* the *communicational issue* and the *environmental issue*. These four issues have cumulated each other and are so inextricably linked that it is increasingly unfeasible to address them separately. The author concludes suggesting some paths to an ecological urbanisation because earth is home to humans and all forms of life.

CITIES INTO THE FUTURE

FOREWORD

by German Solinís
and Françoise Lieberherr-Gardiol

> "Contemplating these essential landscapes, Kublai reflected on the invisible order that sustains cities, on the rules that decreed how they rise, take shape and prosper, adapting themselves to the seasons, and then how they sadden and fall in ruins.
>
> At times he thought he was on the verge of discovering a coherent, harmonious system underlying the infinite deformities and discords"
>
> Italo Calvino, *Invisible Cities*.

TOC

By transforming spaces and societies, expanding cities are restructuring territories and their inhabitants as well as institutions and the actors who govern them. Assimilated into modernity and progress in the wake of war, urbanization followed the path towards economic development. At the end of the twentieth century, globalization, through the introduction of a new structure of the world, increased social transformations and conferred to cities new roles while creating new dynamics around the questions of security, governance and environment. And in the twenty-first century, still in the era of globalization, transformations in the world geopolitical context has led to emerging relations and influence of power characterized by non western values in certain Southern countries.

In the accelerated urbanization that the contemporary world is facing, this collective book [1] is looking for a better understanding of the recent evolution of cities over the past forty years. It was born out of a reflection on the dynamics characterizing territories, institutions and actors at various scales. It is also the result of the awareness that urbanization is a major and irreversible change that not only modifies deeply societies, their values, their way of life, making cities as economic, social and cultural engines but also represents dangerous sources of collective threats in the field of environment, health, instability and exclusion.

The first reflections explored led us to a book structured in three chronological parts. The first part, historical perspectives, tackles urban evolution through international cooperation and social movements. The second part questions about regulations in the context of globalization, from governance, through participatory democracy to sustainable development, while the third section presents responses to urban challenges produced by three of the most important countries in our current global structure: Brazil, China and India. The conclusion provides us a reflection on the major challenges of the future. In its global scope, the book turns towards the vision of a multipolar world not Western-centered.

The authors of this book have highlighted three aspects: the urbanization phenomenon as a historical process and therefore as a demonstration of ongoing social transformation; the approaches of various urban areas and thirdly, concrete practices in various geopolitical and socio-cultural contexts.

Despite the complexity of the urban issue today, the book's structure holds a single objective: better understand and consider the transformation operating in cities through a multidisciplinary vision combining analytical, conceptual and critical points of views. With an international frame of experiences, the various contributions try to seize how strategies of intervention interact with institutions at different levels -international, national and local-, which answers urban problems find, how local actors participate in the formation of the city.

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[1]   Joint study led principally by Françoise Lieberherr-Gardiol.

The originality of this book lies in a methodological process that combines a global approach of the urban questions and the multidisciplinary approaches of eleven internationally renowned authors in the field of urban studies from various perspectives of the academic world, international organizations and civil society. The articles of this book bring a theoretical contribution as well as case studies in majority of Southern cities, which increasing importance is proved by demographic perspectives that evaluate that nine urban dwellers out of ten will live in the South in 2025.

This book is not a simple collection of contributions concerning a common theme, but results from a double approach: on the one hand the collective construction of a problematic and of its issues, and on the other hand the individual reflection of the authors of the different articles who have developed their contributions from their respective fields of research. If the distribution of articles in three parts aims at clarifying the perception of the theme of cities, the authors in their respective articles make reference to historical and conceptual references that impose on us a transversal interpretation of the urban issues in this presentation.

Historical perspectives

In the recent history, decolonization has introduced deep transformations on institutional issues and on the way actors interact in the international, national or local areas by modifying the power struggle, and cities in their increased dynamic have found new challenges and threats. Therefore, in the past forty years, by creating a framework of reference, international cooperation has launched urban operations over the world. This book sets some fundamental questions: How, in the course of these processes, has international cooperation tackled and defined the urban issues, bringing consequently its own contribution to the general debate ? How has international cooperation tried to define norms in a broad sense of political trends for town planning ? And finally, how have these norms been conveyed in policies, producing implementation practices within a widened network of actors ?

Cooperation is thus understood in a broad sense, not only in its multilateral or bilateral scope, but also as a process undertaken by private interventions which may include decision-makers, development agencies, experts and consultants, universities, researchers and think-tanks, businesses, local communities and citizens, etc. This is therefore about the creation and evolution of a space for exchange linking knowledge, policies, instruments and actors in their action on urban area.

Urban policies are the catalyzing centre of this space for discussion and they must be based on public interest. For, as Gustave Massiah expounds in his chapter "an urban policy is a way of implementing, in a given situation, the strategy of social transformation conceptualized into a development model". For his part, Adrian Atkinson insists in his text on the "*quality of political decision-making and adequate knowledge all the way from decision-makers and government staff down to the ordinary citizen, whose everyday practice contributes to the problems*". The forms and dispositions of urban policies have changed over the past forty years: "*From 1976 to 1986, master planning disappeared progressively from the priorities of developing countries... Between 1982 and 1986, a new concept of urban management emerged. The idea was to replace long-term physical planning, with daily action-oriented urban management... urban plans were designed by bureaucrats and experts, generally ignoring political and social dynamics of the city*", as Daniel Biau explains in his chapter.

Nevertheless, the authors do not dwell on issues connected solely with urban growth and the appropriateness of its organization. The new urbanization processes also bring into play important issues of a qualitative nature. If urbanization has been brought into the development sphere, this is precisely because it is basically a phenomenon of a social, cultural and political nature that it involves having a development model at its root. In this respect, Gustave Massiah reminds us that to each development model there is a corresponding urban model and to each development policy there is a corresponding urban policy. Adrian Atkinson and Françoise Lieberherr-Gardiol also underline the fact that the notion of development, as an expression of modernity, has been imposed by the North on the South with neoliberal dominating values.

In addition, urban policies depend on the articulation of the levels and scales between the local, national and global. At the local level, the links between the population, the territory and economic activities are concretizing with a social and environmental responsibility of the entire local community in a democratic contract. The national level creates the legitimacy of the regulations for wealth distribution, social justice and international relations in an interstate global order, whereas in the global arena challenges are setting up regarding the environmental urgency and democratic demand of the geopolitical system.

At these various levels of decision and intervention many actors are interacting, decision-makers, public institutions, private companies or citizens. Therefore social movements highlight the roles and responsibilities of the different actors that are in direct leverage with the urban life and urban production. If in the 1970s new ideas were developed on the right to housing, the imbalances created by structural adjustments programs are accompanied by a rise in inequality, exclusion and poverty since the 1980s. Land occupations and hunger riots illustrate the resistances. Municipalities assert their autonomy and the inhabitants get organized to demand rights for the city by creating solidarity and citizen associations, in a context of crisis. Therefore social movements that are holders of social transformations, which fight for the homeless and land security, for the migrants and the landless, against the expulsions and unemployment in Europe and North America, in Latin America and Asia, are currently being developed as reported by Gustave Massiah. Local policies play an important part of experimentation and social alternatives between the constraints of the economic markets and citizen's demand to ensure the common good and the general interest. Places like the World Social Forum (WSF) or the Local Governments Forum (UCLG) born along with the 21st Century reassert the importance of towns on the world stage and contribute to the renewal of a democratic transition through approaches with different origins such as the Agenda 21, participatory budgeting, urban consultations or local communities' networks.

We should not forget that urbanization is above all a historical process (described by German Solinís and Thierry Paquot), linked moreover to social transformations, in spite of the too important consideration of its political and economic dimensions. Urbanization of the twenty-first century corresponds to a breach in its evolution. The new

nature of its current phase, strongly influenced by globalization, is one of the major issues that must be resolved, understood and taken into account in urban policies and the mechanisms of future international cooperation. Getting to grips with the future of the urban issues is doubtless the main challenge for specialist research, and for town and country planning.

Globalization and new features of urbanization

From the "urban issue" of the past century (G. Solinis and T. Paquot), specific features of urban reality have increased significantly due to globalization. On the first hand **migrations,** either economic, environmental or due to war, demand new answers for host countries and re-settling in a time-frame shortened by increased mobility. They modify relations that populations have with their regions and set new questions regarding wealth distribution and the rights of migrants (G. Massiah). **Decentralization,** linked to the importance that local level has acquired, appears as the second feature in today's urban society. This is significant not only because of its dialectic relations with globalization but also because of its implications in the development of citizenship and the exercise of democracy (F. Lieberherr-Gardiol, G. Massiah and I. Milbert). Finally, questions regarding **security** reveal one of the perverse effects of social organization's problems nowadays where delinquency should be tackled by policies of social cohesion and better governance. Insecurity, which is linked to fear and violence, can appear as a symptom of the urban divide where vulnerable and poor populations are the most threatened. (F. Vanderschueren).

Pursuing the analyses, the articles in this book also present other characteristics of urban processes that appear as necessary strategic conditions to be taken into account for an urbanization of quality. The first of these conditions is of a paradigmatic nature. Thus, three authors give us their comprehensive, promising, critical views on **sustainable urbanization** linked to environmental sustainability as a new paradigm integrating three dimensions of urban development: economic, social and environmental (A. Atkinson, G. Allegretti, E. Fernándes).

The second principle is normative as the result of a fight that has been led for years for the recognition of a new human right, **"the right to the city".** It was made official in the 1996 Istanbul Declaration, on the one hand inspired by the demands of citizens focused mainly at the time on the "right to housing" and, on the other hand by Henri Lefebvre's broader analysis on urban spaces in 1968 in the circle of influence of social movements at that time. In general, the term refers to a holistic view of social, economic, political and cultural equality which would ensure social inclusiveness (G. Allegretti).

The third condition is based on the essential values of modern democracy and touches on the broad, ambiguous field of **democratic governance.** Characterized by a multisectoral and common vision of the city, such a democratic governance engages in a public-private-citizen partnership involving negotiated rules and shared responsibilities. The participation of inhabitants as citizens in decision-making, thus intersects participatory democracy and its urban mechanisms, principally the famous "participatory budget". Urban agglomerations may renew a genuine political contract between representatives and citizens regarding the value of public interest and the sharing of local resources. (F. Lieberherr-Gardiol, G. Allegretti and D. Westendorff).

Together with democratic ideals, with a view to accomplishing an urbanization of quality, **social equity of the territory** seems to be last principle. While accepting that the urban divide is a new characteristic of urban space today, the alternative is territorial affirmative action combating the inequalities of current development in terms of housing, transport or employment and promoting social inclusion (D. Biau, G. Allegretti, E. Fernándes).

The global urban framework gathers in the South 23 of the 27 megalopolis exceeding ten million inhabitants, and three emerging countries economically and politically dynamic – India, China and Brazil- were undertaking urban projects of global importance at the turn of the century. Throughout their urban policies, each country implements an economic and social transformation strategy shaped by diverse elements of the urban patterns, from the colonial to the world liberal. In a balancing process between North and South, they take part in a new international geopolitical system.

In these three countries that are illustrative of an urban dynamic in the South, the trend of massive urbanization over the past two decades is analyzed by Isabelle Milbert, David Westendorff and Edesio Fernandes under an angle of governance in specific sociopolitical contexts and different institutional frameworks. Without getting into a non relevant comparative analysis considering the distinct approaches, we can identify several global considerations on the side of very deep analysis of each case.

Urban development is always taking place in parallel of a steady economic development, with economic liberalization in India and Brazil and State capitalism in China, and it builds on a recent democratic basis around the end of the 20th century in a political modernization idea, and under a particular form known as "socialist democracy" in China. Urban democracy as such, rises up with its legal frames fifteen years ago, under the frame of the Indian decentralized government, the Chinese harmonious city and the Brazilian right to city. For a similar issue, that is to say the creation of the conditions needed for a livable city for everyone, the three emerging countries are going to call for different approaches and instrumentations.

From the Law of Decentralization (India 1992), the Status of Cities and its Ministry (Brazil 2001) or the 11th Chinese Five-year Plan (2006), local authorities' power and citizen participation are still at the centre of concerns but at various degrees until its most pioneer form in Brazil. In particular, the rights of the poor, minorities, women, migrants, are formally recognized creating the multiplication of social actors in urban management. However, regarding the reforms of this scope that affect thousands of municipalities modifying fundamentally the internal balances of the State as well as mentalities and the culture of citizen responsibility, the rhythm of their implementation are hindered by all the malfunctioning linked to corruption, land speculation, electoral vote-catching, bureaucratic inertia, the rise of inequalities. With a major trend to the urban privatization of spaces, services, investments, these emerging cities in the beginning of the 21st century appear as laboratories of the future urbanization, among the typology of urban forms and their challenges as set by Thierry Paquot.

As a conclusion, this book is meant to be multidimensional in its approaches, references and themes, and transversal in a vision and interpretation of cities throughout the world. The international renow-

ned eleven authors come from different backgrounds –international organizations, civil society, universities- and share in this publication, there experience of researchers, teachers, independent experts, international civil servants and representatives of citizen movements. The diversity of their respective disciplines, political and economic sciences, sociology, and anthropology, urbanism and geography enables to better apprehend urban complexity in its opportunities, threats and challenges. Their contributions have been produced independently of any institutional attachments and prompted solely by their interest and passion for urban questions that commit them, beyond analyses and expertise, in their part of citizen.

The reflections contained in the articles review both North and South and carry us in four continents- Latin America, Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe. Experiences of middle-sized cities or Chinese, Indian or Brazilian metropolis do not target an overall urban situation, but a deep insight of the urban problematic in their various geopolitical and socio-cultural contexts.

In their attempts to conceptualize urban questions differently and to reflect on cities after the post-colonial age in a globalized society that is not exclusively westernized, the authors are really setting themselves in the 21st century and its multipolar world with an assessment of successes, dysfunctions and failures. The place entitled to Southern cities corresponds to the increased urbanization in these countries and a new consideration regarding a trend of dewesternization. The scale of perspectives and ideas and the relevancy of information in this book are a genuine source for searchers, urban planners and decision-makers in the field of urban development and environment.

CITIES INTO THE FUTURE

INTRODUCTION

The Urban, a complex and open figure

by German Solinís

If city refers immediately to a reality that we think to understand well, this word however misleads us by simplifying to the extreme this "urban realm in its relation to the whole social" (Amiot, 1986) on which it draws.

In order to try to go beyond the usual use of the term "city" to refer to the new urban complexity, specialists invoke neologisms such as "Meta-Polis", "meta-city" and use dynamics such as "glocalization" or other terms to mean the new spatial-temporal characteristics of urbanization in the era of globalization. The latter, through the explosion of spatial boundaries, seems paradoxically to abrogate the local when faced with the global and to de-territorialize its living spaces (Appadurai, 2006). Nevertheless, at the opposite end of the spectrum of these considerations, we also find the development of the city as an object of merchandise: "city marketing" or "city branding" have become an obligation nowadays as a tool for promotion and planning.

That is why we are looking for different names for the new forms of urbanization. Thus, some talk of *metapoles* (Archer, 1995), *meta-cities* [2] and others of *novel urban configurations*, *mega-regions* and

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[2]   *Meta* indicating a "displacement".

urban corridors (UN-HABITAT, 2010), or the more traditional talk simply of agglomerations.

> *According to UN-Habitat, it is expected that 7 out of 10 people will be living in urban areas by 2050. Urban dwellers will then likely account for 86 % of the population in the more developed and 67 % in the less developed regions of the word. Even in the less urbanized regions, such as Africa and Asia, the proportion of the urban population is expected to increase to 61.8% and 66.2%, respectively.(2010)*

Despite the exceptions that confirm the rule, and in an apparently inescapable rush towards the urbanistic paroxysm, the world caught in the generality of statistics is now mainly "urban" and urbanization is now global. Clearly, we are now in the "urban civilization" in the sense that Marcel Mauss gives to these phenomena, common to several societies and which stand out from ordinary social phenomena by their extent in space. This urban civilization will not be eternal since social phenomena are also historical processes, doomed to their transformations. On the first level, urbanization is nowadays a commonplace trend carrying us more or less straight. We get used to it by the force of circumstance, we share the effects and recognize the characteristics, we subscribe to its principles and at the same time, we question its substance. Therefore, we make urbanization and consequently, in theory, we can participate in the change.

Urbanization processes, as different they are all over the world, represent initially one of the great social transformation's expressions that we are living at this beginning of the twenty-first century. We shall remind a precision that is usually forgotten: urbanization is both the action to urbanize and the growing concentration of populations in its resulting forms of "cities". It designates nowadays the processes, planned or not, of investments of space through constructions, populations and networks of equipments and it is not and has never been the sum of cities nor the adaptation of the cities of Babylon, Athens or Rome…It no longer shares the same characteristics of the designed urbanization model of the Roman Empire or the Spanish crown which had succeeded in conceiving and implementing it in the "New

World", the Americas that are today together with Western Europe, the most urbanized regions of the world. This is not about the same urbanization than the one that "spacialized" trade relations in the Middle Ages nor the industry of the old ages of Modernity. For the time being, it follows the flow of globalization and we seek to understand its new specificities.

We are therefore faced with a practice whose origins date back to Antiquity, which is renewed in the history and is fuelled by a project of society. First and foremost, urbanization marks out the construction and layout of human settlements, beyond its organization and meaning, and this astonishing daily dynamic is greater than the possible outcomes. A mysterious and fascinating whole, a dimension of our life that shapes our societies and that is produced by them. The vague, all-encompassing term is bracketed with its own supervision discipline, "urbanism" [or urban planning], born out of the demands of the industrial society, its methods, its principles and technical nature, the organization and planning of the constructed. This is the **first stage** of the capture of the urban issue.

However, urbanization knowledge does not come exclusively from "urbanism" and arises sometimes in opposition to some of its models. Beyond the technical, artistic or expert orders (architecture, engineering or "urbanism"), understanding the urban issue [knowledge of urbanization] belongs to an epistemology of diverse disciplinary origins. These disciplines, with their battery of concepts and theories, bring along the **second level** of understanding of the urban fact: geography, anthropology, sociology, political science and economy and indeed, within other epistemologies, philosophy and literature, to name just the most traditional. And finally, urban civilization is interpreted and questioned by the daily social experience, practices and lay knowledge of inhabitants. The **third dimension** to understanding the urban issue is finally the one which is fed by all these principles, learning, experience and knowledge: it is that of politics which in this case call the need for public regulation and can include the practice of social organization and also, but with a great deal of caution, governance.

In their young career, social sciences and humanities questioned urbanization processes since the beginning of last century. They always ask new questions that contribute more and more to understand to understand a very complex phenomenon that starts in the analysis

of links between the organization of territories, the organization and orientation of societies.

Given the fact that it is a social phenomenon, it would appear that urbanization cannot be analysed *per se* precisely because its relations with society, politics, the economy and culture depend on the complexity of the relations among these dimensions and between each dimension with urbanization itself. Social actors, knowledge, power, values, needs and projects mingle in an almost inextricable way that most of the time lead to confusion.

We can easily describe and draw up a list of characteristics common to all the entities of society that are part of our urban civilization, the most important of which being universal. But at a deeper cognitive level and in view of the complexity of the phenomenon, the "substantific marrow" [3] (Rabelais, 1534) of the urban form lies in the dynamic links that it develops in a plural way with its generating structures, such as physical forms, social relations, needs, aspirations and inhabitants' representations, and finally, the meanings and the discourses that give to the urban issue its features of identity.

The analyses of the social and human sciences and the technical or legal studies have followed urbanistic treaties. Urban sociology was made up more from the need to understand a new epistemological field, than by its particular methods or approaches. Geography, anthropology and philosophy in general provide us with the most thorough ideas. But the subject, rich with all the constituent dimensions of time, meaning and functions, and the three levels of understanding already mentioned above, is difficult to grasp in its complexity. Hence the need for a transdisciplinary analysis whose methodology is permanently under construction. Thus, the urban object involves spatial planning, the construction of living spaces and the constitution of human agglomerations; it also includes relations that establish meaning and mechanisms of social reproduction. The whole, being in continuing processes of implied negotiations with society. The "urban question" once set, remains an open question.

We should now tackle the important issue of the city, historically linked to our problem of understanding the urban fact, principally as a

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[3]   "Break the bone and suck out the substantific marrow".

legendary producer of meaning. Thus, the links between the city and urbanization can be compared, from a cognitive point of view, to the links between urbanization and society. However, they are of a different nature.

The city, as an ideal place of dialectical tensions between social life and its forms, is now being largely overtaken by the urban issue. It provides, regarding the latter, a limited representation in its objective characteristics and at the same time a symbolic and ideal reference, allowing it, in the best scenarios, to project a Utopian horizon of hope. However, neither the urban fact nor the city, despite appearances and discursive shifts, can establish a causal determination with social relations. In other words, the most common trend currently consists in linking social phenomena with the urban issue in a mechanistic manner, imposing relations of dependence between the former and the latter, as a naturally established link.

Consequently, the city is directly discernable but difficult to comprehend. There are two main reasons for its ambiguity: in today's reality, it is imprecise in its specificities more than before, and in its physical, legal and functional limitations. In the world of ideas, it is precisely what one might consider as an archetype.

The etymological roots of the word "city" are various. In French, it is closed to the Latin *villa* (country house) which in the fifth century meant "a group of houses built against the villa" [4]. In English and Spanish, the word "city" comes from *civitas*, which includes the quality, the condition and status of citizen as well as the community to which he belongs, or even, a politically organized population within a broader structure, commonly the State. Connected to city, *Urbs* is also a Latin word which refers to "the city of all cities", in other words, Ancient Rome. To finish with Latin roots that are constitutive of our conception and issue, *Urbanitas* is the quality of what is from the city: urbanity and courteousness. Therefore, the city has connotations of excellence that becomes a qualification taken to the extreme, when one is dealing with current urban sprawl and its unsatisfactory structured and ordered territories, giving greater importance to the values it represents while distancing itself from the underlying and real facts.

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[4]   National Centre for Textual and Lexical Resources, CNRS, France.

The ideal city also takes on an aesthetic nature insofar as it constitutes an abstraction of space and of its projections towards a history that links it directly with the will-be society with the project, or with a society in crisis with utopia. The physical city is built on foundations of ideas, discussions, designs and on archetypes belonging to founding civilizations (Jerusalem, Babylon, Athens, Rome, etc.), with a direct connection to the model that societies would like to have. The city has thus mostly become the mythical illustration of the place that founds history and territorial laws, while promoting democracy, peaceful cohabitation and social cohesion through the sacralisation of places, streets and maps, that is to say, in the processes of reciprocal adjustments between *Urbs* and *Civitas* constitutive of "urbanity". The city- discourse and design- is thus the symbol *ex ante* of the urban reality.

Indeed, we try to give meaning to the elements surrounding us and escaping us. There is no exception with the city. By analogy we attach a mythical model to each of its current or potential functions. Thus Rome appears as a universal reference of all human agglomeration. But the city can also become an ideal society or in progress, strong of the symbols of certain treaties that created our fundamental references on the political life as The Republic of Platoon, on the paradise as The City of God of St Augustine, or on the dissenting and creative dismissal of what goes wrong in the society like the Amaurote of More. In other words idea preexists to reality and attempts to coincide with the real facts to comply with a sort of "urban paradigm."

In the same way, the current dynamic of urbanization that differs deeply from the under-lying idea of the ideal city seems to take its own remote paths of the original trends by obeying to other rules and logics. The human contemporary agglomerations, without abandoning the principle of coincidence with images of the city and without the possibility to answer favorably to these norms, tend to be seen only in an automatic relation between the serious urban contemporary challenges and an ideal city that became out of necessity, pure ideological discourse.

The last characteristic of this "urban paradigm" is the adjectivation of its name. When we place against "urban" to a noun, it becomes an adjective and tries to bring an explanation, but it qualifies without

producing knowledge. Thus, the paradigm would intend to be self-sufficient in order to understand the phenomena.

In fact, the social phenomena such as poverty or security can take place in territories and urban areas, but the respective territories do not reveal the phenomena. Thus, for example, the expressions "urban violence" or "urban poverty" could lead to the understanding that violence and poverty are characteristic and consubstantial features of the urban issue, a field within which the two phenomena would take place naturally and exclusively. In other words, living spaces do not product social links, but coproduce them dependently from the issues at stake. However, the assumption of causal determination between each other seems to be today one of the driving forces of urbanism and one of the major obstacles in the comprehension of urban dynamics.

For these reasons, the contemporary comprehension of the urban issue can be enriched by the analysis of the ideal city that a society is granting itself, insofar as it could consider it as a kind of ideal model to be reached, but it might not be enough. Indeed, the relation between the qualitative idea of the city and the fact produced by urban processes belongs to the discourse and not to the epistemology. Firstly, we have a problem to access knowledge by the excessive use of the metonymy towards ideology that moves it away from the scientific conscience that we could develop on the urban fact. Then, our second problem lies in the separation between words and reality. The ideal city has only a few empirical accesses in the characteristics of the new urban fact. It is one of the major problems of social transformations underway: we are in the presence of new phenomena that we keep trying to understand with the old categories, overwhelmed by the events.

In the case of city, the first referent of the urban areas is traditionally "the agglomeration, lying upon a continuum of built-up areas" (Moriconi-Ébrard 1993). The United Nations had defined agglomerations as a *continuity of built-up areas in which none are separated from the closest by more than 200 meters in Europe…(1978)* [5] and the urban population is referring to the human inhabitants living within

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[5]   O.N.U., Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division *World Urbanization Prospects*, Glossary : http://esa.un.org/unup/.

the contours of a contiguous territory. [6] Therefore the continuity, the proximity of constructions and the definition of a form limited by its contours are characteristics of the city. In this regard, the difficulty we have to face is due to the urban dissemination, technically known as « *Urban Sprawl* », that seems to be today one urbanization's specificities.

Indeed, the first reason of this « universal » dissemination is the technical order. With the last material possibilities of exchanges and the development of the globalization's "mobile societies" networks, space and time are extending in the virtual opening-up, and agglomerations are becoming open territorial extensions, crossed by traffic lanes and communication networks that expand their influence as far as possible. The second reason comes within the social dimension, which in urbanization tends to impregnate the entire society, in its living conditions and its mindsets, beyond populations exclusively urban or rural. Therefore the dichotomy between the countryside and the city, territorial indicators thanks to which we were used to localize ourselves before globalization, is becoming inaccurate.

In the other hand, the complexity of the urban fact lies also in the fact that it is about an epistemic object that requests an analytical work, a technical and economic object that requests an operational work and a public object that requests a political work. These three dimensions of the urban issue –analytical, operational and political- enable us to have another approach to our theme through the development of closer interconnections between knowledge and policies, social and human sciences knowledge shedding light on urban issues that in the practice are treated and regulated by public policies. Regarding the aspects of equipment and planning of urban areas that represent the operational dimension, they try to give satisfaction to the needs of the improvement of living conditions of the built environment and make of the urban issue a development issue.

In this context, besides the major themes of land tenure, property holding or basic services of infrastructure for dwelling, there is an increased interest for social and political questions, such as citizenship,

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[6]   Urban population: Refers to the de facto population contained within the contours of a contiguous territory inhabited at urban density levels without regard to administrative boundaries.

social inclusion, democratic rights and the fight against poverty, as well as the quality of living condition of the built frame. Thus the urban issue is a wide field that affects, in different ways and for different reasons, the large spectrum of social actors: inhabitants, technicians, experts, designers, regulators, politicians, investors, researchers and academics. In other words it is about the social dimension of territorial policies. Consequently urbanization has to integrate appropriate directions and regulations in space and territory planning policies that have the ambition to ensure the coherence *vis-à-vis* a society project as well as its actors.

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CITIES INTO THE FUTURE

Part I

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

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Part I.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

I

The UN and the Urban Agenda, a journey from Vancouver to Nairobi, Istanbul and Medellin

by Daniel Biau

The urban agenda is probably too broad to be an international priority. This explains why during the last three decades, the United Nations system has tried to give it some focus and to link it to clearer or simpler priorities such as sustainable development, democratic governance or poverty eradication. This has not worked very well in terms of resource mobilization and overall visibility. But it has allowed better understanding of the on-going urban transition, to identify and highlight local policy options and to advise a number of governments on the best ways and means to develop and implement housing and urban strategies.

Contrary to a prevalent view, the urbanization process of the developing world has been less chaotic than expected by the media. Many countries are managing their urban development relatively well, particularly in Asia, the Arab States and Latin America. Ideas and good practices have been shared, adapted and successfully applied in a number of emerging economies. Of course many other countries, par-

ticularly the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), are lagging behind and are unable to address the slum crisis. But the urbanization of our planet should not be seen as an outright disaster. It has both positive and negative features. The United Nations has always stressed the negative to raise awareness while not placing enough emphasis on the positive role of cities, including their impact on rural development.

This article seeks to redress this imbalance. It describes the major milestones of the international urban debate over the last 36 years, from the viewpoint of a UN manager and expert who has been personally involved in many stages of this journey.

1. Vancouver 1976 –
the birth of the urban question

At the opening of the first World Conference on human settlements in June 1976 Kurt Waldheim, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, stated that "one third or more of the entire urban population of the developing world lives in slums and squatter settlements". The Secretary-General of the Conference, Enrique Peñalosa, responded that "the paramount question was whether urban growth would continue to be a spontaneous chaotic process or be planned to meet the needs of the community" (see United Nations, 1976). Similar statements have been repeatedly made since 1976 at many international meetings.

The outcome documents of the Vancouver Conference include a Declaration of Principles, the Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements, as well as recommendations for national action and international cooperation. When revisiting such documents one wavers between two feelings – it seems on one hand that everything had already been said in 1976, while on the other, some recommendations look obsolete in substance or style.

The Vancouver Declaration starts with a preamble stating that "unacceptable human settlements circumstances are likely to be aggravated by inequitable economic growth and uncontrolled urbaniza-

tion, unless positive and concrete action is taken at national and international levels". The first action is to "adopt bold, meaningful and effective human settlement policies and spatial planning strategies (...) considering human settlements as an instrument and object of development". Among the general Principles, the Conference advocates improving the quality of life through more equitable distribution of development benefits, planning and regulating land use, protecting the environment, integrating women and youth, rehabilitating people displaced by natural and man-made catastrophes. Nothing outdated here. In the Guidelines for action, various elements of a human settlements policy are defined. Focus is placed on harmonious integration, reduction of disparities between rural and urban areas, orderly urbanisation, progressive minimum standards and community participation. The Declaration states that "adequate shelter and services are a basic human right" and that "governments should assist local authorities to participate to a greater extent in national development" – still very current concerns. The Declaration strongly emphasizes that "the use and tenure of land should be subject to public control", an idea which lost its attractiveness in the 1990s. The Declaration concludes with a call on the international community to support national efforts.

Twenty years later, the Istanbul Declaration of June 1996 put more emphasis on the role of cities in social and economic development but noted the continuing deterioration of shelter conditions. It adopted the principles of partnership and participation and agreed to promote decentralization through democratic local authorities. It also insisted on the need for healthy living environments. Land use was no longer a priority, while housing and municipal finance were still buried under the agreed need to mobilise financial resources.

The Vancouver Action Plan

The substantive outcome of the first Habitat Conference is a series of 64 recommendations for National Action. These recommendations are organized in six sections. Sections A (Settlements policies and strategies) and E (Public Participation) have become almost self-evident. While the proposed policies devote exaggerated importance to population distribution, public participation could be seen as the cradle of the future good governance paradigm of the 1990s. Section F

(Institutions and management) is certainly the weakest. It implicitly recommends the creation of Human Settlements Ministries and of specialised financial institutions. This occurred in many countries, with disappointing results. It also called for enabling legislation, but not yet public-private partnerships.

The real substance of the Vancouver Action Plan lies in sections B (Settlement Planning), C (Shelter, infrastructure and services) and D (land). In section B one finds a mix of the old fashioned top-down spatial planning and of visionary forward-looking statements. All kinds of planning is advocated, from national to neighbourhood levels, even for rural, temporary and "mobile" settlements! But the improvement of existing settlements is not forgotten. Special attention "should be paid to undertaking major clearance operations only when conservation and rehabilitation are not feasible and relocation measures are made". The word "slums" does not appear, but the idea of participatory slum upgrading is there. The next recommendation on urban expansion calls for legislation and institutions to manage land acquisition and development, for securing fiscal and financial resources, and integrated development of basic services. Reconstruction after disasters is also emphasized as both a challenge and an opportunity "to reconcile the meeting of immediate needs with the achievement of long-term goals". But the question "who are or should be the planners" is not addressed. Partnerships are not yet on the agenda, and the link to implementation and management is missing. Section C carries 18 recommendations representing the core of the Action Plan. While some financial recommendations are outdated, recommendations on the construction industry and the informal sector are still very valid. Among the identified priority areas: "ensuring security of land tenure for unplanned settlements, and providing sites and services specifically for construction by the informal sector". Excellent recommendations are also made on National Housing Policies (provide serviced land on a partial or total subsidized basis, make rental alternatives available, promote aided self-help) and Infrastructure Policies (use pricing policies for improving equity in access, minimize adverse environmental impact, give priority to safe water supply and waste disposal, favour mass transportation and energy efficiency).

Section D on land starts by stating that "private land ownership contributes to social injustice", and that "public control of land use is

therefore indispensable". It advocates a very pro-active land policy based on zoning, land reserves, compensated expropriation, redistributive property taxes, the recapturing of excessive land profits resulting from public investment, and public ownership wherever appropriate. It also encourages the establishment of comprehensive land information systems.

In fact, sections C and D could be positively compared with the strategies recommended in the Habitat Agenda, adopted in Istanbul in June 1996, to provide adequate shelter for all (see United Nations, 1996). Governments moved from the Keynesian consensus of 1976 to the market-driven paradigms of 1996 ("enabling markets to work"). And they have now moved from the Cold War era and the New International Economic Order to a globalizing world with more opportunities and risks. It is a world in which national action is more constrained than it was in 1976. This evolution had a direct impact on human settlements policies, strategies and practices around the world. The outcome documents of Vancouver 1976, however, remain valid in many strategic areas. Some recommendations have become irrelevant due to broader changes in the world and a number of issues were not addressed because they were not yet visible on the human settlements screen. But we should remember the historical pendulum: what seems obsolete now may come back, in a different way, as a basis for future innovations.

2. Sustainable urbanization, a response to economic and social development challenges

Despite hundreds of international gatherings, the debate on the role of urbanization in development has never reached the global political level. In fact world leaders have never expressed any specific views on that matter. UN-Habitat clearly established the strong and positive correlation between urbanisation and economic and social development: the poorest countries are generally the least urbanised, the richest usually the most urbanised. There are very few exceptions to this universal rule. Aware of this correlation, why are governments and a number of international agencies trying to reduce rural-to-urban

migrations? Why are journalists, NGOs and charity groups so concerned at the growth of urban populations in Africa and Asia? Why are cities still seen as a danger or an obstacle to human development? Why are the pre-industrial views of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on rural harmony prevalent in so many development forums which deal with Sub-Saharan Africa? Of course, we know. Urban development has been rather spontaneous during the last 40 years, and many developing cities suffer from unemployment, environmental degradation, lack of basic services, social exclusion, crime and the proliferation of slums. Therefore urbanisation has a bad image because all these problems seem to result automatically from rapid urban growth. Combating urban growth would then alleviate the problems: this appears to make sense. But it is wrong.

Managing urbanization better

The solution lies rather in better urban policies, better urban governance, and better integration of new populations in the urban economy. A good urban policy can be designed, implemented and made effective in any city, irrespective of its size and rate of growth, provided sufficient political, managerial and technical capacities are available. There are indeed many cases of well-managed mega-cities and poorly managed small towns around the world. There are also some cases of urban growth without economic development, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. The real challenge is to combine local capacity-building and urban policy reforms in order to guide and efficiently manage the urbanisation process and to turn urban risks into urban opportunities. Examples of cities which have been able to address this challenge successfully abound in countries as different as China, Thailand, Egypt, Tunisia, South Africa, Colombia or Brazil. On the other hand, very few developing countries have been able to reduce rural-urban migration through deliberate policies. This is understandable as people migrate to cities in search of better employment opportunities and they often find those opportunities by creating their own jobs. These jobs may be insecure, informal and exploitative, but they are more attractive than the prospect of fighting for survival on a minuscule piece of land in overcrowded rural areas. Bad luck for J.J. Rousseau. The romantic village under the palm-trees on the bend of the

river belongs either to the colonial ideology or to the leaflets of international tour operators. It is an appealing but obsolete myth.

What has to be done is to help Least Urbanized Countries of Africa and Asia manage their on-going and unstoppable urbanization processes and make full use of cities as engines of development. Many years have been lost because of the anti-urban bias of both governments trying to favour their rural constituencies and international agencies trying to keep people in the countryside in the hope of achieving food security. The international community should move from myth to reality and give due priority to the urbanisation requirements of poor countries. This is the best way to increase their chances of meeting the Millennium Development Goals and to break the vicious circle of low urbanisation - low economic development. Providing more resources to support sustainable urbanisation in developing countries will have a positive impact on rural development. Well-functioning cities - with adequate infrastructure and dynamic land markets – can easily absorb excess rural population. Because of the highest productivity of urban labour, they can support the expansion of national infrastructure through fiscal redistribution. And larger cities provide larger markets for agricultural products. Improving agricultural productivity and promoting sustainable urbanization are in fact the two sides of the same coin, the two legs of sustainable development. Rapid urbanisation can be managed for the benefit of both the rural and urban poor, it can bring about the much needed increase in human development. Political will and progressive strategies can make a difference and open a virtuous circle towards sustainable development.

In that perspective, the World Development Report 2009 (see World Bank, 2009) recommended to encourage spatially unbalanced growth and to reduce disparities through economic integration. Basically it recognized that slowing down urbanization constitutes an ineffective policy response and that agglomeration economies and labour mobility should be promoted. For once, this argument came from beyond the narrow circle of urban specialists.

3. UMP (1986-2005),
a major research-action effort

The Urban Management Programme was initiated in 1986 by the World Bank and UN-Habitat, 10 years after the first Habitat conference, and a decade before the Istanbul Summit. Its launch marked an important step in the evolution of international thinking on urban development. In 1976, at Vancouver, the world had discovered the problems of rapid urbanization in the South, as well as the serious limitations of urban planning. The international community had also discovered the first urban projects, sites and services and settlements upgrading schemes. This project-approach, based on the implementation of well-defined physical projects, prevailed from 1976 to 1986, while master planning disappeared progressively from the priorities of developing countries.

Between 1982 and 1986, a new concept of urban management emerged. The idea was to replace long-term physical planning, which had no real impact on city development, with daily action-oriented urban management, integrating both physical and financial parameters. The other goal was to insert discrete projects within a framework of overall city management. However, the approach remained sectoral, and UMP-Phase 1 addressed three areas, revealing a technical understanding of urban challenges – finance, land and infrastructure – as key components of the urban development process. In addition, UMP-Phase 1 tried to influence central governments more than local authorities. Urban management was replacing master planning, but municipal development was not yet on the agenda. One of the discoveries of this first phase was precisely to highlight the potential role of local governments in urban management.

Introducing urban governance

The second phase of UMP went further, by directly supporting decentralization processes in various developing countries. The UMP-thematic focus evolved in parallel, as Phase 2 incorporated two multisectoral objectives of urban policy: environmental management and poverty reduction. These two objectives became also top priorities of multilateral and bilateral support agencies, as well as of the Habitat Agenda. From the thematic point of view, UMP Phase 2 combined the sectoral approach of the 1980s with the integrated approach of the 1990s. This transition led to a structuring of Phase 3 around three objectives: protecting the environment, reducing poverty and improving governance, which are all multisectoral. The importance given to urban governance reflected a major step towards a better understanding of urban problems and also offered a direction for their resolution. The concept of good or sound governance – defined as a system of government that is participatory, transparent, equitable and effective – refers to the political dimension of urban management. Good governance requires the combination of urban management and local democracy. It emerged in the early 1990s as the new paradigm in the urban development arena. This is where the world stood in 1996. From planning to management, from management to governance, from central government to local authorities, from technocracy to partnerships, from large infrastructure to sustainable development, UMP was at the heart of the debate on urban development during the 1986-1996 decade.

City consultations

During its third phase (1997-2001), the UMP tried to build adequate regional capacities to implement these new policies in developing cities. Having established four regional offices, the UMP developed an institutional anchoring strategy through which it built the capacities of a number of national and regional institutes which became centres of excellence in urban management. This was a difficult process as it was going against the well-established approach whereby expertise comes systematically from the North. In fact this exercise had to be extended into a fourth and last phase (2002-2005). A most interesting

dimension of the 1996-2006 decade was the promotion of city consultations as a means to translate good urban governance into reality. Invented by the UMP and its twin sister, the Sustainable Cities Programme, city consultations are a practical way to involve stakeholders in urban planning and management, i.e. to define common priorities, agree on responsibilities and initiate concrete actions. More than 100 cities adopted this approach which has become an international standard.

While city consultations are essential at the planning stage, they have to be complemented by follow-up mechanisms at the implementation stage. This may have been the weakness of UMP, connected to the persistent weakness of municipal finance systems in many countries. The programme has identified some promising options such as city community challenge funds and participatory budgeting, but a lot remains to be done in this area. In fact this crucial issue of urban finance remains a stumbling block that the World Bank has not been able to fix in spite of billions of US dollars of capital assistance. An important result of the UMP is to have introduced urban poverty and urban governance into the mainstream of UN-Habitat activities. And the UMP has worked closely with UN-Habitat Regional Offices to promote City Development Strategies (CDS) and set up Regional networks of urban specialists. The UMP has essentially been a useful think-tank involving a broad network of experts. It has renewed urban planning approaches and built new capacities in the developing world. Part of its heritage has been incorporated in the Cities Alliance.

4. Urban planning revisited

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As urban management emerged as a priority, conventional urban planning or master planning almost passed away in the mid 1980s, particularly in developing countries. Many reasons explain this sudden "death":

- In terms of process, urban plans were designed by bureaucrats and experts, generally ignoring political and social dynamics of

the city. City planning was a top-down technocratic exercise, not too different from economic planning.

- In terms of product, urban plans were essentially spatial zoning and land-use maps, not associated with investment planning and resource mobilisation.

- In terms of implementation, urban planning was generally blind on institutional issues such as the relationship between sectoral ministries, and between central and local governments. It did not associate long-term goals with daily city management constraints and short-term priorities.

- In terms of strategy, urban planning tried to go around the need for policy and legal reforms, and often unquestioningly accepted existing situations. Consequently, it failed to address the root-causes of many urban problems. As a result of these limitations, most Master Plans were simply not implemented. Many still lie in the archive unit of Urban Development Ministries and Town Planning Departments.

The international debt crisis of the early 1980s dealt a fatal blow to traditional urban planning as structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) were imposed in many developing countries. Under SAPs, governments had to slash social spending, including on basic services in order to repay their debt. Urban planning became irrelevant as there was nothing left to plan.

The revival of city planning

Planning came back through the environmental window in conjunction with the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. UN-Habitat was one of the agencies that re-appraised urban planning and subsequently introduced participatory planning and management as an element of good urban governance. At the Istanbul City Summit, while urban planning did not figure as a key issue in its own right, it was in fact subsumed under the broader urban governance framework which emerged as the main outcome of the debates. This new planning was expected to meet the following criteria:

- In terms of process, urban plans should be prepared in a democratic way, involving civil society organizations and all concerned stakeholders. Experts should mainly play a facilitating role.

- In terms of product, strategic plans or City Development Strategies should replace master plans. The focus should be on a shared vision for the city (linking social development, economic productivity and environmental protection) and on multi-partner action plans to translate this vision into reality by addressing priority issues.

- In terms of implementation, local authorities should be in the driving seat as the level of government closest to the citizens. Powers and resources should be decentralised and local capacities strengthened. Planning and urban management should be closely integrated.

- In terms of strategy, planning should be considered as a tool, its effectiveness dependent directly on the quality of the urban governance system. Good governance and appropriate urban policy should almost automatically lead to good planning. Several UN-Habitat programmes and projects have demonstrated that this new type of city planning is feasible provided it is focused, locally-owned and politically supported. However it seems too early to claim that urban planning is back on the global development scene. In fact the 2009 Global Report on Human Settlements has once again revisited this issue.

Can urban planning become affordable for all?

The new planning approach promoted by international organisations and already adopted by several developed countries, is a complex process requiring a lot of discussions, commitment and continuity in leadership, and adequate capacities at different levels. This process is hardly affordable by least developed countries which lack institutional capacities, financial resources and often clear policies. The challenge, therefore, is to identify and promote a minimalist approach to urban planning. This approach would generally respect the above-mentioned criteria while simultaneously focusing on very few top

priorities considered as essential for guiding urban development. This concept could be called "affordable participatory planning". By definition, the minimalist planning approach should not be comprehensive but selective:

- The process should mobilise civil society and political organizations in the definition of the vision ("the city we want") and priority areas ("hotspots") through popular consultations;

- In terms of product, it should prioritise infrastructure development with emphasis (especially in LDCs) on primary road and water networks and on pricing and municipal finance;

- Implementation should include a strong component on institutional strengthening, particularly at the local level;

- The strategy should preferably be associated with a review and reform of urban governance legislation, rules and practices.

Of course minimal planning requires maximum political commitment to ensure impact and sustainability. With such commitment, urban planning can certainly become affordable and useful. But planners should also accept to play a more modest and more targeted role in the management of urban affairs. International agencies have adopted a low profile on that delicate topic that UN-Habitat is now trying to bring back on the agenda.

*5. Rediscovering slums
in the new millennium*

Slums came back on the international scene with the creation by UN-Habitat and the World Bank of the Cities Alliance in 1999 and the adoption of the Millennium Declaration in the year 2000. The Cities Alliance was designed to support the preparation of city development strategies (CDS) and slum upgrading projects, and to encourage donor coordination at city level. According to official data slums represent

almost one third of the world urban population. This ratio is going down very slowly in spite of all political declarations and official commitments, and slum upgrading is rarely part of national policies. The first question is: Why do slums exist? Are they a planning mistake? Do they simply reflect the inefficiency or malfunctioning of land markets?

The answer is simple: slums are the best way found by many countries to provide cheap housing for the urban poor. And cheap housing means a cheap labour force, low-income workers. Slums are the physical expression and condition of urban poverty: in many countries they are necessary to ensure profitable economic growth!

Before being a problem, slums are therefore a solution at a particular stage of economic development. They were a solution in Victorian London as they are a solution in Mumbai today. Slums are not a market failure, they are a market success. This is the first thing we should know about slums: they are economically useful, sometimes extremely useful, because they offer low-cost housing options to the poor.

Overcrowding patterns

But all informal settlements are not equally squalid. From Latin America to Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa to the Indian subcontinent, slums are very different, particularly in terms of overcrowding. Some slums are built on public land, some on private land, some are squatter settlements, and others provide rental housing options. Some areas are extremely dense (3 people or more sharing a small bedroom and more than 1,000 persons per ha). For instance in South Asia, 150 million people live in overcrowded units. In West Africa on the other hand, most slums have relatively low densities (less than 500 persons per ha).

The degree of shelter deprivation is directly correlated to the degree of urban inequities. Thus the worst slums are found in the most inequitable cities. These are cities where the poor pay more than the rich to access land and urban services, the cities where land is monopolized by the upper classes, the cities that are physically divided into poor areas and gated communities.

The existence of slums is always a reflection of urban poverty but the intensity of shelter deprivation is usually a reflection of urban inequity. For example, Nairobi is richer than Kinshasa but more than 50 percent of its population lives in slums - the same percentage as in Kinshasa. And the slums of Nairobi offer much worse living conditions than those of Kinshasa, because Nairobi is more inequitable than the Congolese capital. Therefore Nairobi slum dwellers are squeezed into only 5 percent of the total city area. The largest slum, Kibera occupies less than 1 percent of the city area and regroups 20 percent of the city population Its density reaches 3,000 persons per ha.

This is the second thing we should know about slums: they are a manifestation of social injustice, a reflection of a social divide which excludes the poor from the benefits of urban life.

Survival strategies

But the urban poor are not only victims, they are also actors. In fact slums and informal settlements demonstrate everyday how the urban poor fight for survival, how they innovate, how they find resources and energy, how they create their own employment opportunities and transform their environment.

In some cities they form community groups to defend their interests. Slum-dwellers may be the most dynamic "entrepreneurs" of our time – the main "Private Sector" actors. Good at survival strategies, slum people rarely reach the accumulation and development stage. They need support, or at least they need to be left alone, away from public harassment.

Slum life shows that the concentration of people in cities is in itself a positive development factor, simply because concentration means more exchange, more markets, more opportunities, and more risks. This is the third thing we should know about slums: they are a manifestation of human resilience, a reflection of social dynamics, of fantastic human energy. Sometimes they are places of solidarity, often they are places of urban violence, always they are places of urban life, of multiple struggles for survival and for human dignity.

Policy principles

From these three things, we can derive a few basic principles for the reduction of urban poverty. Firstly, the absolute necessity to adopt a holistic approach to address urban development challenges. This means bringing together policy makers from economy and finance ministries with housing and local government departments, to ensure that the key contribution of urbanisation to economic development is well understood, that resources are properly mobilized and allocated, that employment policies are associated to slum upgrading policies. In a word this means advocacy campaigns to strengthen or create enough political will at all levels.

A lot remains to be done. Only a few governments have adopted a comprehensive slum upgrading strategy, national targets are rarely established and the Millennium Development Goals are usually ignored by national and local politicians. In the meantime the UN tries to popularize success stories demonstrating that good policies bring economic and social advantages.

The second principle is to ensure better access of the urban poor to land, housing, credit and basic services. This means identifying urban inequities in these areas and correcting them. The poor should pay less, not more, than the wealthy for the comparative benefits of urban life. Inequity should be replaced by solidarity, the divided city by the inclusive city. Of course political will is required but technical solutions are available, they have been tested, they work.

The third principle – participatory and transparent governance – is the means to deliver on any dimension of urban development, on the three components of sustainable development (economic, social and ecological). Efficiency in municipal finance (resource mobilization and allocation) constitutes one of the best indicators of good urban governance. Since the Istanbul City Summit of 1996 this third principle is widely accepted in the international arena. But it needs to be implemented more systematically at country level.

Indeed a number of governments have adopted reasonable and effective urban policies in the last 10 years. We can mention Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, Morocco, Thailand and China. Many of them have

focused on slum clearance and re-development rather than incremental upgrading.

In the meantime the Cities Alliance did not succeed in increasing international assistance to urban development and slum improvement. As middle-income countries can largely work on their own, the urban crisis is now concentrating on Least Developed Countries which are urbanizing rapidly without sufficient institutional resources. The Cities Alliance is expected to focus on these poor countries.

6. Focus on Water and Sanitation

According to the 2006 Human Development Report (see UNDP, 2006) the world faces a water crisis rooted in inequality and flawed water management policies. More than 1 billion people are denied the right to clean water and 2.6 billion lack access to adequate sanitation. Every year, according to the World Health Organization, 1.8 million children die as a result of diarrhoea caused by contaminated water and poor sanitation. All experts agree that access to water can make or break human development and international institutions invest billions in this sector. While the human right to water and sanitation remains to be recognized in many countries, water debates have gained momentum in international arenas since the adoption of the Millennium Declaration in September 2000. These debates are both consensual (everybody agrees on the magnitude of the water crisis) and controversial (options and solutions are deliberately politicized). Among many topics under discussion, the basic principles and directions to be adopted by national policy-makers in the definition of water management strategies come on top of the agenda. In this area, two inter-related debates have been going on for more than 10 years. The first one is about privatization of service provision, the second one about the price of water for the consumers. But the most difficult challenge is to provide sanitation for all.

Regulating public-private partnerships

In 2002 at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, several NGOs criticized a general move towards the privatization of water provision, particularly in developing countries. Some argued that water being a human right should be provided free of charge to low-income groups. Private companies responded that natural water was free but that the service had to be paid. The discussion on privatization has become highly ideological and seems to repeat itself in hundreds of articles, workshops and conferences.

Most independent specialists nonetheless agree on a number of key points:

- what really matters is the regulatory framework under which the service provider operates, i.e. the conditions negotiated between the local authority and the provider in terms of quality, quantity, spatial coverage, prices, network expansion, etc.;

- there are examples of both efficient and inefficient public utilities as there are examples of both accountable and irresponsible private utilities;

- separating the client/regulator from the service provider is recommended to avoid conflict of interest and to ensure control and transparency;

- public-private partnerships based on public ownership of the network and private management of water distribution, under clear arrangements and rules, have been tested successfully in many different contexts;

- full privatization (as in the U.K. since 1989) is rare and not advisable because water is a common good requiring large scale investment and public scrutiny;

- except in a few documented cases (Buenos Aires, Cochabamba, Manila) "concessions" have worked in several countries as a good format for public-private partnership. In this model private providers (domestic or foreign) manage the network (under a

long-term contract) and are responsible for investment and risk. In some cases, public investment is also mobilized;

- water demand management, i.e. water saving, is as important as water production as in many countries between 25 and 50 percent of the drinking water is unaccounted for (lost or wasted).

It is clear that water provision is a profitable business at many levels, from the multinational company to the street vendor. Water being essential for life, everybody is ready to pay for it. Most consumers don't care about the status of their service provider: they want good quality and sufficient quantity at reasonable prices. In fact this can be achieved in any city of the world provided the following (internationally agreed) principles are respected:

- transparent participatory and effective governance;
- regulated partnerships between local authorities and service providers;
- environmental sustainability;
- affordable prices and sustainable financing.

Interestingly, there is no correlation between geographic areas facing water stress and proportion of people facing inadequate water supply. For instance in tropical Indonesia (where fresh water is abundant) many people don't have access to safe drinking water. Water scarcity for livelihoods is truly a man-made phenomenon.

Making water accessible

The real challenge is not to privatize water supply but to make clean water physically accessible and financially affordable to the poor. In the vast majority of developing countries, this is not the case. In fact the poor generally pay more (up to 20 times more) than the wealthy for the same quantity of water because of wrong governmental policies and misdirected public investment. It should be the opposite: pricing policies and targeted subsidies can and should make wa-

ter available and affordable to all. And water should be accessible: in African cities, women without piped water at home frequently spend more than one hour daily to collect drinking water.

The experience of several South African cities demonstrates that "lifeline tariffs" can be adopted and benefit the poor. Such tariffs provide the first 25 litres (per person per day) free, then the price per litre increases with the quantity consumed (this is called block tariff). Of course this approach assumes that the poor are connected and metered. When they are not, public standpipes have to be subsidized and properly managed. This applies to most slum areas of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, where individual water connections remain unaffordable and where the poor often spend more than 10 per cent of their income on water.

To keep the prices affordable to the poor, public money (fiscal transfers) should be used to extend water networks in informal areas and cross-subsidies through progressive pricing, reflecting social solidarity, should be systematically put in place. These two principles are essential to ensure that the human right to drinking water is enforced.

In many developing cities, poor people live with less than 10 litres a day of unsafe water. In Europe the average consumption is around 200 litres a person a day. In the USA it is about 500 litres, with peaks of 1000 litres in the Southern states. According to the Worldwatch Institute, American gardens, lawns and golf courses require 45 billion litres per day, more than the total human consumption of the entire African continent. These disparities are striking. They confirm that providing 20 litres a day of clean water to each human being constitutes a very feasible target.

While it is fair to recognize that some progress has been made in a number of countries during the last 20 years, a lot remains to be done to ensure universal access to water.

Sanitation: an impossible challenge?

Much more difficult than water supply (in terms of both technical responses and cost-recovery) is the provision of adequate sanitation in overcrowded settlements. This can be done only within the broader

framework of city-wide upgrading and inclusive urban development strategies. Many obstacles can make this task a "mission impossible".

Half of the developing world's population does not have access to basic toilets. More than 80 percent of the population of African cities lacks toilets that are connected to sewers. In Nairobi for instance, hundreds of thousands of people defecate into plastic bags that they throw away every morning. This is known as the "flying toilet" phenomenon.

Water is life, sanitation is dignity. Lack of sanitation is humiliating, particularly for women and girls. Unfortunately sanitation lags far behind water in public provision. Partly because sewerage networks are too expensive, sanitation is often left to individual initiatives. Pit latrines and septic tanks may be adequate in rural areas but they are difficult to implement in dense shanty towns. Public toilet blocks, as those adopted in some Indian cities, offer a good alternative but maintenance needs to be ensured.

Public subsidies are usually indispensable, and they should be targeted to the poorest sections of society. This requires a political will which is clearly lacking in many developing countries. Because the sanitation deficit remains a kind of social taboo, because its impact is not immediately visible, election campaigns rarely focus on "sanitation for all". Inauguration of toilet blocks is less attractive to politicians than the opening of airports, highways or shopping centres. This is what UNDP calls "the national policy barrier". On the other hand many NGOs and Community-based Organizations (CBOs) are promoting and implementing sanitation programmes at the grassroots level. One of the best uses of international funds would be to support these programmes, particularly when they are community-driven, large-scale and well coordinated with local authorities.

It is estimated that universal access to water and sanitation would require an additional $20 billion per year while the overall cost of current inadequate supply amounts to more than $100 billion in social expenditures and economic losses. There is therefore a strong case for investing more in the water sector. Both UN-Habitat, the World Bank and regional development banks are very active in this sector.

The benefits of improved access to water and sanitation cannot be questioned. In spite of heated discussions, the technical, financial and

institutional options are known and the solutions are within reach. Fundamentally there is only one serious debate: Do we want to reduce poverty and inequality? Do we want to promote and support human development? "We" here means political leaders and activists, opinion makers, intellectual and moral authorities, all over the world. They should be aware that: "Water is life, sanitation is dignity, and inaction is crime."

7. Territorial affirmative action
– the need for political will

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Affirmative action policies have been implemented in many countries – particularly India, the United States and South Africa – to redress historical racial and sexual discrimination. Less known is the need for territorial affirmative action to redress spatial inequalities, be they between regions or provinces or between neighbourhoods in a particular city. Affirmative action is required to promote a more equitable and more balanced development through taxation, tariffs, subsidies, and pro-poor investments. Territorial affirmative action can address simultaneously spatial and social inequalities. It should be a major element of sustainable urbanization policies and a political instrument to bring disadvantaged groups and areas into the mainstream of economic and social development. In the planning and management of human settlements, several types of affirmative action can be identified. At least five of these have been tested and applied successfully in different countries.

Investment incentives

Regional planning policies often have a limited impact on the ground because of their weak relations with private investment strategies. In many developed countries, financial incentives are the main means of attracting investors to disadvantaged geographical regions. In the case of France, these incentives amount to approximately euros 10,000 per job created in specifically designated areas (which host one third of the national population). They represent a huge budgetary

effort that has helped revitalize a number of medium-sized cities, resulting in a better-balanced urban network covering the whole country.

Public infrastructure priorities

A very direct way to address spatial inequalities is to spend more public money in the development and expansion of infrastructure and services in low income or disfavoured areas. Slum upgrading is a case in point; likewise the rehabilitation of dilapidated housing estates in the transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The challenge for decision-makers is to devote proportionally more public resources per capita to disadvantaged areas than to the rest of the city. Political will is therefore essential.

Pricing of water services

Affordability of water services for the urban poor constitutes a serious problem in most developing countries. Low-income households generally pay more for their water than high-income households because many water utilities are poorly managed. Affirmative action measures in this field are usually tariff related, aiming at keeping water bills low for those who consume little. "Block tariff" structures provide a free or very low-priced first block of water to individual households and then reflect the transition in prices from basic to discretionary water uses in subsequent blocks. This approach has been adopted in South Africa, based on a lifeline supply of 25 litres per person per day at very low price and cross- subsidization of small consumers by large consumers. Several African countries do the same, implementing de facto the human right of access to drinking water. This principle could also be applied to electricity and other marketable services.

Progressive property taxation

A progressive tax imposes a higher percentage rate of taxation on those with more expensive land and property. In many countries proportional taxes are however the norm and this does not allow property taxes to be used as a redistributive fiscal tool. As land taxes are generally a major source of revenue for local governments, regularly updated valuation of properties and efficient tax collection should be a priority of public authorities all over the world. On the other hand progressive land taxation (with rates varying for instance from zero on small plots to 1 percent of the value on very large plots) could go a long way in redressing social and spatial inequalities – if this revenue is adequately used for infrastructure development.

Intergovernmental transfers

Another important source of municipal revenue is the transfer of funds from national and provincial spheres of government to local governments. The provincial and national authorities can thus contribute to the reduction of inequalities among towns and cities. However, this geographical redistribution of national income (sometimes known as financial equalization) should also encourage local initiatives and dynamism. It cannot simply be based on needs. A delicate balance between two goals (reducing inequalities and encouraging local dynamics) needs to be found: affirmative action is about positive discrimination, not about aligning the most advanced areas on the lowest standards.

Political challenge

This review of various lines of intervention shows that territorial affirmative action is necessary and already applied in several parts of the world. It is an essential means of combating unequal development. It addresses the needs of disadvantaged social groups and geographical areas, and promotes justice and social inclusion. Affirmative action always requires political courage because policy-makers have to convince those better off to share part of their wealth (through taxation and differential pricing) to redress historically and geographically

unbalanced development that is very similar to racial and sexual discrimination. Therefore the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) in building the necessary political will cannot be over-emphasized. CSOs should appreciate that the full realization of the rights to adequate housing and city life depends on resolute affirmative actions in all countries, rich and poor.

8. The recognition of Local Authorities

The 1996 City Summit included the first World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities. It gave a strong impetus to the collaboration of the UN with local authorities, both at the normative policy level and at the operational level. Governments recognised local authorities as their closest partners in the implementation of the Habitat Agenda and committed themselves to decentralizing responsibilities and resources to the local level. The role and influence of international associations of local authorities vis-à-vis the United Nations system have increased ever since, particularly with the establishment of the UN Advisory Committee of Local Authorities (UNACLA) in 2000 and the creation of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) in 2004. At the same time, many programmes and initiatives of UN-Habitat have deliberately targeted local authorities and their needs for capacity-building. Hundreds of local authorities have benefited concretely from this collaboration on issues such as urban management, environmental sustainability, city planning, infrastructure management and slum upgrading.

Partnerships at global level

Most global programmes of UN-Habitat have involved local authorities associations in their governance structure. The Urban Management Programme, for example, has worked closely with regional and sub-regional associations in Latin America. The Cities Alliance benefits from the presence of representatives of UCLG and Metropolis in its Consultative Group and Executive Board. In each case, the perspectives and expectations of local authorities have proven very useful

to guide UN-Habitat and its international partners, such as the World Bank and UNDP, in their programming and evaluation activities at the global and regional levels.

UN-city partnerships

UN-Habitat is the UN agency for local authorities. The greater part of UN-Habitat managed resources is spent in developing countries to address the needs of local authorities, in terms of capacity-building, urban policy reform, environmental planning and monitoring, as well as concrete housing and slum upgrading programmes. Since its creation in 1978, UN-Habitat has supported hundreds of cities in improving their living environment. These range from the poorest towns in Least Developed Countries to the wealthy cities of the Middle East. UN-Habitat has, for instance, cooperated for many years with the small towns in Burkina Faso and with Dubai Municipality, bringing about crucial changes in municipal management and planning. This work has contributed to a complete renewal of urban planning approaches, with a move from top-down spatial planning to multi-stakeholders action planning based on city consultations and debates.

UN-Habitat has also played a major role in post-conflict urban rehabilitation, including through the re-establishment and training of local authorities in countries such as Somalia, Serbia, Iraq or Afghanistan. This intimate knowledge of the capacities and needs of local authorities around the world constitutes a solid reference basis and also a testing ground for UN-Habitat's normative work and policy guidelines. Indeed, this cooperation with local authorities works both ways as many cities support UN-Habitat activities, either through city-to-city cooperation or through direct contributions. In this latter category, mention should be made of Fukuoka and Rio de Janeiro which host and support financially the regional offices of UN-Habitat for Asia and Latin America respectively. Several Chinese cities have also hosted and financed international conferences such as Nanjing which hosted the fourth session of the World Urban Forum in November 2008. The cooperation between local authorities and UN-Habitat benefits from the political (and often financial) support from many national governments which are increasingly aware that efficient local authorities are essential for the improvement of housing conditions

and the sustainable development of cities and other human settlements.

From a European charter to international guidelines on decentralization and basic services.

In June 1996, at the Partner Committee of Habitat II, local authorities made the case for the preparation of a worldwide charter on local autonomy. It was suggested that the experience gained in the implementation of the European Charter of Local Self-Government could be used as a basis for developing a global charter that would set out the key principles underlying a sound constitutional or legal framework for a democratic local government system. An expert group meeting was held in April 1998 to prepare a first draft of the world charter, which was thereafter submitted to consultations in all regions of the world in 1999-2000. The draft charter was then revised and submitted to the UN Commission on Human Settlements in February 2001. However, the Commission could not reach a consensus on the proposed charter because some governments felt that it could contradict their constitutions and that therefore they would prefer a less binding declaration of principles.

The Special Session of the General Assembly (Istanbul +5) of June 2001 welcomed "the efforts made by many developing countries in effecting decentralisation in the management of cities" (United Nations, 2001). But the General Assembly did not discuss specific guidelines. In April 2002 the first session of the World Urban Forum recommended the development of constructive guidelines on decentralisation as a substitute for the world charter. The establishment of an Advisory Group of Experts on Decentralisation to support the dialogue process was endorsed by the Governing Council in 2003. This group developed draft guidelines which were finally adopted by the Governing Council in 2007.   Additional guidelines on "access to basic services to all" were also drafted by UN-Habitat during 2005-2009, in collaboration with UCLG and other partners, and formally adopted in April 2009 (UN-Habitat, 2010).

UN-Habitat has always tried to ensure that the voice of local authorities is heard loudly and clearly in international forums, including in the UN intergovernmental machinery. This was the case with the

Istanbul Partner Committee where governments were briefed by Local Authorities and other partners in an official segment of the Habitat II Conference. High-level dialogues were thereafter formally included in the proceedings of UN-Habitat's Governing Council from its 16th session onwards. UN-Habitat also tried to promote the direct participation of local authorities in the work of its Governing Council emphasizing that local authorities and their associations could not be considered NGOs because local authorities have governmental functions. Their associations are therefore more inter-governmental than non-governmental. Another step in the same discussion came after the elevation of UN-Habitat to programme status in the UN system, resulting in the need for drafting new rules of procedure for the Governing Council. These rules, adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2003, include a specific section on the participation of partners to the Governing Council of UN-Habitat. Rule 64 reads as follows:

> "Duly accredited representatives of local authorities, invited by the Executive Director, in consultation with their respective governments, where requested, or representing national or international associations or organizations recognised by the United Nations, may participate, as observers at public meetings, in the deliberations of the Governing Council and its subsidiary organs."

Two comments can be made on this rule. Firstly, governments could have a say on the accreditation of individual local authorities. Secondly, representatives of individual local authorities and of their national and international associations can participate fully in the deliberations of the Governing Council, without their presence and statements being subject to approval by the Council. They cannot vote or discuss administrative issues, but they can contribute to consensus-building in all substantive areas. Provided it is well structured, the voice of local authorities can be taken seriously into account in the sessions of the Governing Council. UCLG is expected to play an active role in organizing its members to ensure an optimal interaction with the UN system and its various programmes, with UN-Habitat as the designated entry point.

9. Cities and Climate Change

During recent years climate change has become a major issue in the media and in international negotiations. Its causes and consequences have been analyzed by an army of scientists. The renewal of the Kyoto Protocol to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases has been under intense discussion and the process was to be completed in December 2009. Unfortunately the Copenhagen Conference was one of the biggest flops of UN history, a failure due not only to the diverging short-term political interests of G20 members but also to a poorly managed consensus-building process. This process has re-started and got some momentum in Durban in December 2011 but the international community remains very far from a new and meaningful agreement.

As more than 60% of all energy consumption and greenhouse gases emissions occur in cities of developed and emerging countries, the interaction between cities and climate change should be brought to the attention of the international community. The reduction of emissions requires four types of actions: increasing urban densities, improving energy efficiency of buildings, promoting mass transport systems and developing clean energy sources. This is well known from all urban planners. The required policy response is also known: strict land, building and transport regulations combined with financial and fiscal incentives. As usual what matters is the political will to adopt and enforce these measures.

In the short-term, cities have to adapt themselves to face the unavoidable impact of climate change, particularly sea-level rise and more frequent floods. New investments in physical infrastructure are needed, particularly in developing countries. The World Bank and UN-Habitat have designed a programme to support the most vulnerable cities and attract financial resources. Because climate change (unlike slums) is recognized as a global issue, this initiative may succeed. However it will have to involve many partners and to be seriously monitored. Once again urbanization will be addressed through the environmental lens rather than the social or economic lenses, but this

is probably the easiest way to build an international consensus. In the meantime the discussion of a new international agreement on climate change will go on, probably for several decades.

10. Other topics on the urban agenda

In 2002, UN-Habitat initiated the World Urban Forum as a major discussion platform for all partners, with a view to assessing the state of urbanization and discussing policy options on the basis of concrete national and local experiences. This biennial event, held in Nairobi (2002), Barcelona (2004), Vancouver (2006), Nanjing (2008), Rio (2010) and Naples (2012), has attracted thousands of academics, experts, activists and policy-makers who all wanted to have a say on our urban future. The 7th session took place in Medellin, Colombia, in April 2014. It constituted the largest UN meeting of the year by the number of participants (20.000).

In addition to the issues mentioned in the previous sections of this article, several other topics of great importance have been discussed. To mention only a few examples : (i) the reconstruction of countries and cities affected by crisis or natural disasters; (ii) the reduction of urban violence or (iii) the need for new urban tools, e.g. for land management or city monitoring. With the recent global financial crisis (which was ignited by the failure of the US mortgage market), the difficult issue of housing finance will certainly be revisited in the near future.

Indeed the Urban Agenda covering by essence a cross-sectoral and multi-disciplinary field, it has to be related to many aspects of the economic, social, environmental, cultural and political life. It has to provide the territorial or spatial dimensions of a number of societal challenges that the UN system tries to bring together at the global level, in an often scattered but consensual manner. This might be the weakness of the urban agenda: because it is too broad it cannot stand on its own and needs to be subsumed under -or associated with- more popular and fashionable topics. But then it loses its explanatory power, its comprehensiveness, its political value. Therefore urban spe-

cialists have no choice but to continue the struggle and frequently restructure this agenda in the most convincing way to reach the leaders of our world.

A new brand of experts is now required to take over from the Vancouver generation, who are progressively leaving the urban development scene, and to find more arguments for promoting the cause of sustainable urbanisation. The forthcoming Habitat III Conference, to be held in 2016, will bring a new generation to the forefront of the urban debates. They will update our common knowledge, produce a renewed Urban Agenda, but should not forget to learn from the past.

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Part I.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

II

Urban policy and the crisis of globalisation

by Gustave Massiah

The globalization crisis puts a new perspective on the issue of urban transformation. [7] After considering some aspects of the connection between globalization and urbanization, we will return to urban policies and urban models before going on to repeat the importance of urban social movements. We will then go into the effects of the crisis on urban policies and end with alternative policy proposals, initially restricted to local policies.

The crisis of neoliberalism puts into perspective recent decades and the close link between globalization and urbanization. Urbanization has changed and can now be seen as a breach in urban development. The evolution of globalization upsets the geopolitical system and calls into question the very nature of States. It alters the links between local, national, regional and global; between rural and urban; and between individual and universal.

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[7]   Thanks go to Françoise Lieberherr, Jean-François Tribillon and Elise Massiah for their editing and suggestions.

1. URBANIZATION
AND GLOBALIZATION

We are living through a new urban revolution. Urbanization is becoming something different. It is no longer an extension into the South of the 19th century urban revolution. It now corresponds more to a breakdown in urban development. [8] This urban revolution is linked to the development of globalization, without at this point going further into the characterization of globalization seen as a contradictory process whose outcome is not predetermined. As pillars of globalization, cities also become changed by it.

The world's population in full transformation

This new stage of urban revolution directly concerns the world's population. Unlike the 19th and 20th century revolutions, notably in Europe and the United States, which are often used as points of reference, this current urban revolution is taking place in the South. From a demographic, structural point of view, the characteristics of this revolution are hardly apparent because we always go by representations – those of the last urban revolution – which are out of date with regard to contemporary reality.

This urbanization means considerable demographic change. After fears of population explosions and figures of around ten billion inhabitants, we have now accepted the model of demographic transition and the hypothesis of a shift in the rate of population growth. But there remain uncertainties with respect to the hard demographic cores in Africa and South Asia. And we do not know what would happen if China and India were to abandon their authoritarian birth control policies.

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[8]   Massiah G. (1990) "L'Aventure de la Ville". Paris : *La Recherche* review.

The most sensitive issue is not that of global demographic evolution but the distribution of the world's population in every country and between countries. The gap is widening between countries with an ageing population and countries with a high birth rate. Migration is the central strategic issue of the future. [9] Since 2007, for the first time in the world's history, more than half the world population live in cities and over the last decade urban areas have grown considerably. By 2030, all regions of the world are expected to have mainly urban populations with demographic growth being mostly in the urban areas of developing countries. Temporary and permanent migration within every country accentuates social imbalances. There are more and more refugees and displaced persons in their own countries as a result of natural disasters, armed conflict, social unrest, and economic and political crises. In many countries, national and regional development is characterized by the distribution of population in the different regions as well as by resettlement concerns. The economic dynamism of large urban centres attracts migrants and medium-sized cities are playing a growing role in migration between cities.

International migration will affect more than 175 million people worldwide in 2000 – that is, one in 35 people – as compared with 79 million in 1960. [10] Three-fifths were in developed regions. International migratory movements have a marked economic, socio-cultural and demographic impact on the departure, transit and arrival areas. The areas migrants leave behind lose qualified manpower and families are split up. The economic effects of migration are two-way. The remittance of migrant workers' wages to developing countries rose to over 88 billion dollars (30 billion dollars more than development aid).

The thinking on national migration policies is totally inadequate in relation to the reality of these migrations. We should bear in mind the warning Alfred Sauvy wrote, a few months before he died, in an article in *Le Monde*: "If the people are in the South and the wealth is in the North, they will go to where that wealth is and nothing will stop them". That was said with regard to economic migration and does not

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[9]   Massiah G. "Migration and Globalization", November 2004. [Liberation : Link.]

[10]   Migration and Urbanization in the report on the state of world population 2004, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). LINK.

take into account the new international migration which is taking place. Thus, ever-increasing migration linked to the changing environment and climate, could in the end affect hundreds of millions of people. Other kinds of migration, which are also increasing, are a result of war and mainly of so-called "low intensity" conflicts.

The migrants issue colours the recognition of rights in the cities. Interregional and global cooperation give rise to two major questions: What is the connection between migration, development and the distribution of wealth among countries ? [11] How should the basic rights of migrants, migrant workers and their families be respected and guaranteed ? [12] The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families is a first step; it has yet to be ratified by any host country. On this issue States have not reached agreement on calling for a United Nations conference.

According to the above-mentioned UNFPA report, the number of city dwellers will rise from 3 billion in 2003 (48% of the global population) to 5 billion in 2030 (60%). Most of this growth in urban areas will be due to the normal birth rate rather than migration. Over this same period, there will be a slight decrease in the rural population, falling from 3.3 to 3.2 billion. The management of demographic growth and the development of infrastructure in sprawling urban areas have created another area of interest: in the next twenty to thirty years, mainly in poor countries, as much infrastructure as already exists in the world, will have to be built. There is the all-important issue of how to finance urbanization and urban organization.

The world's population is growing and at an unprecedented rate. This is the major challenge for the current generation. In the long term, the five dimensions of sustainable development must be taken into account: demographic dynamism, the occupation of new areas, economic transformation and opening up to the rest of the world, ecological constraints, and social and political dynamics. Jean-Marie Cour proposes giving this objective to Public aid to global development and to set up a system of automatic, annual transfers for finan-

[11]   Massiah G. (2008) "Migration and development", Paris : Cedetim.

[12]   Terray E. (2009) "Migration and democracy", *Plein Droit*, No. 88, Paris.

cing the structural investments which are now needed because of the shift in population. [13]

The rift between urbanization and industrialization

Urbanization is characterized by the population explosion of cities and by the number of cities with over one million inhabitants and those with over ten million. Urban policies vary depending on the size and type of city.

The first level of global urban structure groups together the twenty-seven megalopolises with between ten and twenty million inhabitants. In the North there are only four. The twenty-three other cities are in the South. The world's urban population lives for the most part in these megalopolises. They are "City States" whose public function is more important than that of many States, just as their populations and wealth are greater than those of many States. Urban planning and programming are new to these cities, and all the more so since they are now linked by a global urban structure. There are now therefore urban planning outlines on a global scale.

The second level of urban structure is that of the metropolis. It is not the number of inhabitants that matters, since in India or China a city of two million people is not considered to be a large city but an agglomeration of the same size in Europe is considered to be large. Metropolises are linked to the organization of the national region with its important administrative functions. For the metropolis, the question usually posed is about the development of these cities in relation to their periphery. The Forum of local authorities of peripheral areas of cities (FALP), organized by the city of Nanterre, put forward a proposal on urban policies for interdependent and solider metropolises. [14] The third level is that of central or secondary linking cities where space is organized. Although one would no longer qualify them as "rural", this category has become difficult to define. Let us simply say that these cities give structure and dynamism to a whole region.

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[13]   Cour J.P. "Giving new meaning to Public aid to development", Club AMINTER, 14 March 2002. LINK.

[14]   Global Forum of Local Peripheral Authorities (FALP) Network. LINK.

The rift recalls the close link between urbanization and industrialization which characterized the urban industrial revolution of the 19th century. Around the last urban revolution, directly linked to massive industrialization, the world's population and the region/population relation, principally in countries in the North, became organized. Clearly, an industrialization process is under way today in the BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India and China – as well as in around thirty developing countries; nevertheless, this process does not affect the whole population as was the case in the North. The global generalization of the industrial production-oriented model comes up against a double barrier. The first is the world's ecosystem whose fragility has been measured ; particularly in the degradation of the environment of the megalopolises which themselves are sources of environmental pollution. The second barrier is the negative effect on employment brought about by the lightning speed of productivity. There is a marked difference between the informal sector of cities and the general public. The questions in this important report are on the future: employment. It recalls   Henri Lefebvre's most enlightening remark: "space is the projection on the ground of social relations". [15]

The urban revolution was based on the expansion of the wage-earning classes which, initially seen as a social link, later became a social status. The salary, the purchasing power of employment, later spread to the whole of society. The generalization of the wage-earner created a stabilization of the lower social classes. Stabilization came about through employment, notably through the indirect wage, social welfare, education and health. This social organization transferred into the urban organization. Housing policies were directly linked over this period to the generalization of employment. The expansion of industrialization to the South was incomplete and large areas remained outside this development.

The place of each person in the city only partially corresponds to the old social structures. [16] The place in the city and access to housing are closely linked to the type of income rather than the level. A stable salary confers social status and gives access to credit, housing, indivi-

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[15]   Lefebvre H. (1974) *La production de l'espace*, Paris : Anthropos.
[16]   Massiah G. and Tribillon J.F. (1996) Habitat-tiers. Paris : ACT Consultants. LINK.

dual and community consumer patterns and it is the key to integration, whereas the absence of a stable income opens up the process of exclusion in relation to institutionalized society. Without a regular income our societies do not know how to acknowledge the right to security as inscribed in the Declaration of Human Rights, and incorrectly confused with shifting security systems.

Globalization cannot be analysed without considering growing vulnerability, the increase of inequalities, and the widening and deepening of exclusions. Exclusion through poverty linked to inequalities of income; exclusion from work and social status linked to regular employment; exclusion because of the difficulty of access to housing; cultural exclusion from the elite's social reproduction; and mass exclusion in the megalopolises blurs identities. Traditional groups – community, religious, national and social – only partially understand the relationship of the individual to the group.

There needs to be urgent action on the development and improvement of the lives of poor people, many of whom live in shanty towns and marginal urban areas with restricted access to health care and other services. In many regions of the South, HIV and AIDS have added a new element of uncertainty, notably on the pace of urbanization.

A large section of city dwellers in developing countries, sometimes the majority, are excluded from legal access to land and housing. They live in precarious conditions, in districts lacking the normal facilities; these districts are usually designated as "irregular". It is reckoned that irregular housing – varying between regions and countries – constitutes 20% to 80% of urban growth and concerns between 15% and 70% of city dwellers in developing countries, the average being around 40%. [17] It is in the great metropolitan cities that the problems are worst. Access to land, which is in fact another way of saying access to the city, is the most difficult obstacle to overcome in carrying out housing projects.

This situation is the result of marketing public lines of access to land and housing, Poverty, precariousness, lack of facilities and land irregularities have all been reinforced by structural adjustment pro-

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[17]   Durand-Lasserve A. "En finir avec l'insécurité", *Dossier Enjeux fonciers, Vivre autrement* No.10, June 1996 Paris.

grammes. Undertaking regularization operations implies a redefining and clarification of the role of the State and public bodies, and the institutional strengthening of municipalities and basic communities. Experience over the past few years has shown a need to strengthen the role of municipalities, NGOs and grass-roots organizations. The definition of these new roles would also imply recognition and guarantee of the right of association and that inhabitants should be consulted and associated with the facilities and regularization programmes as well as with their management. A condition of this association would be the reduction of government privileges and local wealthy people who only allow poor people to settle in the outskirts of cities, in areas that are devalued and unfit to be lived in.

2. URBAN MODELS
AND URBAN POLICIES

TOC

Urban policies are dependent on specific situations. At certain times they also have general characteristics which cannot be simplified to just one society, but spread out on a scale that Fernand Braudel calls a world-economy and Immanuel Wallerstein calls a world-system. [18] Only on this scale can the general phenomenon of urbanization be understood and a way of thinking about social transformation and development be formed. The models suggest coherence between concepts and values; the policies correspond to the contingent transcription of the models in situations and periods. To each development model there is a corresponding urban model; to each development policy there is a corresponding urban policy. [19]

Urban transformation is one of the forms of social transformation; one of the most important as it integrates the symbolic dimension, not

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[18]   Braudel F. (1979), *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme*, Paris : Armand Colin.
         Wallerstein I. (2006), *Comprendre le monde. Introduction á l'analyse des systèmes-monde*, Paris : La Découverte.

[19]   Massiah G. and Tribillon J.F. (1988), *Villes en Développement*, Paris : La Découverte.

just the economic. A proper city is structured by layers connecting the different urban models that have marked its history. In the 1960s, the most dominant development model in the North was the Fordist model. The dominant development model in the South was that of national independence. The structural adjustment model or global neoliberal model became established in the 1980s.

Each development policy diverts into different fields with its own urban policy. While the urban model is part of the development model, in a dialectic manner, and preserving the autonomy of the urban dimension, urban policy is in general a relatively direct application, in the urban field, of the development policy.

An urban policy is a way of setting up in a particular situation the social transformation strategy conceptualized within a development model. These concepts are not always very clear for technicians and decision-makers; they function like unavoidable facts. Resistance to policies and crises helps clarify the meaning and why certain solutions are proposed rather than others.

In the culture of decision-makers and experts, in order to understand cities and put forward solutions, one finds elements of several urban models from earlier periods. These elements function as points of reference, often implicit in the relation between urbanization, the State and industrialization. The colonial urban model at its different stages (trading post, implantation, commerce), was the founder of towns in the South. The original system remains as does the pre-eminence of occupation rights over inhabitants' user rights. The classic model, with its two component parts – military architecture on the one hand and on the other, princely architecture which is always monumental and sometimes baroque, sets the stage for the reorganization of authorities in the independent cities. The industrial city model, in the form of workers' housing, is that of the new settlements or production enclaves. The Haussman model with its wide boulevards corresponds to the fantasies of the rising classes and also to urban development.

The Fordist model of régulation and the modern movement

Since 1945, the dominant model in the West has been a liberal social model; we shall call it the Fordist model of regulation. The major phenomenon in industrial societies is the expansion of the salaried class. It accounts for the stabilization of a large part of the working classes as well as the rise of the so-called middle classes. The balance between generations is changing with the widespread education of young people and the growing burden of old people. The wage-earner who emerged from 1830 as a social force, from 1920 onwards became a social status of universal aspiration. Modernity places the three states of progress at the forefront: economic, social and political. It makes distinctions between city space, business space and work space, as decreed by Taylor. It is explained by Ford and Keynes, from production to macro-economy; by Wilson and Roosevelt, from liberalism to the New Deal. The welfare state concerns itself with employment and social welfare. Democracy and Human Rights emerge in political representations. Workers' and national liberation movements define another aspect of modernity: a specific link between the social issue and the national.

There is a close connection between the development model and the architectural model. The urban model of the modern movement corresponds to the Fordist model. The modern movement translates in architecture and town planning as the rationality of social transformation. Housing provides the natural complement to the wage-earner, assuring reproduction. Standards of hygiene convey the moralizing notion of social stability. The urban models of Garnier's industrial city and the garden city are a continuation of the earlier period. Fordism displays the organic architecture of F.L. Wright. The International Congresses for Modern Architecture (CIAM) and the Athens Charter gave shape to the modern movement. They set out mixed housing development zones. They gave the bill, the cheap housing and the low-rent housing to the social housing departments and their completed work became the new towns. We should recall that there are three ways of building a town: the new town, through the production of new

housing districts (renovation, restoration, rehabilitation); applying contemporary housing standards to insalubrious housing and demolition of slums; improvement of two-storey housing through municipal action.

Soviet architecture, after attempting to redirect its ideas in the 1920s, falls into this category and pushes the modern movement to its limits.

The national independence development model and the focused space of States

The national independence model falls into the decolonization category; following political liberation, it was a question of building economic liberation. This model was conceived during the liberation struggles; it borrows ideas from both the Fordisr model and the Soviet model, all across the Eastern countries, China and Viet Nam. It became clearer in India and in Africa, and was completed in Latin America through the debates on dependence.

It is based on heavy industry, the basis for independent accumulation, on an agrarian reform which must modernize agriculture starting with industry and be its outlet, on the control and enhanced value of natural resources, on the substitution of imports, on nationalized companies and on the control of external trade. It involves a powerful, uncontested State, guarantor of national unity, supported by well-equipped armies and ever-present police, and founded on the theorization of the single party.

The limits of development policies appeared fairly soon. Construction of the State became an end in itself. A dual explosion, the State takeover and urbanization, provoked a structural imbalance of the basics of the economy (budget, trade balance, balance of payments). The modernization of agriculture excluded the vast majority of the rural poor. State businesses were for the most part ineffective, their working was bureaucratized and they were incapable of reducing commercial and technological dependence in relation to the multinational corporations. Bureaucracy and corruption were like gangrene on so-

ciety. The denial of basic rights and the absence of liberties finished off the work of reducing to nothing the credibility of the regimes.

The post-colonial urban model gave concrete expression to this development model and its by-products. The major facilities of sovereignty took priority (airports, ministries, grand avenues, palaces); the housing policy was that of the middle classes connected with the State (low-rent housing and other property companies); the working classes settled in the gaps in between and on the peripheries in districts that sprang up over night.

At the outset, with regard to the national independence models, the World Bank was rather on the defensive. It accompanied decolonization while reminding States of the foundations of liberalism; the reference is Rostow's take-off theory which reverts to the catching up approach widely shared by all parties. The World Bank defended an international system based on free trade, comparative advantages taking account of the differences of productivity and the costs of manpower. The debate focused on the relation between the market and planning. [20]

The dominant development model was that of the independent nations. There were three successive development policies corresponding to this model: the infrastructures, the basic needs and integrated rural development. The development policies advocated by the World Bank became more defined. They took account of the constraints and contradictions of implementation policies, criticisms and proposals. At the outset, the Bank funded weighty infrastructures and accompanied the construction of States. Later, the Bank fought against the priority for heavy industry and instead proposed the basic needs approach and small businesses, saying "small is beautiful". Then, later on, becoming aware of the rural poor's exasperation at devaluation and the muddle of the new management and credit restrictions, it proposed to the rural poor access to the market and "rural integrated development".

At the outset the urban policies that accompanied these development policies were linked to transport infrastructures (airports, ports,

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[20]   Osmont A. (1995), *La Banque mondiale et les villes:du développement á l'ajustement*, Paris : Khartala.

roads, highways and railways) and to the other main networks (electricity, water, telecommunications), managed by national and concessionary companies. After that, the rural priority began to take second place behind the urban dimension, and urban matters were dealt with by a small department of the directorate of infrastructures of the World Bank.

In some countries, French Cooperation backed a modern procedure for housing production (planning associations, savings banks and social housing bureaux). This formal procedure responded only marginally to the needs; between 80% and 90% of households resorted to public, so-called informal procedures.

The situation deteriorated with the urban explosion and lack of maintenance. Public offices multiplied. Programmes for the rehabilitation of plots of land and "sites and amenities" were notoriously insufficient; distance and increasingly reduced standards made them unsuitable. After the first Habitat-UN Conference on Human Settlements in Vancouver in 1976, new ideas arrived; "housing is your own affair" was John Turner's remark when he advocated self-help, which marked a turning point. [21] The impromptu districts that had sprung up became established; people began to accept the idea of State regularization and to receive interest from the public savings and credit systems. The World Bank finalized the "urban development projects" with several sections: institutional, financial, urban management, infrastructure, restructuring, not to forget the sections for "women" and "environment".

The structural adjustment model and fragmented space

From the 1980s, a neo-liberal phase began. The prevailing model became that of structural adjustment. It advocated adjustment of the economy and of businesses to the world market. It proposed: liberalization, meaning the regulation by markets and the reduction of the role of States in the economy; priority given to exportation and to free markets; priority to international investment and to privatization;

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[21]   Turner J. (1976) *Housing by People*. London, Paris : Le Seuil 1979.

flexibility and pressure on salaries, the reduction of expenditure on welfare, the reduction of expenditure on health and education deemed unproductive; the unrestrained exploitation of resources; and devaluation of currencies.

To construct their structural adjustment development model, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) took their blue-print from Asia, specifically the Republic of Korea. The "developing countries" category was for those institutions a confirmation of these policies. At the outset, these policies were well accepted. The international balance of power altered. The new medicine was applied in the same way to the South and the North, the East had come apart and the Fordist regulation had been damaged by the money markets. Debt made it difficult to finance development.

The "world liberal urban model" gave concrete expression to the neoliberal model. A new city centre began to compete with the earlier city centres, those of the State and the municipality. The new centres were where the multinational corporations had their headquarters, the large hotels and the shopping centres. In many cities in the South, multinational corporations set up their local headquarters in the hotels. These centres are sections of cities directly linked to the rest of the world with their communications systems and consumer habits directly linked to a fraction of the world's bourgeoisie (international civil servants, ambassadors, overseas voluntary workers, consultants and directors of multinational corporations). There are also the jobs linked to tourism and to access to the world market, financial services, prostitution, luxury local crafts, etc. More and more, the large hotels began to resemble fortresses.

Industry began to develop outside the large cities or in the free zones around ports and airports. The districts began to be segregated spatially, socially and ethnically. Since being a wage-earner no longer constituted the usual inter-mixing element, different kinds of cohesion and power formed community identities. People began to group together more according to their region of origin, and as the State was no longer interested, they began to organize themselves according to their own strengths. These districts are separated from each other, situated around high-speed routes and urban motorways. It is difficult to get from one district to the other on foot. The areas around these motorways are wasteland and unsafe. These districts are defined by their

ethnic and social differences: rich "Latino", average "Latino" and average poor "Latino" districts, etc.

The housing issue is crucial. As the wage-earner has no security of employment, access to housing becomes extremely difficult and because there is disengagement on the part of the State, social housing is insufficient to deflate the rise of property prices. For these two reasons, there is a very marked deterioration in the condition of housing. Slums and insalubrious districts are developing. These new urban concentrations of the population are in the most sensitive areas: along urban riverbanks, along the railway lines and motorways, on rubbish dumps – in all the areas that can be occupied and which are generally the most dangerous, making urban ecology tip towards insolvable situations.

The problem of expansion of the overall urban area together with the pressure of land ownership is considerable. On the one hand, there are a number of districts with a high vertical integration and on the other, the suburban and peripheral districts which are horizontal. This brings with it two kinds of problems: those linked with concentration and those linked with dispersion.

Urban policies that accompany structural adjustment continued to launch "urban development projects", highlighting the institutional and interventionist aspects in the so-called "informal" sector. In fact, urban projects appeared like vectors of the social dimension of adjustment. It was a question of intervening in the working-class neighbourhoods and it affected those with the lowest incomes, the "first tenth". New methods were tried out: for example, the *agetip* – public works agency – that enabled small businesses and artisans to work and thus inject income into the districts. The World Bank discovered partnerships and, through various means, tried to associate them with its policy and plans. It also embarked on decentralization and the strengthening of local communities.

The crisis of neoliberalism opens up a new phase

To reduce imbalances, we well realize what the consequences of the proposed solutions would be. But without any other credible options, even leaders of good faith preferred to attribute the responsibility of unpopular action to the IMF rather than take on the task of readjustment which could but be painful. On the other hand, the World Bank and the IMF appeared to be modernists in comparison with the independent bourgeoisie and the traditional, often archaic layers of bureaucracy that ran the States. Often, the most brilliant elements of opposition forced out of their respective countries, have found shelter and been "recycled" in international institutions.

And yet from the outset, resistance showed the limitations of these policies; hunger strikes multiplied. Reports showed the degradation of living conditions of the "fragile layers of society". In fact, growth, which is real in some countries, arrived with a rise in inequality, poverty and exclusion. Corruption became rife. Weakened States brought about an increase in the number of armed conflicts.

To offset these consequences, the World Bank set up a project called "the Social Dimensions of Adjustment". Subsequently, it decided to make the fight against poverty a priority objective. It decided to complete its plan of action by rigorous intervention with regard to "governance", realizing that it is not enough to leave markets to their own devices in order to solve all the problems.

At the end of the 1990s, from 1995 onwards, a new phase began. The development model was debated. The financial crises in Asia, Latin America, Central America and in Russia demonstrated the limitations of regulation by the financial markets. Social conflict against precariousness in Europe, the United States and the Republic of Korea altered the political balance. The convergence of ecology movements, consumers and workers at Seattle marked a stage in the calling into question of the neoliberal direction of globalization. The debate on policies began at the World Bank between ultra-liberals and neo-Keynesians.

The contradictions of neoliberalism extend into urban situations. From 1980 to 2007 there was considerable growth surplus in almost all countries across the globe. Everywhere, that growth surplus meant even more inequality. The redistribution of wealth functioned only from the poor towards the rich. To give an idea of the scale, we should specify that the share of salaries in the distribution of added value rose nine points from 1945 to 1980. Since 1980, the share of profits regained the nine points lost in the preceding phase. [22] These were considerable developments but gains and losses are never homothetic from one category to another: this is an average. Today, the number of poor people is even greater and poverty is worsening. France is two and a half times richer than it was in 1980 and yet there are now more unemployed, more poors, and more homeless people. The poverty issue is always linked to the question of inequality and discrimination; in effect, no one is poor just by accident in our societies. There is more likelihood of being poor, for example, if one is an immigrant, a woman or a young man from a working-class background. It is a key element of cities' structures. Cities become organized according to discrimination. Sonia Fayman translates that with a fearsome formula: "urban segregation, ethnic cleansing". Poverty moves away from city centres and the surrounding areas; poor people seldom leave their distant neighbourhoods and either hide or melt into the crowd when they come into the city.

After the first contradiction concerning inequality and discrimination the second contradiction concerns the ecology issue. Ecological awareness is linked to the major catastrophes of Bhopal, Chernobyl, Seveso, etc. The environment issue holds a central position. The debate is open as to whether one can or if one should expand the industrial model from green industries and the production of environmental technologies or whether one should move on to totally different models and kinds of growth. This debate will have considerable consequences for urban policies.

The third contradiction, an essential one, is the question of war. Between one and two billion people in the world live in regions where there is a classic war going on or a civil war, which engenders serious

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[22]   Attac.(2009) *Sortir de la crise globale*, Jean-Marie Harribey and Dominique Plihon (Eds.) Paris : La Découverte.

consequences. Urban wars have taken on a new form and have completely altered the urban way of thinking. A city is not planned in the same way if the region is at war or at peace.

The fourth contradiction is that of security. [23] Insecurity increases in cities: social insecurity, job insecurity and housing insecurity; ecological insecurity and civil insecurity related to conflicts and violence. The answer to this insecurity has become one of the essential factors of urban management. It takes the form of a securitarian ideology: one can only fight insecurity with repression, as indicated by the worrying invention of "zero tolerance", which mathematically corresponds to a demand for total intolerance. This goes together with the forceful rise of extremely dangerous notions like those that advance the idea that social inequality is linked to genetic inequality or that insecurity begins with incivility – an idea put forward by the Mayor of New York City.

These debates are echoed in the field of urban policy. At Habitat II, which took place in Istanbul, new proposals were put forward. Among some of the ideas being hatched were sustainable development, the right to housing, variety in basic approaches, the financing of urbanization, methods of urban management, the importance of associations and recognition of municipalities as strategic players. The World Bank entered into the debate with the proposal of a new programme, Cities Alliance. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights proposed, with the associations, to help advance international law. There exist new possibilities for the definition of urban policy. To a great extent they depend on the strength of urban social movements.

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[23]   Massiah G. (2005), "*Soulèvement populaire dans les banlieues et idéologie sécuritaire*", Paris : AITEC.
Bertho A. (2009), *Le Temps des émeutes*, paris : Editions Bayard.
Mucchieli L.(2002) *Violences et insécurité, Fantasmes et réalités dans le débat français*, Paris : Editions La Découverte.
Bouamama S. (2009)), *Les classes et quartiers populaires. Paupérisation, ethnicisation, discrimination*. Paris : Le Cygne

3. URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The arena for the actors of urban transformation is being reorganized. Between the State, protested against but always present, and the inhabitants, variously considered depending on the particular issue, as subjects, clients, consumers, users or citizens, others are trying to find the right slot for their input. Municipalities are gaining more autonomy. They link the local with the region; they assert their representativeness as local or nearby institutions. Associations present themselves as being the organized face of civil society; they restate the interests of inhabitants and the demand for their participation in all democratic processes. Businesses insist on being in the public space ; they repeat the importance of production and take over the monopoly of "good governance"; they convey rationality in the management of networks and services; they correspond to several different forms of logic as demonstrated by the new kinds of actors backing social economy.

In order to fight against their situation and improve it, inhabitants become organized and form associations. They become organized to fight (unions, tenant associations, etc.) ; to experiment and react (solidarity, social integration and development associations) ; or to gain power (political parties, citizen associations). This is not a new situation ; neither does it belong only to urban movements.

Urban social movements are growing and changing. They combine claims for rights in the city and rights to the city. All social movements in cities have an urban dimension. The specificity of urban social movements, through demands concerning inhabitants' living conditions, widens out to include the production of cities and access to rights to the city. The analysis of urban social movements is extraordinarily rich. Movements for the right to housing have grown. Nowadays they are linked closely to defending the interests of the homeless and the badly housed as shown by the example of the national inhabitants' movement for housing (MNLN) in Brazil. The Right to Housing Movement (DAL) in France, is building the NO-VOX movement for those who have no voice and no rights, and is broadening the movement to include those with no homeland, the unemployed, migrants,

the caste-less, etc. Sit-in movements have expanded into a widespread regularization process against the exclusion of poor people from city centres. A vast international movement against expulsion is beginning to get under way. The notion of "urban poor" is becoming more radical. The Asian Coalition for Housing Rights, which groups together inhabitants' associations for the right to housing in over twenty Asian countries places this new term at the fore: urban poor.

Struggles for basic security are expanded to include practices for the improvement or construction of housing, urban rehabilitation and planning, and demands for citizenship. Associations in France such as Emmaus, the Federation for inclusion through housing (FAPIL), the Federation of programmes for action against slums (PACT-ARIM) extend their interventions from housing to the districts. Community movements, in a contradictory way, bring new practices of basic reconstruction, savings and credit banks, self-construction and self-promotion, joint management of spaces and local democracy.

Social movements are bearers of new practices. After struggles and negotiations, the inhabitants of some districts manage to impose their basic security and avoid being moved out. Basic security always opens up a new phase in urban improvements within a district, thus giving an important role to associations and to the financing of housing and district planning by inhabitants' methods of self-production. We also see emerging in these new districts new kinds of local democracy which is extended notably by the accession to municipal responsibilities of those who led the struggle.

These movements give rise to intense development. For example, the movement for urban reform brings into play the analogy with the agrarian reform of decolonization. It places at the forefront land ownership, production and employment in the districts, funding, urban management, democracy and citizenship. In some regions, new attempts seek to bring together municipalities, inhabitants' associations and movements, peasant organizations and workers' unions In order to reflect on new kinds of participatory democracy, including institutional democracy. The best known example is the participatory budget invented in Porto Alegre.

Urban social movements are bearers of new projects for social change. They change their style through their participation in the

"another world" movement characterized by the convergence of social and citizens' movements around a common focus, that of access for everyone to basic rights, to peace and to democracy.

The uprising in the French suburbs brought to the fore the importance of urban struggles. Those riots have some of the characteristics of the riots of Los Angeles in the 1980s and Birmingham in the 1990s. They demonstrate the consequences of neoliberal policies with regard to unemployment and poverty, interaction among equals, discrimination and racism. They also reflect the explosion of North-South contradictions in European cities. They underline the rise of securitarian ideologies in response to social and ecological insecurity. They remind us that policies responding to urban riots have constantly had a dual focus: to divide districts by a selective policy of social advancement; and suppressing the spokesman. In the United States, for example, support for the rise of a black bourgeoisie and the liquidation, even physical, of leaders of radical movements were carried out head-on.

Urban social movements are defined in relation to the development of cities which conveys that of society. What is discriminatory is the position in relation to instability, exclusion and inequality; the rejection of social cleansing, ethnic and urban segregation. The challenge is sizeable as is the contradiction. So then we should reject the view that liberalism holds of social matters, punishment and compassion for poor people. Solidarity would be opposed to charity. So as not to be content, realistically, with a little less inequality, a little less exclusion, in order to be able to fight effectively against injustice and exclusion, we must be capable of conceiving of a world without exclusion and cities without segregation.

4. THE CRISIS
AND URBAN POLICIES

Several scenarios presented the hypothesis of an open crisis of globalization. That is where we are at. This is about a structural crisis: economic and social, ecological, geopolitical, political and ideological. The current sequence – financial monetary, property, food, economic crisis – is a description of the situation. [24]

The Braudel analysis of the crisis leads to the hypothesis of the end of a Kondratiev cycle. [25] It is probable that a new cycle will characterize the 25 to 40 next years. It is impossible to characterize it but there are several possible ways out: warring neo-conservatism or open neo-Keynesianism, with several variants in either case. It is within the next five to ten years that the new economic rationality will become formalized, just as neoliberalism imposed itself from the trends existing between 1979 and 1985.

There remains a discussion on what will follow this coming cycle. Immanuel Wallerstein makes the hypothesis of a reversal of the secular cycle, even multi-secular, posing the historical question of capitalism being overtaken and giving new scope to "another world". [26]

Among the strategic debates that need resolving, let us consider the one that concerns the connection of the urgency of the current situation, and social transformation and its long-term objectives. In the case of urban policies, we can suggest a strategy that links urgency with development. The immediate response is to invest in cities in order to safeguard the inhabitants, fight against poverty and defend liberties. The long-term response is defining the future of the metropolis and new urban policies.

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24   Massiah G. (2009), "Dangers and opportunities of the global crisis". [Rinoceros.org. LINK.]

25   Scandella L. (1998), Le Kondratieff, essai de théorie des cycles longs économiques, Paris : Poche Economie, 1998.

26   Wallerstein I. "Le capitalisme touche à sa fin", *Le Monde*, 13 October 2008.

The dangers of the crisis

It is well known that the Chinese ideogram depicting crisis associates two contradictory signs, as does every dialectic, that of dangers and that of opportunities.

The first danger concerns poverty and destitution. The first way to be sought out of the crisis will be to make the poor pay for the crisis, and first of all it will be those who are discriminated against and those who are dominated. And they will also seek to push down the middle classes. And if that is not enough, they will make certain categories of rich people pay; this foreshadows heavy contradictions.

Among the consequences of such policies is fear of plenty of repression, criminalization of social movements, penalization of solidarity, instrumentalization of terrorism, securitarian ideology, islamophobic, nationalistic and racist agitation, exploitation of scapegoats, migrants and Roma. This evolution will spread from some regions to authoritarian, repressive regimes and even to fascism and fascist movements.

Another way out of the crisis will target countries that will be marginalized and ruined. The risk of war is also one of the classic ways out of great crises. We should not forget that the world is already at war and that almost one billion people live in regions at war. The conflicts are permanent and the destabilization systematic. The kinds of war have changed with the militarization of societies, global apartheid, the war of the strong against the weak, and torture that has become commonplace.

The consequences for cities and urban policies will be extensive: poverty and urban destitution; jobs and housing will become insecure; conflicts, wars and urban violence. Urban social movements will have to define new forms of social solidarity in the cities and make alliances as broad as possible in order to fight for liberty and against repression.

Opportunities opened up by the crisis

While the dangers are well known, the opportunities are not. As Hölderlin says, quoted by Edgar Morin : "Where danger is, deliverance also grows". [27]

For cities, the opportunities opened up by the crisis are worth specifying :

- The ideological defeat of neoliberalism encourages an increase in public regulation and gives meaning to urban policy.

- The redistribution of wealth and the return of the domestic market provide a possibility of stabilization of salaries and of guarantee of incomes and social welfare, including the right to housing and to services.

- The ecological urgency necessitates a transformation of social development and will determine urban thinking and the evolution of the urban form.

- The crisis of the political model of representation strengthens the need for social democracy. The need to strengthen the social link gives meaning to the rejection of social and urban segregation.

- The readjustment between the North and the South opens up a new phase of decolonization and new geopolitics. The global urban armour will be modified. Urbanization and migration are the new ways of populating the planet.

- A system of global regulation giving opportunities to citizens worldwide will enable thinking on mastering urbanization on a global scale.

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[27] Morin E. (2008), "Vivre avec l'imprévisible", *Revue relation-europe*, May 2008. LINK.

These opportunities define new paths for urban policies and the financing of urbanization.

The rise of public regulation should complete the ideological defeat of neoliberalism. It should underline the importance of public policies based on public interest. Neoliberalism is still dominant but the neoliberal ideology has undergone a crushing defeat and it will find it difficult to rise again. The so-called temporary nationalizations, until the crisis is over, should prove difficult to throw away. The sovereign funds have already opened up a channel for unexpected interventions on the part of the State at the level of globalization. The evaluation of privatizations, until now unsuccessfully requested, should hold some surprises in reserve. The new rationality would have difficulty in continuing to subordinate the regulation of the markets and to confuse the private sector with capital and the markets. Similarly, associations would not be considered a non-viable sub-category of businesses. The return of public regulation would perhaps not take the shape of classic State control. Different kinds of social and community property would find a new legitimacy. Nationalizations would take place in different ways and at regional level. Two possible consequences for urban policies: first, the increased legitimacy of public policies – voluntary, local, national or at the level of broad regions and progressing with urban planning and spatial programming procedures; then, an opening up of discussions and innovations on the kinds of land ownership and land policies.

The redistribution of wealth, which is necessary in relation to the excesses of neoliberalism, opens up a neo-Keynesian temptation. It confirms the trend to rehabilitate the internal market, more on a broad regional scale than nationally. This could mean the rehabilitation of social welfare systems and relatively stable salaries. The minimum wage and public consumption would regain its role as driving-force for growth in relation to the over-indebtedness which triggered the "sub-prime" crisis. Access to rights for everyone, for which the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are a weak substitute, would find its place again. It would enable the redeployment of public services by linking public sectors, municipalities and a strong community element.

There are two conditions to this hypothesis which make the idea of simply returning to the Keynesian model of before neoliberalism dif-

ficult. The first condition is the need to respond to the ecological constraints that make it dangerous to continually strive to increase production. The contradiction between ecological and social matters is the deciding factor, and it is essential that this obstacle be overcome. The second condition is the need for regulation that is open and worldwide, as compared with the national regulation set out at Bretton Woods in the sixties.

There are considerable opportunities for urban policies. A public social housing sector could once again become topical. The strengthening of revenue would make life easier in the working-class districts. There could be new expansion for the public sphere. Social and urban segregation could decrease in the metropolis.

The urgency of climate change and the depletion of resources make it impossible to continue with development based on increased production and waste. The urgency of the ecological situation forces a complete break with previous methods which will mean a transformation of societies, combining social and ecological matters with peace and liberties. [28] This is a plan for the future which is not simply a down-to-earth Utopia. The consequences for urban policies are already potentially sensitive. Awareness about the environment modifies the conception even of urban styles and housing. This extends to a new conception of progress which could change the direction of technological innovation and would drastically change cities. Similarly, the evolution of scientific thinking will play a decisive role in the evolution of architectural and urban thinking.

The crisis of the political model of representation makes social democracy and the strengthening of representative democracy by participatory democracy unavoidable. The renewal of models of power and of representation will be at the centre of social and economic reconstruction. It is probable that the recomposition of the social link will mean new opportunities with regard to the juridical, formal forms of democracy imposed from the top. Inequalities of income and the relation between the minimum wage and the maximum wage will be far more sensitive. Democracy will remain a point of reference but the determinants may change. Electoral and institutional systems would have greater difficulty in being considered independent of social situa-

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[28]   Massiah G.(2009) "Écologie et solidarité internationale". LINK.

tions. Stronger demands will highlight community and individual liberties and their guarantees. Access to individual and community rights for everyone should create a social democracy without which political democracy would lose much of its attraction. The various links between participatory (probably direct) democracy and representative (often delegacy and notability) should progress and diversify.

Other developments already embarked upon should become more important. Local communities will expand their role in local power and local institutions. Agencies of conurbations, less dependent on communes than classic property agencies, should extend their fields of competence to include urban, land, housing and transport matters. The strategic alliance between local communities and community movements will form the basis of territories and residence citizenship. Large regions will be the driving-force behind national and regional development.

Such development will have considerable effect on nature and on the way in which urban policies are made. Alliances between working-class and middle-class sections of society, the basis of the model for the renewal of working-class districts, will be made easier; these alliances will be the alternatives with regard to the different oligarchies. The construction and development of the social link gives a privileged position to the construction of the public space, symbolic reference and social link of the cohesive metropolis.

Readjustment between North and South opens up a new phase of decolonization and new geopolitics. It might close the phase than ran from 1979 to 2008 and through management of the debt crisis take over the control of raw materials and military interventions. Between thirty and fifty developing countries, of which the three most dynamic are Brazil, India and China, can defend their points of view and their interests. It is not a question of a multipolar world but of a new international, geopolitical system. The effects could be considerable, notably for the terms of international trade. This would go together with new urbanization and migration which are the new ways of populating the planet.

This evolution carries two conditions. The first is that developing countries be capable of changing their growth model favouring the domestic market and the consumption of the working-class and mid-

dle-class sections of society with regard to exports. This deconnection is possible. It offers new possibilities for urban policies. The second condition is that developing countries build alliances with countries in the South; it is in their own interest to do so. The first phase of decolonization failed mainly when the petroleum countries, after the clash of 1977, had allowed rifts to form between countries of the South, thus enabling the G7, supported by the IMF and the World Bank, to impose structural adjustment.

The indispensable and necessary global regulation will require an overhaul of the system of international relations based on a radical reform of the United Nations and a progression of international law based on the implementation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, rejecting the subordination of individual and community rights to commercial and business law. This worldwide regulation could help make global citizenship a reality. It could have several important effects for urban policies: first of all, on the financing of urbanization, and urban amenities, considered as a Global Public Good which should be financed by international taxes; next, on the mastering of urbanization through linking the different levels; and the planning of conurbations from the global urban framework to global level and large regions; that of conurbations and national and regional development to national level and to the level of large regions; that of access to the region and to rights at local level.

None of these opportunities will happen on its own; they are all heavy with reprocessing and renewed oppression. The opportunities can only be seized if resistance is increased and if the struggles – social, ecological, pro-liberty, anti-war – are intensified. By displaying the potential borne by the resistance movements and current practices, another world offers a way out of the current crisis in its various configurations. [29] It would enable coalitions to be founded for freedom and democracy and against authoritarian, repressive conservatism. This would enable the struggle against a possible alliance between neoliberals and neo-Keynesians by increasing resistance and demands for social and ecological modernization. And it would allow us to go even further. After all, while capitalism is not eternal, the

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[29]   Lusson J. and Massiah G. (2009), "Les issues stratégiques à la crise globale", [rhinoceros. LINK.]

question of it being overcome is here and now; it must be posed and prepared straight away. Its prefiguration already exists in current society. It is now that we must plan and prepare another possible world.

The challenge is that of asserting rights and their inscription in urban policies and in the generation of cities. And thence the idea that the city to be envisaged is one which would rely on the right to housing for everyone and the right to the city for everyone, the latter being more difficult to envisage. Refusal of segregation does not mean that everyone must be able to live in the centre. It is a matter of inventing new cities. On that point, city practices in the North and the South have much to teach us. It means not opposing the city of rights to the actual city, basing ourselves on the real city and acknowledging working-class ways of creating the city. There are numerous courses to follow from taking account of the scale of the district in urban generation, of equality of the standards of amenities in districts, of the development of urban services. Several of these courses have even seen the beginnings of implementation in the past before being abandoned through insufficient political backing in comparison with the new rationality.

By highlighting the potential borne by resistance, current practices and intellectual demands, it is a matter of providing a way out of the current crisis.

5. ALTERNATIVE LOCAL POLICIES

To show some of the opportunities opened up by the crisis, we will highlight local policies.

Local policies are an issue of major contradictions. They can be the arena for trying out alternatives. Local policies are one of the strategic levels of social inclusion policies. They must take account of the constraints resulting from globalization and the world markets, from the development of large regions and from the direction of national policies. They define a coherence between region, population and activities, and they combine in one overall project, development, environ-

ment, democracy and conflict prevention approaches. Local communities contribute to the renewal of the political dimension by bringing together all actors in constructing local institutions, which provides a framework for citizen action. At the heart of these choices is the sense of the common good and public interest that must be taken care of by the public services in different ways and at levels varying from one country to another. Their function is to ensure that every citizen, whatever his place of residence and income, has equal access to basic rights. Vectors of social inclusion, elements of social progress and pertinent tools for the fight against social, territorial and other inequalities, public services and goods worldwide are the best means of satisfying essential needs.

Local policies, to the extent that their aim is to fight against social exclusion, are faced with the issue of access to rights for everyone. What characterizes a local social inclusion policy is precisely the way it implements access to rights for everyone, as needed and by giving more to those granted rights who until now had not taken advantage of them, by making them actually effective; which legally allows for the right to amenities and facilities enabling there to be compensation of any local deficit, without risking condemnation for a breach of the principle of equality of public office and its advantages or the reprobation which, strangely, condemns with the same vigour positive and negative discrimination.

Since issues relating to transport, land, employment and the promotion of a local domestic market are pre-eminent, many cities reject the World Trade Organization's (WTO) agreements, particularly that the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) should be applied to their region, as they prefer to have domestic markets, local employment and improvement of everyday life of the local population thanks to bids from public utilities departments. Similarly, the new tools of democracy (participatory budgets, social insertion planning, local Agenda 21, resident citizenship, etc.) will better enable the fight against the rise of discrimination and racism. The debate which will take place over the coming years will inevitably be on alternative local strategies.

The Forum of Local Authorities, created in Porto Alegre at the first World Social Forum, reasserts the role of communes as political players on the new world scene and their will to set up alternatives to

current development. This strategic linking between the Social Forum and the Local Authorities Forum for social inclusion conveys the ambition that for six years now has brought Mayors together: to be the players of thinking and implementation of the new choices for another world, based on cooperation, solidarity, more dynamic and fruitful relations between representative democracy and participatory democracy, a world that builds peace and justice for a shared, sustainable development.

This linking is strategic for local authorities because the implementation of a social inclusion policy requires participation and intervention, which does not exclude debate, with citizens' social movements. It is also strategic for citizens' social movements because the building of local coalitions with municipalities enables the setting up of social dynamics and strengths that can bring about social inclusion policies. The local level can be a testing-ground for social experimentation and for building new methods of cooperation between groups and individuals, thus creating an alternative to the destructive competition of the current economic system. The autonomy of social and citizens' movements in comparison with the different authorities and their capacity to formulate and articulate, on their part, the demands of populations constitute the conditions for building these coalitions.

The challenges for alternative local policies

An alternative local policy must take into account issues of space, time and scale. Let us put forward some preliminary thoughts.

An alternative local policy is defined:

- from the point of view of space, by territoriality; it defines a coherence between population, territory and activities;
- in the linking with other levels of spatialization; it combines local, national, regional and global levels;
- from the point of view of time, by the contradiction between short-term, that of urgency, and long-term, that of action on

structural change; this point falls into the definition of a strategic perspective;

- in the linking of the response to needs expressed by the population, the constraint of socio-economic balances, cultural dynamics, and the long-term of ecosystems;

- from the point of view of scale, to the measure of problems which are posed and must not be limited to simple economic improvements;

- in the relation with institutions, that is sometimes summarized by governance it encounters the need for the democratic imperative.

The challenges may be defined from a critical analysis of situations and contradictions which appear, and alternatives sketched through movements, reflection and new practices.

There are four major concerns for alternative local policies:

- The importance of social inequalities, the persistence of social and cultural discrimination and of spatial segregation. It is the fight against inequality and discrimination that will enable a new model of development and a new conception of growth to be constructed.

- The extent of the limitations of the ecosystem with regard to ecological constraints and the rights of future generations. Local mastering of the environment becomes a prime objective for local policies.

- The permanence of North-South inequalities based on domination, and the importance of conflicts and wars. The new urban revolution is first and foremost that of the cities of the South and it characterizes the evolution of the global urban structure.

- Social, economic and ecological insecurity is increased and the need to find answers which are not determined by securitarian, repressive ideologies become a major concern in local policies.

Strategic lines of alternative local policies

Let us propose a structure of alternative local policies around some strategic lines :

- Land policies and transport policies based on challenging spatial segregation

- Public utilities departments' development policies based on access for all to these services and to respect for basic rights

- Local development policies based on local production and local businesses, the local market and local employment

- Policies for the protection of the local environment based on improving local ecosystems and the rights of future generations

- Policies for the production of social housing based on the right to housing and to the city

- Local economy policies, particularly land, based on the link between the production of wealth and redistribution

- Citizen participation policies based on the linking between representative and participatory democracy and on residential citizenship

- Cooperation policies based on international solidarity and involving cities and territories in international action.

Over the past few years, a considerable number of measures and tools have reaffirmed these directions. They are the subject of debate of numerous networks for exchanging experiences, among which are cities whose experiences we have followed:

Agenda 21, participatory budgets (Porto Alegre, Brazil), social insertion planning (Barcelona, Spain), Ecoloc, local economy model (Municipal development programme, twenty African municipalities), "urban consultations" (Latin American Urban Management Programme, over forty municipalities in Latin America), local tax systems linked to simplified land registers (Parakou, Benin), the citizenship of

residence, linguistic and cultural vernacular education (Cotacachi, Ecuador), the Network of local communities for the promotion of public utilities departments (Liège, Belgium), the Local town planning and sustainable development plan (Aubervilliers, France), Urban agriculture, etc. At the Forum for responsible globalization held in Lyon in 2006, one idea put forward was "social and environmental responsibility for territories", giving responsibility – beyond the scope of local authorities – to local coalitions grouping together all the actors of a region.

Alternative urban policies highlight a major convergence as compared with dominant representation which restricts social transformation to meetings between businesses and administrations, between economic power and political power. In the new period, the emergence of associations and local communities strengthens citizen power. The alliance between social movements, which we shall call simply "civil society", and local institutions, is a strategic alliance.

Transformations of urban policies

Although alternative urban policies are not limited to local policies, they enable certain alternative orientations to be confirmed; all the more so because they are not conceivable without the other levels of decision and intervention. It is the linking of levels and scales, between the local, the national, the large regions and the global which defines the nature of an urban policy. This will be marked by the coherence between the scales. But this linking can also, depending on the situation, give greater importance to one of the levels in relation to others. This is what led to emphasizing local policies, in a situation marked by the limitations of national policies because of the current globalization logic.

In future situations, each of the levels will have its importance. It is at local level that relations between populations and territories will be confirmed and local democracy will be built. Not to forget the sphere of economic activities which are directly called into question by the imperatives of the social, environmental and democratic responsibility of businesses. The national level remains the determining factor and

retains the dual legitimacy of redistribution of wealth and international regulation in a global inter-State system. The level of the large regions becomes more precise; it can be the support for a reorganization of globalization and impose itself as the scale of national and regional development and the major networks of infrastructure. The global level remains to be seen and invented. The ecological urgency introduces a new paradigm which can only be perceived at the level of the planet. Urban and spatial thinking must combine the responses to the ecological urgency, to balanced, multipolar geopolitics, to social justice and to respect for liberties. The three challenges correspond to the responses in terms of space – globalization, the environment and democracy.

Postface

2011 brought drastic changes and opened a new historical period, obliging researchers to go deeper into the crisis analysis, to open and confirm new perspectives. The article on "The urban dimension of Mediterranean revolts" (Massiah 2012) will analyse this situation.

From Tunis a new wind blew first to Egypt, then to the whole Mahgreb-Machrek region. It crossed The Mediterranean and reached South Europa. It is now spreading all over the world and has found a new breath by crossing the Atlantic. A new sense of ownership of public space and a new meaning of the city surged from this new cycle of revolutions.

These mobilizations are an answer to the crisis and to the austerity policies which resulted and increased. They show that popular mobilization can open up new paths in parallel and in opposition with authoritarian and conservative trends. They highlight the evolution of social contradictions. They reveal the political culture of a new generation, through the forms of these urban revolutions. Indeed what is emerging from the urban squares is a new generation which wants its place in the public space. This youth is less defined through an age bracket than as a cultural generation which is in line with such a situation and then transforms it. The political culture of urban squares

blends utopia and realism. It directs action towards the unacceptable limits and the pretences of existing authorities, including some democracies. The coming urban revolution can bring renewed values, the values of a social and ecological transition and the values of freedom and democracy.

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CITIES INTO THE FUTURE

Part II

The emergence of regulations within globalisation

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Part II.
The emergence of regulations within globalisation

III

Governances, from global to urban – between innovation and revamping

by Françoise Lieberherr-Gardiol

Multiple interpretations of governance

The word "governance" seems to be ever present and to have a variety of meanings depending on whether it is interpreted by World Bank laboratories or development programmes, by political arenas or civic demands, by scientific studies or advertising slogans. For some people this concept has ambiguities which mask the uncertainties linked to globalization. For others it shows itself to be the organizer of modern values creating a new world order. There is no lack of digressions between a simple promising "*aggiornamento* of aging styles of government" (Gaudin, 2002), "a central pre-condition for social and economic progress" (van Dok, 17), or the principle of a new world humanism and of a global political order (Morin, quoted by Gaudin). Another interpretation is the need for renewal after the end of the great mobilizing political narratives of the 20th century (liberalism, communism and socialism), where governance comes under a search

for progress deeply embedded in Western values with a "modernity label" (Gaudin, 2002).

Admittedly, this is a new regulation which lies within the constellation of ideas produced by 1990s globalization, but where did it come from and where is it going ? Is governance merely a fashion or a fundamental change ? In the vagueness surrounding this notion several features emerge. The first presents itself with certainty : its origin is localized in Western societies where styles of government and institutional balance change, and academic analyses respond on the principles of collective decision-making and public action. The second feature of governance is that it has duality – it is both analytical and normative – in the sense that it puts forward categories of analysis and prescribes models for action, the best known being the *good governance* of the World Bank. Although this dual position explains governance's current following and the extent of its diffusion, it also increases the surrounding confusion. The third feature is the multidimensional potential of governance that corresponds to political, economic, social, environmental, administrative and cooperative fields.

Dealing more specifically with urban governance, as the offspring of governance, it is important we take a brief historical detour on this concept because urban governance, which has a smaller, less well-defined public, finds its roots in governance.

From analytical approaches to normative views

With our brief historical perspective, we see that the actual concept of governance was not born in the United States in the 20th century but first appeared in France in the 13th century, meaning the rule over bailiwicks (Moreau Defarges, 2003), and later, in the 17th century, in the debate on the balance of parliamentary and royal powers regarding the importance of guidance (Gaudin, 2002) [30]. Today's use of the term came around the 1990s but it had already appeared in the 1970s in se-

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[30]   Gaudin notes that allegorical frescoes of *mal governo* and *buon governo* decorate in the 13th century the walls of the great rooms of the ancient Town Hall in Sienna.

veral studies, where governance is understood as meaning the capacities of guidance of public action [31].

Over the past twenty years a movement of unity has grown, symbolically marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall, which is discovering a world that is multipolar and more flexible, a universalistic international dynamic, a growing practice of partnerships, creating uncertainties with regard to the responsibilities of different actors in collective action, a relativization of State power at different levels, and the definition of new rules for the institutional game. It has come to mean taking a new look at power and at the evidence of current changes that require guidance. Far from being the concept of one researcher or of one specific discipline, governance comes from a collective product of several areas : political science, the economy, public administration and sociology. Reflections and analyses have developed mainly around three perspectives : modern governance, multi-level governance and corporate governance (Gaudin, 2002). In political science the examinations concern the guidance of public action, the modernization of organizations and their strategies of adapting to change, the diverse situations of interaction between public and private actors, between public administrations and firms [32].

Thus, in political science, the debate arises from a twofold calling into question : on the one hand the very conditions for producing public policies and on the other the legitimacy of public power (Jouve, 2008). Reflection around a State regulation crisis aims to define the public space made up of a complex network of interests, interaction among actors and levels of political intervention. There, governance appears as a complex decision-making process beyond plain government concerning legitimacy and the constitution of the public space, the distribution of power among the governing and the governed, negotiations among social actors, and decentralization of authority and of its functions (Solinís, 2003). Another founding theme is that of corporate governance which in an American context has developed in the economy by observing the signs of transformation in productive

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[31]   Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki, 1975, *The crisis of democracy*, and Olsen J., 1976, *University governance.*

[32]   March and Olsen, 1989, *Rediscovering institutions*, Marin, 1990-1991, *Generalized political exchange*, Kooiman, 1993, *Modern governance.*

processes through organizational restructuring seeking minimization of costs.

The scientific analyses that explored the new principles of politic relations were followed by a search for solutions as a direct response to challenges of public action. In 1989 in the climate of criticism on the excesses of the interventionist State, the World Bank launched its normative concept of *good governance* which intervenes as a model of public administration to open the way to expansion of the market economy in the global South and East. The Bank adapted certain elements of corporate governance approaches to new neo-liberal development strategies (in a straight line down from the so-called "Washington Consensus"). The Bank put forward its strategies for African countries from its own reading of the difficulty of promoting an economic project without the minimal conditions of political legitimacy, social order and institutional effectiveness (*Africa : Crisis in governance*, 1994). According to the World Bank's position papers, "good governance" involves three essential dimensions : reduction of public spending, public sector accountability, fiscal transparency via privatization of public services and banking rules (bancability) of operations.

In order to implement good governance, the Bank developed training and reflection programmes [33] with an educational mission aimed not only for government decision-makers but also for new community leaders, academics and technicians. This development model quickly found connections in multilateral and bilateral cooperation, NGOs and international, specialized bodies. Thus the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its conception of human development took the idea further from the World Bank's reductive and functional notion to the market affirming the primacy of law. In 1997 a basic UNDP document defines the three interactive areas of good governance - the State, civil society and the private sector -, and sets out the criteria as follows : participation, responsibility, equity, effectiveness and transparency, which were largely adopted in the world of international coopération [34]. In addition, governance was not only a model

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[33]   From the World Bank Institute.

[34]   "Governance can be seen as an exercise of economic, political and administrative power to manage the affairs of a country at all levels. It covers the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups

for poor countries but it was also applied to rich countries like the United Kingdom under the aegis of Anthony Giddens who was an adviser to Tony Blair (2002) and the European Union (*White Paper on European Governance*, 2001).

Among the many debates on the normative applications of good governance there emerge two principal criticisms. The first is on the World Bank's philosophy that implicitly assumes the domination of the logic of the market. In the context of countries of the South, this would constitute the most complete form of conditionality and political interference (Ormont, 1998 ; Solinís, 2003) and represent an attempt to move power from the public to the private sector. Similarly, attention paid to civil society remains ambiguous as it accompanies a certain detachment on the part of the State by encouraging the action of private operators as, for example, in access to urban services such as water and electricity. Another criticism is the generalized application of norms created in capitalist Western societies to developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In their study *"Is good governance a good development strategy ?"* (2007), Nicolas Meisel and Jacques Ould Aoudia start with a critical analysis of development which is not just on economic growth but also represents a medium- and long-term process of transformation of institutions. Although since the 1990s "good governance" was imposed as a universal requirement of development policies, even considered as "the mantra of development in developing countries" (UN-Habitat, 2009), there are now emerging serious questions as to its transferability and effectiveness in terms of growth. In effect, international financial institutions have provided an operational tool copied from existing institutions in developed countries, with "good governance" involving respect for individual rights, secure contracts, effective administration, democratic political institutions. But the transition that developing countries go

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can set out their interests, exercise their legal rights, carry out their duties and negotiate their differences of opinion", UNDP DgCID 16. For Carlos Milani, governance relies more on concertation, negotiation and the need of dialogue and less on hierarchical relations, and implies the integration of decision processes into a context of plurality of actors (Les relations entre les sciences sociales et la décision politique, dans G.Solinis, 2005, *Construire des gouvernances entre citoyens, décideurs et scientifiques*, Bruxelles : P.I.E Lang).

through is marked by a long process of depersonalization of the social regulation systems which does not bring with it an immediate change to formal Western-style institutions.

*A generalized idea
and an all-encompassing logic*

This brief perspective on the emergence of governance shows not only the complexity and proliferation of this idea but also the vast area of its interpretations and applications, from spheres of science to those of public administration and international aid cooperation.

Definitions of governance vary according to the field of application, the level of intervention, the tools adopted, the legitimacy and responsibility of the actors, and the theoretical degree of analysis. Given the plurality of conceptions, this paper will aim to focus on the component parts of governance and not its ideological yoke. The set of keywords – guidance, regulation, complexity, interdependence, diversified actors, multipolar powers, fragmented decisions, multi-level negotiations, opening up, partnership, competition and cooperation – all place governance as a process. It is displayed in a context of transformation, bringing with it transitions where globalization, neo-liberalism, the multipolar dynamic, State weakening, the emergence of civil society and private actors – all shape a new world. The old orders are crumbling and new principles of organization are being formed in an overall logic of market. Thus, in sum, governance as a new paradigm has three pillars : public and private actors working together, negotiated rules of the game, and interactive, collective decisions which can be made at several levels from local to transnational and from an organization to a region or State.

In short, governance was born in a context of geopolitical and ideological transformations : globalization, neo-liberalism, the opening-up of a multipolar world and environmental crises. It became confirmed as the new founding paradigm of the end of the 20th century. While governance was born in a complex world that appeared disorganized and barely intelligible, the response came not only from a

theoretical revision as described earlier but also from a practical revision aiming to forge a new tool for action. Now it appears that the practical solutions prevail in the contemporary world. Governance dominates in a modern negotiation conception, integrating rules of the market with a call for accountability to guarantee its effectiveness.

Before talking about urban governance, we should discuss the current applications of governance. The main difficulty of governance comes from its generalized reference as a sort of super-regulation that rules over all development practice in different areas : poverty, security, taxation, the environment, etc., under one single, vague acceptance of collective decision-making. Generalization and imprecision make for different interpretations. The second difficulty is that governance is not politically neutral as it is often deemed to be. It came into being with Western foundations defining its criteria and values, and it is generally applied without considering the cultural and institutional gaps taking place in other contexts. In addition, it is marked by the dominating neo-liberal current that promotes the market economy, thus directing its application in development cooperation and the expected results. So, far from being neutral, the application of governance shows that it has the "Western label" as regulation system and development model with universal scope. Moreover, while governance represents a major stake within the framework of international aid, it is more often seen as a controversial idea by countries on the receiving end because it brings with it interference and conditionality. A third difficulty arises in the generalized, almost unconscious use of a normative approach, and in its instrumentalization which intervenes with an operational structure defining the exercise of power and a doctrinal structure controlled by the World Bank aiming for success in a project with barely discernible economic interests. The fourth difficulty is the vagueness that surrounds the concept of governance which in most discussions is confused with democracy and the ambiguity of its representative, participatory or technical dimensions linked to a project.

On urban governance

Urban governance falls into the sphere of application of cities involving local government as well as different levels of fragmented operations in a municipal territory, with interaction that can be supralocal, local or sub-local. As mentioned earlier, the underlying hypothesis to the idea of governance is the existence of a crisis of governability of societies which draws cities into a dynamics of transformation, and in today's world this territorial aspect of governance underlines the growing, determining role of cities emerging as collective, political actors [35]. Between 1980 and 1990, urban power underwent great changes in the West beginning with the United Kingdom and reforms of local power initiated by Lady Thatcher involving the privatization of public services and the promotion of public-private partnerships with a view to creating "cities of enterprise". In addition, decentralization and transfer of competence policies were implemented in several European countries. In this context of emergence, urban governance found significance with modernist visions when "developer" mayors were trying to integrate economic and social strengths around major local projects and to impose the power of some cities on competitive inter-urban situations. Without dwelling on the different lines of research in the social sciences, like Isabelle Hillenkamp (2007) we will retain two major convergent and complementary trends. The first comes from the notion of governance applied to the city as a new, decisive policy actor in the transformation of the world economic system. To this, come the acknowledged role of force for economic growth, and public and private actors' new thinking and consequent action. The second trend runs from urban studies to the necessary inclusion of governance for an interdisciplinary, overall approach. Overcoming conventional ideas of public action, it recognizes

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[35]   Through an innovative analysis, Neil Brenner traces the transformation of urban governance in western Europe during the last four decades and, on this basis, argues that inherited geographies of state power are being fundamentally rescaled (Brenner, N. 2004 *New States Spaces. Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood*, Oxford : University Press)

the diversity and growing independence of social sub-systems where governance becomes a way of coordinating relations among actors, territories and sectors.

There is a convergence of approaches in some basic principles and ideas. Thus, according to Jouve (2008), urban governance refers to a process gradually setting up a readjustment in the exercise of urban power to the detriment of local governments and urban institutions and to the benefit of actors from civil society. The fragmentation of city government, the globalization of exchange, the unpredictability of the future, the disconnection between political authorities and citizens, the broken societies and non-adherence would explain the breakdown of traditional models of public action. In fact, the processes of fragmentation affect at one and the same time urban space, social groups and activities, and they meet at all spatial levels of the city. The result is regional imbalances between concentration and urban sprawl, a proliferation of institutions and networks intervening in one area, and a diversification of actors with divergent value systems and interests. This multiplication of actors leads to a crumbling away of power on both the horizontal and vertical plane. Add to this a "political crisis" with citizens whose points of reference and structures of belonging have been modified by globalized thinking, and are aware of the limitations of political institutions and demand to be included in decisions that concern them. With regard to the new kinds of partnership, some people describe them as "social constructs" where collective representations and legitimate systems of reference are formed which guide public action (Cunha et al. 1998).

Diffusion of urban governance in the South

The importance of local urban power and its role were formally recognized at international level at the "City Summit" in Istanbul in 1996. The current demographic situation is that half the world's population live in cities. Indeed, it is a decidedly urban 21st century, with a greater increase in population in the South (where the population doubles every 30 years) and an economic situation of wealth concentration. This trend highlights the dual role of cities. On the one hand ci-

ties are recognized as driving-forces of the economy, places of social innovation and cultural diversity, laboratories of democratic experimentation and ecological futurology. But on the other hand, they produce a concentration of pollution and environmental degradation, industrial and health risks, social exclusion and ethnic conflicts. To this is added alarming situations of the urbanization of poverty with a billion people living in slums in 2007, sanitary conditions that are shameful and improper for over two billion urban dwellers, and in the countries of the South a dominant economic and general informality means inhabitants live in insecurity and are deprived of their rights (UN-Habitat, 2006). With this structural dynamic, local public authorities have to confront – particularly in developing countries – enormous difficulties because of lack of financial and human resources.

In this context, the main international cooperation bodies see urban governance [36] as the best suited urban management method for the current situation. To put it simply, urban governance aims from now on not to "build the city" through State-imposed vertical operations but to "build with the city", in other words in consultation with the inhabitants. Thus, the UN Agency concerned with cities (UN-Habitat) added to criteria defined by UNDP – participation, responsibility, equity, effectiveness, transparency, those of decentralization, citizenship and security – and it defined a composite index of urban governance (UN-Habitat 2004) which was promoted within the framework of the Global Campaign on Urban Governance from 1999. The Urban Management Programme (UMP, a joint UN-Habitat/UNDP programme) conceived participatory urban governance as one of its three objectives from 1996 in four regional networks (Africa, Arab States,

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[36] Urban governance involves a trio of actors representing the public sector, the private sector and civil society in a concerted strategy for economic development, social solidarity and political participation. Pieterse (2000) defines it as a planning process for decision-making mechanisms and their implementation in order to coordinate the specific efforts of local government, civil society organizations and the private sector with a view to sustainable urban development and local democracy. According to UN-Habitat (2009), urban governance is "the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, plan and manage the common affairs of the city. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action can be taken. It includes formal institutions as well as informal arrangements and the social capital of citizens".

Asia and Latin America) promoting more than 100 urban consultations [37]. As for the World Bank, from 2000, it encouraged urban governance to combat poverty by furthering inclusion and empowerment for the poor.

From 1991, major research programmes enabled a panorama of the principal problems of cities in the South to be set out with the inclusion of sustainable development and poverty themes. But the notion of urban governance was created in the North and exported to developing countries with its normative view and presupposed neo-liberal ideologies, its Western institutional and organizational points of reference, and its ethnocentric cultural values [38]. Through a few concrete cases linked to decentralization in Burkina Faso, administrative reforms in Viet Nam and local democratization in Bulgaria, we propose to examine how this Western product is interpreted, adapted and implemented in more or less hybrid ways in very different cultural and geopolitical contexts.

Thus, our position of analysis refers to both multiple and single forms of urban governance, the interpretation and adaptation of which differs not only according to the continent or the temporality but also to the logics of the actors and the institutional environment specific to each urban situation. Rejecting the idea of an operational model of universal scope, we underline the diversity of mechanisms interacting, their complexity and their capacity to evolve. In addition, there are two dynamics involved, forms of exogenous and endogenous governance which can either complement each other or conflict. Next, we consider urban governance as a template of public action transforma-

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[37] The urban consultation promoted by the UMP breaking with traditional approaches of city planning, introduces participation into urban management so as to improve city planning by involving all the actors in the definition of priorities, action planning and its implementation. It aims at facilitating a dialogue between local authorities and the urban actors concerned, at creating partnerships between private and public sectors, associations and civil society, and catalysing the development of an action plan.

[38] Richard Stren (1995, *Urban research in the developing world, Latin America.* Toronto : University of Toronto Press Incorporated) puts forward the idea that urban research in the South is the result of "disciplinary amalgam" with varying emphases – geographic, planning or sociological – depending on the region and which have little concern in the way in which the cities are actually governed.

tions that allow us to analyse new kinds of guidance employed in major trends of decentralization and globalization. There comes into play a decentration of power plans in the hands of administrations and local representatives and an opening up of the decision-making arena to other actors. One aim is to determine which are the processes of change of local power, organization of interests and elites, and building collective identity are setting up in new forms of cooperation or partnership. Urban governance comes into play in the kinds of arrangement that actors set up to develop a threefold capacity for action in economic development or territorial policies, for the integration of social and political groups, and for adherence to a shared view of urban development. In their new role, cities become an important place for political and social innovation. And lastly, although international cooperation agencies have made urban governance a doctrine for aid to development, we analyse this operational framework as just one exogenous governance among different dynamics.

Decentralization, municipal learning and overlapping governances in Burkina Faso

Although the notion of urban governance introduced by international aid agencies at the beginning of the 1990s was presented as a new model for the distribution of power and responsibilities and a tool for the democratization of local life, how was this adaptation accomplished ? In the post-colonial State of Burkina Faso, the structure of this experiment was designed together with a decentralization law in 1993 which from 1995 built democratic urban communes and their framework of governance [39]. An Urban Development Programme (UDP) launched by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) in three medium-sized cities – Ouahigouya, Koudougou and Fada N'Gourma (Delsol 2004)– provided a framework for action to consolidate the municipal institutionalization process through partici-

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[39]   Burkina Faso. (1999). *TOD Textes d'Orientation de la Décentralisation*. Édition spéciale.

patory local development [40]. There were four lines of strategy : the reconstruction of markets as driving forces for the economy, sanitation operations as social leverage, the creation of a new legal structure or Municipal Public Establisments for Development as a "municipal service", and the action-research as empowerment approach to encourage the emergence of civil society and the effectiveness of local government capacities (Lieberherr-Gardiol, 2005).

Although Burkina Faso tried in the first decades of independence to build a modern national arena with its State authority, various lines of governance criss-crossed among traditional clans systems, French colonial power, a revolutionary period, a modern "multi-party democratic" political regime and international aid creating movements of resistance or appropriation. The experience we are looking at took place in Burkina Faso at a time of great changes in attitudes, modes of socialisation and values, and in a local cultural, institutional context ill-prepared for the municipal management of public affairs. The new communes were elected in 1995 for the first time as a new socio-political organizational structure and also as a layer of local governance. How was this local governance to become the concern of the inhabitants ? How would social appropriation of the commune take place ? How would the communes be able to draw up suitable policies for the public good ?

The first actors in line were the town halls which were still weak. Typical features were lack of management experience, low levels of education and technical competence, institutional weakness of the communal structure, lack of local perspective on long-term development and its challenges, and inexperience of citizen culture. The second in line in legitimate traditional governance were the customary chiefs. Together with the political (national and local representatives) and advisory roles, they had the weight of traditional practices and values still deeply entrenched which had survived the period of colonization. However, their status, forms of reproduction and functioning were the opposite of those of democratic representatives, i.e. a hierar-

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[40]   The Urban Development Programme aims to find a new equilibrium for the development of the different regions by building the technical, financial and institutional capacities of ten medium-sized towns to counterbalance the strong attraction of the two urban poles – Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso – a dual political goal of urban development and national planning.

chical system with vertical relations based on authority and obedience against a system of equal relations and rights based on responsibility and autonomy. The survival of traditional power is a factor for integration between the old system which continues in a vague but meaningful way and the modernity of the decentralized commune bringing social relations up to date based on human rights and equity.

The third line of actors is civil society – many and varied, emerging in several places (Laurent 2004) but not yet really existing as a democratic counter-power nor as private sector. Who are the emerging local actors ? We can identify competent, motivated people with small business ventures of productive activities – goods and services (hairdressing, garages, second-hand clothes, drinks stalls, etc.), and social innovators who embark upon a variety of associations (disabled, refuse, people's pharmacy, market traders, etc.) in a dual track of real militancy for local revitalization and striving to obtain subsidies. Among these actors we should note the dynamic role played by women and young people. These are still peripheral actors in a patriarchal social system but they are gradually emerging as agents of change, the women because they plan a different future for their children, and young people because they want a modernized future. Although they are still kept apart from local political life, they act as direct inventors of new forms of socialisation and social securitization (consumption, children's education, clothes, leisure) in the evolving social relations marked by the weakened roles of traditional authority – patriarch or husband – the conversion to new occupations, the adoption of urban values and the role of money. In such a world bursting with vitality and new dynamics, the combined strength of new local representatives and the emerging civil society should gradually come to build a new citizens' arena, but the boundary between public and private remains blurred. Confirmation of public interest has yet to be voiced ; the city cannot be merely the sum of individual interests. However, the "public idea" is gradually taking shape.

The fourth actor, Municipal Public Establishments for Development (MPED) which were set up within the framework of the Urban Development Programme, provides technical support through its different sections of activities – infrastructure, sanitation, planning and

institutional support – and the financing of the operations [41]. Through its technical and management abilities it certainly plays a decisive role for the success of the UDP, but it also plays a role that is increasingly invasive and dominating in local dynamics. There is a certain ambiguity in the distribution of roles and responsibilities as well as a certain institutional and political vagueness within the municipal structure which create conflicts regarding competence and tension between local authorities and technical agents. In fact, it is the power stakes that are being played for in the municipalities that must gradually attain technical and management competence and reduce the involvement of MPED to a support role and technical consultancy.

The fifth external actor is the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation whose UDP falls in line with Burkina Faso's aspiration for interregional urban readjustment. Its development philosophy aims in parallel to strengthen the different actors with local governance competence, emerging citizen and democratic behaviours, and the local economic fabric by being a facilitator but without any rigid procedural structure. Through financial contributions to the infrastructure, the MPED and other social activities, SDC takes a direct part in some control of municipal operations. Thus it plays an important normative role, becoming involved in the strategic guidance of the programme and, with difficulty, finding coherence between its two roles of accompanying the process by delegating tasks and responsibilities, and of being responsible for the financing and effectiveness of the programme.

The analysis of the basic elements of the Burkina Faso experience helps us highlight the conditions for producing a new urban governance with four main features. First, this local governance came from an endogenous, voluntarist action at national level, the law of decentralization, and it was supported by an exogenous intervention of international cooperation inspired by the Swiss practice of direct democracy and the principles of international good governance. But decentralization introduces not only a new organizational framework, it also in-

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[41]   Swiss agency for development and cooperation, adapted from C. Nigg-Wolfrom.(2002). Une expérience de coopération originale à Ouahigouya, Koudougou, Fada N'Gourma au Burkina Faso. Programme de Développement des Villes Moyennes 1990–2000, Berne.

troduces new forms of access to resources and to negotiations in the public arena. Second, such an institutional change cannot be definitively introduced just like that because it operates like a graft that succeeds at varying levels through experimental stages of rejection and gradual adjustment. Various aspects of local political life have shown as, for example, the market crisis [42] whose management system based on the recovery of costs was disputed by shop-keepers, or the semi-failure of the sanitation operations which was due to a variety of factors : lack of municipal involvement, the MPED's technical shortcomings, hesitant environmental awareness and weak mobilization of the population. The third feature was that the motivations of the different actors were often divergent and more or less conflictual depending on whether the goal was individual or general. Collective action should ideally be built around a minimum consensus that is acceptable to everyone. Fourth, the value systems moulding attitudes belongs to varying lines running through society from historical inheritance to modernist aspirations. As a specialist of sub-Saharan Africa, Jean-Pierre Elong MBassi remarked, "the aim is to tie the institutional construction of States in with the people's experiences so that they take over public institutions despite their thinking being still very full of the traditional system of governance" (DGCID, 2008). For example, citizenship is going through a complex situation of transition where identitarian points of reference are far from being stabilized between the more traditional or modern norms of reference. And what is principally at stake – the common good – citizenship fluctuates in its strategies of material reassurance for "better living" and social reassurance for "living together". With regard to the fine weave of democratization of this new urban governance it often finds itself confronted with political ills such as autocracy, nepotism, clientelism and marginalization of minority groups. In addition, the individualistic democratic concept developed in the West is not suited to a community-style regime where governmental structures are embedded in the other structures of society, where belonging to primary ethnic, tribal

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[42]   The market crisis, materialized by its shutdown and the suspension of the Swiss financial contribution, was followed by mediations accompanied with public awareness campaigns (theatre, radio) and tax compliance training courses which led two years later to a new model of market management proposed by the municipality.

or family groups and their specific values define their political adherence (de Bruyne and Nkulu Kabamba, 2001).

In conclusion, urban governance far from operating as a simple management tool shows itself to be an institutional and organizational outcome shaping collective action and comprising multiple and hybrid values and attitudes. The coexistence of rural and urban areas, which is to say one society based on mutual knowledge and another, superimposed and set in new relations of sociability, involving dual traditional-modern thinking. There is also the coexistence of an oral culture which respects the spoken word and a written culture based on signing a contract. Observation of community life showed how the component parts of urban governance are still uncertain and fragile : vague democratic rules, uncertain social and institutional legitimacy, new municipalities that are weak on management and technology and in their democratic culture, a hesitant civil society, and a concept of the public good not yet internalized in attitudes and representations. While there does exist the political-administrative organization structure and the exercise of local government authority, the social content involving collective duties and responsibilities still needs to be shaped into a new urban citizen membership. Thus the experience of Burkina Faso enables us to go beyond the idea of multiple governances, to urban governance as a system of hybrid governances among the more or less normative lines influenced by localized, Africanized and Westernized political ideologies.

Public administration reforms and participatory approaches in Viet Nam

Viet Nam in transition underwent thoroughgoing transformations one of which was the adoption of political reforms *doi moi* (renewal) in 1986 introducing the passage from a centralized economy to a socialist-style market economy, and the Public Administration Reform (PAR), programme launched in 1995. The PAR, which was directed towards organizational and institutional restructuring through new laws, edicts, administrative procedures and financing mechanisms, happened gradually at a slow pace, with stability as its prime objecti-

ve. Thus the Socio-Economic Development Strategy 2002-2010 strengthened the reforms through a decentralization of the tasks and responsibilities from central to provincial and municipal levels, and a redefinition of relations within society from a top-down perspective to bottom-up movements involving civil society. This strategy aimed "to successfully build a democratic, clean, strong, professional, modern, effective and efficient public administration system which operates in line with the principles of the rule of law, socialism and the leadership of the Party" (Ha 2002). The convergence of an accelerated urbaniza-tion and an integration into the globalized market in this country with a centrally-planned economy tradition tested the towns' and cities' physical capacities on the territory and their political-administrative management structure. With regard to the urbanization process in Viet Nam, it was marked by insufficient infrastructure and public services and by the deterioration of the urban environment. In this context se-veral international cooperation agencies set up urban development programmes.

We will tackle urban governance in Viet Nam (Lieberherr-Gardiol 2003) through two institutional transformation experiments – the One Stop Shop as a basic administrative reform and community participa-tion as a first step towards democracy. According to the official terms, the Government decided to implement the One Stop Shop mechanism "aiming at a radical change in the relationship between public admi-nistrative agencies and citizens, organizations, and in working proce-dures used by the former when addressing affairs of the latter, with a view to reducing inconvenience for the latter, preventing bureaucratic and corrupt practices and authoritarian behaviours of some cadres and civil servants, and improving state management efficiency and effec-tiveness" (SDC, 2003). Thus, the basic concept launched as a pilot project in 1997 was to concentrate in one single window different kinds of administrative services located in various places, from the citizen seeking advice to dealing with the matter and delivery of the documents or services. To benefit citizens using the system, who were often at a loss when confronted with administrative complications, the One Stop Shop with modern equipment and competent staff had to provide better access, transparency, equality and effectiveness. While the wording of this reform may appear evident, its application in fact involved wide-ranging transformations. This reform, which went fur-

ther than simple technical measures, came up against social, institutional, political and cultural barriers, created by the systems in place and by social actors with diverging interests. It highlighted rigid administrative systems, bureaucratic mentalities and a hierarchical advancement mechanism based more on political merit than professional competence. Despite the goodwill of the municipal and provincial authorities, it appeared that resistance to change in mentalities, in social status acquired within the administrations and in the societal models of reference had been greatly underestimated. The verification of legal taxes and a free administrative service was often overridden by the informal practice of paying bribes and setting obstacles for the deferment of authorizations. The SDC accompanied the setting up of the One Stop Shop in Dong Hoi and Nam Dinh with a training system, appropriate manuals and a follow-up mechanism. An evaluation undertaken by the Ministry of the Interior in 2002 enabled the reforms to go from pilot projects to an institutionalization of the One Stop Shop in the whole of Viet Nam – regional capitals, urban districts and wards. Conceived with a view to better governance, the One Stop Shop appeared as a catalysing starting-point for more complex reforms of the PAR.

The second experience concerns a community participation programme in Nam Dinh where there was a dual strategic aim : to facilitate access to basic infrastructures for people living in disadvantaged districts and to promote a participatory approach as a prelude to local democracy (Stanley and Schubeler 2002). This programme included various environmental health activities linked to the living conditions through improving sanitation, provision of drinking water and refuse collection in the form of micro-credits, and education and awareness programmes in schools and among the population [43]. Restricted to just a few districts in 1997, the local authorities later institutionalized this reform throughout the city. It was integrated into an broader Urban Development Programme put forward by the SDC which aimed for strengthening capacity-building in management through a dual approach of hardware together with software, with a physical entry-point of infrastructure (sanitation and drainage) by bringing urbanized areas

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[43]   SDC (2005), *Nam Dinh Urban Development Project (NUDP),* LINK.

up to standard and a strategy of steadily establishing institutional capacity-building.

The software approach had two innovative aspects. First of all, community participation in accordance with international cooperation ideas came under a new line encouraged by the Government and expressed in the slogan "People and State work together". Despite its popularity with the international community, participation remains an ambiguous, not very explicit concept. Within the framework of this Vietnamese project, participation began with official local organizations which mobilized inhabitants, making the process credible and controllable for the local authorities (Khuat 2007). In addition, the development stakes were tackled like social and technical issues, avoiding any political connotation. The second aspect, local democracy, also responded to a transition trend starting from the standpoint of a very centralist political-administrative apparatus and moving out to a better representation of the population's interests and the gradual appropriation of a citizen's active behaviour. In Viet Nam, civil society is still weak and a kind of urban middle class is emerging which is more oriented on a consumer culture and personal ambitions than being the bearer of public opinion for social justice and common interest. Although some kind of democratic participation in this country does represent a first step towards better governance, it is a long, slow process which questions the very foundations of Vietnamese society in its political system, its social vision, its ethical and cultural values.

These two experiences of governance display new kinds of interaction among decision-makers, administrators and city users. The first issue raised is temporality. Beyond the logic of the project and its limited time span, these two experiences tend to fall into a movement of institutional transformation which is more sustainable medium- to long-term and carried out by central and local governments in Viet Nam. They also raise the democracy question. Apart from the political-administrative and territorial structures gradually modified by the PAR, the structural framework for the population is also being modified. It is gradually opening up to negotiations where a still timid civil society can acquire the right to information and to speak out. This new citizen involvement is creating an embryo of citizenship. But depending on the modernist or outdated visions of the actors, this transition

process will not be linear ; it will either progress or encounter resistance and rejection.

Urban Democratic Forums,
participatory tools in Bulgaria

While decentralization processes and administrative reforms were being carried out within the framework of a national programme in Burkina Faso and Viet Nam, the experience of democratic Forums in Bulgaria took place with the agreement of and in parallel with a municipal government exercise which resulted from an external international cooperation initiative represented by the SDC (SDC 2007). This programme of democratic Forums which affected 33 municipalities of small and medium-sized cities between 2000 and 2004, corresponded to a highly structured process of ten forums per city and brought together 60 to 80 citizens as well as around 20 experts, municipal and media people who were invited to attend for a year. In this exchange and learning arena, led by an external moderator and a local operational group, the collective discussions covered around ten priority subjects – social, economic and cultural – that had been selected at the first session and were of particular interest to the local community. During the Forums, participants listened and learned to respect the views of others, the right to speak, the expression of their personal opinions, debating through the construction of arguments and above all, the negotiation of common solutions by consensus. The idea was to develop a sense of citizen responsibility and initiative comprising two interdependent elements : an open arena for dialogue and participants' concrete activities in the form of recommendations and small projects. The recommendations addressed to the municipalities enabled a move from the identification of problems to the proposal of solutions, while the small projects enabled ideas to become action.

How was this concept translated into Bulgarian practices and how was it adopted by local actors (Berthin and Lieberherr 2001) ? Although this experiment in urban governance was announced as going hand in hand with civil society, it was carried out with the support of the municipality which gave the process legitimate status through its

presence and through the candidates' proposals, and it played the game of democracy by receiving the recommendations. It should, however, be noted that the municipalities tended to control the Forum by pre-selecting the citizen candidates according to their local political interests, and showed themselves to be little interested in the recommendations because they were used to handling the population with the view that they knew what was good for it. What happened to the civil society actors ? Although that kind of democratic Forum presupposes social representation as egalitarian as possible, local conditions displayed the prevailing socio-political codes in representations and actions. There was a kind of "élite" attending the Forum who were known for their economic and technical expertise, active and committed women, and some young people who were far less accepted and who were often motivated by personal career aspirations. However the disadvantaged and excluded categories as ethnic or economic minorities were absent. With regard to the NGOs who were supposed to play the role of catalyser of the initiatives and mediator between social and government actors, they could be placed in the context of a centralist society with no counter-power. Generally created as "services" by international aid in the 1990s, they were rarely present at the Forums, if at all.

Democratic governance was indiscutably a new paradigm in Bulgaria at the end of the 1990s (UNDP 2000). How did it develop and what was at stake ? The first evaluations carried out among the participants in the Forums mentioned elements of success in the improvement of a democratic culture and citizen responsibility, but they also mentioned factors of weakness such as scepticism and mistrust on the part of local authorities, local administrations' conservatism and absence of initiatives, participants' lack of confidence, and the weak social and economic conditions of the communities. The participants' initiative of small projects in various sectors : tourist, cultural, health or other, became the principal concern and the symbol of the Forums because these projects corresponded to the usual practice of international aid being of direct benefit to these relatively poor communities. However, their impact was very restricted because of limited understanding of short-term local and sectoral development with no regional or global perspective. During the social, institutional and economic transition process that Bulgaria is going through, the evolution starting

from a traditional vertical governance system, will take place through the clarification of legal competences, making decision-makers and citizens aware of their responsibility, and strengthening civil society. Forums assessed like schools of democracy, generating ideas and initiatives, consolidating public opinion and mobilizing citizen commitment could make a positive contribution. These Forums must enable decision-makers' authoritarianism to be overcome as well as citizens' passiveness, clientelistic practices and localist views. The Forums must also open up to multi-power sharing, a multi-ethnic view of the community and social solidarity that goes beyond inter-family or clan solidarities. Some people spoke of a revolution of mentalities. One thing is clear : the democratic Forums have multiplied in Bulgaria and have gained a following in neighbouring countries.

Urban governance – a challenge and a permanent state of construction

From a context of ideological and geopolitical transformation, whether globalization, neo-liberalism, opening up to a multipolar world and environmental crises, governance has asserted itself as a new founding paradigm of the late 20th century. Talking of cities as strategic places of the 21st century, characterized by the growing complexity of the processes involved, Saskia Sassen (2007) places the challenge of cities as platforms of governance. Spheres of promise and conflict, of social cohesion and exclusion, of wealth and poverty, cities represent a concrete environment for the exercise of politics, the management of public affairs and the integration of the demands of all formal and informal actors. Brought together around the municipalities, the various contributors can build a democratic sphere for negotiation between projects and institutions and where the plurality of local actors can be acknowledged (Massiah, 2003).

From our analyses of these urban governance experiences, some strong points emerge. As mentioned in the introduction to the three cases – Burkina Faso, Viet Nam and Bulgaria – our position of analysis considers multiple forms of governance whose adoption varies depending on the contexts, and various operational mechanisms which

result from a dominating exogenous model in international coopera-tion. Thus, urban governance far from operating as a simple manage-ment tool, shows itself to be an institutional and organizational out-come shaping community action and made up of multiple and hybrid values and attitudes. We talk of the fabrication of urban governance because it is set at the centre of socio-economic and democratic transi-tions, of exogenous and endogenous dynamics, of the emergence of new actors, of the construction of new rules and contracts for living together, and of the creation of a collective identity. Imprinted on them are movements of resistance and rejection, conflicting and di-vergent interests, development phases and phases of regression, and paralysing routines. These are all largely underestimated in projects for the promotion of governance. A new culture of participation and democratic responsibility is taking root in clannish or pre-existing centralist policies, in the local power systems in place, in the cliente-list mechanisms of social sharing and in discrimination against mino-rities.

Overall, international cooperation in transition countries aims to improve the management of cities' public affairs. It is a matter of ap-plying a normative approach but which could be said to have two contrasting ideological trends : a major neo-liberal trend represented by the World Bank promoting the weakening of local authority and the domination of the market economy, and a minor trend represented by civil mobilization with a view to participatory democracy. Partici-patory budgeting experiences in Brazilian cities and the social and ecological management in Curitiba illustrate this second approach. However, many approaches combine to a greater or lesser degree the demand for administrative, financial effectiveness with the strengthe-ning and mobilization of civil capacities.

As shown in the articles by Biau and Massiah, city management approaches have evolved over the past 30 years from vertical techno-cratic exercises, little concerned with institutional challenges, with sectoralized interventions and short-term views, to a multisectoral shared view for the city. The current context of environmental and government crises highlights the growing complexity of urban net-works, the uncertainty of the future and awareness of the long-term. All these elements contribute to this global urban governance ap-proach characterized by an opening up, by rules negotiated between

public and private actors and by collective decision-making. It is the promotion of a real public-private-citizen partnership, without a supervision and control structure, including local actors' networks in a concerted strategy of economic development, social solidarity and political participation and in a right to the city for everyone. Such a process involves commitment, expertise, political will, learning in democracy and continuity.

"Governance is the child of abundance and democracy … an idea from the rich world" where "so-called basic needs are more or less satisfied … and the market can come into play" (Moreau Defarges, 2003). This position illustrates the two principal criticisms of governance mentioned earlier, on the one hand its dominant economic dimension ruled by the market promoted by the World Bank and applied in international cooperation, and on the other hand its Western origins which transfer conditions of application direct without taking into account the vast differences in living standards, social and institutional regulations, cultural values. "A city management model that is proposed from outside means erasing any societal debate on the choice" of urban project to be developed with regard to the system of social relation governing the city (de Ponte, 2002). There are many traps to avoid falling into in the concern for each specific local context of urban governance.

However, the direction of an ideal governance, in conformity with local specificities, should follow the two dominant Western lines of democracy and sustainability, where democratic rules define public interest which are constantly re-negotiated with new compromises, and sustainable development, a new globalizing move, guides our consumer and production systems. This means taking into account the complex and contradictory issues of urban governance in order to bring about coherence in the diversity of interests and actors in a unified project, weighty trends and situations of emergency, conflicts of economic and ecological challenges, and power play in what is ultimately a win-win game. It also means democratic participation must be considered not simply as mobilization of the public within the restricted framework of a project but as a redistribution of power within a local community. "Democratic participation means questioning the existence of the political contract" between elective representatives and citizens, it questions the importance of what is deemed to be in

the public interest and also the criterion of sharing local resources (de Ponte, 2002). It means enhancing the value of the political sphere and avoiding tendencies that reduce the mechanisms of governance to merely economic and administrative effectiveness. Thus, far from being fixed and imposed, on the contrary, governance is under permanent construction through the accountability of actors and the transparency of its rules, and in accordance with political, social and cultural local codes. Between innovation and the rehabilitation of old ideas, there is a multiplicity of solutions but none claim to be the magic formula for governance in today's world.

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Part II.
The emergence of regulations within globalisation

IV

Participatory democracies: a slow march toward new paradigms from Brazil to Europe? [44]

by Giovanni Allegretti

During a conference on Participatory Budgeting (PB) organised in Prague by the "Transform !" network in November 2008, several participants from Eastern Europe declared to admire the rate at which experiences related to that particular type of participatory democracy's tool are spreading across the world. However, they added that this sounded like an utopia for their countries, which 20 years after the fall of the Berlin wall "still have more urgent problems of establishing representative frameworks".

Only some months later, at the first International Congress on Participatory Budgeting Models organised in Berlin by Inwent and Marc

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[44]   This text owes part of its reflections to the project Participatory Budgeting as innovative tool for reinventing local institutions in Portugal and Cape Verde ? A critical analysis of performance and transfers (PTDC/CS-SOC/099134/2008, funded by FEDER – COMPETE and FCT) and to the project Cidade e Alteridade : Convivência Multicultural e Justiça Urbana co-funded through an agreement FCT/CNPQ (4.4.1.00).

Bloch Institute [45], a group of young Polish activists of SLLGO [46], which deals with some growing PBs in rural cities of Poland, observed that this logic of thinking was wrong. In fact, they stated, "participatory practices provide a unique opportunity for enrooting new, improved models of representative democracy", so that "it is worth starting to structure hypotheses of governance based on dialogue between participation and representation, instead of following a path which states the supremacy of representation and then is forced to reintroduce the direct involvement of citizens to correct the crises of legitimacy of elected institutions, as already happened all over the western world".

Such an interesting debate explicitly poses the question whether or not a unique sequential logic in conceiving the relationship between representative democratic institutions and spaces of participatory decision-making exists. It also raises doubts on the fact that some countries need participatory practices as a pivotal and indispensable tool for making their representative institutions function, while others can afford to think of participation as a mere "added value", which could be either ignored or underestimated because the "minimum functionality" of institutions is already granted.

The "Double Disease of Democracy"

TOC

The theoretical debate on such issues is obviously open, but more than one renown thinker (Touraine, 1994 ; Fung and Wright, 2003 ; Santos, 2008) stresses the existence of a "double disease of liberal democracy" (DDD) which is spread all over the planet. This urges us to rethink governance frameworks that create "hybrid models" of institutions and public policies which could involve a tight dialogue between delegated decision-making and direct participation of citizens in the framing of government acts, at least in the management of local and regional levels of policies.

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[45]   See www.burgerhaushalt.de.

[46]   SLLGO is the Association of Leaders of local Civic Groups, based in Warsaw (cfr. www.lgo.pl)

As a matter of fact, the so-called "DDD" describes a twin phenomenon. On the one hand, the pathology of representation concerns the way how citizens are increasingly distant from political life and the elected, which they often even do not want to know. On the other hand, obviously related to the former, the pathology of participation is related to the increasingly common idea that "there is no point in participating", as citizens feel far too small to confront large interest groups and the political and economic dynamics that dominate society (Santos, 2008). Such a perspective seems to underline that only the implementation of a tight dialogue between participatory arenas and institutions could activate a "virtuous circle" able to bring an end to the DDD.

While this debate is taking place, in the daily practice of several political/administrative institutions around the world it is becoming increasingly clear that opening "solid" spaces for citizen participation in the shaping of public policies could simultaneously help to increase the legitimacy of institutions, as well as the efficacy of governing and managing resources. It could also allow for a better fulfilment of inhabitants' needs and provide a key stimulus towards enrooting decentralisation processes in common culture (Allegretti, Freitas, Pereira 2013). Such a "convergence of effects", which the opening of spaces of participatory democracy can offer to representative institutions and their political-administrative tasks, explains a "convergence of interests" that is often regarded as "suspicious" (Dagnino, 2004 ; Dagnino e Tatagiba, 2007 ; Ganuza e Baiocchi, 2012). This concerns the way how citizens' participation is central both within the discourse of social grassroots movements (especially those which share a common "alter-globalist" perspective, recognising themselves in the Charter of the World Social Forum) and the champions of the "neoliberal consensus", such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or even some National Cooperation Agencies.

As a matter of fact, citizen participation can be observed and evaluated through several different perspectives and points of interest, emphasizing different features and results, and using the ambiguity of the concept's intensity to stress its merely "informational" dimensions or to valorise its "co-decisional", "co-managerial" or even "revolutionary" potential. The latter is the case when the emphasis is put mainly on the pedagogical process of "cumulative and progressive

appraisal" which it can open, and whose final results cannot be imagined from the beginning. Even the concept of "citizen" can be read in various ways, either in terms of a customer, a user, an individual who could be empowered by the participatory process (thus enhancing his/her rights of accessing services and power-sharing) or in mere terms of "aggregated groups", which can exert pressures on institutions and express public choices, passing from a condition of "stakeholders" to that of "shareholders" of decisional powers.

Converging crises

Undoubtedly, the present world financial crisis raises issues related to the provision and distribution of resources, and the need to find innovative strategies is especially felt regarding local administrative institutions, affected by diminishing State transfers and self-funding opportunities. If this crisis constitutes a major issue, it is not acting alone ; but – instead – it sums its risks to those generated by the legitimacy crises of representative institutions, and to a widespread loss of communitarian values which the analyses of authors like Bauman (1998) or Beck (2003) clearly identify, relating it to "liquid modernity" and the individualist trends of present society.

The question is whether and how the convergent effects of these parallel - and interrelated – crises could be addressed by increasing the level of citizens' participation in public policies.

For many cities of different sizes, in different geographical contexts, both in the South as well as in the North of the world, this represents a crucial "bet" on which to invest human energies and creativity as well as intellectual and financial resources. So this challenge has been addressed worldwide by innovations in public policies, seeking to develop participatory mechanisms allowing citizens to share public actors' responsibilities in decision making. One of them is Participatory Budgeting (PB), which involves citizens in discussing and deciding on the priorities of budgeting documents to be implemented using public resources.

In the following paragraphs of the present essay, we will be referring to PB not only as a central *tool* of new experiments seeking to successfully renovate public policies at a local or supra-local level, but also as a *perspective* from which it is possible to understand some features and challenges of a needed major "shift" in facing the mentioned convergent crises.

We choose Participatory Budgeting for three main reasons. The first one is that PB tends to address concrete issues, proposing a way to share decision-making on resource allocation between elected representatives and inhabitants, which appears to be relevant in the context of economic crisis, but also for making the perception of this "sharing" more effective among the social actors. Resource allocation is definitely a matter of highly concrete and symbolic value. The second reason relates to the fact that the majority of around 2,700 PBs today experienced in the world (Sintomer, Herzberg, Allegretti, 2013) go beyond a mere "stakeholder' approach", opening decision-making to all citizens, independent of their belonging to aggregated groups. They therefore take advantage of "individual motivations", using them as an engine to promote participation, while creating deliberative common spaces where all proposals can be negotiated and reviewed through collective action. The third reason for focussing our essay on PB is because during the last 24 years several different models of it have been implemented, showing an intense variety of motivations and objectives, which were set in coherence with specific tools and local government cultures in each specific local context (Sintomer, Herzberg, Allegretti, 2013 ; Sintomer, Allegretti, 2009). Such features allow considering Participatory Budgeting today as representative of the plural paradigms which are contributing to shape a new "culture of participation" around the planet, which shows the added value of following a South-North direction in global learning. Under this perspective, PB could be regarded as both a space for renovating public policies and political systems, and an instrument to dynamise societal relations and try to create a new civic culture of common goods.

Participatory Budgeting :
an incremental tool for
facing a wide range of issues

Today, using the definition of Appadurai (1991), we could consider PB as an "ideoscape", signifying a political model which travels globally but exists through local appropriation. Participatory Budgeting, after first being shaped during the '90s in semi-peripheric Latin American countries, where it contributed to consolidating new democratic institutions (Sintomer and Allegretti 2013, Calvo 2011, Molina Molina 2010, Avritzer, 2009, Santos 2007 ; Marquetti, Campos, Pires. 2007), spread to Europe and Africa at the end of the millennium.

Today PB could be considered a mainly urban "device". In fact, although its methodologies are spreading also in rural environments (especially in Poland, in the Andes and in some African countries), its first experiments have all been implemented in big cities, and the main and more interesting examples are still held in large towns, as it is well proved by cases such as those of Dakar, Yaoundé, Lisbon, Cologne, New York or Chicago [47]. A reason to explain such prevalence could be that the original conception of PB was aimed at bridging social gaps and reducing the distance between citizens and elected institutions. This usually constitutes a deeper problem in large and dense urban areas whose size and scale of problems reinforce social polarization and the separation between inhabitants and their political representatives.

According to Cabannes (2004, 2005), four "pure models" of PB can be recognised analysing a wide range of existing experiences. The first and most widespread one is the "territorial model", in which discussions on resources are organised through community- or neighbourhood-based public debates. The second is a "thematic model", which concentrates energies on specific policy sectors (ex-

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[47]   The last two ones developed since 2011 in some electoral districts of the two cities and are growing very fast in terms of increasing deliberative quality and spreading to other wards (Lerner and Secondo, 2012).

ample of this could be the "Public Housing PB" of the Toronto Housing Community and the Logiparc Housing Agency of Poitiers). The third one is the so-called "actorial model" which aims to involve specific social or age groups (the most common example being the PBs dedicated to younger people and schools, as in the French Regions of Poitou Charentes and Nord-Pas de Calais, in the Swedish towns of Uddevalla and Örebro, in the Brazilian metropolises of Recife and Fortaleza, or in the towns of São Bras de Alportel, Trofa, Lisbon, Oliveira do Hospital, Vilanova de Famalicão and Condeixa in Portugal). The fourth model – partially overlapped to the previous - could be defined as a "virtual PB", because proposals, deliberation and priority voting take place mainly through the internet, as happens in Lisbon (Portugal) or Cologne (Germany). In both cases this involves a significative amount of investments included in the municipal budget. Examples of this last typology demonstrate how the risk of exclusion which it can imply needs to be addressed by mixing such a model with others, simultaneously offering different channels of possible participation. In the hypothesis tested in Belo Horizonte, Lisbon or Cascais (Allegretti 2012a, Sampaio 2010), important investments have been made in "itinerant caravans" equipped with computers and internet connections, through which trained facilitators help people living in the most deprived areas (and especially youngsters) to learn to use computers and to participate in "virtual PB" voting.

Today, all the above mentioned "PB models" are rarely found alone. Instead, the majority of experiences mix them, trying to create complementary environments for a "healthy development" of participatory practices allowing for an equal access to different groups or types of citizens.

In a context of financial and economic crisis, it seems natural that existing PBs, which historically have mainly been instruments towards orienting resource allocation, thus focussing on expenses, and particularly capital investments, are changing or at least enriching their "core business". This has implied starting to debate issues related to "income", with the clear aim of strengthening the financial autonomy of local institutions, by consolidating they revenue- and fundraising capacity, as well as their ability to build partnerships with the social fabric and economic stakeholders. This is becoming a strongly-felt "need" especially in some developing countries in Africa, but also

in small and medium sized European cities, such as Grottammare in Italy or Santa Cristina de Aro in Spain, which have been experiencing such a shift in the last five years.

A last development is also clearly visible regarding the recent spread of PB experiences around the world. It is related to the "cross-pollination" of Participatory Budgeting with other practices of social dialogue, such as spatial participatory planning, sectorial consultative councils or Agendas XXI. In the case of some German PBs, the tradition of "Planungzelle" (Dienel, 1977) led to experiments involving the use of a "random selection" of citizens, involving different types of social groups and individuals, which were not easily attracted to participate in public debates, in the budgetary discussion. This "hybrid merge" between PB and the "citizens' juries" method has likewise been experienced in other countries such as Spain, France or the Tuscany Region in Italy, and in rare cases even combined with principles of "deliberative polling" (Fishkin, 2009). An example of the latter is that of the Zeguo district in the Wenling municipality in China (He, 2011, 2010), which used random sampling of inhabitants, through scientifically set methods aimed at increasing the "representative capacity" of PB, thus reflecting gender, age and socio-economic stratifications and the educational-professional differentiation of the overall population. Although interesting for their ability to raise issues of "social representativity" and "deep deliberation", models like that of Zeguo seem to compromise on objectives of "social inclusion" and civic pedagogy through wide participation, given that they concentrate on "reduced samples" of inhabitants (Sintomer, Traub-Merz, Zhang, Herzberg, 2012).

Therefore, today it is becoming clear that choosing a specific set of PB is a strong political option, which has to seriously interrogate itself on the coherence between its main aims, on the one hand, and the mechanisms of promoting and implementing participation locally, on the other hand. Just to provide an example of this, if the Swedish PBs, whose main need for experimenting is that of recreating and enhancing social ties within the context of a strongly individualist and fragmented society (Allegretti 2011c, Langlet, 2008), would use the Internet as the main feature for debating and voting priorities, they would probably not reach their goals, therefore partially wasting time, resources and energies.

Such a reflection is important in supporting the idea that PB is not a "model", but rather a contextualizable "set of principles" which characterises a new approach to participation. Some of these principles have been well classified for the European context by comparative research (Sintomer and Allegretti, 2009 ; Sintomer, Herzberg and Röcke, 2008). They are : (1) The budgetary and/or financial dimension needs to be explicitly discussed. (2) A participatory budget needs to be implemented at a town level (or a decentralised district that has an elected assembly and a certain measure of control over public services) while a neighbourhood level *per se* is not enough. (3) It should be a repetitive procedure over a period of time : a single meeting or referendum on budgetary issues does not constitute a participatory budget in the sense implied in our work. (4) The process should include certain forms of public deliberation in assemblies or specific fora. (5) The moderators of the participatory approach should report back on the results achieved, at least in the form of a report or follow-up to discussions (notion of accountability).

Obviously, these criteria have been established in order to clarify the features of PBs and distinguish them from a larger range of other participatory or consultative tools in use in several cities within the European context. On other continents, it would be possible to stress the centrality of other principles : for example the need of implementing specific measures for increasing "social justice" and "solidarity" in the distribution of public resources or for guaranteeing the total transparency of expenses-tracking as a means to fight corruption (Matovu, 2006), as we will see further. As a matter of fact, the contexts and the goals which justify the experimentation of PB may modify its main settings, possibly adding new criteria to those above stated, rather than replacing them (Allegretti, 2012, Allegretti, Garcia, Paño 2011, Allegretti, Alves 2011).

Tailoring practices
to the changing contexts

If settings and goals of PBs are usually site-specific, results also are. As Marquetti et alii (2007) and the project INCLUIR (2007) showed well, for example, the capacity of PB to be a space of social inclusion and redistributive justice is directly proportional to the tools forged to implement these aims. Since the start-up of the first Participatory Budgeting examples in the early '90s, Brazilian cities have been those which set a wider range of measures to fulfil these types of goals.

Among the means to guarantee equal access to all citizens some were very simple but sagacious. For example, specific rules regulating the speaking-time of each intervening person during PB meetings were set in order to "equalize" the cultural differences between participants and their different habits to speak (or not) in public ; babysitting sessions during assemblies were organised to allow participation of young and/or monoparental families, which usually have less spare-time than the elderly (especially retired citizens) ; the live-streaming of assemblies was used to integrate commuters and other citizens with difficulties to attend meetings ; the geography of meeting places was set according to the need of guaranteeing accessibility to all neighbourhoods, particularly those less served by public transportation, and in some cases the number of public meetings was multiplied in order to allow people to participate in assemblies taking place in spaces located at walking-distance. Taking into account the risk that the choice of meeting places could communicate wrong information to the inhabitants, public spaces such as schools, libraries or sport centres were privileged rather than using private schools, seats of associations, parties or institutions which could give the impression of being "excluding" spaces for some types of potential participants.

As far as the size of public meetings for discussing budget priorities is concerned, this probably represents the weakest point in Brazilian experiences. Here where big assemblies have always been privileged, in comparison with the use of small seminars and workshops

where everybody could feel more at ease, due to the reduced number of participants and the slower agendas, marked by a more serene use of time and space resources. Over time, several cities corrected mistakes related to this particular aspect, creating a variable geometry of spaces (pre-meetings, convocations for the preparation of public debates, thematic seminars) compatible with a wide range of needs and the desires of every citizen. Experiences are known, where special tools were used to take into account the particular needs of disabled people, i.e. translation in language-of-signs for integrating deaf participants, and the publication of reports and proceedings of meetings in Braille. In several of these situations, initially the service did not exist, but was provided by the municipalities after specific requests and pressures by citizens with special needs. The fact of PB usually being an "incremental" and "progressively-built" process helped to complexify its features and devices over time according to the requests of participants.

As far as measures towards stimulating a more equitable distribution of resources are concerned, Brazil also possesses several important experiments, usually centred on three types of devices. The first is constituted by the so-called "matrixes of social criteria", whose goal is to reduce the "dictatorship of simple majority", merging the vote of citizens who support specific investments with "technical criteria" helping to address common choices which benefit weaker social groups and/or specific areas of the city. The second device consists of providing "positive discrimination" criteria which make weaker social groups more represented inside "delegate groups" which, especially in big cities, are usually established to simplify the dialogue between citizens and public officials in some decisional phases of each participatory process. A third tool is represented by the so-called "caravanas", i.e. collective visits organised by public institutions to involve citizens in an active diagnosis of their territory before the phase of investment priority voting. This last measure is very important because it is not only useful to enrich the debate on the investments which are most urgent to support, but also because they can help to alleviate a lack of knowledge on the relevant territory which affects a majority of citizens.

The last example clearly illustrates that such tools become very useful not only for their direct effects on investments, but mainly for

their pedagogic added value on citizens' civic engagement and maturation. In fact, "social justice" could be guaranteed by elected institutions through services and decisions which choose not to pass "through" PB voting. As it happens in Europe, for example, the quantity of investments co-decided with citizens could be limited to a restricted part of the budget, in order to leave to elected officials a "discretional space of manoeuvre" to guarantee an equal distribution of resources. But such behaviour seems rooted in a widespread relationship between inhabitants and representative institutions mainly based on mutual "mistrust", which could negatively affect the participatory spirit. Meanwhile, if measures to guarantee equity and solidarity are undertaken together inside a collective space of decision-making, as is the case in several PBs in Southern World, the trust-centred environment could enhance and stimulate important results in terms of pedagogic appraisal (Mbera, 2012).

As Rebecca Abers' findings underline (2000), only by accepting to be a really open space to share decision-making with citizens, Participatory Budgeting can foster important appraisal, which is not only useful to increase the levels of civic engagement of citizens, but can also teach and shape new skills to be reused in private life, making citizens grow up as more complex and richer human beings (see also Talpin, 2011).

The rescue of territories :
reaching environmental sustainability
through enhancing citizenship

One of the main aims of the first experiences of Participatory Budgeting – especially the Brazilian ones in the early '90s – was to consolidate citizenship and expand the "right to the city", by making traditionally silent voices count in policy setting and decision making. In the transformation of local territory many of these cases, concentrated on issues of social integration, which sometimes could only be solved through physical arrangements, such as the requalification of slums, the provision of infrastructures and services, the opening of equipped common areas, and so on, but the "territory" and its envi-

ronmental quality in themselves were not so central as such (Allegretti, 2003). It was a strong political choice by institutions whose political representatives were convinced that the quality of "citizenship" and the level of accessibility of services are a crucial precondition for the sustainability of territorial transformations and the improvement of their quality level.

That explains why several cities invested in training programmes whose main aim was to provide new skills and tools to citizens and public officials with respect to promoting better decision making on public policies. This is the case of several Brazilian cities (such as Porto Alegre or Guarulhos, in the São Paulo metropolitan area), and some Bolivian (El Alto) and Spanish (Seville) ones. They invested in "capacity building" initiatives by often using the pedagogic methods of Paulo Freire centred in self-appraisal. Their aim was to avoid the training moment being perceived by citizens as space of "indoctrination" through which representative institutions would try to influence people decisions, instead of simply contributing to the creation and spreading of new knowledge and capacities of critical analysis of urban complexity. One of the first Asian PB experiences, that of Kerala State in India (Shubham et al. 2001), which took shape in 1996 [48] and still represents one of the worldwide largest experiments at a regional level, also took this line of action. In the "*Kerala People's Campaign for the Ninth Plan*" promoting citizen participation in decentralized planning was held to call for a preliminary capacity building phase. In this respect, together with a pilot-project called "Kalliasseri People's Planning Experiment", the "Total Literacy Campaign", the "People's Science Movement" and the "People's Resource Mapping Program" became indispensable instruments to spread a culture of participation in complex decisions,. Furthermore, in order to increase the mobilisation of citizens through a cyclical process, 373 state-level trainers were involved, together with almost 10,500 trained provincial-level resource-persons and 50,000 trained local activists. Among the latter 4,000 retired technicians were mobilised as "Volunteer Technical Corps" to spread knowledge and give quality to discussions, which constituted the "engine" of the process since its beginning (Sunny, 2009 ; Chaudhuri and Heller, 2002).

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[48]   See: http://www.kerala.gov.in/government/localself.htm

All of these examples underline that improving the quality of public discussion and that of all policies aimed to fulfil the common interests of a local community is possible, but that it requires specific measures and investments. The case of Porto Alegre still remains an important reference from this point of view. In 1994 the new mayor Tarso Genro, who was very much concerned with the quality of democratic decision-making processes (Genro and De Souza, 1997) promoted an important evolution in PB mechanisms, making citizens collectively approve two major transformations : first the introduction of thematic PB assemblies, and second the establishment of "social and technical criteria" which have to be fulfilled by citizens' requests within the hierarchisation of budget priorities. In fact, Genro's team had noticed that a limited number of issues were always at the top of the "priorities list" issued by the PB People Council every year (usually housing, street-paving and basic infrastructures). That repetition, although necessary to reduce the infrastructural gaps and to reverse the social polarisation of city investments, could impoverish the complexity of urban management that local institutions have to guarantee ; for example, eliminating issues such as culture or the environment from the governing perspective. Furthermore, some municipal services (as those in charge of mobility and infrastructures) had noticed that the quality of certain public works had gradually lowered, due to the fact that the "pressure" posed by citizens on some priorities such as street-asphalting was pushing the administration to implement decisions rapidly, without matching the quality levels usually guaranteed by the respect of technical requirements and building procedures (Allegretti, 2005a).

There were two ways of dealing with such risks : one was a top-down and authoritarian one (i.e. : reducing the amount of money on which citizens could exert co-decision, in order to provide a margin for manoeuvre to the institutions which would guarantee the survival of many other important policies.), and the other was proposing a modification of the PB structure introducing a mechanism which could stimulate citizens (from "inside" the process") to widen their reading of city complexity. This second path was the one chosen by the Porto Alegre municipal government, in order to express its commitment to increase (and not reduce) the margins of participation. Although, it was not an easy policy to be followed, due to the resistance

that citizens put up for some years against the respect of "technical/legal requirements and criteria" applied to the hierarchisation phase of PB decisions. From their point of view the latter appeared to be an easy, artificial and clever way to "re-bureaucratise" the participatory process and partially expropriate the "peoples' will". The argument convincing the popular committees which annually contribute to the revision and amendment of the PB "internal ruling document" was that, given that many technical criteria were set by national laws, they had to be respected anyway. Superposing them after citizens' decisions, instead of incorporating them during decision making would have enormously slowed the implementation of certain investments.

The present complexity of the participatory architecture of cities like Porto Alegre, Recife, Seville, Belo Horizonte or Fortaleza, which can scare a beginner when looking at the fluxograms and organigrams of the structure set to improve decision-making, should be interpreted from this perspective. It is just a slow ongoing process of studying "additions" seeking to improve the quality of commonly-done decisions, which gradually complexify the PB "device". The scope of these "additions" will hopefully be taken into account by new starting processes, but copying the complex structure might also be dangerous, risking the creation of a participatory device which repulses citizens because of its unreadable complexity, instead of attracting them through its transparent and understandable way of functioning.

As a matter of fact, every local experience should gradually reach its complexity, respecting the level of "tolerance" that social actors can afford at every stage of the participatory device's transformations, which could be strictly linked to the characteristics of each local context, its social/political conditions and its maturity in dealing with several interconnected issues at the same time.

Enhancing a pedagogy of solidarity

The expansion of PB to several different places today illustrates this aspect and poses new challenges to the device itself. This is clear, when comparing some Southern world PBs with those of Sweden or Norway, for example. In the first, in fact, issues related to culture and the environment are often left at the margins of decision-making by the social actors (or appear as "late conquests"), while in some Nordic countries they are central from the beginning of the process.

Notwithstanding, reaching aims of complexity in participatory decision-making, and facing issues related to sustainability in the public discussion is possible. This possibility is often in a relation of direct proportionality with the capacity of local governments (or of the most sensitive and innovative social actors) to clarify the existing links between the apparent "abstraction" of issues related to sustainability and the concrete daily-life-experience of citizens, and the aim of guaranteeing a better quality of life for every citizen. An interesting case again is offered by the Porto Alegre experience, in as far as it concerns the issue of convincing citizens to support the approval of investments to reduce water-pollution in the city's lake Guaiba.

At the end of the '90s the inhabitants several times opposed the suggestions of the City Hall to approve "anti-pollution measures to clean the lake", where bathing had been forbidden for many years. But in 2000, the Municipality proposed to introduce a "technical criterium" which (without superposing the people's decision on priorities to be funded) could promote a gradual depollution programme for Lake Guaiba (Prefeitura de Porto Alegre, 2002). The criteria consisted of giving a higher score (while deciding the list of priorities to fund) to the "demolition" of slums located beside the lake and its affluent rivers and streams, and the "relocation" of their inhabitants in social housing. This could allow reducing pollution without investing money in specific environmental projects for the lake. When some years later the idea started to produce its first concrete effects, and the Praia do Lami (Lami's beach) was re-opened to bathing soon to be followed by several other beaches, many vulnerable social groups which had until

then considered "environmental policies" just as a superfluous issue benefiting people with an already wealthy social status, they started to revise their positions. In fact, they understood that depollution was allowing economically vulnerable citizens to take a swim close to home, without having to reach the sea-beach, located at a distance of more than 100 km. requiring an expensive trip. From this perspective, the first practical output of the environmental-friendly criterion used to promote the cleaning of the lake without further investments created the possibility of giving to the policy a new proactive reading. Other cases which have been able to make the discussion of environmental policies more "acceptable" to all the citizenry were related to waste-recycling, whose potential of producing local development and micro-economies to benefit vulnerable social groups was underlined with positive effects.

In the light of such examples, PB could be read as an interesting mechanism which can address issues of environmental sustainability (reduction of the ecological footprint, land saving, precautionary principle, energy saving, closure of natural cycles, protection of biodiversity and socio-diversity, etc.), through the emphasis made on sustainability addressed first of all in its social-economic dimensions (Busatto, 2005). Thus, it is a device which can slowly foster cultural changes, making citizens and institutions "converge" towards the valorisation of policies aimed at increasing sustainable development by widening the adhesion of all social/political and administrative actors to the main "principles" of sustainability.

Similar challenges are not automatic in any PB and they only can be addressed in a mid-term perspective, especially through merging Participatory Budgeting with other processes of citizen participation in planning and development. This is because PB is a device tending to face "immediate" investments, which often can be decided within a narrow-minded, fragmented and short-termed perspective, if specific measures are not undertaken towards complexifying the visions of all the intervening actors, thus trying to overcome the risks of immediatism and self-referentiality.

Learning from the South and differentiating motivations and goals of experimentation

Over the last 10 years, the diffusion of networks of decentralised co-operation practices among local administrations and research centres, the interest of some international institutions (primarily UNDP, UN-Habitat and the World Bank Institute), and the efforts of the "alterglobalist" movement acting under the motto 'Another World is Possible' to spread awareness of some important experiences in the democratisation of urban management in Latin American cities, stimulated the birth of experiences of participatory budgets in Europe and other continents.

The European Union itself has even funded exchange and emulation projects, launching a Network (No. 9 of the URB-AL cooperation programme) entirely dedicated to the issue of Participatory Budgets. The mutual learning during the programmes of dialogue and cooperation between cities was the main factor that allowed 'the return of the caravels'. That is, the 'disembarkation' and the taking root in European soil of creative innovations born from urban management in cities in the Global South, which themselves had been stimulated by a 'virtuous rethinking' of land management models often borrowed from Old World Countries during and after the periods of colonisation (Allegretti, Herzberg, 2004).

The Latin American practices of PB had mainly centred on 'urban conflict' rather than on the search for 'social peace', interpreting urban conflict as a source of creative solutions, capable of drawing on the wealth of different stratifications in cities without mortifying them through homogenising approaches. In this way, they had tried to put different sectors of society into dialogue with each other, and to involve 'antagonistic' movements in the experimentation with innovative management policies for the transformation of land use. In some cases, several Latin American PBs had succeeded to fight global trends convinced that privatisation of public services and outsourcing and externalisation of social responsibilities must be the rule in order to grant efficiency to local policies through market-oriented strategies,

that rarely proved interest in the needs of the most vulnerable citizens. For example, in Porto Alegre the re-publicisation of the transportation agency in 1990 showed great results in terms of efficiency and effectiveness when combined with a participatory approach which was able to involve users as well as employees in the reshaping of mobility services. The same happened in Belo Horizonte and Fortaleza for the water and housing services, while in Recife a new umbrella-project of "risk-prevention" interlinked with participatory budgeting recently won the "Best Practices" award of the International Observatory of Participatory Democracy (2008) [49], for having managed to almost reduce to zero the number of casualties of citizens living in poor and unsafe areas yearly struck by natural disasters.

In the European contexts, the interpretation of PB has undoubtedly been more "light". For example, until now rarely PBs have acted as spaces to challenge mechanisms of privatisation, which tend to leave larger and larger margins of power to those that end up managing 'common assets', once 'public assets' in both ownership and management terms.

If in cases like Italy this lack of a cultural shift toward common goods was mainly the consequence of regulations approved by national or regional governments to stimulate the private management of formerly public services, in other countries the free choice left to municipalities on how to manage their facilities and service-delivery structures made the ambiguity of some PB conceptions become clear.

Spain is an example where the study of "ambiguity" in PB application becomes interesting. In fact, there are towns such as Puente Genil (Andalusia) or Santa Cristina de Aro (Catalonia), where PB decisions are applied to all public sectors, including the management of service-delivery agencies. In Cordoba, instead, the sub-budget of municipal sectorial agencies has often been excluded from the financial pot subjected to citizens' decisions, so reducing the total amount of services and resources left in their hands. And this despite the city being a promoter of the international network of Local Authorities against the Privatisation of Public Services…

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[49]   www.oidp.net

Families of innovative practice :
heading beyond models

If examples of Participatory Budgets in Europe do not point at an inversion of the privatising or outsourcing mechanism, as experimented in some of Latin America cases (especially in the Andean area, and mainly in villages and cities with a high indigenous population rate), this is mainly because PB in Europe was less intended as a tool for democratising access to resources and democratic management of common goods and assets than as an instrument for granting 'good governance'.

Sintomer and Allegretti (2013, 2009) and Sintomer, Herzberg and Allegretti (2012) showed in their comparative studies on PBs in Europe that in the Old Continent several different families of Participatory Budgeting are today at work, often being strictly linked to models of management which reduce citizens' participation to the valorisation of "proximity", social linkages and "community development", as well as the modernisation of the public administration machine or the creation of new public-private partnerships. Much more rare, instead, are the examples centred on the horizon of reaching a radical model of participatory management of public resources, where the goal of "social justice" could be a pivotal feature. The most interesting examples of PB where a fairer redistribution of common resources becomes a central goal are mainly concentrated in Spain, as the cases of Cordoba and Seville illustrate (Allegretti, 2012 ; Allegretti and Ganuza, 2013). They usually set mechanisms for enhancing public discussions and decisions which are based on the creation of the already mentioned "grids of social criteria" which could help to valorise projects aimed to mainly benefit weak social groups and less wealthy neighbourhoods of each city. Such mechanisms were inspired by those in use in many Latin American experiences, where PBs are generally also conceived as means for contributing to fill the gaps between social groups and the different areas of a often highly polarised territory.

As far as it concerns other cities in different countries from Spain, is it possible to underline that the aim of reaching "territorial (rather

than social) justice" seem to be a frequent goal for several PBs, which subdivide their territory in several sub-districts, in each one of which citizens have the right to approve some priorities (in terms of public works and policies) to be inserted in the budget proposal for the next year.

It has to be admitted that in some cases Latin American cities have been able to turn sophisticated and modern tools into administrative routine much more than European cities themselves. A clear example relates to the merging and articulation between PB and the processes of participatory planning. Since the early '90s, for example, the city of Porto Alegre was subdivided into 16 districts, whose number and borders were forged according to a discussion with community groups, in order to reflect feelings of "ownership and belonging". In 1999, the new Master Plan led the City Council to create 8 Planning Regions, each one merging together two PB districts in order to create a better relationship between the choices of participatory budgeting and those of the "Municipal Management System of Urban Planning". When the Observatory of Porto Alegre (OBSERVAPOA) was created in 2005, one of its main tasks was to develop social, economical and environmental indicators on easily understandable maps, reorganising all the statistical data through a Geographic Information System which was based on the PB districts. The Observatory was a very important innovation in itself, because it was set up as a "mixed structure" (whose members are the municipality, some universities and social organisations, but also inhabitants indicated by the Popular Council of Participatory Budgeting), which has the task to verify and diffuse knowledge on the city, raising the level of inhabitants' awareness and confidence in the information spread, due to the fact that its main source is not anymore located in the political powers, but in a larger range of different actors (Fedozzi, 2007). Only few cities in Europe (as those of Bobigny or Morsang sur Orge in the Metropolitan area of Paris [50]) have so far adopted a similar idea of letting Observatories monitor participatory processes. But recently the OIDP international network, based in Barcelona, studied special guidelines for stimulating cities and social movements to create independent observatories to follow

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[50]   See Camilla Lattanzi (2008), "*Virtù periferica*", in *Altreconomia*, October 2008, pp. 34-35.

and communicate the output of participatory experiences in local areas, and some structures started to be activated in other parts of Latin America (as in Chile and Mexico, for example) as well as in Africa, where an African-Wide Observatory on Participation was launched in December 2012 together with the Senegalese Ngo ENDA.

In the same period, in the town of Santo André (located in the San Paulo metropolitan area), PB and strategic planning have been systematically articulated, and the strategic planning meetings had to elect delegates to the PB council. The Office for participatory budgeting and planning (SOPP) also elaborated a Geographic Information System to represent on maps the social indicators in each district, together with the distribution of resources made possible by PB. The city participated in the URBAL Project "INCLUIR" (called "Participatory Budgeting as a means to overcome the social and territorial exclusion"), using the opportunity to improve its representational geographic-based system, and make some European cities interested on how to replicate or emulate it.

In Belo Horizonte, in 2008, the Municipal Government published a complete study on the distribution of the 1000 public works funded through PB since 1993. Thanks to the Geographic Information System, it was calculated that 80% of the city population was living closer than 500 metres from a Participatory Budget-funded public infrastructure, and it was represented on very communicative maps. But Belo Horizonte went further in using new technologies, for example setting an "electronic PB" which allowed more than 500.000 citizens to vote some city-wide public works through the internet (Sampaio 2010, Allegretti, Matias, Schettini 2007). Furthermore, in 1996, the spatialisation of social/economical data was used by the Town Hall and the Catholic University of Minas Gerais to create the "Quality Index of Urban Life" (IQVU), whose more than 50 parameters were used to better distribute the municipal resources on the 80 infra-urban statistical areas of the territory. Since 2000, PB in Belo Horizonte allocates resources to every district proportionally to the level of its IQVU : the lower the index, the higher the resources aimed at improving the quality of life in that city area.

Similar "more scientific features" are still today to be implemented in European cities, although in the last 2 or 3 years the use of Internet tools to better enroot PB in the decision-making structures of some

cities have made enormous progress. The software created in Hamburg to "simulate" budget construction, or those used in Modena and Rome XI [51] to map and follow the implementation of co-decided investments clearly illustrate this trend.

Despite this generally slow modernisation of tools used within the PB frameworks, in 2008 a very interesting mathematical instrument was adopted in the Participatory Budget of the IX District of Rome, thanks to the support of the Tipus Laboratory of Participatory Techniques of the Third Roman University. The device consists of using ANP software (Analytic Network Process), a *multicriteria* method of calculation whose aim is to evaluate the cost/benefit relationship of each investment proposal made by citizens, through considering some "intangibles", i.e. perspectives, variables and factors not linked to their economic/financial value. The method (Sintomer, Allegretti, 2009) is based on the translation into numbers of judgements made by citizens in a narrative form, and the final index result is higher proportionally to how much the number of benefits reduce environmental and social costs. It is interesting that in the Rome IX District, the proposed method was not implemented before being discussed with citizens' representatives, and that they contribute to improving its performance by inserting two new principles for evaluation, which are the "solidarity potential" of each proposal, and its "capacity of creating synergies" with other works and projects already under way in the area (Allegretti, Alves 2011).

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[51]   In 2006 the Rome XI District (together with other partners) elaborated a free-software for connecting PB and the Google Earth satellite images, called "E-dem 1.0" (www.municipiopartecipato.it). Unfortunately the process of PB stopped in 2008, and the software has not been used again, although other cities (as the Spanish Santa Cristina de Aro) are today using it.

Expanding knowledge
through planetary networks

How many of all the different experiments of PB and other partici-patory processes will be able to "merge" and "positively contaminate" each other, partially will depend on the degree of "inclusiveness" that international networks of participatory practices will be able to reach. Today, in fact, one of the most outstanding processes has been the birth of several networks which are stimulating the interchanges among experiences in different countries, both in a North-to-North, in a South-to-North and in a South-to-South perspective. But the degree of "inclusiveness" of these different structures is also highly differen-tiated.

In fact, networking is happening at different levels, it is promoted by a wide range of different actors and often reveals objectives and strategies which are diverse and complementary. One of the main types of networks today dealing with PB as a key issue is that of so-called "national networks", which valorise the common language and a similar socio-political background of PB experiences taking place in the same country. Among these networks there are some (as the Bra-zilian, the Chilean or the Colombian one, but also the Italian Working Group of the multiactorial association called Network of the New Municipium or ARNM) which have a high level of politisation. For this reason, they can sometimes be perceived as "exclusive clubs" whose permeability is reduced because members are informally re-quested to share a common political vision on PB as a central tool for "democratising democracy".

In other countries, "governance" constitutes the main focus of na-tional networks – which are often more informal and built around a "catalyst" institution (as Engagement Global/Service in One World in Germany, the tandem CES–IN LOCO in Portugal, the Association of Regions and Municipalities – SALAR/SKL - in Sweden). In these lat-ter cases (as well as in Japan or South Korea), PB is usually read as a useful tool to foster a modernisation of government's action, by in-creasing transparency and the efficacy of policies, and promoting im-

provements in social capital creation. In such cases, the networks seem more open to incorporate political and ideological differences, and their permeability provides a more "inclusive" approach to different kind of experiments, while also presenting the risk of fostering the "dilution" of the main PB principles. The German case is particularly interesting because the "virtual space of networking" created by the "*Bürgershaushalt*" project [52] proposes a "filtering" of accepted members, through setting some minimum criteria of access to welcome new local institutions in the web.

The opportunities of "scaling-up"

Rare cases of "regional networks" can be found in Lazio or Tuscany (both in Italy) and in Andalusia (Spain). Here networking is not an explicit objective, but a natural effect of a regional strategy which combines training of local authorities together with special funding dedicated to promote participation at municipal and submunicipal levels, thus strengthening a natural dialogue between experimenting institutions.

A lack is generally felt in the performance of all these national or regional level networks : it relates to the still unexplored possibility of realising a comprehensive "mapping" of each country's or region's experiences which could go beyond the panorama of active members of the network itself, and stimulate comparative studies among all the existing experiences in that territory.

The Lazio Region constitutes an exception, having started in 2008 to publish an annual "*Atlas*" of all the PBs experimented in the regional territory. Anyway, being that the work is internally produced by the Regional Office of Participation, for reasons of diplomacy (and also lack of human and intellectual resources) it does not contain any "evaluation", but is limited to "descriptions" sent by the cities themselves and lightly re-elaborated by the Regional Office personnel.

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[52]   See : www.burgerhaushalt.de.

An effective networking strategy is today being promoted by the United Cities and Local Government Office for Africa, which in 2012 started a promotion and training strategy for PB. It also instituted a special award for African best practices in the participatory budgeting domain, which has been launched in the "Africities" Pan-African Forum 2012 (in Dakar) and will be delivered in all the next editions of the event. Such a strategy is taking advantage of already well established national networks, which mainly work in Senegal, Cameroon and Madagascar. Especially in the latter two countries, they have been able to promote cross-pollination among municipal experiences of PB, creating a critical mass that is quickly multiplying the number of local experiments, which overcome the number of 75 in each of those countries. An interesting case is that of the South Kivu Region (Mbera, 2012) in the Democratic Republic of Congo, whose Provincial Government in 2010 started to promote PBs, actively contributing – with the support of the World Bank Institute – to the increase of local resources to guarantee more effectiveness to the experiments. The South Kivu Province formalized its commitment with the promotion of participatory Budgeting with a legal framework which enforces local authorities to undertake PB experiments.

Nowadays, one of the most interesting and effective world experiences in scaling-up PBs is that of Poland, where in 2009 the National Government approved the so-called "Solecki Fund" law, which promote participatory budgeting in rural villages, through a reimbursement mechanism which give back from 10% up to 30% of the value of PB investments granted by the city, according to a mathematic formula which rewards the poorest municipalities and those that invest more in PB. Thanks to such a mechanism, in 2012 the number of PBs in Poland raised to more than 1,100 in 2012, also convincing urban municipalities (which are not touched by the benefits of the law) to undertake PB experiments. Somehow, this experiment (which is part of the expansion of PB to ex Soviet-countries, taking into account the PB experience which started recently in Albania, Croatia and Slovakia) proved even more effective than those of countries (as Peru and Dominican Republic) in which PB was made compulsory by national laws for all local authorities (McNulty, 2012 ; Allegretti et alii, 2012 ; World Bank, 2010).

Towards an open conclusion :
enhancing the quality of policy
through the quality of democracy

In the last five years several cities around the world increasingly benefited from such mechanisms, promoting "cross-pollination" between their participatory experimentations, and if Participatory Budgeting spread quickly in such different places it was partially due to the growth of cooperation interchanges, which was strengthened as well by the diffusion of policy-oriented handbooks and international libraries of participatory techniques and best practices (see UN-Habitat/ENDA TM, 2008 ; UN-Habita/MDP-ESA, 2008 ; UN-Habitat, 2009 ; URBACT, 2006).

If we read the spreading of Participatory Budgeting as a metaphor of the possibilities opened by the radicalisation of participatory experiences – at least those heading to a horizon of participatory democracy implementation – we could be optimist. In fact, many experiences reveal to have been reaching important "material" results in several domains, such as the reintegration of the informal settlements, the diffusion of infrastructures in areas ignored for a long time, the reduction of vandalism in public spaces or the faster implementation of more effective environmental projects. They have also produced more "immaterial" outputs, like the growth of the average level of civic sense, the valorisation of citizens' skills through new partnerships, the recreation of mutual trust between citizens and political representatives, the better integration of vulnerable social groups, the capacity of local institutions to increase their strength via the creation of critical masses of pressure (involving their citizens) to obtain more attention and transfers from the supra-local institutions, or the raise in quality of public debates on territorial problems.

The major limit of all formalised participatory processes (and particularly of the most complex ones, like PB) is that they are "fragile" and "volatile" (Cabannes, 2005), due to the fact that in the majority of countries they are superposed to the autonomous capacities of organisations of civil society. Their rules risk to reveal themselves as "iner-

tial" and "trapping" regarding the setting of a progressive/evolutionary process, thus "freezing" the participatory devices into repetitive rituals emptied of innovative energies.

Moreover, even if articulated mechanisms of participation often prove useful to enlarge technical skills, awareness and knowledge levels of participants, they do not automatically grant a fostering of complex cultural changes.

Beyond the sprawl ?
The difficulty of changing cultural references

The analysis of urban modifications in Porto Alegre in its first 15 years of Participatory Budgeting clearly shows that the pressure of inhabitants on the institution can lower the quality level of public investments, making some benefits usually provided by careful technical planning disappear. For example, as stated in Allegretti (2005), the "urban extensive" model which usually determines the city sprawling in many towns of developing countries is often so enrooted in the inhabitants' imaginary, that it becomes difficult to local authorities to oppose such a development model of planning, thereby contributing to the growth of "irrationality" in urban management and land-use typologies of transformation.

Undoubtedly a lot of time is needed to explain to all citizens how negative it could be to follow the "sprawl-model" of urban development that was so common in the past, in particular the one based on individual detached or semi-detached houses, which often represent the "individual dream", i.e. an urban "myth" spread all over the world by homogenised audiovisual products known via TV and cinema. And a lot of courage and energy by political institutions and technical mediators/facilitators is also demanded, when it comes to confront enrooted "urban legends" and "prejudicial myths" on city development and economic evolution.

So, if participatory processes seek to promote cultural transformations which can really raise the level of sustainability of urban transformations, working with important mid-long term goals becomes in-

dispensable, possibly favouring the merge between more "immediatist" mechanisms of participatory decision-making (which are useful to create the confidence of inhabitants in the good-faith of public institutions) and other methods of participatory planning which refer to larger mid-long term perspectives. So, good "participatory engineering", meaning the creation of fluid and well-conceived organisational structures to promote cycles of participatory debates with citizens on territorial transformations, is never enough. A strong political will towards promoting real sustainable changes, at the same time without disrespecting the point of view of citizens, proves fundamental.

Furthermore, it has to be noted that mechanisms of networking are not necessarily "oriented-to-evolution", being that they can contribute to spread the idea that "minimum standards of consultative participation" could be enough to satisfy the expectations of many inhabitants. Some training sessions on PB provided in the last three years by the World Bank or other international institutions, especially in Africa, often evidenced the risks of "diluting" the idea of committed and radical hypotheses of participation, spreading "light" models of Participatory Budgeting (Sintomer, Herzberg and Allegretti, 2013, Allegretti 2011b) and making them be accepted as "noble" forms of participation.

One recent event points out all these risks. In fact, during winter 2009 the new mayor of Porto Alegre (Josè Fortunati) raised a strong debate in the Brazilian metropolis, proposing to "biennalize" the discussion of PB, whose cycle had been repeated yearly till that moment. To defend his idea he quoted the exchanges which had occurred with the cities of Santo Andrè and Belo Horizonte within the Brazilian Network of Participatory Budgets created in 2007. The main reason for accepting the "biennalisation" of decision-making spaces for prioritising public investments would be that implementing common decisions takes a long time, because of the respect of rules on tendering and technical deadlines for detailing executive planning schemes. A similar position reveals an intense "stepping-back" in PB ambitions. In fact, in the past the debate in many cities experimenting participation was mainly focussed on how to reform and modernise the administrative/technical machine in order to improve its effectiveness and fulfil the expectations created by the participatory processes. Today,

the new Brazilian debate seems almost to accept the idea that modernising administrative machines is a too hard and slow task, and it is better to be realistic and adapt the participatory machine to the limits and constraints of public bureaucracy.

That is why it becomes very important to continue to fight, maintaining alive the "tensions" and "conflicts" between the different perspectives of the highly diverse range of urban actors. As a matter of fact, their conflicting interests can guarantee that the setting of any participatory process would not be conceived as a mere "gift" given by public institutions, but a hard "conquest" of dynamic social fabrics which try to find "half-path compromises" with their elected representative.

Only if so, to enhance the active contribution of citizenry will be not only possible in the discussion of policy contents, but also in the setting and monitoring of the tools and methods used to forge them through time.

As many Brazilian and Spanish Participatory Budgets demonstrate, a similar perspective could lead to a higher level of "radicality" of participatory processes, but also to a stronger confidence of inhabitants into their functioning, being that many concrete experiences show that citizens usually feel more sense of "ownership" for something they have contributed to create and whose rules are not a "black box" but something they can control, monitor and periodically revise.

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Part II.
The emergence of regulations within globalisation

V

Security – a permanent challenge for cities

by Franz Vanderschueren

The city, symbol of security

Ever since the first urban centres were formed until today, the city has always been a symbol of security for citizens. Citizens expect security from city authorities, security which will protect them from the dangers present outside and inside the city. Three periods of the functioning of urban security can be distinguished in the history of cities.

The first period includes cities until the end of the Middle Ages, when the city was first and foremost a refuge for commercial activity, and had to face danger coming from outside. It was the army that then ensured security.

At the beginning of the 14th century, when cities began to have their own feudal powers, the particularity of democracy emerged, but no security structure was universally institutionalised in cities which rarely had more than 50,000 inhabitants, often being City States. Internal security was, however, perceived as a condition of the democratic development of cities and of citizens' quality of life.

With the period of industrialisation and urbanisation that began in the early 19th century, when the first large cities emerged, internal security was taken care of by policing structures. This is the model that still prevails today. But over the past thirty years, growing insecurity and the expansion of cities and their peripheral areas have shown that there are limits to this model which is based on the existence of a criminal justice system.

There is ample debate on this subject, and in this article it will be tackled from the viewpoint of the relationship between security and urbanisation. Two preliminary observations must be made. On the one hand, the subject of urban insecurity is vast and heterogeneous since it covers a whole range of issues: theft and attacks on citizens, sexual crimes, fraud and contraband, the trading of favours and all white-collar crimes, domestic violence, violence in schools, cyber-crime, organised crime, human trafficking, the mafia, in certain cases, and all kinds of abuse of power. In addition, it is inseparable from the range of urban and social policies since many crimes and violent behaviour are closely related to citizens' living conditions. (Weatherburn and Lind, 2001).

On the other hand, tackling the question of urban insecurity means considering two distinct sets of themes which are often confused at the level of citizens: real insecurity based on the direct experience of crime, and the perception of insecurity or a feeling of fear which is independent of victimisation and indicates a lack of confidence in the ability of the authorities or of the community to confront the insecurity (Kessler, 2009; Robin C., 2004).

The urbanisation shapes security

Historically, security has gone through changes linked to the development of urbanisation. From the beginning of industrialisation, which is to say the creation of medium and large cities, two specific periods can be distinguished in these changes.

The first one corresponds to the beginning of industrialisation, between 1800 and 1840, and extends, depending on the country, between this period and the first half of the 20th century.

This phase marks the transformation of a population which was predominantly rural (90%) to a population which tended to become urban in the industrialised countries and in Latin America. Such population made a living in industrial activities or by having formal and informal work.

Global rate of urbanisation	
Year	Rate
1800	9%
1900	16%
1950	38%
2000	50%

Source: P. Bairoch and UN-HABITAT

The second period coincides with the current period of globalisation of urbanisation when, in the 20th century, the mainly rural world population became urban, Asia and Africa became massively urbanised, and the number of metropolises increased, particularly in developing countries.

Initial urbanisation changes insecurity

The first period of urbanisation took place at the beginning of the 19th century in the advanced countries of Europe, and progressively spread to North and South America between 1850 and 1940. The colonial regimes prevented this transformation from taking place in Africa and in Asia. A notable exception was Japan, which became industrialised very early on.

This first transformation brought about urbanisation in many cities of over 200,000 inhabitants, creating the first large cities. In his reflections on the change caused by this evolution, Simmel (1903) shows

the end of informal social control, solidarity and social cohesion which had existed through inhabitants' knowing each other in small town and country communities. According to Simmel, the excessive stimulation in the urban context of the large city [53] leads, to a person becoming indifferent and blasé, dissociating himself from his fellow citizens to seek out a specialisation and an individual role in a climate of freedom and fierce competition. Such generalised individualism and the erosion of informal social control make society vulnerable to crime. The challenge this evolution posed was to find a form of substitution for informal social control through an institutional response.

Indeed, this urbanisation is expressed in most countries by the passage from crime of a rural kind (rustling, attacks on travellers, plundering, etc.) to crime that takes advantage of all the opportunities a city has to offer. Crime becomes established in the context of chaotic, poor housing conditions, particularly in the outskirts of the city. For example, in 1910, in Berlin, 35% of the residential area was comprised of single-room apartments, and 13% of the basements and attics were turned into housing, which meant 60,000 Berliners were living in 20,000 basements. (Jonas and Weidmann, 2006: 164-165) Urbanisation also marks the mass growth of prostitution in cities and the overworking of women in domestic service (Simmel, 1892), as well as an increase of what Sutherland (1949) called "white-collar crime" where usury was commonplace, and the trading of favours and abuse of power were frequent. Corruption was rife.

Furthermore, the norms, particularly with regard to the practice of the appropriation of goods, changed when the urban era began: the relative vagueness of the rural world was not functional for industrial development which needed precise rules to measure profitability. The context of urbanisation and industrialisation and its correlative, the development of the working classes, brought strong resistance to exploitation by employers. There is, therefore, some confusion between social crime (rebellion or agitation) and ordinary crime, often perpetrated by the same people. This explains the concept of "the dangerous classes" in bourgeois minds of the 19th century. In fact the distinction between the political unrest of working classes and crime was made only in the second half of the 19th century, when social and political

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[53]   Simmel refers to cities with over 200,000 inhabitants.

reforms enabled conflicts to be resolved through political or union representation. (Lea, 2006)

An institutional response: the police

This society which was becoming urbanised and industrialised also went through other transformations connected with security. Until then, the creation of the police force that guaranteed people's protection and law and order, had been private. It was, in fact, Sir Robert Peel, when he was Home Secretary in England, who institutionalized the police force, and, later, the city of Paris adopted the same model which then spread to other countries. The English "bobby" gradually became the ideal model of a police force. Sir Robert Peel's idea was a kind of de-militarisation of law and order, and a de-privatisation of the services that granted protection of people and property, which now were handed over to the central State or government of the city, and fell into the category of deterrent. The police force was perceived, above all, as a preventive, neighbourhood service which identified with the people. "The police are the public and the public are the police" and "the ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions" he stated. (Chalom et al.. 2000)

The models of police which were to become widespread, responded to two trends. The British "bobby" acted first and foremost as a deterrent. Initially, he carried out numerous duties which involved controlling the working class, but later he focused on offenders. This model was a civil police force which, as a public service, was subordinated to the elected political authority that was either central (in the majority of European countries) or local (as in The United States and Canada).

A second, similar model of a police force emerged in Japan and developed after the Meiji Restoration, in 1868, which gave impetus to industrialisation in that country. It is known as the "Koban", a polyvalent police force with officers having close contact with local communities; they pay visits to homes several times a year. This system prevails successfully in Japan, and now in Singapore. It involves a very

strong link with the local community and knowledge of inhabitants on the part of the police. They fulfil several roles: intelligence unit, formal law and order, mediators and leaders of informal control. The police there provide help to the residents and maintain close links with them; all of this creates awareness of the closeness that exists between the police and the citizens. In addition they develop an approach centred on problem-solving. (Bayley, 1976; Brogden and Nijhar, 2005)

The studies on Japanese police have shown efficiency as the Koban are operating with a number of agents lower than the one of industrialised western countries (see table below) and take advantage from the influence and impact of the whole Japanese structure of social control (Chikao Uranaka, 2010)

Comparison Table: number of police agents/inhabitants (year 2005)					
Japan	USA	United Kingdom	Germany	Italy	France
1/520	1/353	1/337	1/312	1/279	1/275

Source: Chikao Uranaka, 2010, 21)

However, despite its civil nature, in many countries the police adopt a vertical, military-style structure which persists until today, distancing the police from communities and making the control of police activities a purely hierarchical exercise. This model does not allow for any civil society control over the police, and its effectiveness and transparency depend exclusively on the qualities of those in command.

Generating an ideological consensus

The police is part of the criminal justice system (police, courts and prisons) arising from the evolution of the law. It is based, on the one hand, on Beccaria's utilitarian perspective (1764) which views punishment as a form of prevention if it is just, swift, appropriate and

proportionate, and, on the other hand, on analyses of human behaviour deemed to be rational. (Bentham, 1840)

At the beginning of urbanisation, the prison was considered as progress compared with earlier despotism, because it avoided arbitrary decisions and allowed for punishment proportionate to the crime, as well as "rehabilitation through labour and the education of criminals". The criminal justice system was set up, and where it operated, it afforded an effective response to the kind of the crime and to the quantity of it, which was often greater than the number of crimes committed nowadays. Kant (1797) put forward the philosophical foundations that advocated for a secular state being completely responsible for the administration of justice and the police. "For Kant, the right to punish found its cause for action in a kind of moral obligation that the hierarchical authority would have to restore order by imposing suffering on the guilty person." (Pires, 2008:196)

Additionally, the context of industrialisation imposed rules and forms of negotiation acquired through difficult struggles (unions) which allowed for informal social control in most societies. This system became institutionalised towards the end of the 19th century in industrialised countries and went unquestioned until the 1960s and 1970s. It underwent some serious crises, but the solutions were considered sufficient insofar as public opinion wanted the delegation of authority to go to the State, via the police and the justice system, which was to control crime in all its forms, and people accepted the idea that prison was a form of expiation.

The setting up of a new kind of criminal justice system with a legal and philosophical foundation and ad hoc instruments – courts, prisons and, particularly, the police – opened the way, at the beginning of urbanisation, when there was often confusion between ordinary crime and social crime, to a phase of social consensus that allowed criminals to be marginalised. Thus, the criminal justice system became operational with the development of urban and industrial capitalism, and it was even helped by its own adversaries, since Engels condemned, in the name of the proletarian revolution, the criminality that came from the working classes. Referring to theft by poor people, which was frequent at the beginning of industrialisation, Engels wrote "The earliest crudest and least fruitful form of this rebellion (proletarian) was that of crime. The workers soon realised that crime did not help mat-

ters...The whole might of society was brought to bear upon each criminal, and crushed him with its immense superiority" (Engels, 1845:140). That text announced the future concept of "lumpenproletariat" which stigmatised the criminal behaviour of the working classes.

This effective model of the criminal justice system became stabilised at the beginning of the 20th century, and succeeded in dealing with the main conflicts deriving from crime in Europe, the Americas, Oceania and Japan. In other countries of Asia and Africa, the colonial system ensured law and order, and urban integration, and the police system imposed was no different from those of the metropolises, except for political control. However, the colonial systems slowed down the urbanisation process, as rural populations were not allowed to settle in the cities even if they worked there during the day.

The crisis of the early metropolises in America

This system met with problems that called into question some essential aspects of urban security. The first problem was highlighted by the Chicago School (Park and Burgess, 1921) in the 1920s and 1930s. The rapid growth of the large American cities, which changed from cities that had less than one million inhabitants to several million inhabitants in a matter of decades, due to the arrival of immigrants from different countries of Europe, created districts of "social disorganisation" where criminal behaviour and violence of all sorts prevailed, and generated gangs of young people, analysed by Trasher (1927). The Chicago School showed the geographical and social dimensions of crime; it explained the existence of gangs as a kind of compensatory socialisation created by their peers when institutions (family, school and districts) were insufficient, and it established the foundations of social prevention. In other words, when faced with the crises of urbanisation and industrialisation, the Chicago School approach showed that it was not enough to have a criminal justice system and social policies. Massive prevention policies were also needed which would fit into the urban, social fabric (neighbourhood work) and would focus particularly on groups of youths at risk without stigmatising them.

Thus, well before the Second World War, a functional, effective system had arrived in order to control and prevent crime. The system has a legal, philosophical foundation, instruments and a specific social policy which is social prevention by district and by community. Within the framework of the welfare state, it benefits from ways of solving social conflicts that allow for criminals to be separated, avoiding any collusion with "social crimes". In this context, cities where the system is well established manage to control crime and have stable or gradually decreasing rates of victimisation.

A second crisis occurred in the second half of the 20th century, with the studies of philosophers such as Foucault, and sociologists such as Goffman. They showed the failure of prisons as a form of rehabilitation and criticised the right of society to punish (Foucault, 1975) or the perverse nature of prisons presented in the form of "total institutions" which provoked violence and false adaptation (Goffman, 1961). This crisis did not have a really massive, creative response, except in the slow development of alternative punishment which is far from replacing prisons. But the prison crisis continues today, since 60% or more of ex-convicts re-offend. However, the rates of imprisonment show significant differences when compared: in the United States and Russia the rates are 700/100,000 inhabitants, while in Japan the rate is lower than 50/100,000 inhabitants, and in Europe the average rate is roughly 100/100,000 inhabitants. But a higher rate of imprisonment is not an indicator of security, and the reverse is sometimes the case. This rate is more the consequence of citizens' fears and political ideologies than the result of an effective security policy.

The consumer society restructures security

However, facts like the exponentially growing rates of traditional criminal activities and new crimes which began to undermine the foundations of the criminal justice system in the 20th century from the 1960s onwards make the search for alternatives complex. The crisis began in the United States, spread to other developed countries and, finally, in the 1980s, reached the developing countries.

Exponential growth of criminality

In industrialised countries, the phenomenon of exponentially rising crime manifested itself in the middle of the period of economic growth during the "30 glorious years", particularly in crimes against property, while the homicide rate remained stable in most European countries.

Between 1970 and 1985, according to UN statistics, reported crimes increased in urban areas by 5% on average per year, which is far higher than demographic growth, particularly in the industrialised countries. (Finlay, 2000) This increase included all crimes against property and crimes linked to drug-trafficking which constitutes a major new crime. Comparisons are difficult because the sources are not homogeneous but the United Nations' surveys in representative cities (UNICRI, 1995) showed that at the beginning of the 1990s, in cities with over 100,000 inhabitants, an average of 60% of inhabitants were victims of a crime every five years, not counting domestic violence. The differences were outstanding: in Latin America and in Africa the percentages were 68% and 76% of inhabitants, respectively, and only 44% in Asia. Around 20% of these crimes were against people and around 70% against property.

The main characteristics that appear from the data of this period show that urban crime affects people or their property and principally involves men (80% to 90%). They also show the overwhelming number of adolescents and young adults engaged in such crime, and levels of formal education far lower for criminals than non-criminals. They also indicate that the social sections of people who are excluded either from the formal job market for racial reasons, or because of the poor quality of their urban environment, produced the largest number of criminals (Finlay, 2000), except with regard to "white-collar crime" and domestic violence which is present across all social classes.

The range of urban causes

There are many reasons for this increase, and they do not all have a direct connection with urbanisation. We should first underline the fact that there is no correlation between the size of the cities and the crime rates: Tokyo, the world's largest agglomeration (30 million), is one of the safest cities, whereas Port Moresby which has fewer than 300,000 inhabitants is one of the most crime-ridden cities, and within one country there can be a marked difference. Bogotá has a crime rate lower than those of Medellin and Cali, which have only a half or a third as many inhabitants. It is the management of security and not the size of cities that conditions the crime rate.

The causes connected to forms of urbanisation are the diverse opportunities for theft or vandalism linked to individual rather than public means of transport, turning the car into an object of theft or vandalism. In addition, the increase in the number of double-income families and the predominance of the nuclear family in urban areas means that nobody is at the home for several hours during the day and sometimes children are left on their own, thus reducing parental care. The breakdown of the extended family link has removed the possibility of family network support. The complete separation of places of work from homes and leisure spaces increases the amount of time homes are left empty during the day, and sometimes for several hours at night.

There is also juvenile frustration. When faced with the difficulty of obtaining a worthwhile salary in the formal sector of the urban economy, thus delaying autonomy which would enable the acquisition of an independent home and the possibility of founding a family, urban youths go down the alternative route of criminality, particularly the crime of marginalised groups, or "amateur crime" (Kessler, 2004), or drug-trafficking. Access to bars and cafés at all times of the day and night leads to more violence and fights that are sometimes fatal. The example of Diadema, a town in the outskirts of São Paulo which succeeded in lowering the annual rate of homicides from 100 per 100,000 inhabitants to fewer than 20, by banning the selling of alcohol after a

certain time of the night", illustrates this phenomenon. (De Luca Miki, 2007).

The specific case of badly-equipped, poor districts increases the causes of criminality. Jobs are scarce, and so crime becomes an alternative for many young people. The cost of living in the city is high, and alcoholism and the problematic drug consumption are frequent. Gangs of youths linked to occasional crime and drug-trafficking are commonplace. [54] Relationships between the police or justice system and these districts are hostile and loaded with either ethnic or class prejudice, which sometimes result in violent, discriminatory or corrupted police practice. And, finally, theft and drug-trafficking, contrary to what happened during the period of consensus which ensured informal control, are considered as activities which although are not positive, are more or less tolerated for want of other means by the inhabitants of these districts.

From the viewpoint of security issues, the principal risk of these districts is their possible gradual transformation into no-go areas, meaning districts where the socially recognised law is no longer applied but is substituted by the standards of an internal group that imposes its rules by force and, as a result, creates conditions which make the community vulnerable to organised crime.

Gradually, young people who are victims of societal violence are marginalised (Walgrave, 1995) and many murders, suicides and criminal behaviour such as theft, armed attacks, problematic drug consumption and drug-trafficking and uncivil behaviour are associated in urban mentality with "youths at risk". The perception of an adult world centred on its own fears stigmatises these young people, forgetting that they are victims as well as perpetrators of anti-social behaviour, and that their "at risk" behaviour affects above all their psycho-social development. The rates of victimisation of youths often double those of adults while their socio-economic situation makes youths the principal victims of unemployment. For example, in Latin America, 23% of young people aged between 15 and 29 neither work

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[54] Since the end of the 1980s, gangs of youths are commonplace in all regions. They adopt modes of behaviour with variable styles and degree of violence, depending on their social context and institutional responses to social conflicts. (Hagedorn 2007; Klein 2001; Rodgers, 1999)

nor study (Sen and Kligsberg, 2007: 208); and 22% of girls and 15% of boys under 17 have been victims of sexual abuse within their families (IIN, 2003). The inequalities and their urban expression, spatial segregation, worsen even more this situation of injustice. As J. Borja describes: "the inequalities, in a context of poverty, generate vulnerable and threatened sectors (the wealthy). Among the vulnerable (the poor and marginalised, the unemployed and workers without contracts, and anomic) there emerges behaviour of expressive violence (frustrated youths see what the city has to offer but which is unaffordable to them), and groups at risk appear: the future offenders. The mafias of the black market (drug and various trafficking, theft and kidnapping, the workforce of organised crime) find fertile ground in these groups of people". [55] (Borja, 2005:215)

The emergence of new crimes

The mass appearance of new sorts of previously unknown crimes, marginal or ignored, constitutes a second factor, after the exponential growth of crime, which accentuates the crisis of the criminal justice system.

Crimes linked to drug-trafficking

Crimes linked to drug-trafficking first appeared in the 1960s and became widespread across the world in the 1980s. Involved in these crimes are actors as diverse as organised crime, mafias, decentralised actors in the slums who supply drugs to all consumers and, finally, the small-scale dealers who supply the local clientele in the neighbourhood and, of course, the users who come from all districts and social sectors.

The international dimension of these crimes and the whole ensemble of support services that organised crime has at its disposal (well-

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[55]   The author's translation.

paid legal experts), as well as the reproduction processes of this criminality make it very complex; to tackle it, the police services, the courts, the health and education services as well as urban services are mobilized.

Governments deal with this problem in two ways, mainly: by cracking down on drug peddling and with heterogeneous prevention policies. However, the ideological aspect of the drug debate conditions the responses to this problem, as shown in the recently re-launched debate in Latin America by three former Presidents [56], and from cities' experiences which have developed innovative forms of prevention, as in Vancouver, for example. (Vanderschueren, 2006)

On this point, cities are facing three main problems. The first one is the no-go areas where forms of "perverse social capital" ensure both the predominance of drug-trafficking through violence and the reproduction of their local domination by co-opting youth.

The second problem is that of the prevention approach. There are two distinct lines: cities that lay stress on primary prevention aimed at the whole population – whether they are consumers or not – and whose objective is "zero drugs". And then there are cities that have adopted a policy of targeting vulnerable populations through primary protection schemes, aimed at developing the resilience capacities of those concerned and also at supplying rehabilitation treatment; the problem of trafficking is dealt with in cooperation with the police and a policy of harm reduction is established. [57] This last aspect is often a problem because it involves acknowledgement of the fact that "zero drugs" is utopian and that some users must be helped with no certainty of success in their rehabilitation.

A third problem is the trivialisation of both the use of drugs and the trafficking. We increasingly see that drug use varies according to social sector and age, and that the activity of trafficking is somewhat tolerated, particularly in places where the sale of drugs offers an alternative to unemployment or under-employment. In Latin America, for example, the fact that more than one in five young people are either

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[56]   Cardoso (Brazil) and Gaviria (Colombia) together with Lagos (Chile).
[57]   See the example of Vancouver: http://vancouver.ca/fourpillars/(2011).

jobless or not receiving any formal schooling, makes them a group available for trafficking.

Organised crime

For a long time, there have been mafias, but neither they nor organised crime had previously benefitted at an international level from the financial advantages of their activities. Nowadays, they play a considerable role in the globalisation of crime.

Organised crime (de la Corte and Giménez, 2010; C. Flores, 2009) and the mafias are two distinct phenomena which use violent methods. Unlike organised crime which grows according to the weakness of the State structure, particularly the police and the courts, mafias have support in civil society and a territorial base which make them difficult to control and, at the same time, ensures their continuity. Organised crime is a kind of firm which in order to develop an illegal trade uses violence and corruption, and tends, especially through money-laundering, to penetrate the formal, legal economy, which blurs the boundaries of the legal systems of finance and the economy. It can only expand when the State is weak and allows illegal trade or when it is incapable of punishing it. When there is repression by the State, organised crime has two main responses: moving on to other and usually more violent crimes as in Mexico (G. Valdés, 2013), or decentralisation in cartels which multiply, and, when neutralised, do not have a serious effect on the whole set-up. (The model is Cali, Colombia). This second option was followed in the Western Cape, South Africa (Kinnes, 2000) as in most countries of Latin America where drug-trafficking infiltrates into districts, beginning with small groups or families and expanding as more young people are recruited.

This decentralisation affects the city because it increases the number of no-go areas and complicates State intervention which needs a connection with the local authorities, community policing, decentralised controls and well-trained networks of prevention led by local prevention actors.

Cyber crime

Cyber crime, which is only about fifteen years old, grows very rapidly and obliges the police, teachers, bankers, entrepreneurs, IT specialists, lawyers, judges and legislators to create an ensemble of controls which are highly complex and sophisticated. It is defined as "any criminal offense that is committed or facilitated through the use of the communication capabilities of computers and computer systems." [58] Cyber crime comprises falsification or cloning of credit cards, penetration of banking secrecy and embezzlement, insider trading and using mobile phones for transmitting images of pornography or gratuitous acts of violence, plus the abuse of companies providing these services. All of the above illustrate this kind of crime which is very difficult to control without investing costly resources. In 2005, Y. Jewkes (2005:513) estimated that fewer than 10% of these crimes were reported and only 2% of them were dealt with. She also states that the police are not the main actors in charge of controlling and preventing cyber crime, activities that correspond more to Internet service providers and the users. [59]

The comparative results of a survey from Price Waterhouse highlighted that in 2009, 30% of surveyed enterprises were victims of these frauds meanwhile the number of victims reached 34% in 2011. [60] However in 2011, 50% of frauds were detected by the enterprises themselves, which confirms the thesis of Y. Jewkes. This phenomenon is growing and affects many victims among enterprises, governments and internet users, in spite of the unreliable published costs of cybercrime as they derive from studies ordered or performed by companies specialized in selling security programs

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[58]   T. A. Petee and others (2010: 10)

[59]   "Government, the police, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Internet Users all broadly agree that the latter two groups – ISPs and IUs – must bear the primary responsibility for cleaning up cyberspace" (Y. Jewkes, 2003:502)

[60]   LINK. (January 2012)

Awareness of domestic violence

Domestic violence affects women, children and, in some cases, other members of the family. This violence is not new but the awareness of the amount of domestic violence and its impact is recent. These are attacks on the most basic rights of women. Those young people who are victims of or witness this kind of violence often conclude that it is a way of resolving conflicts (Smaoun, 2000; S. Larraín, 2007). For several decades, the struggle of women's movements, international organisations and regional conventions [61] have changed legislation, demanded that these violent practices be recognised as crimes, easing the incorporation of the gender dimension into police training and practice, and raising awareness on "*fémicide*" (the murder of a woman by her husband, ex-husband or ex-companion). It is estimated that nearly 50% of women who have been murdered have been victims of femicide.

However, the cultural roots of domestic violence run deep and can only be changed over the long term and by civil society. In the cities, we are starting to realise that domestic violence cannot be changed merely by the exercise of justice or police protection, but rather by community mechanisms which play an educational role in the neighbourhoods (for example, reception centres, community monitors, re-education programmes for men and family mediation).

The narrowing of the gap between serious crime and petty crime

The increase of violence in petty crime and the fact that victims are killed or wounded for almost nothing, and particularly the co-opting of youth into uncontrollable actions linked to drug-trafficking, makes it difficult to draw a distinction between urban petty crime and serious crime in terms of violence. This situation increases citizens' fears and

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[61]   The Beijing Conference (1995) and, in Latin America, the Belem do Para Convention (1994).

leads to more severe forms of repression. Citizens are often frightened by young criminals who have committed armed theft because of the violence accompanying these acts and the incapacity to understand, prevent and confront this behaviour, but they view the 50,000 million dollar fraud of financier Madoff (LINK), misappropriation of funds or tax evasion as though they were watching a detective film.

Attempts to respond

From the 1970s and particularly in a context of economic stagnation, increasing criminality turns into an unbearable social burden. The obsession with security grew in all sections of society, and towards the end of the 1980s research shows that poor urban sectors were the main victims of criminality. The first responses to this phenomenon appear from the 1980s onwards.

Privatised security

The prestige of the traditional police officer has dwindled and privatisation of security has emerged. From the beginning of the 1980s, private security systems approved by States began to appear on a large scale. This system gradually overtook the number of police officers. At the beginning of the 21st century there are now more agents of private security systems than police officers in democratic countries. [62] This "silent revolution" which has reintroduced profit in security, has developed a system conceived at the outset as a way of reducing the costs of funding the police. It benefits from States' tacit complicity, since ten years went by before any legislation appeared on this subject, first of all in Germany, and, also, because in countries as diffe-

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[62]   In the continental countries to the West of the European Union, private security agents represent 80% of the number of police officers (all police included), whereas in the United Kingdom, Eastern Europe, the United States and the whole of the Americas and Oceania, there are two to three times more private security agents than police officers.

rent as the United States and China (Beijing) in the 1990s, a large part of the private security system contracts came from the State. This system is also encouraged by insurance company practices which often demand private protection, judging that of the police to be inadequate. At the end of the 1990s, the growth of this system reached more than 20% annually in the United States, the United Kingdom and China. (Irish, 1999)

The limitations of this system are known: it is currently a system which almost exclusively serves the sector of private or public enterprise and major services, covering less than 10% of the population. In most countries, this system employs staff at minimum salary level, leading to a very high rate of staff turnover which stops them from becoming proficient or developing a sense of loyalty to their employers; also, staff training is often shaky. Finally, being market oriented, it is only concerned about the clients. In some countries, the collusion between police activities and the private security system is obvious when police officers are authorised to be employed in this sector. In addition, the private security system, contrary to State justice, rejects any moral notion of control, the agenda being an instrumental rather than moral recommendation, governed by the notion of profit and loss, which replaces the moral language of criminal justice. Thus, the control of theft is only carried out if the cost is inferior to that of the initial loss. (Shearing and Stenning, 1984)

Along the same lines, the privatisation of prisons seems to be a formula which will enable costs of running prisons to be reduced. But this formula poses the problem of a conflict of interests for prison managers, who have to choose between having as many prisoners as possible and releasing them.

The wave of police reforms

A second response to this crisis appears within the police forces and this has led to several police reforms. Four formulae prevail. There is the model of community policing which is spreading in Canada, in several American cities and elsewhere in other countries, with different modalities and nuances: neighbourhood policing in Europe and

community policing in America. This kind of police is based on several principles, finding inspiration in a return to the basics: Sir Robert Peel's approach. (Bayley, 1994; Brodeur, 2003; Chalom et al., 2001)

A second formula, which is in fact included in classic community policing, is the so-called "problem-solving" approach of the police. Created by Goldstein (1990), this is a transformation from reactive police activity to a proactive police who focus on the causes of a problem rather than on a response to its effects.

A third reform, called "strategic proximity" fits into the neighbourhood police formula, but modifies structures within the police in order to deal with the new problems (Fernandez, 2008). The new element resides in an adaptation of internal police structures in its work related to prevention activities.

A fourth model, called intelligence led policing, is a way of better deliver police work. It "involves developing and maintaining a detailed and up-to-date picture of patterns of crime and criminality in order to intervene it most effectively to disrupt networks and remove prolific offenders. Doing so requires staffing, procedures and structures to elicit information , interpret it and act on it promptly and systematically" (Tilley, 2005:321)

So we are far from achieving a universal model of a police force, but rather in a search for a model which would adapt to each country and even to each city. One of the main points of discussion that has to be defined is to whom the police should be accountable: just to the hierarchy or to civil society as well ? [63]

To this matter of police reforms in several countries must be added the issue of police transparency. A radical fight against corruption is far from won, which makes the control of serious crime almost impossible. Technical capability and trust in the police are essential success factors. A police force backed by public opinion, as is the case in Quebec, has 85% public approval ratings (Dupont and Perez, 2006).

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[63]   This police accountability is not only aimed at police deontology but also at the evaluation of the activities, modalities, priorities and criteria present in the police.

But in other countries, public opinion approval ratings do not even reach 30%. [64]

And, finally, the current shifting of the discussion on the subject of "the police" to that of "security networks" (Newburn, 2005) shows that we are witnessing a "breaking up of State monopoly on policing, and the emergence of a broad range of private and community based agencies that prevent crime, deter criminality, catch law-breakers, investigate offences and stop conflicts" (Bayley and Shearing, 1996:586).

Legal reforms in Criminal Law are the modernisations that seek to make the law more flexible and to reduce impunity, but it is clear that the law can neither tackle nor elucidate all crimes. [65] Modernisation of the justice system is always costly; in the British case, for example, only a 2% crime reduction was achieved. The wheels of justice do not allow for the effective tackling of a large quantity of crimes which are important to the general public. It is this situation which brought the private sector to have recourse to arbitration to settle disputes between private companies.

Although Criminal Law remains essential in confronting organised crime, corruption and serious crimes, the search for alternatives, such as restorative justice or social mediation, are today still very much in the minority.

The new urban context

The new urban context changes rapidly, particularly with the urban sprawl of Third World metropolises and major North American cities, like Los Angeles. In the 19th century, the density of construction went hand in hand with demographic and social density, and the absence of rapid transport facilitated the frequency of social contact (Innerarity,

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[64]   This approval rating is based on surveys that show the percentage of the population who believe that the police is trustworthy.

[65]   This is due to several factors: the first being the report rate of under 50% on all crimes; the second is the number of crimes reported that the police pass to the law; and, then, the limitations of the law.

2006). On the morphological plane, the density of 19th century cities has been replaced by fragmented urban districts and overflowing urbanisation with no centrality (Sassen, 1991). The lifestyle tends towards social segregation and the homogenisation of groups in districts according to their income and lifestyle. These separated units have no links between them and protect themselves in "gated communities" (Charmes, 2005), or take refuge in ethnic areas where a discriminating urbanisation consolidates its position, which only furthers insecurity, social distance and the feeling of not belonging to the same society. Shopping centres become semi-public spaces where everyone meets but only as consumers.

Public spaces have changed and if they are to be made into instruments of social interaction, their solidarities will have to be reinvented. In fact, current material conditions no longer demand the same focal points and densities of earlier times, as access to private and rapid public transport, to telecommunications and other means of communication enable a different kind of urban life. It is within such context that solidarities must be reinvented locally, which could be generated by social participation and responsibility on matters of security.

The new governance of security

The problem of security in cities is, above all, a dual problem of governance. The first problem lies in the ability to articulate the central State's initiatives with those of local and private authorities, and, particularly, with local communities. This involves acceptance of the end of State monopoly with regard to security, and recognition of the role of other actors, where responsibility for security becomes everyone's concern: State, local and community authorities, the private sector and civil society. For example, there can be no social prevention policy without a prevention programme set up by local authorities. Because the prevention policy has to be decentralised, it is illusory to expect the central State to take on this task. But one can expect the State to encourage it, to contribute to the funding and to ensure follow-up. Similarly, the role of the private sector becomes unavoidable: cyber-crime control or businesses protection need private security sys-

tems, but more effective and professional than the current systems and the responsibility of internet providers and users in cleaning the cyberspace.

The participation of social actors and their connection with local authorities through various associations, partnerships or networks constitute the second aspect of governance. Civil society participation acquires decisive weight insofar as it is inescapable. Without it, alternative penalties, reinsertion programmes and focused prevention on combating domestic violence or violence in schools cannot be developed. Police reform only acquires its full strength if it is accompanied by the responsibilisation of civil society.

Within this framework, acceptance of the role of other institutions becomes the *sine qua non*, and the connections with and practice of an "active subsidiarity" are essential. In order to meet this challenge there must be a decentralised security policy, competent local authorities, adequate institutional framework and educational capacities for coordination and dissemination.

Promising and negative practices

There are many positive and negative examples. The cases of Bogotá and Medellin, in Colombia, and Diadema, in Brazil, are the best illustrations of this in Latin America: the reduction in the rate of homicides of 391/100,000 inhabitants in 1991 to fewer than 30 in Medellín (Salazar, 2008), the similar evolution in Bogota (from 120 to fewer than 20) in eight years, (Llorente and Rivas, 2004; Mockus, 2007) and the case of Diadema (de Luca, Miki, 2007) already mentioned, show that no situation is irreversible. Their success is due to a policy of good governance run by local authorities, set up in a sustainable, educational manner, backed by a positive view of security as a component of social cohesion, and on a range of cross-cutting social prevention programmes, together with a control policy supported by neighbourhood police. (UN-Habitat-UAH, 2009) Whereas the countries of Central America (Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala), which have applied so-called "hard" and later "super hard" policies of re-

pression, have seen an increase in the levels of crime (Sen and Kliksberg, 2007).

Mexico confirms the same lessons. The only repression through joined operations (military forces and police) implemented between 2007 and 2009 in the states where organized crime was extremely violent, has led to an increase in homicides (around 60%) but the organized crime is responsible for only half of them (Escalante, 2011; Merino 2011). This increase overcomes the growth of homicides in other Mexican states without joined interventions. The analysis of Merino (2011) shows that without these federal government operations between 5000 and 7000 lives could have been saved. The consequences are clear: organized crime (Valdés, 2013) is far from being neutralized and urban social prevention programs are urgently needed as well as social reforms.

The priorities

These decentralised policies around a structure of good governance involve the acceptance of priorities that vary according to city. There are, however, inevitable priorities like social prevention aimed at "youths at risk", the prevention of domestic violence, the reinsertion of prisoners and the fight against organised crime.

The importance of prevention focused on youths at risk comes from the fact that a large number of perpetrators and victims of crime belong to this group. These young people are in a learning phase and are vulnerable to being influenced by organised crime. The success of prevention policies implies acceptance of the fact that the main social issue at stake in "at risk behaviour" of groups of youths is the psychosocial development of them and not the insecurity of adults. In effect, too many adults see that these young people represent a risk for the adult world, hence the lowering of the age of criminal responsibility and the hardening of sanctions aimed at youths in many countries. There must be a definitive change in the viewpoint focused on the adult world.

When youth at risk are the actors

In Medellin, in "Comuna 13", a district which used to be the epicentre of civil war, young people are getting an education through hip hop, breakdance and graffiti. They are supervised by the community, street monitors and non-armed community police.

(UN-HABITAT and UAH, 2009,).

The example of *Faro Oriente de México* where youths from the poorest districts, often in trouble with society, and their families can benefit from training workshops, mainly on culture and the arts, with no constraint other than their own choices, show that one can reach and emotionally liberate over 2,500 young people per year, and reach the public who come to see the shows which can mean several tens of thousands of young people and their parents… LINK.

In the State of São Paulo, the JEPOM programme of nine municipalities offers young people of 18 and 19 who have already been in conflict with the law, the (voluntary) possibility of one year of civil service, time during which they carry out half a day of (unpaid) community work and the other half-day is devoted to subsidised training. Results: in nine years, there was a reduction of 80% in crimes and the reinsertion of many young people. LINK.

This approach also involves youths as protagonists, making them participate in the formulation of prevention programmes, such as social policies from which they should be benefitting. For example, developing prevention policies aimed at violent gangs of youths proves difficult without the support of other young people. Access to these young people also involves modalities that take into account young people's language, culture and diversity as well as emotional and spiritual needs. The underground culture (hip hop, etc.), for example, showed its effectiveness in New York, Medellin and Mexico for groups most at risk. One of the most effective and successful initiative in Los Angeles "Home Boys Industry", addressing former gang's members and ex-convicts shows 70% reinsertion.

Domestic violence is a fundamental urban "work in progress" of security since between 25% and 50% of families are affected by this

problem. The establishment of community reception structures, support and re-education is today a priority for municipalities (Larraín, 2007): fair laws and effective policing is not enough. The presence in the districts of monitors trained in this field can do a great deal and the re-education of aggressors as in the case of the work of the "Promundo" NGO in Brazil.

Promoting egalitarian behaviour

In the favelas of Rio, the Brazilian NGO "Promundo" has built and set up a programme to improve equality between men and women. Starting with research carried out in the favelas, the NGO established a model of egalitarian behaviour and created a programme of education for a change in attitudes and a lifestyle focusing on community social norms and men behaviour. (LINK and ONU-HABITAT and UAH, 2009: 82)

The international debate on prisons shows that recourse to alternative punishments or to alternative forms of justice is a route that contributes to involving civil society and to legitimising the exercise of justice. And yet one of the restrictions of these alternative formulae is that they require commitment on the part of local communities to offer these opportunities as, for example, community work. The development of capabilities within cities to take charge of these alternatives is a necessary trend to follow.

The reinsertion of former prisoners is often a failure since we know that at least 60% of them re-offend and the large majority are stigmatised for life. Despite commitments made by almost all countries (Marwan M., 2012), the reduction of imprisonments has often increased with no correlation to demographic growth and reinsertion has failed. For there to be a change, alternative punishments and modifications in the life of the prisoner must be sought in order to redirect him to citizen re-education, by changing the prison structure which accumulates the negative characteristics of Goffman's (1961) "total institutions", and by ensuring a "tutor" from the time of impri-

sonment until several years after release. On this point, the Japanese model is interesting because it gives the ex-prisoner not only the effective support of a person in charge of conditional release who looks after around twenty former prisoners, but also a personalised "tutor" who is a person of note in the city, who having received his training, helps the former prisoner to find work and social reinsertion.

Finally, the fight against organised crime has become a priority. It involves action led by the central State where the role of the police and of legislation is essential, making it one of the priority areas. Cities on their own cannot confront this opponent but they can contribute to this objective through information and the fight against corruption, and, particularly, through prevention policies for groups of vulnerable young people who might be seduced by the offers of easy money made by organised crime and through the inclusion of no-go areas. On this point, the temptation of many cities is to restrict itself to situational prevention which consists of modifying the urban context to avoid crime, by embellishing it, restructuring it or making it safer. The example of the "cable metro" [66] of Medellin installed in the traditionally violent marginal districts, shows the need for social prevention policies. It took 32 social prevention projects in these districts to make peace with and calm the inhabitants there before the Metro was finally built, and now it improves the quality of life of the exclusion districts. (UN-HABITAT-UAH, 2009)

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[66]   The "cable metro" is a kind of cable-car system that connects with a normal Metro line and has cabins that can hold eight passengers, taking them to the hills alongside the valley of the city of Medellin where the poorest social sectors live.

In the "narco" favelas

For twelve years, in the favelas of Rio, where drug traffickers dominated and neither the police nor the law set foot, community mediators have resolved local conflicts which are sometimes a matter of life or death. They speak to everyone and understand the mentality of traffickers and the other inhabitants. They focus on supporting the positive energy of the *faveleros* and building justice on this basis. (ONU-HABITAT and UAH, 2009)

In other similar favelas of Rio, the NGO "Fight for peace" successfully trains young people with sports education, based on boxing and the martial arts, and thus develops these young people's self-esteem and citizenship training with no concessions to traffickers who, like all the inhabitants, find these initiatives positive since they see it as enabling their children not to be like them.(ONU-HABITAT and UAH, 2010: 57)

Conclusion:
the beginning of a long road

The new governance does not destroy the criminal justice system but exposes its limitations and changes in accordance with the evolution of cities and their insecurity. It is necessary to have a change of mentality, of practices and of institutional structure to create networks of security and conditions for informal social control that is positive for every urban society.

This new governance, that we see timidly rising in "urban pacts" of successful partnerships and in practices of "Libre Blanc" such as in Johannesburg and Bogotá, is passing through a new institutional framework which should completely change the habits of monopolistic States, introducing new actors and accepting flexible ways that make all citizens and civil society responsible for security.

This structure is yet to be built and we know that it must go through much delegation of responsibility to cities, that it requires the support of States and civil society institutions, police reform which takes account of national cultures, forms of partnership which include young people and practices of justice which must be education for conflict resolution. We are still far from consensus on this point, but current outlines indicate that the way is now open.

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VI

Urban environment
in the context of development:
the case of Southeast Asia

by Adrian Atkinson [67]

The intention of this essay is to trace the development of awareness since the final decades of the 20th century of the need to take steps to ameliorate environmental problems in the burgeoning cities of the South and what is actually being done in this respect. As will become evident as the discussion unfolds, the 'environmental movement' that yielded the great debate about environmental issues – and, from the mid-1980s, the 'sustainable development' discourse that grew out of this - has not been very interested in urban environmental problems. So the text might seem at times as if it is discussing two different sets of issues. Concerning Environment, writ large, educated citizens are aware of the global discourse that has largely emanated from the North and been transmitted to the South in great measure through the efforts of development agencies. Interventions to combat urban environmental problems have been largely parallel, rather than a consistent result of this discourse. What this essay does is to look at

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[67]   With assistance from:Anissa Febrina (Indonesia) and Nguyen Viet Thang (Vietnam).

both these phenomena and, at the end, to try to show how they relate – or maybe *should* relate to one-another.

Before focusing on the present, however, it is useful briefly to look back into history and make the general remark that societies, as far as four thousand years ago, if we take the case of Mohanjo-Daro, were capable of building planned cities with regular street networks and "…high quality…sanitary arrangements…(that)…could well be envied in many parts of the world today." [68]   The simple point is that societies can choose – in Jared Diamond's sense [69] – the way they organize their living arrangements. The way our global society, with its extreme liberal sensibilities, goes about planning and managing urban environments today is certainly far short of the better models left behind by history.

Even up to the late 20th century, there was an idea in currency that the organisation of society could be planned and managed coherently and we will see in the Vietnamese case presented below how, for all its shortcomings (Nguyen and Nguyen, 2007) it demonstrated that it is possible to establish coherent development policies and follow these out consistently such that we are not obliged simply to allow the development process to go where it will and then try to mop up the consequences after the fact.

What is being discussed in this paper is the consequence of the attitude that prioritises fragmented private initiative that gives us today's chaotic, sprawling cities that would be difficult enough to manage in environmental terms even if there were a genuine commitment to do so. What we see in the rapidly growing cities of the South today is a fatal far falling short of real commitment to coherent solutions to our problematic contemporary living arrangements that do the minimum necessary to avoid the worst in the short term but avoid worrying about the longer – what look increasingly like catastrophic – consequences of these arrangements and certainly care little for the quality of the living arrangements for the vast majority of urban citizens.

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[68]   Sir Mortimer Wheeler, quoted in Morris (1994, 33).

[69]   Diamond's (2005) recent book *Collapse*, subtitled: *How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed.*

We can see across the 20th century a general 'development process' encapsulated by the term 'modernisation' of which the two key, related phenomena have been industrialisation and urbanisation. From the start of the process around the turn of the 19th Century in the UK, 'development' has been pursued as a seeking after certain lifestyle goals that seem to have landed in a high degree of mobility – through the use of cars, aeroplanes, etc. – and in the ideal of the suburban home, spreading out from cities that have grown more or less contingently across recent history. Whilst these lifestyle goals have far from been achieved by all – on the one hand because some who do have the choice, choose to live within dense (but systematically de-densifying) city centres and the majority who do not have the choice live in more or less overcrowded and insanitary informal settlements – it nevertheless gives us the form of the city we see developing today.

From the outset, as it occurred in the UK, industrialisation and urbanisation could be seen to generate environmental problems that in the first instance were tolerated but in time generated social movements campaigning for a recognition that these were *genuine* problems and that the public sphere *should* intervene to ameliorate these. This first wave of movements gave us health legislation that brought local institutions into being that were mandated and capable of taking the necessary steps to address the problems (Benevolo, 1967). This was followed by commitment of resources, coupled with technological innovations that gave us the means – classically through the organisation of water supply and sewerage systems and thence public transport – to reduce if not eliminate the problems.

Whilst there were certain break-points, amelioration did not take place all at once but followed a kind a ratchet with the rise – and once satisfied the institutionalisation - of movements, spearheaded at different times by different interests, motivating particular interventions (improvements in water and sewage treatment, investments in urban highways and, alternatively, new initiatives of public transport, etc.). As is made evident later in this paper, the environmental movement of the late 20th century was little interested in urban problems because in the North there was a sense that there were no longer any major problems in the cities to be solved but that there were serious global problems – which might involve cities but only secondarily.

The Advent of the late 20th Century Environmental Movement

The inspiration for the long wave of the 'environmental movement' that led to some of the initiatives discussed later in this paper starts with a series of publications in the 1960s and early 1970s. These pointed to the impossibility of indefinitely pursuing the development trajectory along which the world was heading and the need to take more heed for the use and abuse of resources and the environment (inter alia: Carson, 1962; Fraser-Darling, 1971; Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1972; Commoner, 1972) culminating in the publication of the report of the Club of Rome, *The Limits to Growth* which appeared in 1972 (Meadows et al, 1972). These publications appeared in the context of public debate almost exclusively in the United States that culminated in the establishment of the US Environmental Protection Agency and the introduction of the first modern environmental management tool, the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).

It is important to remember that the inspiration of this movement was not simply a question of needing to improve environmental management per se but, far more profoundly than this, to change fundamentally the ideology, orientation, planning and management of the contemporary development process – being in other words social and economic rather than narrow goals concerning how to manage the environment. From the outset, however, the institutional response was one of containment, responding with improved environmental management but remaining silent of the deeper issue of the 'development paradigm'.

1972 was also the year in which the concern for the abuse of environment and resources broadened out into an international debate through the organisation of the first United Nations conference on the environment which took place in Stockholm that year. Here for the first time North met South to discuss issues that in the first instance seemed very distant from the concerns of governments and civil society in the South. The struggle there was one to 'catch up' with the North or at a minimum to eliminate poverty and the preoccupation of the environmentalists to slow down on the (ab)use of environmental

resources sounded as if the North could have its lifestyle but the South should learn to live frugally!

In the first instance, 'environment' as conceived by this movement was a global concern: that the earth's waters and air were becoming systematically polluted, the forests depleted and in general resources being exploited to exhaustion. Urbanisation was not seen as an important issues with negative environmental consequences because, as already noted, the cities of the North seemed to work well enough. This squared also with the fact that the international development movement as supported by the United Nations and related international development organisations was paying little attention to urban problems in the South. As recently as 1992, Chapter 7 of Agenda 21, produced in the context of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), complained that in spite of rapidly growing urban environmental problems in the South, only 1% of development assistance was going into urban settlements (Quarrie, 1992:76).

Of course the 19th Century environmental movement in the North had been about urban environmental problems and in the South there were those who with justification pointed to the fact that the more serious environmental problems in the South at this point in history were precisely *urban* environmental problems. This was picked up in the 1990s by the World Bank – that by then was actually spending more like 17% of its lending on urban infrastructure (World Bank, 2006a) – whose urban section coined the phrase 'brown agenda' to distinguish urban environmental issues from the global issues – termed the 'green agenda' - on which the environmental movement in the North was generally focusing its attention.

The Process of Rapid Urbanisation in the South

There is no need to repeat in any detail here the details dealt with elsewhere in this publication concerning the rapidity of urbanisation in the South over recent decades, in most respects following in general outline the processes that took place in the North during the 19th and

early 20th centuries. In summary, by the end of the 20th century most Latin American countries had urbanised in the sense that some 80% of the population was living in towns and cities rather than villages and the countryside. With the exception of the already-urbanised countries of East Asia, in both Asia and Africa, the end of the 20th Century saw a rapid process of transition under way with countries between 20 and 50% urbanised and with no exceptions to the rapid process in which parts of the rural population were either caught in villages growing into towns or migrating to towns and cities.

Initially one might talk of the urbanisation of excess rural population in the sense that there was no more space for yet more farming: rural populations were high, relative to the resource base and the technologies in use, but levelling off. However, after the turn of the century rural populations in increasing numbers of countries started to decline and, indeed, urban areas have been growing more from children born in towns and cities than from in-migration. The entity of what was being referred to as 'urban' was – and is – also changing. With once a relatively sharp distinction between rural and urban, increasingly cities have been spreading loosely into the surrounding countryside so that the borders become blurred and new settlements appear in 'peri-urban' areas some way out of the cities but with close economic ties with these.

The capacity and inclination for authorities and populations in the South to confront the negative environmental consequences of this urbanisation varies. A fascinating phenomenon in Spanish Latin America is the way in which even with little or no involvement of formal planning on the part of the authorities, peripheral developments in cities across the continent are often 'informally planned' on street gridirons and even with spaces left for social infrastructure on the assumption that some time in the future this will be built. One can only conclude that there is a kind of cultural 'tacit knowledge' inherited from the fact of planned cities from the early days of Spanish colonialism. By contrast, in so far as authorities in much of Asia and Africa only manage to control the location of part – in some cases only a relatively small part – of the urban expansion, this occurs spontaneously on a basis that can often be seen to be an inheritance of the rather informal way in which rural settlements are organised. In urban

areas this results in more or less severe dysfunctionality that one can in general define in terms of 'environmental problems'.

Thus, over the past decades, authorities that earlier in the 20th century were assumed to take all the decisions and make the investments necessary to organise urban growth systematically relinquished or lost control and increasingly the organisation of much of the urban space and process became spontaneous, referred to as 'informal'. This didn't always mean no-organisation and much work has gone into studying the varying processes of 'informal developers' and community self-organisation [70]. It is important to keep in focus this general retreat of governments and failure of local governments to address growing environmental problems.

Significant blame for this has been laid at the door of the international development ideology of neo-liberalism and the prejudice that this brought with it towards governments proactively planning and organising the development process. Whilst the problems dealt with here certainly predate the implementation of 'structural adjustment' and related measures of the international financial organisations (IFIs), the tendency in these to call for reduction in government programmes inevitably left a failure of confidence in planning and action where it came to coherent approaches to urban development.

Whilst it is true that towns and cities were and are growing at a pace far outstripping the financial capacity of the authorities to provide housing and infrastructure – even with substantial IFI loan support and development donations – during the 1980s and on into the 1990s, development priorities were focused predominantly on income-generating activities to pay off debts and organise some kind of economic growth such that looking after the environment – and indeed social needs of the urbanising population – remained largely out of focus.

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[70]   Pioneering work in this respect was carried out by John Turner (1976) whose enthusiasm for self-developed urban settlements laid the foundations for an attitude of acceptance towards informal settlements that was followed by assistance and investment in 'upgrading' programmes by the World Bank and other development agents.

Urban Environmental Problems in the South

So what are the environmental problems that have arisen under these circumstances? It is useful to make reference to the substantial work of Hardoy, Mitlin and Satterthwaite (1992, 2001) in their comprehensive survey of urban environmental problems in the South and the following paragraphs derive in part from this analysis.

Photo: Adrian Atkinson

First we need to look at the consequences of the poor environments that are to be found in cities throughout the South today and especially in areas which have been developed informally – occasionally neighbouring on industrial areas and more often on roads and heavily polluted waterways that directly affect the health of those living and

working under these conditions. Poor environments lead to environmental health problems that include particularly diarrhoeal and other water-related diseases and to respiratory disease. The world health organisation estimated in the early 1990s that some four million children were dying annually from contaminated water and food induced disease with hundreds of millions suffering from intestinal parasitic infections. Whilst respiratory disease is less likely to kill, it was and is debilitating hundreds of millions of people living or working in air-polluted urban environments (WHO, 1992).

Whilst every urban citizen must obtain water in order to survive, in few cities in the South is the water supplied to all homes. For many this is supplied via neighbourhood standpipes and large populations must buy water from vendors at a price considerably above what is paid by generally richer people in formal housing. There are few cities in the South where water supplies by any of these means provide water fit to drink. Sanitation arrangements are generally poor with inadequate and sometimes non-existent sewer systems or sewage treatment. 2008 was the International Year of Sanitation and the WHO/UNICEF (2008) Joint Monitoring Report on Water and Sanitation for this year indicated that some 20% of the world's urban population lacked at that time improved sanitation arrangements with the figure for South Asia of over 30% and sub-Saharan Africa approaching 60%.

Although in recent years, in the framework of the Millennium Development Goals, the percentage of population without improved sanitation has been increasing, this has been at a rate which, if continuing, will not meet the Millennium Development Goal of halving the numbers of people without adequate sanitation between the year 2000 and 2015. 'Improved sanitation' in urban areas is, furthermore, still some way short of a full sewerage system with even basic treatment. For example, in the early 1990s, where 26% of sewage in the city of São Paulo was treated and 20% in Accra, only 1% was treated in Jakarta (McGranahan et al, 2001, Table 4.4). Figures have not improved substantially since then. The result is that both groundwater and all surface waters within most cities in the South are heavily polluted, spoiling these as sources of usable water or for recreation and contributing substantially to ill-health.

Very many southern cities suffer regular flooding, particularly – but not exclusively – in areas where the poor have settled illegally – indeed flooding in Bangkok, Ho Chi Minh City, Jakarta, and Manila over the past five years seems to indicate a rapid worsening of the extent of urban flooding at least in Southeast Asia. Whilst people adapt to floods as an inconvenience, these generally contaminate fresh water sources exacerbating the incidence of disease and in extreme case cause of deaths. It should be emphasised that most urban flooding results from ongoing urban development including surface sealing and subsidence due to over-extraction of groundwater. Informally dumped solid waste constricts drainage channels but generally in any case planning and investment in drainage is inadequate to deal with the problem or can even, as in the Bangkok case exacerbate the extent of flooding in some areas in order to protect others.

Related to this is the incidence of landslides brought on by heavy rain and land saturated in informally disposed of wastewater. Cities where informal settlements are built on slopes are particularly prone to this hazard which from time to time results in destruction of houses and deaths. A further significant hazard is presented by the incidence of earthquakes. Building technologies are available to resist destruction in even strong earthquakes but these are disregarded altogether in many southern cities and certainly by those building their houses informally. An extreme case occurred in the suburbs of Jogjakarta in May 2006 where some 335,000 houses were partially or completely destroyed by a relatively mild earthquake, as a consequence of the misuse of modern materials – inadequately fixed bricks and roof-tiles (Atkinson, 2007)

Solid waste disposal is also generally poor in southern cities with – to take the same three examples from the early 1990s as above (ibid) – 90% being collected in São Paulo, 83% in Jakarta and 75% in Accra with most of this disposed of in insanitary ways. In smaller cities and everywhere in peripheral areas of larger cities there is little or no collection and waste accumulates where it is dumped into waterways or on unused open land where it is sometimes burned, adding to air pollution. Some of the waste is informally recycled making a living (not always the least remunerative) for a segment of the poorer population. Although a few local authorities recognise this as a legitimate activity and assist in providing suitable clothing, generally the activity is one –

albeit among many in the informal economy – that is particularly hazardous to health.

The direct relationship between urban air pollution and morbidity and death rates is difficult to establish precisely but city statistics do indicate a general relationship (Hardoy et al 2001:99-101). Extreme examples are provided by industrial cities (the most notorious being the city of Cubatão, neighbouring São Paulo) but traffic in large southern cities – in some cases exacerbated by periodic inversion weather conditions – also take their toll. One estimate for Latin American cities indicates some two million children as suffering chronic coughs and some 24,300 premature deaths a year whilst 20,000 premature deaths a year is the estimate for just four large Chinese cities.

Thailand: Photos: Adrian Atkinson

Thailand: Photos: Adrian Atkinson

Much is being discussed today about the threatening impacts of global warming and although it is the inhabitants of the northern countries that have most to answer for in producing the 'greenhouse gases' [71] that are generating the phenomenon, the sprawling nature of southern cities is also associated with growing dependence on petrol vehicles which, whilst not generating concentrated local air pollution, contribute to global warming. Further impacts of global warming can be expected in the future in the form of increased and more frequent flooding and sea-level rises that will add to this in the many cities located on the sea that could, in the not too distant future, lose much of their developed land permanently.

It is sometimes thought that industry is a major source of urban pollution – and the case of Cubatão was mentioned above. Whilst industrial pollution in the South is generally poorly managed and,

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[71]   Albeit China has now joined the major emitter of greenhouse gasses.

where industries are using toxic chemicals these can contribute insidiously to local poor health, most urban pollutants originates from dispersed sources and actions right across the city and into the surrounding region. Thus polluted water is due to households with inadequate sanitary conditions and poor sanitary practices, most flooding is due to poorly or unplanned urban development and air pollution could be greatly ameliorated if not eliminated by systematic regulation of vehicle exhausts. Besides air pollution, poorly conceived urban transport systems dominated in terms of the use of road space by the automobiles of the few who can afford them, together with poorly regulated mini-bus and related informal public transport systems, lead to accident-prone and congested traffic making the cities difficult to move around.

Semarang, Indonesia: Photo: Ulrich Ranke

All these problems can be greatly mitigated or eliminated with relatively small changes in citizens practice and relatively simple technologies which, however, need to be consistently implemented and which in some cases require significant sums of money which

governments are unwilling to raise by taxation or borrowing. But this is not simply political resistance, there is also the broader question of human resources: the quality of political decision-making and adequate knowledge all the way from decision-makers and government staff down to the ordinary citizen whose everyday practices contribute to the problems.

Cubatão, Brazil: Photo: Adrian Atkinson

What is being done to overcome the problems?

Over half the cities of over one million population in the South and many smaller towns and cities were founded under the colonial rule of the Europeans and in the early 20th century were built to European specifications with water supply and in many cases with sanitary sewers and tramway systems. Informal settlements had started to appear

early in the century but it was with few exceptions only in the 1950s and 1960s that these became a notable feature of southern cities. Furthermore, infrastructure investments generally increasingly lagged behind development – in many cities investment for instance in extending sewer systems of public transport simply ceased.

Combating deteriorating urban environmental conditions in the South has in few cases been a predominantly indigenous initiative. As discussed earlier in this paper, the growing problems have appeared and worsened in the context of rapid urbanisation, increasingly within the framework of liberal ideology and particularly structural adjustment conditionalities, reducing the effectiveness of government initiatives. Ironically this has resulted in the IFIs, the United Nations and bilateral assistance organisations and latterly international and local non-government organisations (NGOs) pushing and in many cases leading the search for and investment in solutions.

Southern governments initially reacted to growing unplanned settlements by attempting to demolish them as not conforming to their image of development (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989). However, as these were often not only immediately rebuilt and also added to with further settlements, there emerged a resignation to the fact of informal settlements and eventually to a commitment to in-situ solutions to the accompanying environmental problems. The IFIs that initially lent small amounts to governments to finance urban infrastructure and low-cost housing – which generally fell into the hands of the not-so-poor – then turned to loans and grants to install water supply, sanitation and other environmental improvements in already-existing informal settlements.

These programmes were already underway in a few countries when the environmental movement made its appearance. The impact that the movement then made was not particularly noticeable. On the one hand most countries adopted umbrella environmental laws and thence various regulations and institutional initiatives arose in the form of new Environment Ministries and Agencies. Whilst having a relatively loud voice and often being allocated staff more committed and capable of seeing the problems clearly, these were – and remain – relatively marginal within the overall spectrum of Government, that is to say they have mostly been allocated small staffs and budgets.

In some countries provincial and/or local environmental agencies have also been established. The focus of these has been predominantly on global and national environmental problems (the green agenda) with responsibilities regarding the brown agenda remaining mainly in the hands of Public Works or equivalent Ministries and their line agencies at the regional and city level. Environment ministries mounted small, focused campaigns – often with support of the IFIs and/or other external development organisations – such as concerning reduction of urban air pollution and disposal of industrial waste.

What the environmental movement did bring to the process was not so much to do with the environment as a concern for the insensitivity with which the international agencies had been delivering their solutions. 'Participatory planning' began to replace technocratically delivered solutions in the mid 1980s. These were offered as pilot projects by various development agencies and institutions at first in rural areas as 'Rural Rapid Appraisal' (Chambers, 1983), 'Participatory Action Research' (Rahman, 1993) and under yet other titles. After UNCED, urban oriented participatory planning initiatives came under the title of 'Local Agenda 21'. The World Bank, on its part, launched such projects in a number of Asian cities under the title of Metropolitan Environmental Improvement Programme (MEIP) and in conjunction with that experience changed from 'squatter settlement upgrading' to 'community upgrading' (Viloria-Williams, 2006).

The mechanism used by external development agencies to organise participatory processes was Non-Government Organisations (NGOs). What has been termed the 'rise of civil society' grew out of unorganised movement experiences on the 1960s that, in the course of the 1970s and 80s took on formal structures around a variety of issues (Brand, 1985; Princen and Finger, 1994). The environmental movement was certainly prime amongst the 'new social movements' in the North and this was to an extent reflected also in the South. On the other hand, the formation of NGOs could also be said to have been promoted to a significant degree from funding by external agencies to manage participatory processes in project delivery (Cernea, 1988; Brown and Korten,1989).

The following two sections are intended to illustrate in a little detail how, in the case of two countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Vietnam, urban environmental problems have emerged, the initiatives

that have been taken in trying to overcome them and the results as we see them today [72].

Urban Environmental Planning and Management in Indonesia

In several respects Indonesia responded relatively early both to the fact of deteriorating urban environmental conditions resulting from the spread of informal settlements and to external pressure to take a more coherent approach to environmental problems. In fact the Dutch colonial Government had already taken what we now think of as urban environmental initiatives in the 1930s. This is worth mentioning because what was then referred to a 'nuisance legislation' concerned with environmental health has continued to this day to form the basis of many effective - and some less effective - urban environmental health measures in urban Indonesia.

On the other hand, informal settlements also began to emerge in Indonesian cities in colonial times and a small programme was started to ameliorate the conditions in these. This history surely encouraged the independent Indonesian government to develop a consistent approach to the amelioration of environmental conditions in informal settlement under the title of Kampung Improvement Programme (KIP) – 'Kampung' being Indonesian for village – involving the World Bank. This started in Jakarta in 1969 (Suselo and Taylor, 1995:13; Viloria-Williams, 2006:79), and thence with the Asian Development Bank and a number of bilateral development agencies joining the World Bank, dividing up the cities and financing further programmes. The intention was as far as possible to avoid demolition and undertake work to surface walkways, provide drainage and water supply through standpipes as well as building communal toilet and washing facilities. Eventually over 300 cities and towns were served by the World Bank programme alone and countless further programmes that eventually

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[72]   For overviews of the situation in six Southeast Asian countries by 1996, see Atkinson (1997).

included local NGO initiatives made improvements to the living conditions of many millions of poor urban citizens.

Following the major programmes in Jakarta and Surabaya, a broader programme of general urban infrastructure provision was initiated under the title of Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Programme (IUIDP) that financed infrastructure 'packages' covering water supply, sewerage and human waste management, improvements to solid waste management, drainage and flood control, urban roads and market improvements to public markets (van der Hof and Steinberg, 1992; Suselo et al, 1995). These programmes were accompanied by the production of basic urban plans and integrated improvements to informal settlements following a simplified KIP approach.

After the larger cities had been covered, smaller cities and towns were dealt with in clusters. The mechanism for delivery of the plans was consultancies over two years or so followed by bank loans over numbers of years to carry out the work. Under the impact of the growing concern for a more coherent approach to the environmental dimensions of the programme, from the mid 1990s IUIDP projects were required to include an environmental assessment both of the pre-existing situation and of the measures to be undertaken [73].

It becomes necessary to ask what the overall impact was and why it is that one can find small and large settlements in Indonesian cities that still merit no better name than slum. There are, broadly speaking two reasons for this. The first concerns the sheer rapidity of the urbanisation process and the lack of the kind of investment that would have been necessary to eliminate these conditions. The authorities looked enviously at the transformation of Singapore next door that also started independent life with significant slums but managed to create what some feel to be an all too clean and tidy urban environment! The reason was, of course, that Singapore is now a rich country and Indonesia remains a relatively poor one: the resources available for urban improvements have been strictly limited.

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[73]   For an analysis of one such environmental assessment carried out for a cluster of 18 towns in Sulawesi, see Atkinson (1998).

Jakarta: Photo: Adrian Atkinson

But it is also possible to point a finger at the mode of delivery of the programmes – that in spite of the legislation were, until well into the 1990s (and with the notable exception of the Surabaya experience) severely top-down with no genuine participation. This resulted a lack of 'ownership' and hence maintenance such that in many areas improvements rapidly deteriorated. Later programmes, where communities were encouraged to participate in decisions as to what improvements should be made, demonstrated how, with very modest means and local commitment, some slums could be transformed into pleasant urban neighbourhoods.

The Surabaya case pioneered the change in procedure that involved populations prior to any decisions being made concerning environmental improvements. This was clearly the result of a constellation of local decision-makers able to find their way through what was a highly centralised government system as well as the initial World Bank procedures. The Bank itself also initiated a learning process through the MEIP, mentioned above which included Jakarta. The

'community upgrading' which this introduced in pilot areas that included social and economic development components in parallel with infrastructure improvements pointed the way to subsequent approaches to the upgrading of informal settlements. However, as noted above, local environmental problems remain, including poor quality water supply, inadequate waste management – in Jakarta, waste collection oscillated across the 1990s between 78% and 88% - and for much of the population regular flooding of neighbourhoods that resist solution without much more substantial resources and strategic investments together with a better quality of urban management.

Jakarta: Photo: Adrian Atkinson

The impact of the advent of environmentalism internationally resonated in Indonesia with a comprehensive environmental law introduced already in 1982, a Ministry of Environment and then in 1990 an executive Environment Agency. Numbers of critical environmental NGOs were formed, foremost being the more politically engaged umbrella organisation WALHI and the more scientifically-

inclined Pelangi. For many years the Ministry was led by Emil Salim who had both an international reputation as 'environmental activist' and pursued a forceful set of policies aimed to insert environmental concerns into the development process. He actively cooperated with the environmental NGOs, some of which collaborated whilst others preferred to keep their distance from government.

Relatively little of the policy framework was directed towards urban issues, and the style was generally one of campaigning, given the failure of the Ministry to gain access to influencing the national budgetary process. A national Agenda 21 was compiled with UNDP assistance that made little practical impact and what integrated local environmental campaigns or programmes of the Local Agenda 21 kind did occur – such as in Surabaya (Atkinson, 2001) - were motivated by external funding rather than indigenously generated.

Among the Ministry-instigated campaigns, the PROKASIH programme aimed at improving pollution control of industries that were discharging wastes into rivers and the ADIPURA programme has given annual prizes to urban authorities that achieved a certain level of cleanliness of their city. Urban air pollution was also seen as a growing problem that attracted small externally-financed projects. Initially the World Bank URBAIR programme was implemented in a number of Asian cities (Shah et al, 1998) paralleled by the German-funded MERKAL study (Kleemann,1994) carried out in conjunction with the national scientific foundation BPPT followed more recently by the EU-funded CURB-AIR initiative. Whilst considerable information has been compiled, these have tended to remain at the level of policy-making and pilot projects.

A radical process of decentralisation of powers, responsibilities and significantly also of resources to local authorities – bypassing the provinces – that was introduced in 2000 is enabling a locally more sensitive approach to urban environmental management to take shape. In the first instance, however, the results were very patchy, where 'local democracy' is something that takes time to be learned and where some local authorities used their power and resources more competently than others. At its best decentralisation has led to substantially increased efforts to make local environmental improvements – such as the Surabaya environment department established in 2001 – that is

collaborating with local NGOs and aggressively seeking external finance for environmental management projects (Kono, 2004).

Where the economic crash of 1997 raised the spectrum of a new impoverishment of a country that had over decades struggled to reduce poverty and its environmental effects, since the turn of the century, there has been a feeling, reflected in urban environments, of a sense of increasing tidiness even of poor urban neighbourhoods which may in part be put down to the fact of one-time rural migrants having learned how to organise their new life in cities with very modest resources, with the encouragement of government programmes and the assistance of committed local NGOs. The long-term sustainability of these development is, however, nowhere on the agenda and attempts to focus on these have gained no response amongst local academics or responsible authorities (Atkinson, 1993).

Since 2006, when climate change hit the international agenda, there seems to have been a new impetus to urban environmental management, complete with new injections of international finance and even involvement of the private sector to benefit from carbon credits. In general the issues have been, as everywhere, mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation to the impacts of climate change. In 2006, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono declared the national greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction target of 26%, following which a national board was establisged to come up with the National Action Plan Addressing Climate Change (RAN-MAPI). Aside from its major focus on reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation the plan, issued in 2007, includes several sectors to be dealt with in the urban context including waste management and reduction in energy consumption [74]. The National Development Planning Board (Bappenas) then develops RAN-MAPI into an annual roadmap, breaking down GHG emission targets into practical projects by sector (Bappenas, 2010).

The Ministry of Public works has been responsible for transmitting the road map to achieve local targets at provincial and city level. This has meant building new measures into the urban special and master planning processes. Infrastructure projects aimed at mitigation in-

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[74]   Rencana Aksi Nasional Menghadapi Perubahan Iklim (RAN-MAPI), Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim (DNPI), November 2007.

clude installation of energy-saving city lighting and use of carbon credits to improve the management solid waste disposal sites. On the adaptation side, new impetus is being put into flood control measures – for instance with the World Bank investing in new measures in Jakarta under the title of Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project. However, as elsewhere in the region, whilst urban flooding is evidently increasing in seriousness, indications are that this is so far not due to climate change-induced sea level rise but rather to urban development problems which urgently need taking in hand if low-lying neighbourhoods of the coastal cities are not to become uninhabitable in the foreseeable future.

Urban Environmental Planning and Management in Vietnam

TOC

The contemporary idea of 'environment' came late to Vietnam as did the process of rapid urbanisation. As a divided country until the end of the war in 1975, urban development occurred in entirely different ways in the north and the south and the legacy of this is still discernable [75]. In the north, the government had definite policies for the containment of Hanoi – whilst also asserting it as a large city on the scale of what was Saigon – and developing satellite industrial towns within about a one hundred kilometre radius of the capital. But the urban population remained well below 20%. In the south, little was done by way of planning and the fact of rampant influx of war refugees into what is now Ho Chi Minh City (made up of the cities of Saigon and Cholon) as it was thought that after the war these migrants would return to the countryside.

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[75]   For a detailed and comprehensive history and analysis of urbanisation in Vietnam see Douglass et al (2002).

Photo: Nguyen Viet Thang and Adrian Atkinson

Once the country was unified, the south, too, came under the erstwhile policies of the north and it was not until the mid 1990s, in the framework of the introduction of liberal policies and greater freedom for people and businesses to move and develop as they saw fit, that urbanisation began to take off. By the year 2005 the population exceeded 26% of the national population – itself growing fast – and it is estimated that by 2030 the urban population will be over 40%. Recently the urban population has been growing at about one million inhabitants a year (Coulthart et al, 2006).

Photo: Nguyen Viet Thang and Adrian Atkinson

During and immediately following the war, the focus of the Government was entirely upon security and thence economic development with very little attention and resources directed to urban infrastructure or housing. This left a backlog of needs in terms of water-supply and sanitation that, with the rapid growth of cities, is difficult to catch up in spite of there now being an awareness of the need (Warlters, 2006). Meanwhile, housing provision is now predominantly the responsibility of the private sector. Some large housing estates are being built but a large proportion of the housing is built individually and ranges from a reasonable quality to classic slum housing – of which the World Bank estimates there are some 300,000 units in Ho Chi Minh City but which can be found in significant numbers also in other cities. Urban planning remains locked in a framework inherited from communist times that is far too rigid to be capable of directing development particularly on urban peripheries and in consequence development is becoming scattered over wide areas particularly in the met-

ropolitan regions. This is difficult to serve with infrastructure and as these areas densify, so the environmental problems escalate.

Photo: Nguyen Viet Thang and Adrian Atkinson

Small slum-upgrading pilot projects have been undertaken – one of the most visible being the Tan Hoa Lo Gom Canal project in Ho Chi Minh city, financed by Belgian assistance (Verschure et al, 2006). The World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and bilateral agencies – notably Ausaid, Agence Française de Dévéloppement (AFD) and Japanese assistance (JBIC) – have been helping to finance and develop basic urban infrastructure. Coordination amongst these external agencies was formalised with the creation of the Vietnam Urban Forum in 2001 with the Vietnamese government (Ministry of Construction) taking 'ownership' of it in 2003. However, the Vietnamese government remains resistant to recognising the spread of slums because these are seen as substandard and thus in principle should be demolished and replaced with housing of a higher standard.

The fact remains, however, that Vietnam remains a very poor country – with GDP per capita considerably less than half that of Indonesia - and the resources simply are not present to build better quality housing for the poorer population.

A classic case is presented by Nhon Trach new town to the west of Ho Chi Minh City (Tuan, 2007). This was planned as an integrated industrial suburb in the context of the successful attraction of inward industrial investment. Land was made available for industry, housing and centre city functions and industries came to locate in the industrial area. However, the standards set for the housing areas were far higher than could be afforded by the working population and the (informal) services that settled in proximity with the areas where the workforce came to live. As neither the industries nor the government provided any housing, this appeared as informal development expanding the neighbouring villages into what became a town with the official housing land remaining almost entirely empty in spite of the presence of roads and other infrastructure. The environmental conditions in the informal villages included heavily polluted local streams from waste water and informally disposed solid waste.

Besides serious water pollution problems – and it should be added, notable problems of inadequate solid waste management – in the growing cities, there is a rapidly growing problem of air pollution partly from industry but particularly from traffic. As recently as the mid-1990s, urban roads were dominated by bicycles. Following the turn of the century, motorcycles came within the financial capacity of large sections of the population and these, together with a growing volume of cars, rapidly displaced bicycles, reaching a crisis in terms of traffic management and serious air pollution by 2005. Whilst air quality monitoring is ongoing in the major cities, policy directives have been promulgated and the both the national Environmental Protection Agency and local authorities in the larger cities have been formulating means to control the problem, effective solutions to what is an growing problem have yet to be implemented.

A further serious problem particularly in coastal cities and above all in Ho Chi Minh City is flooding. This is a regular and increasing occurrence as a consequence of the continued sealing of surface area and the lack of adequately coherent drainage. However, this will almost certainly increase as a problem due to changing weather condi-

tions and with half the city less than one metre above sea level, the defence of the city against permanent inundation is a question that until 2007 had not been apprehended by the government. Although there had been increased concern with flooding it was only after from 2008 that numbers of studies were undertaken to analyse the nature and possible future of urban flooding problems and what steps need to be taken to mitigate these.

Hô-Chi Minh City: Photo: Adrian Atkinson

The national government acknowledged the problematic of climate change and the urgent necessity to consider the impacts of this in the coming years on Vietnam in the passing of Decision 158/2008/QD-TTg in December 2008. This, however, made little reference to urban flooding as a specific problem and one which needs urgent attention in the case of Ho Chi Minh City. By 2010 a number of studies had been undertaken both to outline measures that could be taken to reduce the flood risk of the city and also assessments of how effective

these might be (ADB, 2010; Gravert and Wiechmasnn, 2011). As in the case of Jakarta – indeed, with even more dire consequences – it is clear that ongoing urban development, particularly in very low-lying areas – is already resulting in very regular flooding and with ongoing development, even with the proposed mitigation measures, significant areas of the city are likely to become uninhabitable within the coming decades. This is not reflected i n the present urban and regional plans but might be expected to result in plan amendments in the coming years.

Ho Chi Minh City: Photo: Nguyen Viet Thang

Returning to the question of urban environment as a policy and in-stitutional issue, it was noted at the outset of this profile of Vietnam-ese urban environmental planning and management that the country came late to the subject. During the communist years, environment was not an issue in itself and the first coherent recognition of this by the government was the adoption of the Environmental Protection

Law of 1994 following creation in 1993 of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (MOSTE), along the lines of the Thai Ministry of the same name. This remained a small and weak Ministry until its replacement in 2003 by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE), again following Thai precedent and the arrangements that had been in existence for over a decade in the Philippines. The environmental protection law was thoroughly overhauled in 2004.

As in the case of urban infrastructure development, environmental planning and management has been dominated by external assistance from a large number of international and bilateral agencies. During the 1990s assistance was given both to generate strategic documents – including the first National Environment Strategy and Action Plan – and to provide technical training and assistance to the provincial environment offices (DOSTE) particularly to empower these to control industrial pollution, given the rapid inward investment of large industrial plant. It became clear that environmental issues remained on the margins of government decision-making and UNDP supported a Capacity21 project linking MOSTE with the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) in an attempt to get environmental considerations incorporated into economic planning from the outset. Similar attempts were also made in some cases at the provincial level.

These attempts did not make a significant impact, with the national planning system involving nested socio-economic plans followed by urban and regional physical plans under the Ministry of Construction and environmental planning and other initiatives taking place on the margins. The importance of this is that economic development is promoted and the national budget directed towards this with relatively little regard for environmental – or indeed social - consequences. In spite of strategic policy documents – the most recent being the National Strategy for Environmental Protection and Strategy for Sustainable Development (Agenda 21) – action on environmental issues is carried out largely to mitigate the consequences of development rather than to guide it. Of course the market orientation of Vietnamese development today means anyway that plans of all kinds have diminishing directive power and it is a combination of private sector negotiations and rampant 'informal' development that create the reality on the ground – and the environmental problems which come with this.

Concluding Thoughts

There are really two perspectives on where we stand today with regard to urban environmental problems and what has been achieved in trying to mitigate these. On the one hand the present concern for 'environment' clearly originates in the analyses of the later 1960s and early 1970s that gave birth to the international environmental movement with its strategic concern for the abuse of the global environment in all its dimensions including the spoliation and exhaustion of resources. Today this concern falls under the heading of 'sustainability' and 'sustainable development'. The other perspective is one that has a narrower focus, concerned with living conditions in urban areas that deals particularly with human health and in principle also the efficiency and convenience of cities. Crudely speaking we can say that the latter perspective is short-term and the former long-term.

There is no universally recognised comprehensive set of urban environmental problem indicators and monitoring to say where we stand and how well we are doing to combat the problems. In one area – what might be considered to be the core area of 'improved' urban sanitation – we do, however, have such a global assessment in the form of the Millennium Development Goal for sanitation and the Joint Monitoring Programme reports where we see that progress is being made in the provision of sanitation for urban populations but that this is not keeping pace with the growth in urban population (WHO/UNICEF, 2008:10).

This seems to represent quite well the situation we find in the two countries here looked at in detail. However, in the case of South Asia and particularly Africa, the sanitary situation falls far short of the goal. Furthermore this measure does not yet look beyond the toilet at whether and to what degree the waste is being treated and hence what the impact is on the quality of ground and open surface water in and around the cities – and the health dangers that this poses.

As we have seen in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam, flooding is a further problem which we know to affect large numbers of cities and

within those cities particularly the poor whose settlements locate in places liable to flooding because no formal developer would choose to build there, making eviction unlikely. They are prepared to take the risk and suffer the consequences that are mostly a question of inconvenience rather than being fatal [76]. This situation is probably much like the situation with regard to sanitation: that measures are being taken to improve drainage in most cities but that the rapid urban development – both formal and informal – means having to run fast to stand still and until urbanisation is more or less complete, this will continue to be a losing battle.

The evidence for the problem of urban air pollution also has, as in the case of flooding problems, to be more anecdotal. Certainly, the cities of Latin America where in the 1980s inversion conditions led to major crises of weeks where the air became dangerous to breathe death rates rose significantly. This situation led to measures being taken in many cities to control the problem. Possible ameliorative measures are well-enough known and it simply took political will to confront the issue, which is far from eliminated, but brought to a level where it no longer represents a political problem. One would like to think that this could follow the European case where, once urbanisation rates have stabilised it is easier to focus on step by step measures to improve the environment.

Or we can take one step back and take issue with the attitude that lets things happen up to a crisis point and then does just enough to avoid political repercussions. If we reflect in this way then a whole host of questions arise as to why the means cannot be found to organise the social process, of which current rapid urbanisation is one facet, in a way that foresees the problems we are facing and deals with these in a organised fashion where in almost all cases workable solutions are known and where it is, again, a question of political will to plan and to resource the solutions. The problems of abuse of water resources, of avoiding contamination or of treatment, of drainage and how to build cities to avoid flooding, of air pollution and how not to

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[76]   Flooding that covered much of city of Jakarta in February 2007, with tens of thousands of houses affected, many up to the roof and with some areas affected for several days, killed just 54 people. The flooding of Bangkok in January 2012 was even more extensive and lasted considerably longer with the first signs of areas of the city that are indefensible against floods.

produce it or if produced how to eliminate it: all these can be solved. But we live in times where all this knowledge is disregarded as running counter to the liberal pursuit of individual happiness as defined through the evolution of processes of consumption in a world where those able to convince populations to consume what they have to offer are king.

This brings us back to the start of the essay, not just to the fact that societies have existed that *did* have an organised approach to urban development based on notions of what makes a good environment (we can't necessarily vouch for whether these populations were therefore happier or not), but to the concerns and aspiration of the environmental movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Whilst we might be able to see a process of amelioration of immediate local environmental problems that could emerge in time in the cities of the South once the urban environmental managers do not have to run so fast just to stand still, this vision falls to pieces when we start to look into the longer term that was the concern of the original environmental movement. We simply cannot continue to develop in this way: it is simply unsustainable!

Certainly the World Bank and a widening range of international agencies and institutions are coming to focus on the emergent problems connected with global warming and to support what it terms 'adaptation planning' to anticipate the problems that will be arising and as far as possible to avoid them – but understanding full well that the consequences are likely to be dire [77]. What has yet to be focused upon is the impacts not of a voluntary reduction in the use of energy from fossil fuel to reduce global warming but of a reduction that will be happening anyway as a consequence of depletion. The impacts that this will have on urban life everywhere will be devastating (Atkinson, 2008). We might say that the main problems will be economic rather than environmental: that energy prices will rise inexorably and as almost everything within the modern economy has a component that derives from petrochemicals, so the price of almost every-

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[77]   The word 'catastrophic' occurred eight times in the text of Chapter 5 of the World Bank (2006b) 2007 issue of *Global Economic Prospects* that dealt with the probable impacts of global warming in the future. Furthermore, the 2009 World Development Report will take the impacts of global warming as its main theme.

thing will rise. Under these circumstances, however, today's cities will become unworkable in ways that we can only speculate on.

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CITIES INTO THE FUTURE

Part III

Emerging urban policies

Part III.
EMERGING URBAN POLICIES

VII

Democratic decentralisation at the crossroads. A case study of India

by Isabelle Milbert [78]

Introduction

Public decentralisation policies have been at the core of the reform of government institutions in many developing countries during the last 25 years. These policies were supported to a large extent by multilateral and bilateral cooperation programmes, which were taken over later by major international conferences held under the auspices of the United Nations during the 1990s (Milbert, 2000), although the civil society demands prevailing at the time did not treat this reform as a priority. [79]

For 20 years there has been a strong consensus – based on widely differing perceptions and objectives – on the need for decentralisation and giving more power to town and city governments. Today, the benefits of these policies are as diverse as the steps taken in this re-

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[78] The author would like to thank the French National Research Agency and the CITADAIN project for its support.

[79] For instance, decentralisation is not mentioned in African National Conferences reports (Ziegler, 1997).

gard. In most countries, decentralisation has been incomplete, keeping in view what has taken place in India. Our hypothesis, illustrated by a case study of this country, is that the legal measures related to decentralisation have had a strong impact on the democratic functioning of institutions and have contributed to a new definition of citizenship, even though the issue of an effective link between representative and participative democracy remains unresolved. However, at the technical level of the delegation of powers and sharing of financial responsibilities, a great deal of uncertainty and incomplete changes are noticed. Generally speaking, decentralisation policies have not received the financial and human resources required for the implementation of their objectives. Finally, decentralisation has had a strong impact on national space development and is responsible for many of the growing inequalities between various urban areas, in a context where privatized modes of urbanisation are developing rapidly.

Decentralisation has been defined and used in different ways by various institutions, researchers and experts. In its widest sense, decentralisation is a "creation of bodies, separated by law from the national centre, in which local representatives are given formal power to decide on a range of public matters […]" (Meenakshisundaram, 1996: 56). It includes the transfer of authority and responsibility by the central government and its various departments to subordinate governmental organisations, semi-autonomous and elected public bodies, including municipal bodies, or even the private sector. Cheema and Rondinelli's well known typology differentiates between deconcentration, delegation, privatisation and devolution (1983). I have identified in this paper the general insistence on the wider definitions of decentralisation such as, for instance, the tendency to equate decentralisation with deconcentration (United Nations, 1962, UNDP, 1993), or the intentional ambiguity between decentralisation, community development and privatisation (Manor, 2004) as the central problem in the theorization, implementation and assessment of decentralisation policies.

In this paper, decentralisation is therefore considered in a narrower sense as an extension of representative democracy and as a categorisation of the territorialisation of political power, transferring a part of the state's authority and functions to local elected bodies. In this sense, the election of municipal bodies is the key element that condi-

tions the transfer of public power to representative authorities at the local level (Michalon, 1988). But it is not the only condition, as demonstrated by Mawhood (1987: 9) when he describes the five fundamental characteristics of decentralised local bodies: they have a separate legal existence; they have their own budgets and the power to allocate as well as generate their own resources through taxes and earnings from services; they employ their own staff and have an administrative autonomy; a municipal council is elected by universal suffrage; they perform a certain number of specific functions.

Decentralisation is also a part of a general movement leading to the multiplication of actors and the redefinition of a multilevel governance through which the state apparently loses its prerogatives for the benefit of a global level (Jessop, 2004), lower levels (Le Galès 1995), as well as a number of stakeholders belonging to the civil society or the private sector (Kahwaja 2004, Agrawal & Ostrom 2001). Such a reconfiguration of global governance is bound to have a strong impact on the outcome of decentralisation reforms: these have taken place when "there is a movement from the central role of the official state apparatus in securing state-sponsored economic and social projects and political hegemony towards an emphasis on partnerships between governmental, para-governmental and non governmental organisations in which the state apparatus is often the first among equals". (Jessop, 2003: 5)

Launching of Decentralisation Policies

In the late 80s, there was apparently a very large consensus on the need for decentralisation in which all stakeholders saw a great potential: governments would be more effective; ordinary citizens would have a greater sense of ownership of development projects; delays in decision-making would be reduced; local participation would increase; partnerships between government agencies and the private sector would be encouraged; government procedures would be more transparent for ordinary citizens; accountability of bureaucrats vis-à-vis elected representatives would be greater; overall corruption in the political system would be reduced; programmes would be more re-

sponsive and better suited to local conditions; government would appear more legitimate in the eyes of its people due to greater transparency and accountability (Manor, 1999 : 99-100). A number of stakeholders hoped that as a result of decentralisation new forms of citizenship would take root (especially through the empowerment of minorities, women and poorer sections of the population), while others saw in it all the advantages brought by the privatisation of services.

It would be difficult to find such total unanimity on other public policies: 63 developing countries enacted decentralisation laws during the 1980s (World Bank 2000). This surge of public policies is therefore based on a "constructive misunderstanding": there was a consensus on these laws because every actor involved saw in them a means of realising specific goals which would, in fact, be contradictory to the goals sought by other actors. One could say that decentralisation became a "meta-norm" to be implemented at a global level under the auspices of international organisations and cooperation agencies (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 : 890).

Another reason behind this swell of reforms that would severely modify internal balances in the states concerned is the consensus between the different cooperation agencies which also saw a large number of varied and distinct advantages in the implementation of decentralisation policies. A common point that the various agencies agreed on was that decentralisation would facilitate the struggle against poverty: "Decentralisation directly promotes the empowerment of local actors and, as far as possible, of the most underprivileged, the participation of local actors in decision-making and the appropriation of reforms by their beneficiaries. Taken together, these conditions provide greater access for the most underprivileged to public services that satisfy their needs and are within their means." (Raess, 2007: 247, regarding Swiss Development Cooperation projects). Each cooperation agency thus weighed its influence in the countries where its aid was concentrated so that it could participate in this massive transfer of public policies (Ayres, 1999) and make sure that these decentralisation laws were enacted and implemented. External funding for cooperation has often to covered the initial costs of decentralisation (setting up city councils, organising elections, etc.) and has made it easier to hold elections (in West African countries), train elected members, reorganize local finances and set up services (Latin America), pro-

mote local development (Bolivia, Burkina Faso, etc.) and set up multi-level institutions including cities (Cities Alliance) (Milbert, 2000, Satterthwaite 2001).

Internal contradictions in decentralisation procedures became apparent in the 1990s. To begin with, the initial vagueness of the definitions of decentralisation had severe consequences at the ground level: what some called "decentralisation" was in effect no more than deconcentration or privatisation, which was in direct conflict with the implementation of democratic decentralisation, particularly at the time of transferring functions to municipalities. On the other hand, the initial expectations about decentralisation, based on reflections in the field of public administration, concentrated only on the technical aspects related to the deficiencies of public services and implicitly equated decentralisation with procedures connected with privatisation while, at the same time, elected representatives and citizens elaborated new types of democratic action. Very soon, there arose grave doubts whether decentralisation would really lead to better management and greater administrative and financial efficiency (Prud'homme, 1995).

However, criticism and disappointment (mentioned by Baud and de Witt, 2009: 9) did not stop decentralisation reforms from coming into force. This eventually led to demands, this time from civil society, for a second wave of decentralisation measures that would rectify the defects and limitations of the earlier laws and would finally allow greater efficiency and local democracy to take root (Arvind, 2008, Ramanathan, 2007).

India seems to provide a very good illustration of the wave of decentralisation reforms launched in the 1980s and 1990s: identified as a priority by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1986, decentralisation was implemented and pursued at the same time as economic liberalisation. However, decentralisation was far from being a new concept in India: several laws instituting urban local bodies had been passed during the British rule particularly in 1870 (Lord Mayo's Resolution), 1882 (Lord Ripon's Reforms) and 1916 (Milbert 1986). However, these measures were considered very disappointing by the leaders of the Congress Party who felt that the British colonial rulers had cheated them by doling out no more than a few crumbs of democratic self-government.

After Independence, Indian urban local governments were organised on the basis of the "ultra vires" principle. Hence, in this federal system, the state governments had more freedom in the management of their affairs in the absence of constitutional provisions. Urban local bodies were in fact subjected to controls exercised *ex ante* by administrators and "supersessions" while elected representatives, under direct administrative supervision, were likely to be suspended *sine die* for the slightest deviation.

The result was far from satisfactory: "In many states, local bodies have become weak and ineffective on account of a variety of reasons, including the failure to hold regular elections, prolonged supersessions and inadequate devolution of powers and functions. As a result, urban local bodies are not able to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units of self-government." (Statement of Objects and Reasons, Indian Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992)

As a consequence, a constitutional amendment appeared as a prerequisite for a reform to strengthen local urban bodies. The objective was to grant a constitutional status to municipal government in India for initiating a process of participative and decentralised democratic government of urban areas. Two constitutional amendments were eventually voted in 1992 concerning rural and urban decentralisation. This process was undertaken at the national level with close coordination between the central government and a number of Indian experts. In the federal context, the states would continue to bear heavy responsibilities regarding the implementation of the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA), especially in matters of legislation and implementation. All the state legislatures subsequently passed conforming legislations in order to implement the CAA, though the exercise has been perfunctory in a number of cases (Sundaram, 1996).

The implementation of the 74th Amendment was intended to change the urban landscape in three ways: create a local democracy, provide guaranteed representation for the weaker sections of society, devolve urban functions together with a sound financial devolution procedure corresponding to these functions, and create an institutional framework which would strengthen the urban capacities for planning and managing the city such as District Planning Committees, Ward Committees, Metropolitan Planning Committees, State Finance Commissions and regular auditing of accounts (CRISIL, 2008 : 3)

This has now created a great variety of situations throughout India, where states have dealt differently with the problems of fiscal decentralisation and urban management (Fernandes, 2004). From the beginning, the elected members of State Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) were reported to have certain reservations regarding this reform. A commonly accepted explanation is that they saw this new scale of political activity as a direct threat to their own influence and constituency. This initial institutional twist, where decentralisation was perceived as an initiative of the Centre rather than the states, has had many practical implications.

Nevertheless, decentralisation has enabled urban local bodies to regain in some measure the autonomy that they had lost completely. The 74th Constitutional Amendment has provided for the regular and fair conduct of elections to urban local bodies by statutory Election Commissions. It secures the territorial jurisdiction of urban local bodies by clearly defined criteria, designated as *nagar panchayats*, municipal councils and municipal corporations (for large urban areas). It aims at giving an adequate representation to women and weaker sections of society in municipalities and Wards Committees, and to the offices of chairpersons. It foresees the constitution of Wards Committees for a number of wards in large urban areas, in order to ensure popular participation in civic affairs and decentralised governance. There is also the specification, through a separate Schedule provided in the Constitution (12th Schedule), of the powers and functional responsibilities to be entrusted to municipal bodies and their committees, to be confirmed by state laws. The 74th CAA also foresees that there will be a specification, by state laws, of provisions for the mobilisation of local finances through taxes and revenue sharing and assignment, and the appointment of Statutory Finance Commissions every five years for reviewing the financial position of local bodies, for making recommendations on local taxes and transfers by way of assigned taxes and grants-in-aid. There are also provisions for setting up committees, predominantly composed of elected representatives, for comprehensive district planning and metropolitan planning by integrating urban and rural plans for land use, resource use and environment, and limitations on the state's power for the dissolution of elected local bodies.

The implementation of constitutional amendments aimed at decentralisation was intensified after 2005, when a tardy but genuine effort was made to give top priority to urban policies through the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Mission (JNNURM). In fact, one objective of this policy is to ensure that decentralization is completely operational in the 63 large cities concerned. One of the conditions to be eligible for receiving funds from the Centre under JNNURM is to have fully implemented the provisions of the 74th CAA (JNNURM, 2005).

JNNURM thus aims to fulfil the conditions of full accountability as described by James Manor (Manor, 1999, 11): adequate funds, adequate powers, double accountability.

Democratic Assertion of Decentralisation

The aim of decentralisation is to transfer to the local level all the elements already present in the democratic system, including popular sovereignty, equality and political freedom. H. Blair describes the local government body as the "meaningful authority devolved to local units that are accessible and accountable to their local citizenry, who enjoy full political rights and liberty" (Blair, 2000:21). The underlying aim of decentralisation is to ensure that local elected representatives pay more attention to the demands of their fellow citizens by strengthening public participation and making local bodies more accountable to the public.

Decentralisation has led to the creation of municipalities or, in other words, entities exercising authority in a demarcated space. The very delimitation of municipal boundaries often triggered an extensive democratic debate and a lot of interaction between people, traditional authorities and political leaders (Jacob, 1998). It also led subsequently to the regular holding of local elections which are closely followed up by the citizens because of the concrete, tangible issues at stake. (Utomo, 2009)

The introduction of decentralisation in urban areas has brought about a profound change in city governments: it has increased the number of actors and altered the nature of their interactions (Le Galès,

1996). It has given a sense of belonging to the local citizenry (Ruet, Tawa Lama-Rewal 2009), created new levels of political action (de Wit, 1997), opened new modes of access to political life (Utomo 2009) and created a new class of local politicians (Baud & Nainan, 2008). In many countries, including the European countries, decentralisation has made it possible to delocalise cultural and economic activities, thus facilitating local development and putting an end to the capital's ascendancy.

Today, in most countries, local elections depend a great deal on the prestige enjoyed by various political parties at the national level but also, and above all, on the quality of local candidates and their social networks as well as the quality of their urban management. Political conditions linked with local elections rarely concentrate only on the municipal team's efficiency in the area of urban management. In many cases, in the North as well as the South, party politics at the national level also play as important a role as the individual charisma or managerial efficiency of mayors. One also has to take into account the identity and the status of the different voters and the patronage exercised by elites (for example, big landlords, former feudal chiefs). In many cases, ethnic, religious, linguistic and regional identities are likely to condition the voting results more than the assessment of the efficacy of municipal management. (Bako-Arifari, 2002, Blundo, 1998)

In India, the primary objective of the 74th CAA was to reinforce democratic governance and create a three-tier system of democracy. City and town dwellers would thus be able to elect their local government representatives in the same regular and uncontested manner in which they elect members of the state and central legislative bodies.

The above objective has been attained in a vast majority of Indian states. Urban local bodies have been constituted and reinforced. Several rounds of regularly conducted municipal elections have been a spectacular political phenomenon in most Indian states (cf. Bercegol on small towns in Uttar Pradesh, 2012).

State Election Commissions have been created in accordance with the provisions of the Act. They oversee the entire election process and guarantee the adherence to democratic rules. The 74th CAA also specifies that the electoral system should provide for the specific rep-

resentation of the "weaker sections of society", namely women in addition to Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SC/STs). The implementation of these measures has led to significant changes in local politics, especially in North India (Jeffrey, Jeffery, Jeffery, 2008, Ciotti 2009). From the beginning, weaker sections were well represented both among local councillors and in Municipal Committees and also at the Mayors' level. Women, for instance, were appointed Mayors very soon after the enactment of the 74th CAA (Tawa Lama - Rewal 2005). However, "the decision of which seats are reserved need not follow any set criteria and could be used for political purposes by the ruling party. This situation undermines the effort to broad-base participation by women and SC/STs [80]" (UNDP, 2001:24).

The Difficulty in Building an Urban Citizenry through Decentralisation

Political decentralisation has now taken root, hence decision-making mechanisms have become more complex, as demonstrated by the setting up of most international urban projects. Local actors, including mayors, action groups, citizens movements, cannot be ignored anymore: most international UN Conferences since the 90s have highlighted these new urban dynamics. Decentralisation is well established, but it certainly has not been able to solve all the issues linking representative and participative democracy, that is the electoral process on the one hand, and citizens' action on the other hand.

This distinction between representative and participative democracy has logically taken shape in Latin America first (Marques-Pereira, 1998). The Bolivian legal system (Kohl, 2002) is undoubtedly one of the most complete systems as it incorporates the two processes: the citizen votes at the local level, but they also continue to take part in public affairs through social activism, the election of neighbourhood representatives and participation in meetings and decisions related to the running of the district and the city. There is explicit provision for links between these local action groups and municipalities

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[80]   SC : Scheduled Castes ; ST : Scheduled Tribes.

in Bolivian laws, through the creation of "vigilance" and "neighbour-hood" committees (*comites de vigilancia,   organisaciones territoria-les de base*). In many Latin American countries, participative budgets have also been successful in mobilising the population in the area of urban management (Cabannes 2004).

Generally speaking, political control over municipalities has become a major issue in the power struggle, giving rise to various degrees of hybridisation between traditional and emerging leadership (Bako-Arifari 2002, Chatterjee 2004) and giving rise to debates around what Appadurai calls "deep democracy"

In India, municipal sub-levels are expressly provided for in the big cities (with a population over 300,000), through the creation of Ward Committees, which should facilitate interaction between citizens, civil society organisations, councillors and ward personnel (Singh 2012). But they have not yet been set up everywhere. It is true that the 74th CAA is quite imprecise on this subject: as a result, their duties, financial resources and mode of functioning vary considerably from state to state and from city to city. Also, their access to funding and their responsibilities are not necessarily co-related (Wit, Nainan, Palnitkar, 2009: 65). Similarly, institutionalised citizens' groups for every ward in the big cities are yet to be fully developed and in some cases (Bangalore and New Delhi), they have been taken over by the middle class and elite groups (Zerah, 2007, Harriss, 2006). Since Ward Committees have not been set up as initially planned, the Indian government framed a law envisaging the participation of citizens and the community in local government as explicitly foreseen also in the JNNURM. But very few states have implemented this type of legislation so far.

There are still many different interpretations concerning the institutional setup of municipal bodies, the powers of mayors and the mechanics of their election. Claiming that citizens in all parts of India do not enjoy uniform rights to elect their representatives and that the functions and financial means are not identical in all urban local bodies, some researchers conclude that "the democratic power of an Indian citizen regarding local bodies varies widely across states. This is contrary to the uniformity that exists in her democratic power towards the national and states governments" (CRISIL 2008).

Local democracy also suffers from several biases detrimental to the poorer sections of the population (Narayanan, 2003): as migrants and illegal squatters, they often cannot vote, nor run as candidates for election, especially when they are slum-dwellers. Giving out election cards has therefore been a key instrument of party clientelism in urban low-income neighbourhoods (Milbert, 2009). In many cases, it is the elite in charge of urban management, acting in response to demands emanating from middle-class citizens groups, who actually maintains poor urban dwellers in marginal situations, refusing land tenure regularisation and poor neighbourhoods servicing, and insisting on slum clearance (Dupont, 2010). In recent years, in depth research surveys demonstrated how, instead of facilitating a better accountability, decentralisation has not been able to reduce corruption (Veron et al., 2006), communalism, urban social fragmentation (Harriss 2007), land speculation (Fernandes, 2004) and elite capture (Bardhan & Mookherjee 2000).

Uneven Transfers of Functions

When structural adjustments policies were implemented, the accompanying institutional policies prescribed a strict model for services to be provided by local bodies. They were aimed at depriving cities of the responsibility of providing redistributive goods and services which, it was felt, belonged more to the sphere of the private sector. They therefore considered limiting municipal responsibilities to the provision of goods and services serving the interest of the city's well-being, thus maintaining a competitive rate of taxes in relation to other metropolises. A little later, W.Dillinger pointed out the importance of clear and well-defined links between each government unit and its specific services so that the voters could hold the local government responsible for each of its functions. This clarification of the definition of responsibilities was, according to him, necessary to improve the accountability of local institutions to voters (1994:25).

In reality, the results of decentralisation are very uneven as regards the real power conferred on urban local bodies. Only in some countries have the numerous functions and a sizeable portion of financial

resources been actually transferred to local bodies. This process, at times, has encouraged separatist movements instead of neutralizing them (cf. the case of Bolivia and Colombia).

In many countries (e.g. Argentina and Bolivia), decentralisation has made it possible to eliminate the responsibility of public policies at the central level regarding a number of subjects that are both costly and difficult to manage, especially urban services related to human development (health and education), and services demanding heavy investment and costly maintenance (water supply, sanitation and transport). At the city level, this decentralisation came as a shock since no organisation had the ability or the means to undertake these new tasks and treat them on a priority basis, in a context where the existing functions were already quite onerous and the tax base was very weak.

Over the years, the sharing out and allocation of functions have remained unclear, contrary to the initial recommendation of W. Dillinger. One of the first pitfalls has been leaving out some key elements of urban development (slum upgrading, services maintenance, public urban transportation) in an uncertain financial and regulatory framework.

The second pitfall is the delegation of some difficult tasks requiring considerable expertise to local urban bodies with hardly any guidance or funding from the central government. For instance, urban local bodies in developing countries proved to be too weak to take complete charge of functions such as the management of natural disasters, risk prevention or heritage conservation, while in Europe, these tasks are backed by considerable support from the central governments (while local governments still often lack accurate expertise). Even the task of promoting the economy (through local development and job creation) often has to be backed by external institutions to be successful, as demonstrated in several interesting cases (e.g. Bolivia, Thévoz, 1999).

The third pitfall is the superimposition of competencies at the different levels of government. In many countries, including India, town-planning, environmental protection and even the fight against poverty are a case in point.

In India, the 12th Schedule of the Constitution introduced by the 74th Amendment does not envisage a framework for linking municipal functions with the corresponding financial instruments. The 12th Schedule, which establishes the list of 18 functions, is not really mandatory: it is up to the state governments to decide which of the 12th Schedule functions are to be devolved to urban local bodies. "A comparison of the state legislations with the Central Act reveals that few state governments have availed of the opportunity presented by 74th Constitutional Amendment to clarify municipal functions listed as 'mandatory' and 'discretionary', and avoid overlapping institutional, functional and geographic jurisdictions" (UNDP, 2001: 24). Maharashtra undertook the most comprehensive amendments to municipal laws in respect of the functions of the municipal body and the Wards Committees, annual reports on environment and the extent of subsidisation of services, and the constitution of district committees. Many other states adopted a more restrictive approach.

TWELFTH SCHEDULE OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

(Article 243W)

1.   Urban planning including town planning.

2.   Regulation of land-use and construction of buildings.

3.   Planning for economic and social development.

4.   Roads and bridges.

5.   Water supply for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes.

6.   Public health, sanitation conservancy and solid waste management.

7.   Fire services.

8.   Urban forestry, protection of the environment and promotion of ecological aspects.

9.   Safeguarding the interests of weaker sections of society, including the handicapped and mentally retarded.

10. Slum improvement and upgradation.

11. Urban poverty alleviation.

12. Provision of urban amenities and facilities such as parks, gardens, playgrounds.

13. Promotion of cultural, educational and aesthetic aspects.

14. Burials and burial grounds; cremations, cremation grounds; and electric crematoriums.

15. Cattle pounds; prevention of cruelty to animals.

16. Vital statistics including registration of births and deaths.

17. Public amenities including street lighting, parking lots, bus stops and public conveniences.

18. Regulation of slaughter houses and tanneries.

This illustrative schedule of functions seeks to widen the municipal operative sphere in four new areas: economic and social planning, care of the weaker sections, urban poverty alleviation and protection of the environment.

The central government was too optimistic when it left the devolution of functions to the discretion of the states. Actually, the functions envisaged in the 12th Schedule and in the laws of the various states were only partially transferred to the municipalities (Bandyopadhyay et al, 2011). Government agencies and high civil servants have continued to trespass on the functions of municipalities. On the other hand, some functions transferred to municipalities are too ambitious, redundant and, therefore, impossible to implement at the local level, given the human and financial resources at their disposal.

This is true, for instance, of the built heritage conservation: Gujarat is a significant example of municipal action, since considerable efforts have been made in the capital, Ahmedabad, thanks to the goodwill of a non-profit organisation, the backing of international heritage bodies and its original institutional set-up in conjunction with the state and municipal authorities (Nayak, 2003). But in all other cities of Gujarat, such as Jamnagar, Bhavnagar or Junagadh, historic buildings and neighbourhoods are decaying and urban local bodies do not have the specialised staff, the financial means and the popular or elite support that would enable them to deal with their built heritage. Slum rehabilitation, environmental protection or, sometimes, even primary educa-

tion (cf. the case of Jaipur city) meet with the same absence of concern and capacities within urban local bodies' staff.

Programmes to fight urban poverty are managed by the states and sometimes delegated to urban local bodies. But the responsibility is not fully entrusted to them, leading to considerable gaps in the implementation, aggravated by the lack of political will (de Wit, 2002, Milbert, 2009). Urban planning, building control and bye-laws, water supply, sanitation and roads are key functions that are yet to be devolved to urban local bodies in many states. CRISIL estimated that only 60% of these transfers had been completed in 2008. Related institutional tools such as Metropolitan Planning Committees are badly missing in nearly all states (CRISIL 2008: 9).

The implementation of decentralisation in India thus came as a contradiction to many deconcentration and delegation strategies adopted after Independence in the urban sector. For example, during the 1970s and 1980s, the Indian government, with support from the World Bank, had allotted substantial funds for setting up Water Boards, public bodies in charge of the management of water in the different states. Similarly, 'Urban Development Authorities' (UDAs) were placed directly under the state governments, were put in charge of investment, creating infrastructure building and town-planning in most Indian municipal corporations (cities having a population of over 200,000). These public bodies at the state level were not abolished after decentralisation reforms were implemented, and have not lost any of their prerogatives, thus giving rise to an overlap between their functions and those newly acquired by elected urban local bodies. In the future, one could imagine that either the supervision of the UDAs would be progressively transferred to the Municipal Corporations or that their functions and staff would become part of the Municipal Corporations.

As a consequence, most tasks related to planning have yet to be devolved to urban local bodies (except in Kerala and West Bengal). Even more worrisome is the fact that no state has to this day been able to change the sharing of functions with Urban Development Authorities, which remain in charge of most urban investments, infrastructure building and urban planning. Therefore, various deconcentrated state agencies, like Urban Development Authorities, Water Boards, Hous-

ing Boards, are now becoming a direct obstacle to the further implementation of decentralised functions.

The issue of power sharing between urban local bodies and state or national institutions extends to land-related matters and the jurisdiction of municipal bodies over their own urban territory. Many public or semi-public bodies like the railways, port authorities, industrial promotion services and the army actually control vast tracts of land within city limits. It is difficult to quote exact figures, but for instance Bertaud estimated that about 30% of the land under the Chennai Municipal Corporation is under the control of state or national institutions (2002). These lands lying outside the jurisdiction of the municipal authorities are under-utilised and subjected to non-municipal priorities.

Decentralisation, but without the Means required for Fulfilling its Objectives

Initially, financial decentralisation was proposed because "it puts the responsibility for costs, tax levels and expenditures on the shoulders of local beneficiaries and local decision-makers. It therefore maximizes the accountability of government to taxpayers and underpins genuine local political and managerial autonomy" (Manor, 1999: 95). However, it has been observed that political decentralisation in most countries has not been backed by sufficient financial devolution or by the provision of adequate human resources. Generally speaking, local governments are not self sustaining. They usually receive financial support from the state authorities, either in the form of entitlements (giving a legitimacy to the process) or in the form of grants (which enhance the dependence of local governments). Lack of administrative capacity has increased the managerial and investment difficulties faced by urban local bodies.

Deconcentrated state bureaucracies have so far been the main beneficiaries of decentralisation in most countries of the South since urban local governments have not been provided with the means required for decentralisation, whether in terms of revenues, staffing or procedural reforms. The two initial limitations, namely financial and

human capabilities, were properly assessed right from the beginning (Peterson 1994). Although cooperation agencies and national governments have elaborated an impressive number of programmes and projects in support of national policies with the collaboration of local and international academics and consultants, they have not been able to keep up with the rising needs.

In most countries, local taxes continue to yield low revenues. Local resources have remained limited, except in the case of a few large cities. Everywhere, fiscal decentralisation has led to an increase in spatial inequalities, even in developed countries as demonstrated by the case of Greater Paris municipalities and endless discussions on inter-municipal fiscal redistribution.

In India, the 74th Amendment suggests financial self-sufficiency. Huge efforts were made to overcome the appalling state of municipal finances in the 1980s when many municipalities had an annual budget of hardly more than one dollar per capita. In 2003, O.P. Mathur showed that locally generated tax revenues represented only 6.9% of total revenue raised by the central government and 10.4% of that raised by the state governments. While the municipal governments raised only about one-fifth of the revenue raised by the central government, urban municipal areas produced over 50 per cent of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This demonstrates that the urban local bodies have not been given the tools to establish effective linkages between their resources and the activities carried out within their own jurisdictions (Mathur 2003: 145). Bercegol (2012) also shows the lack of political will to levy taxes at the town / city level.

A number of states and Municipal Corporations took initiatives such as the reform of property taxation in Andhra Pradesh and the issuing of bonds by the Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad in Gujarat (Mathur, 2003, 149). However, a recent study by CRISIL still establishes the same diagnosis as Mathur: "the revenue raising power of the urban agencies has become important as the growth pattern of the Indian economy has substantially shifted towards urban centres in the last two decades. The basic revenue structure for the urban centres has not altered in the past two decades. The two basic revenues – property tax and user charges are insufficient to fund urban investments and cities would like to spend approximately Rs.30,000 per capita in immediate infrastructure investments. The average revenue of 42 top

cities in India is only Rs.1,700 per capita, and this figure is boosted by the existence of the octroi tax in Maharashtra urban centres.(…) Clearly, existing revenues will not help finance these investments." (CRISIL 2008, 16)

State Finance Commissions have been created as per the Constitutional Amendment. However, this has not solved the chronic discrepancy between municipal resources and state and central resources: "municipal bodies do not get proportionate benefits of the growing richness of the cities" (UNDP 2001: 25). It is obvious that in India, whether at the municipal or the ward level, the delegated wide-ranging powers are not correlated with corresponding financial allocations (except in Kerala and West Bengal). The amount of finance made accessible to urban local bodies does not match the funds needed to perform the main municipal functions. "Urban local bodies have to depend upon the state government's political and bureaucratic lobbies to access funds" (UNDP, 2001: 24). A very vivid debate has been going on concerning the most appropriate measures to overcome urban local bodies fiscal and financial weaknesses, including new duties, methods of property tax assessment and the replacement of the octroi tax. But so far, Indian ULBs have found the greatest difficulties in levying their own taxes and raising their revenues in a context of distrust from their own constituents (Kalirajan & Otsuka 2012).

The capabilities of the Indian local bodies are also related to their human resources. India now has more than 60,000 municipal councillors and more than 3,000 elected mayors, almost 200 of them in cities having a population of over 200,000. The task of training these new local politicians is quite challenging even today. As in all other countries, their electoral success depends on their practical knowledge of the city's problems and how well they fit into the local networks. Many municipal councillors do not have the necessary educational background to analyse documents that are often difficult to understand (legal documents, budgets, appraisal reports). Most of them, when they take up office, have had little exposure to urban management and usually have no basis for comparison and no standard of development to go by. The task of training these elected representatives is exceptionally difficult: any attempt to train candidates before the election would be interpreted as an advantage given to one adversary over another. After the election, the elected member becomes an official who

is very busy with his public duties and he is considered to be above any need for training. In India, the few existing institutional structures capable of providing such training are largely inadequate in terms of quantity and often even in terms of quality, especially at the state level. Therefore, training takes place at present largely via the party system and peer group support. (UNDP, 2001: 25). The same issue of training is also quite acute in the lower strata of municipal staff, who are locally recruited and, in many cases, unable to perform the new tasks assigned to urban local bodies. A minimum level of municipal staffing, in quantity and quality, has often been called for (Vaidya, 2007).

The influence wielded by senior bureaucrats in urban governments raises questions about the functioning of local democracy in India. For instance, elected members of city councils and mayors highly depend on official authorizations from state government officials for a number of activities. Senior bureaucrats head Municipal Corporations. As IAS officers (Indian Administrative Service), they are usually very competent. However, they are frequently transferred, generally every two to three years : they are appointed by the state and central government and are entrusted with a variety of tasks and responsibilities, city management being only one of them. They play a leading role in the city's management, to the detriment of mayors. In many cases, the state officials (particularly Municipal Commissioners who head the Municipal Corporations of largest cities) agree to curb the initiatives coming from elected local urban bodies, who are constantly suspected of collusion and corruption. This difficult equation between the elected members, the municipal administration and the state administration considerably harms the international image of Indian cities, since they cannot be represented by reputed mayors who project their city's image abroad, as was done way back in the early eighties by personalities like Jaime Lerner in Curitiba, Alfonso Barrantes in Lima or Pasqual Maragall and Joan Clos in Barcelona. Thus the two main constraints on local institutions are linked together, by the state politicians' unwillingness to share power and the state bureaucracy's reluctance to give up its prerogatives, especially to local institutions whose quality of management remains to be built (Mohanan 1997).

From Decentralisation to the Privatisation
of Land Development

From the beginning, decentralisation was closely connected with private local development, as pointed out by the early United Nations documents (1964): "governments should decentralise as quickly as possible the powers of decision-making to accelerate their economic and social development and make their programmes sustainable" (cf. Thévoz, 1999, on Bolivia)

However, the debate on privatisation that began in the early stages of decentralisation was of a different nature and based on the failure of public bodies, since municipalities had not been able to adjust to the ever-growing demand. In the name of efficiency, there was a move to consider privatisation, public – private partnerships or even recentralisation. In the eighties, decentralisation and privatisation developed side by side but privatisation often seems to have been a weakening factor going against the very objective of strengthening the powers, financial capacities and functions of municipal bodies.

In India, decentralisation has been closely linked with privatisation in three ways, the most evident being the delegation of urban services (garbage collection, water) to the private sector (Baud, Dhanalakshmi, 2007), but there are also cases of the privatisation of urban management staff and even the privatisation of cities themselves.

Unfortunately, liberalisation policies and the new provisions intended to facilitate public-private partnerships did not lead to the better management of infrastructure and basic urban services (Singh, 2006: 372). Singh describes the case of Gurgaon and Faridabad where the government of Haryana is trying to promote modern industry-friendly cities by revamping institutional mechanisms with the aim of strengthening the links between investment in infrastructure and industrial needs. However, the exceptionally rapid urban growth and the huge private investments have taken the state government by surprise and they have not been able to keep pace in the areas of water-supply, electricity and transport while keeping the municipal authorities marginalised in the process.

Privatisation is in evidence also in the field of urban management. A great number of tasks for which urban local bodies do not have the necessary expertise are now entrusted to an excellently trained body of consultants and large engineering companies, whether it is the preparation of city development plans (in the context of the JNNURM), for the preparation, monitoring or assessment of projects, new policies and technical expertise and even for urban research. In some cases, these activities also involve training of municipal staff (e-governance, financial management etc…), but it is to be feared, as it happened in the case the preparation of city development plans by private consultants (on the basis of existing City Master Plans), that it will only marginalise the inexperienced municipal staff a little more.

As everywhere, decentralisation, linked to privatisation, has led to competition between cities and to the emergence of city marketing techniques in order to attract private investments, although the leader-ship difficulties mentioned earlier have mitigated this move.

In the past, many new cities were developed in India, in complete accordance with Indian town-planning traditions, irrespective of whether they were built and developed by the government for strate-gic and political reasons (Chandigarh, Bubaneshwar) or whether they were set up for economic reasons (heavy industry, mining sites) or for purposes of urban land development, as in Navi Mumbai on the out-skirts of Mumbai (Shaw, 2004). Most of these new cities were planned and built by the central government, but new private towns would also be authorized, usually on the site of mining industries (Mi-tra, 2002). The government's intention to establish municipal authori-ties once the private new town was built and completed always led to clashes with the industrial builder, who wanted to keep complete con-trol on the new township. The most striking example continues to be the city of Jamshedpur (Jharkhand), launched in 1907 by Jamshedji Tata. The steel city with a population of 1.3 million in 2011 (ranking 36th out of 53 million-plus cities), is till today managed by Tata In-dustries and is considered to have an exceptional record in providing services. "People do not want of a municipal corporation because they fear the provision of services would not be so good," explains a high official of the Jamshedpur management. [81] A similar defiance towards

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[81]   Interview, October 15th, 2012

elected municipal bodies is to be seen in the 2005 legislation on Special Economic Zones.

Special Economic Zones, whose distinctive features were defined in a law enacted in 2005 (SEZ Act) and in the SEZ Rules, February 2006, belong to a different category altogether. They are in effect 'duty-free' enclaves treated as a foreign territory "for the purpose of trade operations, duties and tariffs". The law provides several tax incentives for developers and investors in these zones intended to create optimal conditions to promote exports, private investment and job-creation.

The government has great expectations from this policy: "SEZs need to be seen in the context of attempts by the Government of India to launch second generation reforms and also a continuation of earlier initiatives to boost exports (…). SEZs allow the government to experiment with radical (in the Indian context) economic reform in a sufficiently large geographical area (minimum size 1000 hectares) but on a localized basis, without the difficulty of introducing such reforms at the national level." Thus, there is a strong link between SEZs and export promotion. At the same time, they are also seen as a laboratory for conducting experiments in economic liberalisation and spatial management.

Large Indian companies have greeted these measures very favourably. By setting up SEZs, it is possible to develop vast spaces and avoid existing cities together with their environmental problems, their slums and their politicians and start (in theory) from "ground zero" where the planner and investor can function without constraints in an "internationally competitive and hassle-free environment for exports". It is interesting to note that in these official documents, SEZs are not shown as an instrument of land development or as elements of an urban or human settlements policy.

During the last few years, the Indian private sector, particularly the biggest industrial enterprises such as Reliance, Tata and Mahindra have quickly seized this opportunity for investment in new urban centres, even more so because it comes with numerous fiscal advantages. More than 500 SEZs spreading over thousands of hectares have been approved so far and are at the planning and implementation stage. These SEZs have actually allowed the private sector to enter the fields

of urban investment and even land development (construction of roads, suspension bridges and even airports).

However, the private sector has adopted a contrasting attitude as regards the opportunities offered by various Indian states. There is actually a deep divide between the northeast region and the west / south of the country. Plans were drawn up from 2009 onwards to set up more than 50 SEZs in Gujarat, in Maharashtra and in Tamil Nadu while, in 2013, only one SEZ is operational in Orissa, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2013). If this trend is confirmed, this *de facto* privatisation of the land development and new town policy would constitute a complete reversal of the country planning strategy which, in the first four decades after India's independence, was dominated by the idea that development can be attracted to backward regions by creating the required infrastructure.

Conclusion

Are we now heading towards a second wave of decentralisation or towards privatisation? While the urban democratic vibrancy makes no doubt, many countries are facing the necessity to readjust their legislation on decentralisation, for many reasons: some realise that they created too many administrative and political levels (France, Spain) or too small entities (France, Switzerland). Quite a few countries are institutionalizing participatory methods such as ward committees or participatory budgeting. Many countries have to readjust the financial and functional share of responsibilities between the centre and the cities, while most of them have to continue reforming their administrative regulations, recruitment and training so that cities can face their environmental and social challenges. In quite a few countries where decentralisation is half way between deconcentration and decentralisation, the question remains if the central government will allow more autonomy to the urban local bodies (Madagascar). Everywhere, whether in the North or in the South, decentralisation has led to a weaker position of urban authorities in front of private entrepreneurs, whether in the field of urban services, where urban authorities are not

always in a position to create the conditions for a true competition that would lead to lower prices for a better service, or in the field of investments and job creation, for which municipalities are openly competing and eventually accepting to curb the implementation of their own regulations on land use, for instance on coastal zone regulations.

The decentralisation policy launched in 1992 has considerably changed the way urban authorities function in India. For several decades, some of them were under the direct control of state governments (Lavigne, Milbert, 1983). But this reform has not been totally successful so far, and the image of local urban politics is not entirely positive. Since 2005, there have been discussions on the possibility of improving the decentralisation policy with a new set of measures directed towards instruments and means: status of municipal staff, training and organisation of leaders who take decisions regarding the city, executive powers of Mayors, formalisation of the increasing participation of citizens in municipal affairs, taking into account the new actors, identification of new instruments of public policies, simplification of funding procedures and reform of fiscal systems are the main topics that are being currently debated. However, the possibility of privatising urban management is also being considered at the same time.

Notwithstanding the original satisfaction with the enactment of the 74th Amendment and its obvious achievements, it has been widely acknowledged that it has provided only the enabling constitutional base for the continued existence of elected local bodies, representation of weaker sections in these bodies, a framework for regional planning, comprehensive functional allocation, mandated and durable devolution of funds and own revenue sources and decentralised civic functions. But not everything has been implemented till now: "The central government is rather powerless indeed as the establishment and management of urban local bodies is a task on the state government list and the central government can only draw broad guidelines" (Wit et al, 2009: 77).

There is general dissatisfaction about the very uneven and usually poor performance of urban local bodies. A positive hypothesis would be that this is just the beginning of the long road to the reform of urban government and true decentralisation, as was stated four years after the implementation of the decentralisation policy by the highest civil servant in charge of administrative reforms: "State governments

are yet to address the fundamental issues bedevilling effective local government such as functional clarity, closing the vertical gap between functions and commensurate revenues, location and distribution of executive and policy-making authorities, recasting state controls, enabling various partnerships, adequate staffing, e-governance and capacity-building" (Sundaram 1996). While urban democracy has considerably progressed during twenty years, the relationship between political and administrative bodies has certainly become more complex, and it is not sure that it has improved and benefited urban citizens and cities environment.

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Part III.
EMERGING URBAN POLICIES

VIII

Possibilities, challenges and lessons of the urban reform procès in Brazil

by Edesio Fernandes

Urban development and its challenges

TOC

The exclusionary nature of the growing process of urban development globally has renewed the calls for the promotion of urban reform in many countries. Many low- and middle-income countries are currently in the uncomfortable position of having to "change the wheels with the car moving", given the grave social, urban, and environmental problems that have accumulated over years, and even decades, of rapid urbanisation and governmental neglect. This task has been complicated further by the effects of the changes in the nature and dynamics of the traditional urbanisation process within the context of the ever-changing global economy. More than ever, stakeholders in several countries understand that the importance of getting the regulatory and institutional frameworks right cannot be underestimated. The promotion of urban reform takes times and it requires continuity and systematic responses at all governmental levels in order to address the scale of the existing problems. It also requires other fundamental factors such as capacity building, approval of articulated policies accor-

ding to a clearly defined public agenda, and the allocation of the necessary esources. [82]

It is in this context that the Brazilian experience deserves to be better known. An important process of urban reform has been slowly, but consistently, promoted in Brazil since the late 1980s. Significant legal and institutional changes have been introduced at the national level, creating a whole new legal-urban order that was consolidated with the enactment of the 2001 City Statute and the installation, in 2003, of both the Ministry of Cities and the National Council of Cities. More recently, as record-breaking investments by the federal government in housing, sanitation, infrastructure, especially through the Plan to Accelerate Growth – PAC, the "My House, My Life" Housing Programme, and other social programmes have raised a new set of questions to be addressed by policymakers in the country.

This national legal order has been complemented by the impressive enactment of a whole generation of Municipal Master Plans: some 1.400 such plans have already been formulated all over the country since 2001, and it is the nature of their contents, as well as their effective enforcement, that will materialise the new urban-legal order consolidated by the City Statute.

Above all, the Brazilian experience clearly shows that urban reform requires a precise, and often elusive, combination of renewed social mobilisation, legal reform, and institutional change. This is a long, open-ended process, the political quality of which resides ultimately in the Brazilian society's capacity to effectively assert its legal right to be present and actively participate in the decision-making process. The rules of the game of urban development and management have already been significantly altered; what remains to be seen is whether or not the newly created legal and political spaces will be used at all governmental levels in such a way as to advance the urban reform agenda in the country. There is still a long way to go in Brazil, and many are the serious obstacles to be overcome.

This article describes the main aspects of the process of urban reform in Brazil. Following a brief account of the historical context, the

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[82]   This article draws from, updates and expands upon, articles published by the author in 2007 and 2010; see Fernandes (2007a; 2007b; 2010; and 2013).

article will discuss the new legal-urban order that has been created in Brazil since the promulgation of the 1988 Federal Constitution; special emphasis will be placed on the provisions of the internationally acclaimed 2001 City Statute. The article will then describe the new institutional apparatus that resulted from the creation of the Ministry of Cities and the National Council of Cities in 2003, as well as discussing some of the main problems affecting these new institutions since their creation.

As a conclusion, it will be argued that, while significant progress has already been made towards the realization of the urban reform agenda in Brazil, the socioeconomic, political, institutional and legal disputes over the control of the land development processes have increased. The renewal of social mobilisation at all governmental levels is crucial for the consolidation, and expansion, of this new inclusive and participatory legal-urban order.

The origins of the Urban Reform Movement

As a result of rapid urbanisation since the 1930s, Brazil has experienced one of the most drastic processes of socioeconomic and territorial re-organisation in the developing world. Over 83% of the total population of 190 million people lives in urban areas, and there is an enormous concentration of population and economic activities in a very small part of the national territory. All the relevant figures and available data clearly indicate the staggering scale and complex nature of this process, which has been widely discussed in an extensive literature. [83][2] Put briefly, rapid urbanisation in Brazil has generated a nationwide urban crisis characterised by the combination of sociospatial segregation, negative environmental impact, and escalating informal development. The escalating housing deficit has been estimated as 7 million units, while some 15 million other families live in inadequate

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[83]   Data on the urbanisation process in Brazil can be found in several sources, the main one being the site of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics – IBGE (*www.ibge.gov.br*); for some recent analytical studies, see Fernandes and Valenca (2001).

conditions. At the same time, there are about 5.5 million under-utilised properties in the country, and an enormous stock of serviced, but vacant, plots of land.

However, despite a longstanding tradition of political, legal, and financial centralisation during most of the urbanisation process, until recently the federal government had failed to formulate and implement comprehensive national land and urban policies, or even to put together a basic institutional infrastructure to deal with the many concerns affecting cities and the growing urban population. In fact, prior to the creation of the Ministry of Cities in 2003, both the lack of a proper governmental response at the federal level and the elitist and exclusionary nature of the actual governmental intervention through the few existing programmes were some of the main factors determining the exclusionary nature of land and urban development in Brazil. This was aggravated further by the conditions of political exclusion resulting from the centralised and authoritarian legal system in force until the promulgation of the 1988 Federal Constitution, which undermined not only the legal-political powers of municipal government, but also the quality of the representative democracy system at all governmental levels.

Another fundamental factor in the creation and reproduction of this process was the prohibitive, obsolete legal order still affirming the anachronistic paradigm of the 1916 Civil Code, thus reinforcing the historical tradition of unqualified private property rights. [84] As a result, until recently the scope for significant state intervention in the domain of property rights through land policy and urban planning was very reduced, especially at the municipal level. [85] While most municipalities still have only a set of basic laws – determining the urban perimeters and traditional constructions codes – only from the mid-

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[84]   I have discussed the legal basis of the historical process of urban development in Brazil elsewhere; see Fernandes (2002a).

[85]   Although it is less popular in Brazil than it is internationally, the impressive case of Curitiba demonstrates that many problems with the legal order may be successfully overcome if there is a solid political-institutional pact in place; in any case, Curitiba is indeed the exception that proves the rule, because of the conservative and even exclusionary nature of the city planning strategies adopted in that city until recently. For a general reference, see Schwartz (2004); see also Fernandes (1995c).

1960s did a new generation of more ambitious planning laws start to be enacted in some of the main cities, although initially they were regularly legally contested.

From the mid-1970s and especially early 1980s on, important cracks appeared in the longstanding military regime, as a result of a powerful combination of factors: the growing social mobilisation through trade unions, civic organisations, social movements, residents' associations, groups linked to the progressive branch of the Catholic Church, and other collective channels; the re-organisation of traditional political parties and creation of new ones expressing renewed political claims for politico-institutional change, particularly through democratic elections and the strengthening of local government; and also, to a lesser extent, to the rearrangements within land and property capital. The first significant attempts at the democratisation of urban management at the municipal level could be identified in the mid-1970s. [86]

As a result of the growing process of social mobilisation and political change an important federal law was approved in 1979 aiming to regulate urban land subdivision nationally, as well as providing basic elements for the regularisation of consolidated informal settlements in cities. Soon afterwards, some progressive environmental laws were also enacted, including a groundbreaking legal recognition in 1985 of a civil public action to defend diffuse interests in environmental matters, *locus standi* being extended to the emerging NGOs. [87] At the municipal level, the first land regularisation programmes were formulated in 1983 in Belo Horizonte and Recife. [88]

A national Urban Reform Movement then emerged and started to gain momentum, within the broader political opening process aiming to promote the redemocratisation of the country. [89] With the increa-

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[86]   See Kowarick (1994) for analyses on the social mobilisation processes in Sao Paulo.

[87]   For a detailed analysis of the civil public action, see Fernandes (1995b; 1994).

[88]   For a critical analysis of the first stage of the regularisation programme in Belo Horizonte, see Fernandes (1993).

[89]   For a broader analysis of the urban reform movement, see M. L. de Souza (2001).

sing strengthening of a new sociopolitical pact, there was a wide recognition of the need for deeper legal and political changes in the country, thus leading to the remarkable, though, in many respects, flawed 1986–88 Constitution-making process**.**

A new legal-political order for the cities with the 1988 Federal Constitution

It was the original chapter on urban policy introduced by the 1988 Constitution that set the legal-political basis for the promotion of urban reform in Brazil. Although the urbanisation process in Brazil started in the 1930s with its peak in the 1970s and several federal constitutions were promulgated in 1934, 1937, 1946, 1967 and the 1969 general amendment, there were no specific constitutional provisions to guide the processes of land development and urban management until the 1988 Federal Constitution came into force.

Since the Constitution-making process was itself the subject of an unprecedented level of popular participation, much of this constitutional chapter resulted from was developed based on the "Popular Amendment on Urban Policy" that had been formulated, discussed, disseminated and signed by more than a hundred thousand social organisations and individuals involved in the Urban Reform Movement. This "Popular Amendment" recognized the following general principles: autonomy of municipal government; democratic management of cities; the social right to housing; the right to the regularisation of consolidated informal settlements; the social function of urban property; and the need to combat land and property speculation in urban areas. Another important "Popular Amendment" proposed the approval of a series of constitutional provisions recognising the collective right to a balanced environment.

Following a process of intense disputes in the Constituent Congress, a progressive chapter on environmental preservation was

eventually approved, together with a groundbreaking, though limited, chapter on urban policy. [90]

Most of these popular claims were recognised to some extent. The right to the regularisation of consolidated informal settlements was promoted through the approval of new legal instruments aiming to render such programmes viable, both concerning settlements formed on private land (*usucapiao* rights, that is, a special form of adverse possession rights in five years) and on public land ("concession of the real right to use", a form of leasehold). The need to combat land and property speculation in cities was explicitly addressed, and new legal instruments were created for this purpose, namely, subdivision, utilisation and construction compulsory orders ; progressive property taxation; and a punitive form of expropriation. The principle of the democratic management of cities was fully endorsed, as the 1988 Constitution provided a series of legal-political instruments aiming to widen the conditions of direct participation in the overall decision-making process.

The autonomy of municipal government was also recognised in legal, political and financial terms, to such an extent that Brazilian federalism is considered to be one of the most decentralised in the world. However, the 1988 Constitution did not take a proper stand on the matter of metropolitan administration, transferring to the federated-states the power to do so. [91]

At that juncture, there was no political consensus on the recognition of the social right to housing. Regarding the recognition of the principle of the social function of urban property, there were heated debates between antagonistic groups, and as a result the following formula was approved: "private property is recognised as a fundamental right provided that it accomplishes social functions, which are those determined by municipal master plans and other urban and environmental laws". By making the principle of the social function of urban property conditional on the approval of municipal planning

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[90]   For an analysis of the constitutional chapter on urban policy, see Fernandes (1995a) and Fernandes and Rolnik (1998); for a discussion of the environmental chapter, see Fernandes (1996a; 1992a).

[91]   For an analysis of the Brazilian experience of metropolitan administration between 1973 and 1988, see Fernandes (1992b).

laws, the intention of conservative groups seemed to be to make this principle merely rhetorical. The limited Brazilian experience with city and master planning so far had been largely ineffective in terms of its power to reverse the exclusionary conditions of urban development. On the contrary, informal land development had largely resulted from the elitist and technocratic nature of city planning.

Faced with the impossibility of approving another, more progressive constitutional formula, the Urban Reform Movement then decided to make the most of the situation and subvert the approved provision, by consciously investing in the formulation of municipal master plans throughout the country that would be both inclusive and participatory.

Local experiences in the 1990s and the expansion of the new legal-urban order

TOC

Brazil became an interesting urban planning and management laboratory, with new strategies and processes establishing new relations between the public, the community, the private, and the voluntary sectors where urban land development was concerned. The promulgation of the 1988 Constitution inaugurated a whole new legal-urban order, and its possibilities began to be realized throughout the 1990s by means of a series of progressive local experiences. Many municipalities approved new urban and environmental laws, including some master plans, and new land regularisation programmes began to be implemented by several of them. [92]

Special emphasis was placed on the political quality of all such processes, with popular participation being encouraged in various areas, from the definition of urban policies in "City Conferences" to the introduction of innovative participatory budgeting process. [93] Since then, municipalities such as Porto Alegre, Santo Andre, Diadema, Recife and Belo Horizonte have gained international recognition.

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[92]   I have discussed the ongoing experiences of land regularisation in Brazil in some detail elsewhere; see Fernandes (2002b, 2000).

[93]   For a critical analysis of the participatory budgeting process, see C. Souza (2001); see also Fernandes (1996b).

However, the lack of regulation of the urban policy chapter in the 1988 Constitution through federal legislation, as is the tradition in Brazil, led to a series of legal-political difficulties, which were fomented by groups opposed to the advance of the new legal-urban order. This undermined the extent and the scope of the promising local experiences. As a result, the organisations involved in the Urban Reform Movement decided to consolidate and expand the urban reform movement itself initially by creating the National Forum of Urban Reform – NFUR in the early1990s.

Comprising a wide range of national and local organisations and movements, the NFUR was instrumental in promoting the urban reform banner and agenda nationally. Three of its main targets in the 1990s were the incorporation of the social right to housing in the 1988 Constitution ; the approval of a federal law regulating the constitutional chapter; and the approval of a bill of law, originating from a popular initiative using the new possibilities created by the 1988 Constitution, which proposed the creation of a National Fund for Social Housing. At the same time, the NFUR also called for the creation by the federal government of an institutional apparatus at the national level to promote urban planning and policy in Brazil.

A long process of social mobilisation and a fierce political struggle lasted throughout the 1990s and into the new century, within and outside the National Congress. In 1999, a new federal law regulated the action of "civil society organisations of public interest" so as to allow them to receive public money. The social right to housing was eventually approved by a constitutional amendment in 2000, and the federal law creating the National Fund for Social Housing was finally enacted in 2005. Of special importance was the enactment, in 2001, of the internationally acclaimed "City Statute", the federal law on urban policy.

A pioneering legal framework :
the 2001 City Statute

Resulting from an intense negotiation process which lasted for more than ten years, within and beyond the National Congress, the City Statute confirmed and widened the fundamental legal-political role of municipalities in the formulation of directives for urban planning, as well as in conducting the process of urban development and management. This groundbreaking 2001 City Statute recognised explicitly the "right to the city" in Brazil. [94]

The City Statute broke with the longstanding tradition of civil law and set the basis of a new legal-political paradigm for urban land use and development control. It did this especially by reinforcing the constitutional provision recognising the power and the obligation of municipal governments to control of the process of urban development through the formulation of territorial and land use policies, in which the individual interests of landowners necessarily co-exist with other social, cultural and environmental interests of other groups and the city as a whole.

The City Statute elaborated on the principle of the "social functions of property and of the city", thus replacing the individualistic paradigm of the 1916 Civil Code. In addition, the Statute provided a range of legal, urban planning and fiscal instruments to be used by the municipal administrations, especially within the context of their master plans, to regulate, induce and/or revert urban land and property markets according to criteria of social inclusion and environmental sustainability. All such instruments can, and should, be used in a combined manner aiming not only to regulate the process of land use development, but especially to induce it, according to a "concept of city", to be expressed through the municipal master plans.

Municipalities were given more scope for interfering with, and possibly reverting to some extent, the pattern and dynamics of formal

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[94]   For a broad discussion of the new urban-legal order and the City Statute, see Fernandes (2007b).

and informal urban land markets, especially those of a speculative nature, which have long brought about social exclusion and spatial segregation in Brazil. In fact, the combination of traditional planning mechanisms – zoning; subdivision; building rules, etc. – with the new instruments – compulsory subdivision, construction and utilisation orders, extrafiscal use of local property tax progressively over time; expropriation-sanction with payment in titles of public debt; surface rights; preference rights for the municipality; onerous transfer of building rights ; etc. – opened a new range of possibilities for the construction by the municipalities of a new urban order which can be economically more efficient, politically fairer, and more sensitive to the gamut of existing social and environmental questions.

Moreover, the City Statute indicated several processes for municipalities to integrate urban planning, legislation and management so as to democratise the local decision-making process and thus legitimise a new, socially orientated urban-legal order. Several mechanisms were recognised to ensure the effective participation of citizens and associations in urban planning and management: audiences, consultations, creation of councils, reports of environmental and neighbourhood impact, popular initiative for the proposal of urban laws, public litigation, and above all the practices of the participatory budgeting process. Moreover, the new law also emphasised the importance of establishing new relations between the state, the private and the community sectors, especially through partnerships and linkage "urban operations" to be promoted within a clearly defined legal-political and fiscal framework.

The 2001 legislation also improved on the legal order regarding the regularisation of consolidated informal settlements in private and public urban areas, enabling municipalities to promote land tenure regularisation programmes and thus democratise the conditions of access to land and housing. As well as regulating the abovementioned constitutional instruments of *usucapiao* and concession of the real right to use, the new law went one step further and admitted the collective utilisation of such instruments. Subsequently, still in 2001, given the active mobilisation of the NFUR the Provisional Measure no. 2.220 was signed by the President, recognising the subjective right (and not only the prerogative of the public authorities) of those occupying public land until that date to be granted, under certain circumstances, the

"concession of special use for housing purposes", another form of lease-hold rights.

All municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants, among other special categories, were given a deadline of five years to create and approve their master plans.

The City Statute has been complemented by important new federal laws enacted subsequently, namely those regulating public-private partnerships (2004) and intermunicipal consortia (2005). More recently, several federal laws were enacted in 2008, 2009 and 2010, aiming to facilitate the regularisation of informal settlements, particularly those occupying federal land. There has also been a nationwide discussion on the proposed, thorough revision of the 1979 Federal Law, which governs the subdivision of urban land.

This gradual, fundamental process of legal reform has also been supported by a significant process of institutional change, in which the creation of the Ministry of Cities in 2003 deserves special mention.

Institutional reform at the federal level

Throughout the urbanisation process, there was no adequate institutional treatment of the urban questions at the federal level. There were some isolated, sectoral programmes scattered through several ministries dealing with aspects of the broader urban question, but there was no national urban policy to articulate them, especially because the then existing urban policy secretariat had insignificant powers and few resources. Given President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's celebrated academic and political background, the lack of a national urban policy and a corresponding institutional apparatus during his government (1995-2002) was particularly frustrating.

Only with the election of President Lula in 2003 was an original decision made to create the Ministry of Cities. It is important to stress that the new Ministry was not created as an executive decision by the new President, but as his response to the social claim long defended by the NFUR and other stakeholders, which fact confers a special form of legitimacy on the Ministry of Cities.

The Ministry consists of an Executive Secretariat presiding over four National Secretariats, namely, housing; environmental sanitation; public transportation and mobility; and land and urban programmes. Among other tasks, the Executive Secretariat has focused on building the capacity of municipalities to act, initially through a national campaign for the elaboration of multipurpose municipal cadastres. As well as formulating national programmes on their respective subjects, the four Secretariats have been involved in several negotiations with the National Congress to promote further changes in the regulatory framework in force, with a relative degree of success so far.

Two important ongoing initiatives implemented by the Land and Urban Programmes Secretariat deserve special mention, namely the National Programme to Support Sustainable Urban Land Regularisation and the National Campaign for Participatory Municipal Master Plans.

Sustainable Urban Land Regularisation in a National Programme

Initiated in 2003 with what the then Minister called a "virtual budget", the National Programme to Support Sustainable Urban Land Regularisation has grown in resources and impact, and its importance and reach was recognised in 2005 by a generous Cities Alliance grant. [95] The programme combines intervention, articulation, and mobilisation strategies – legal, financial, urban planning strategies and political - in order to create the basic conditions for municipalities to act. Grants have been given to municipalities, federated-states and NGOs to promote the formulation and implementation of regularisation programmes and the judicial recognition of adverse possession rights. Special emphasis has been placed on the definition of criteria for the regularisation of settlements occupying federal land, and hundreds of thousands of leasehold titles have already been given to occupiers or are in the process of being finalised.

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[95]   For a detailed analysis of the National Programme, see Fernandes (2006).

Promising partnerships have been formed with several stakeholders, especially NGOs and social movements; institutions representing land registrars, judges and prosecutors for the government; the Urban Development Commission of the National Congress; academia; etc. Educational "kits" have been distributed, including step-by-step manuals. A virtual network sends daily messages to some 10,000 people and institutions all over Brazil. Virtual courses on urban land regularisation have been promoted, aimed at thousands of people from several professional backgrounds and institutional positions, and from all over Brazil: local government officials; civil servants from most state governments and from several ministries of the Federal Government; land registration officers; lawyers, judges and prosecutors for the government; urban planners; members of NGOs and associations; residents in *favelas*, irregular land subdivisions and *quilombos* (areas occupied by the descendants of former slaves); etc.

Participatory Municipal Master Plans and the National Campaign

Another important initiative has been the National Campaign for Participatory Municipal Master Plans, which has been instrumental in boosting the discussion and mobilisation nationally around the issue. The abovementioned approval of municipal master plans is a legal requirement affecting about 1,700 Brazilian municipalities, and it is the political and technical quality of this process that will eventually determine the extent to which the possibilities of the new legal-urban order proposed by the City Statute will be realized.

For this gigantic task to be properly fulfilled there was an enormous need for municipalities to be provided not only with capacity building and financial resources, but also with adequate technical information and conceptual formulations. Educational "kits" have been widely distributed, grants have been given to municipalities and registered consultants committed to the urban reform agenda; a "bank of experiences" has been created, organising materials from more than 700 ongoing experiences; a virtual network disseminates experiences and information; and seminars and all sorts of meetings have been

promoted throughout the national territory, always in partnership with local institutions.

Difficulties and constraints

Significant progress has already been made in the implementation of the urban reform agenda nationally, and the Ministry of Cities has gained increasing institutional credibility, social legitimacy, and political influence. However, the Ministry of Cities still faces many serious problems, the most immediate being its precarious institutional organisation, small team, and limited budgetary resources.

There is still a serious problem of fragmentation to be overcome in the way interrelated urban policies are formulated within the Ministry and in its relationship with other ministries. Only in 2007 was a new national sanitation policy approved by federal law. With due respect to the importance of the recently approved National Fund for Social Housing, as well as to the improvements already made to previously existing federal programmes through *Caixa Economica Federal*, the fact is that a new, comprehensive and articulated national housing policy has not yet been formulated. Federal investment in both areas, housing and sanitation, has significantly increased since 2003, indeed breaking historical records, but, given the longstanding governmental neglect of those matters and the extent of the accumulated social debt, the total budget is still limited. The ambitious "My House, My Life" national housing programme swiftly launched in 2009 in response to pressure from developers and promoters affected by the national effects of the global economic crisis bypassed the process of discussion of the national housing policy conducted by the Ministry of Cities; as mentioned below, some of its impacts have been questionable.

The creation of the Ministry of Cities has certainly given more visibility to the long neglected urban concerns, but with this recognition new disputes have also emerged – including disputes over the control of the Ministry of Cities itself. With the growing recognition of the political dimensions of the urban questions, fierce political disputes have resulted from the constant realignment of the questionable political coalition supporting President Lula. As a result, while all the four

National Secretaries were kept in office, in 2005 the first Minister and Executive Secretary, from a left-of- centre political party, were replaced by persons nominated by a conservative, populist political party less in tune with the principles of the urban reform agenda. At the same time, the long insignificant Urban Development Commission of the National Congress has been getting more political visibility and influence, and not all of its members fully embrace the reform agenda. More recently, the fact that the Ministry of Cities controls the enormous amount of financial resources earmarked for PAC and the housing programmes has increased the interest of conservative, centre-right political parties that support the governmental coalition, and as a result also the newly elected President Dilma Rousseff has recently nominated a conservative politician not clearly committed to the urban reform agenda as the new Minister.

Given all these constraints, the Ministry of Cities has been systematically investing in the establishment of partnerships of all sorts – within the federal government; through intergovernmental relations; with the National Congress and the Judiciary; with the private sector; and with the organised social movements, NGOs, and the academia.

A fundamental part of this process has been the intimate link between the Ministry of Cities and the National Council of Cities.

The National Council of Cities

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the new political-institutional apparatus that is currently being created in Brazil has been the installation of the National Council of Cities.

In April 2003, President Lula called for a national mobilisation to discuss a list of land, urban and housing policy goals, through a series of municipal "City Conferences" in which delegates would be elected to participate in State Conferences, and eventually in the National Conference planned to take place in October 2003. It was expected that some 300 or so municipalities, out of the 5,571 existing, would have the time and the conditions to organise local conferences. As it happened, over 3,000 municipalities did so, as did all 27 federated-states. Over 2,500 delegates discussed the initial national policy direc-

tives on urban development, as well as the range of specific proposals on sectoral housing, planning, sanitation, and transportation national policies. They all voted on the definition of the final list of principles that should guide the formulation of national policies by the Ministry of Cities.

Moreover, one of the most important deliberations of the 1st National Conference of Cities was the creation of the National Council of Cities, with representatives from all sectors of stakeholders being elected. The National Council consists of 86 members, 49 representing segments of civil society (popular movements; workers' unions; NGOs; academic institutions; and the business sector) and 37 representing federal, federated-state and municipal administrations. All the members are elected for a two-year term. Citizen participation in the Council's deliberations is thus widely ensured, and the Ministry of Cities is legally required to follow and respect such deliberations.

The 2nd National Conference of Cities took place in December 2005, again as the culmination of a nationwide mobilisation process. Some 2,500 delegates and 410 observers from all federated-states and different social segments discussed a more articulated National Urban Development Policy, aiming to generate "fairer, democratic and sustainable" cities. The 3rd Conference took place in November 2007, again involving the participation of over 2,500 delegates; it aimed to take stock of previously approved plans and programs, as well as discussing the National Housing Plan. Perhaps involving a lesser degree of popular participation, the 4th National Conference took place in June 2010, discussing "Advances, difficulties and challenges in the implementation of the urban development policy".

The National Council of Cities has met on several occasions so far, issuing several important resolutions, and it has gradually been recognised as a most important sociopolitical forum. This recognition is unequivocal among the stakeholders more directly involved with the urban concerns discussed by the National Council. However, it still needs to be fully acknowledged by the federal government as a whole, particularly when it comes to fully accepting the National Council's deliberations as well as translating them into proper budgetary provisions. It is also crucial that the National Council is empowered to control the Ministry of Cities, so that the urban reform agenda that

justified its creation is not replaced by a series of clientelistic rela-
tions.

In any case, the promotion of the National Conferences and the ac-
tion of the National Council have already made a difference to the
course of urban policy in Brazil, and have conferred a unique degree
of sociopolitical legitimacy on the decision-making process. For this
reason, both initiatives were given the 2006 UN-Habitat Scroll of Ho-
nour Award.

Current challenges for the City Statute and the Ministry of Cities in Brazil

It is undeniable that the approval of the City Statute consolidated
the constitutional order in Brazil as to the control of the process of
urban development, aiming to re-orient the action of the state, the land
and property markets, and society as a whole, according to new legal,
economic, social, and environmental criteria. Its effective materialisa-
tion in policies and programmes will depend on the reform of the local
legal-urban orders, that is, the overall regulatory and institutional fra-
mework put together at the local level to govern land use development
by the municipalities, particularly through the approval of adequate
master plans. The role of municipalities is crucial so that the exclusio-
nary pattern of urban development can be reversed in the country.

Over 1,400 municipalities have already implemented their master
plans to some extent, and, 10 years after the enactment of the City
Statute, several studies have recently begun to assess their efficacy
from the viewpoint of how they have promoted both inclusiveness and
participation. The existing studies have shown that there has been
progress on many fronts: the general discourse of urban reform has
been adopted by most Municipal Master Plans; specific sectors – envi-
ronment, cultural heritage – have been dealt with; there has been a
widespread creation of ZEIS - Special Zones of Social Interest corres-
ponding to the areas occupied by existing informal settlements; and,
whatever the variations – which naturally express the different politi-
cal realities in the Brazilian municipalities – the participatory nature

of the discussion of the plans was remarkable. Perhaps the main achievement has been the record production of data and all sorts of information about Brazilian cities.

It is still early to make any definitive assessments, but there are strong elements suggesting that – even fully acknowledging the diversity of situations and the several problems and constraints affecting popular participation - while the new tradition of master planning is indeed more participatory than ever before, the socioeconomic, political and institutional disputes over the control of land development processes have worsened, very much as a reflection of Brazil's recent economic growth and the growing, record-breaking values generated by dynamic, and often speculative, land and property transactions in the country.

There are several problems of legal efficacy undermining the new Municipal Master Plans: excessive formalism and bureaucracy of municipal laws; requirement of further regulation by several subsequent laws for full enforcement; punctual changes have been promoted without participation; both the obscure legal language and the imprecise technical legal writing (urban laws are rarely written by legal professionals) have widened the scope for legal and socio-political disputes.

There are also several problems of social efficacy undermining the new Master Plans: most plans remain traditional plans, merely technical and regulatory, often failing to territorialise the proposals and intention, as well as to intervene in the land structure and in the land and property markets. The emphasis on the new tools created by the City Statute has been placed without a clearly defined project for the city. The vast majority of the plans has failed to recapture any surplus value resulting from state and collective action, and when this has happened, there has been no or limited social redistribution of the newly generated financial resources.

Moreover, most plans have placed no or limited emphasis on social housing in central areas, having failed to earmark central, serviced, vacant land for social housing. Generally speaking, there are no specific criteria for the expansion of urban zones, public land and property have not been given a social function, and there has been no clearly articulated socio-environmental approach. Large projects have often bypassed the plans – and presumed collective eviction Above all,

land, urban, housing, environmental, fiscal and budgetary policies have not been integrated, and the regularisation of informal settlements is still largely viewed as an isolated policy, with most plans imposing enormous technical difficulties to the legalisation of informal settlements. Bureaucratic management and technical complexity have also meant that there has been a widespread lack of administrative capacity to act at municipal level. Many Master Plans are mere copies of models promoted by an "industry" of consultants. Obscure planning language has been as problematic as obscure legal language.

It seems that many, if not most, municipal master plans have not been totally successful in the promotion of sociospatial integration, especially in that, by keeping the tradition of regulatory planning, they have failed to directly intervene in the land structure. Many new master plans have failed to territorialise their proposals and are not backed up by adequate spatial plans; many have limited themselves to the approval of conventional regulatory plans, especially zoning and land use regulations, but have failed to adopt the new urban tools so as to intervene more directly in the urban structure by determining obligations to land and property owners; and most of those few others that have made use of such new urban planning tools – especially the sale of building rights – have done so without having clearly determined a redistributive context for the application of the newly found financial resources, thus reinforcing traditional land and property speculation and sociospatial segregation processes. Technically complex and even somewhat obscure, many plans have not taken into account the limited capacity local administrations have to act so as to implement them. Indeed, the effective implementation of the approved laws is the main challenge faced by the social movements, urban managers, legal professionals and politicians committed to the promotion of urban reform in Brazil.

At the other governmental levels, the precarious institutional systems have experienced several problems. At the federal level, sectoral policies have not been integrated, within and outside the Ministry of Cities; urban policy has articulated with environmental policy; there is no national urban/metropolitan policy/system of cities, as well as no national territorial policy generally, and especially regarding the Amazon. The institutional and legal action of the federated-states has been very limited.

Above all, at all governmental levels, there is a profound lack of understanding that cities are not only about "social policy"/"infrastructure for economic development", but they are about also the economy itself.

While it is undeniable that the process of urban reform in Brazil has been given an enormous boost with the recent legal and institutional reforms, there are many problems to be overcome and serious challenges to be confronted at the federal level, and the new laws and institutions should not be taken for granted.

At this juncture, it should be briefly mentioned the great impact the Plan to Accelerate Growth (PAC, launched by President Lula in 2007), may have to advance urban reform and the consolidation of the federal institutional apparatus in Brazil. The record amount of financial resources – initially announced as US$300 billion – in infrastructure, sanitation, land regularization and other fields – initially over three years, but extended by President Dilma Rousseff - has raised a new set of questions to be addressed by policymakers, namely :

- Are there adequate projects in place for the application of the new financial resources ?;

- Do the public administrations, especially at the municipal level, have the necessary conditions to manage such projects and resources in a proper and efficient manner?;

- Are there adequate channels and processes in place to enable social, fiscal and judicial control of the expenditures, so as to prevent the clientelistic use of the resources, not to speak of corruption ?

It is still premature to make a consistent and fair assessment of the impact of PAC, but there are already strong elements suggesting that a significant part of the new resources is being wasted given the lack of administrative capacity and institutional efficiency, when it is not being politically manipulated or, even worse, appropriated in corruption schemes.

The same applies to the federal housing program "My House, My Life" launched by President Lula in 2009 and extended by President Dilma in 2011, promising to build and deliver over 1.000.000 houses over three years, which also involve record-breaking investments by the federal government. Again, it is still premature to make a consistent and fair assessment of the impact of the programme, but there are already elements suggesting that, apart from the abovementioned problems with administrative capacity and institutional efficiency, by failing to articulate with the land structure – and thus make use of vacant and under-utilised private and public land and property - the programme has encouraged a significant increase in land prices as well as the construction of thousands of housing estates in precarious peripheral areas – thus reinforcing the traditional pattern of sociospatial segregation.

The City Statute itself has already been the subject of several proposed changes at the National Congress, many of which, if approved, might undermine its potential. So far, the discussion of such bills of laws has been stalled in the Urban Development Commission. Moreover, the continuity and the quality of the action of the Ministry of Cities will depend on how the existing political disputes and contradictory interests will be accommodated. The very existence of the Ministry has been questioned, especially by some people who would like to see it merged with other ministries within the context of a streamlined federal government.

On a broader level, the full realization of the urban reform agenda by the Ministry of Cities will depend on how the federal government as a whole understands the centrality of urban questions. Critical to this understanding will be the promotion of more interministerial integration and intergovernmental articulation. The Ministry of Cities will also need to be provided with a more consistent institutional infrastructure and capacity to act, and the necessary resources for the promotion of the whole new set of social policies and programmes. The control of urban development cannot be left only to market forces; but nor can it be left to municipal government alone. There is a crucial role for the federal government, as well as the federated-state governments.

On a more internal level, the Ministry of Cities needs to promote better integration between its Secretariats and respective programmes.

The approval of a comprehensive housing policy aimed at the urban poor is of utmost importance, in part to slow the process of informal development. For this purpose, the clear definition of a national policy on the utilisation of federal land and property is particularly necessary. The definition of an articulated territorial organisation policy and system of cities is also crucial, including an adequate treatment of the pressing matter of metropolitan administration. More emphasis should be placed on the attempts to reconcile the "green" and the "brown" agendas in the country. Existing partnerships need to be reinforced, and new ones should be formed.

Possible lessons from the Brazilian experience

The confirmation post-City Statute of old socio-spatial segregation processes by the Brazilian state at all governmental levels, despite the possibility of significantly changing the course of things through the formulation of profoundly different and inclusive Municipal Master Plans, seems to demonstrate that – with the support of lawyers - urban planners and public managers remain, and have seemingly become increasingly more, hostages to exclusionary land and property markets that they have created and fomented in the first place, as well as of segregating public policies that they have implemented.

To break with this perverse logic, as well as to put an end to the renewed legal and political disputes on urban land and property matters, a concentrated effort needs to be urgently promoted to provide more (in)formation to planners and legal professionals, as well as society as a whole, on the nature and possibilities of the new legal-urban order the City Statute symbolises more. The education and training of planners, as well as of legal professionals, judges, prosecutors, and registry officers, is of utmost importance. If judicial courts need to follow Public Law/Urban Law principles when interpreting property related conflicts, rather than embracing obsolete unqualified private law ideas, Brazilian civil society needs to claim more for the recognition of social and collective rights.

Brazil's legal-urban order has significantly changed, but... have the jurists understood that? Has the nature of urban planning been changed accordingly? Have urban managers assimilated the new principles? Has civil society wakened up to the new legal realities ? To play the game according to the new rules is fundamental for the collective construction of sustainable and fairer cities for the present and future generations.

In this context, all things considered, I would propose a very cautious optimism. Even given due consideration to its shortcomings and constrains, the law is not the problem. The City Statute has created the most appealing enabling environment policy makers and managers could dream of in their attempts to promote urban reform. In the last analysis, the future of the City Statute and the new urban legal order it symbolises urgently requires a thorough renewal of the socio-political mobilisation process around land urban, housing and environmental matters so as to advance urban reform nationally.

It is a task of all progressive stakeholders to defend the City Statute from the proposed (essentially negative) changes being discussed at the National Congress; overcome the existing obstacles and improve the legal order further; but above all, to fight for the full implementation of the City Statute.

The Brazilian case makes it clear that, if "bad laws" can make it very difficult both the recognition of collective and social rights and the formulation of inclusive public policies, "good laws" *per se* do not change urban and social realities, even when much they express principles of socio-spatial inclusion and socio-environmental justice, or even, as is the rare case of the City Statute, when the legal recognition of progressive principles and rights is supported by the introduction of the processes, mechanisms, tools and resources necessary for their materialisation.

If decades of socio-political disputes were necessary for the reform of the legal-urban order and for the enactment of the City Statute, a new historical stage has been opened ever since, namely, that of the socio-political disputes at all governmental levels, within and outside the state apparatus, for its full implementation.

All in all, the Brazilian experience has clearly shown that, if urban reform requires combined institutional change and legal reform, it also

fundamentally depends on nationwide social mobilisation. This is indeed a highly political process, and the constant renewal of social mobilisation in Brazil, through the NFUR and other collective channels, within and outside the state apparatus, is the *sine qua non* condition for the advance of the urban reform movement in the country.

The urban reform process is naturally an expression of the country's specific historical conditions and political processes, but important universal lessons can be learned by other countries and cities interested in promoting social inclusion in cities.

Besides the abovementioned socio-political, institutional and administrative requirements, the Brazilian case has stressed the importance of redefining the legal system to create the bases of an inclusive land and property governance framework, in which new legal concepts and principles (especially the recognition of collective rights), institutional mechanisms and socio-political processes are properly articulated. The perspective of urban reform also requires broader access to judicial courts to help push the legal boundaries from inside the legal system, as well as to guarantee the effectiveness of the legislation in force.

This is a process of renewed fierce disputes though, and, difficult as it is, changing the rules of the game is no guarantee that the game will be played accordingly. In fact, the enactment of progressive laws may perversely contribute to the creation of a legal discourse and practice that demobilises civil society, thus keeping unchallenged, if not legitimising, the main foundations of the exclusionary *status quo*. There is a growing literature discussing the possibilities, limits and intrinsic contradictions of participatory processes, especially participatory budgeting and municipal master planning processes. [96]

Also in this respect, the materialisation of the possibilities of any redefined legal system and its translation into a new socio-spatial pact will depend on how it is legally and politically appropriated by the stakeholders. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau clearly understood, houses make a town, but citizens make a city.

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[96]   For a critical analysis of the experiences of participatory budgeting, see Fernandes (2010).

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CITIES INTO THE FUTURE

CONCLUSION

Planetary urbanisation with or without cities

by Thierry Paquot

By 2030, planet Earth will have achieved its urban revolution. In other words, 8.5 billion inhabitants, of which about three billion 'poor' people, will be 'urbanised'... Asia will account for almost five billion individuals, predominantly in China and India, Africa will reach a billion and a half, Latin America more than 700 million, North America, more than 360 million, Europe will border on 550 million, and the former Soviet Union, 340 million. Urban society 'values' will then be embedded as much in the city as in the country, and farming communities will aspire to the *middle class* city lifestyle so lauded in soap operas. In conflict-torn Africa, refugee camps will continue to forge themselves into makeshift cities. In Asia, farmers, as in the previous century, will try their luck by migrating to large cities. The urban population of the United States will settle in the *sunbelt*, while in Europe it will hold on resolutely to a rural idyll within cities, where a false sense of nature is created by the edge city. The private automobile will continue to be a key condition for mobility – a fundamental value of urban society – because it is safe, comfortable, flexible and provides all mod cons. Indeed, cars are becoming real extensions of workplaces, plugged to all telecommunication networks ; radio controls turn the heating on in your domotic house, switch the oven on, and run a bath at the desired temperature. Cars now offer children viewing screens and video games. The virtual and the real are blending into one reality with ever-increasing ease. It would be presumptuous at this stage to outline an oil-related geopolitical forecast for 2030,

or to measure the scale of pollution related to widespread automobile ownership. Similarly, what can be said about warnings of climate change ? About cities now distant from the sea, having to equip themselves with a harbour ? About winter sport resorts considering new attractions for lack of snow ? About temperate zones becoming rainy and palm trees in Geneva or Bordeaux no longer being an exotic feature ? The tourism industry, which is predicting about two billion tourists per year from 2020 – namely one in four 'earthlings' – is embracing the meteorological map regardless of bankruptcy, unemployment and abandoned industrial sites…

There are countless scenarios, disastrous or not, whose accuracy depend largely on the elements taken into consideration as well as their uncanny combinations. In terms of forecasting, one thing is relatively certain and that is the element of surprise, the unexpected. Who could have foreseen the edge-city in the United States, urban scattering in Europe, large urban aggregates and zoning in Asia, so berated elsewhere ? A few social norms, such as the family unit (even if recomposed...) or religion (not yet entirely privatised...), are holding their ground much better than is asserted by specialists. Along the same lines, one might mention certain collective or individual behaviours that have endured despite their predicted disappearance. In this light, we need to observe world developments with all possible discrepancies, overlaps, oppositions, resistance, and do so with the understanding that the pace of change will vary widely across the board. But before exploring the planet's urban future, it seems appropriate to briefly describe the turbulent epic of cities.

A three-phase history of cities

Historians agree on the origins of the 'urban phenomenon', its geographical location, predominantly in river valleys, and the earliest examples (about 8000 years BC, for the first archaeological sites). Originally, 'cities', as we now coin them, emerged from the Neolithic Revolution which paved the way for farming and animal breeding, namely the domestication of some plant and animal species. Populations of hunter-gatherers, each at their own pace, settled and gradually

took up agriculture, which, if the harvest was good, yielded a surplus of farm produce to be sold. An unprecedented social organisation ensued, whereby trade flourished at crossroads or on river and sea routes, based on an increasingly complex social and technical division of labour. The city materialised as a set of buildings and the heart of military, religious and economic power, where these routes intersected.

There has been much debate about the elements that together define the term 'city' : fortifications, craftsmen, high population density, a grid pattern or radioconcentric layout, roads, etc. In fact, it seems that Egyptian 'cities' had no fortifications, while the word for 'city' in Chinese, Greek or Russian for example, also means 'citadel', 'great wall' or 'fort'. Similarly, some of these cities had strong traditions of craftsmanship, present and active, while others settled for travelling merchants who provided goods made elsewhere. One thing seems certain : the 'city' has never existed on its own, it is therefore necessary to view the 'urban phenomenon' not in the singular but in the plural, and to talk about networks of 'cities' with specific temporalities, and structures that are typical of their surrounding rural hinterland. In other words, the common denominator of this urbanisation process is the formation of urban units with defining features that organise themselves differently and develop on their own terms.

No two cities have the same history. However, the first cities can be dated to approximately 10,000 years old, which in view of our planet's timeline, as well as the various animal and plant species, constitutes a rather short history : Jericho (around – 7800 BC), Catal Hüyük (- 6000), Egypt (- 2600), Harappa (- 2000), China (-1500), black Africa (-300), Mexico's Olmecs (-800), etc. Therefore, for a long period of time, Earth was chiefly populated by nomads who co-existed – knowingly or not – with semi-nomads and settlers, of whom only a tiny fraction resided in cities... The population of these cities varied widely and usually numbered two to three thousand souls. Only a handful of cities were densely populated : Babylon, at its peak (-1730/-1690) may have held more than 200,000 people, Rome reached one million inhabitants during the second century AD, while populations in Baghdad as well as Byzantium and Chang'an amounted to more than 800,000 in the eighth century. These cities marched to glory before declining and sometimes disappearing altogether from

map and memory. With the opening of new maritime routes after the discovery of America and the shaping of new geopolitical entities at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the capitalist world economy spread worldwide, and created new cities or pumped life into some to the detriment of others that had until then been wealthy and envied.

From 1492 onwards, Europe shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, new harbours prospered from distant trade – often slave trade – while others toppled over. Asia came into contact with Africa and Europe *via* the Near East and the Middle East. A new unstable hierarchy of cities took shape, renewing itself periodically according to alliances between colonial powers, the dissemination of technical progress, economic growth, migrations, etc. Fernand Braudel demonstrates well how 'world cities' have competed with each other and experienced diverse fates. Venice declined to the benefit of Cordoba, which relinquished its lead to Amsterdam, which in turn bowed down before London, etc. London, the capital of an empire on which, admittedly, 'the sun never set' saw its population expand from over 500,000 inhabitants in the early seventeenth century to two million in 1845, and seven million in 1910.

This spectacular demographic shift was driven by the Industrial Revolution, the third great wave in the world's path to urbanisation. The mechanisation of agriculture, the spread of mechanical transportation, the multiplication of industries equipped with machine tools all increased trade. Improved health and hygiene secured population growth, fostered migratory movements (rural exodus and immigration), redefined the rules of the economic game and overhauled social and therefore urban morphologies. The modern city, in all its technical glory, is mapped by never-ending flows of varying kinds. This is what sets it apart from previous cities which, in the simplest terms,

sheltered : the military (garrison city), the priesthood (Episcopal city), students (university city), commodities (market city)... Henceforth, the 'modern' city, which sprang from industry and mechanised transport, the steam machine and electrification, was shaken up by the endless movement of capital and workers, manufactured goods and services, rumours and news, desire and sex, fear and hope.

We are still living in this third phase. It is characterised not only by urbanisation in its demographic sense – namely when urban populations outnumber rural populations, which has been the case in industrial countries since the 1900/1910s – but also by an 'urbanisation of lifestyles'. The latter introduced and mainstreamed 'the spirit of the city' across all geographical areas and each of us has been affected. Urban 'behaviours', be they emotional, sexual, sartorial, dietary, religious or cultural take precedence over 'rural' values, and are adopted and adapted. The dissemination of the urban model, first propelled by industrial countries, is now being relayed by the globalisation of capitalist economy and the internationalisation of new information and communication technologies (NICTs).

In sum, the first phase is the creation of cities sustained by agricultural surplus. The second phase corresponds to the globalisation of capitalism and of trade cities connected to the transcontinental network. The third one begins with industrialisation and supports the expansion of the modern world, which bears witness to the process of urbanisation across continents – primarily in industrial countries and then in the third world, with or without industrialisation – and the scheduled and irreversible fading out of peasantry at varying speed according to regions. This latest form of urbanisation is paired with a multiplication of millionaire cities (11 in 1900, 80 in 1950, 276 in 1990, 370 in 2000, and presumably 550 in 2015) and the emergence of gigantic megalopolises in excess of ten million inhabitants (2 in 1950 and 18 in 2000) [97].

This third phase also brings a shift from the city to the urban. In effect, historical cities spill out of their administrative borders and scatter into sprawling urban developments. The quest for a residential lifestyle, the quality of road systems, new temporalities of urban daily life and the difficulties in finding affordable accommodation in the city centre have paved the way for urban spreading ; an uncontrollable jungle of concrete and greenery. Admittedly, some cities still exist – and we all know and appreciate them – as well as some suburban

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[97]   In relation to the history of cities in three phases, you may read : *La Cité à travers l'histoire* (1961) by Lewis Mumford, French translation, Seuil, 1964 ; *Les villes dans l'histoire* (1970) by Arnold Toynbee, French translation, Payot, 1972 and *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIe siècle* by Fernand Braudel, Armand Colin, 1967-1979.

towns, but they are overwhelmed by the urban, this 'something' that took shape after both a city era and the city area, what Italians call *città diffusa* and Germans *Zwischenstadt*. Therefore, periurban development is history ; this notion is now obsolete as the centre is no longer central and periphery no longer encircles but is encircled.

The urban varies according to the history of different urbanisation processes : here it eats into the landscape, blends into the forest, mirrors the meandering of the river and there it latches onto collective equipment or a shopping centre or even a motorway hub. Here it drapes the territory in a thousand folds, and there it lands like a chequered tablecloth on a bistro table. The spread of developed land has linked up, even if sometimes tenuously, cities that until now had been clearly demarcated. This urban development does not come down to simply the spatial form of urbanisation, it also puts into question the political representation produced by city-dwellers that are geographically scattered, as well as the self-identity of a fragmented place, sometimes dominated by one city with a powerful footprint. It also results from time management, related to the transformation of lifestyles, and changes impacting family and labour.

Five forms of urbanisation and five questions

Although our planet is now fully urbanised, the shape this takes varies widely. One may categorise five main forms of human establishments : the slum, the megacity, the global city, the residential enclave and the medium or intermediate city. Let us stop for a moment in each of them. Since fifty per cent of people living in the city are slum-dwellers, it is impossible to ignore them, particularly as they sometimes shape a culture that is specific to them. Squats, illegal occupation of land, precarious and uncomfortable constructions, hovels far from technical networks or access roads to the big city : slums shelter new migrants who come to 'make it' in the city. There, they find entire 'countries' which introduce them to city life and help them find jobs within the incredible informal economy.

Slums are not a new phenomenon. It is fundamental to study them geologically, as each 'layer' corresponds to a particular migration, and countless endeavours to bail oneself out. Usually the oldest shacks are the sturdiest. Year after year, their 'owners' equip and embellish them. They have given hope of finding any social housing and have come to terms with it by staying in a neighbourhood where they have family and friends and benefit from a system of mutual help. The most recent layers are identified by huts made of rush, branches and jute bags, or rusty metal sheeting. They are sometimes rented to an inhabitant from a cinder block hut. For years, governments wanted to eradicate slums, by destroying the vulnerable shelters with bulldozers or letting fire spread, fires that were not always accidental… But just as soon as a slum has been destroyed, it grows back somewhere else, identical, nestled on the side of a hill, in the hollow of a valley. It belongs to the 'real' city. It clings on for dear life, stands firm and attempts to create an infrastructure around it, whether legal or not.

The priority issue is land ownership. It is necessary to protect slum-dwellers by granting them a sanitised piece of land and encouraging them to build a house where they feel at home, according to their resources. Additionally, a slum-adapted urbanism should be trialled through pilot programmes supported by NGOs and national or international institutions, along with grassroots committees. Many initiatives should be publicised, not to serve as references, let alone transposable models, but to sharpen the local debate. The multi-millionaire megalopolises of the South are teeming with illegal slums that border tourist areas, large shopping centres – which belong to transnational companies – as well as private high-security property complexes. These megalopolises continue to spread out onto arable land, alongside motorways and railway tracks, swallowing up small towns and villages. Those who dwell at the edge of these huge conurbations and cannot afford already scarce public transportation are confined to their homes and survive by working, for the most fortunate, in caretaking, gardening, health clubs and leisure resorts for the wealthy, as well as in numerous private housing estates.   This territorially engraved economic disparity does not seem the least bit disconcerting. Sporadic movements of dissent are soon quenched by the army and none of these groups seem to organise themselves into a genuine political force.

Among the thirty-odd megalopolises with more than ten million inhabitants (though collecting and comparing statistics is difficult here…), only four of them have sprung from two of the richest countries, Japan and the United States : Tokyo takes first place of this ranking chart with close to 26 million, New York is eighth with 18 million, Los Angeles, fourteenth with 15 million, Osaka, twenty-fourth with 11 million. Mumbai, Lagos, Dacca, São Paulo, Karachi, Mexico are storming ahead and facing colossal problems with water supply, waste treatment, traffic jams and accommodation, all of which somehow do not hinder a disorganised, singular economic momentum, ranging from the most rudimentary activities (manufactured goods) to the most sophisticated (cutting-edge technologies).

Nevertheless, these megalopolises of the South do not compete with European and North American urban regions which occasionally yield an 'urban gross domestic product' that is much higher than the standard gross domestic product. Surprisingly, a study conducted in 1990 showed that Tokyo's GDP matched up to that of Great-Britain's, New York's GDP was higher than Brazil's, and Paris' GDP exceeded that of India. The ranking chart of the world's most populated cities differs from that of cities producing the most wealth. It is all the more striking when one observes the performances of 'global cities', to use the phrase coined by Saskia Sassen. Thus Frankfurt and Milan, small agglomerations in terms of population density, stand out economically to the point of resembling 'global cities' such as Tokyo, New York or London. But what do we understand by 'global cities' ? These are thriving urban territories with formidably efficient infrastructures, garnering leading banking and financial industries, universities and research teams, laboratories, news agencies, communication companies, lawyers, chartered accountants and legal experts, transnational company head offices, intangible industries, etc. Within these 'global cities', the *jet society* and a 'floating' population of immigrants ready to take any job under any condition rub shoulders but lead separate lives… In these times of a globalised society that favours the chosen few, others, who by choice or constraint, remain on the sidelines, are left to live in specific temporalities. As a result, the standardisation of behaviour (dietary, sartorial, residential, communicational, professional, emotional, etc.) set by urbanisation does not spread irreversibly

but entails mixing, rejection, often striking combinations that protect the world from a deadly cultural homogenisation.

'Global cities' lead to a denationalisation of production and wealth distribution ; a denationalisation moving beyond the framework of the nation-state. 'Global cities' are more attuned to the globalisation of capitalisation than the ambitions and strategies of their nation-state, from which they dissociate themselves. This is a slowly emerging trend that will soon establish itself and seep into the cultural domain. In the heart of 'global cities', in the uptown suburbs of megacities, in the vicinity of slums, a new residential product is starting to attract the interest of a well-to-do clientele : the residential enclave. Conceived in London in 1743, during the creation of *Leicester Square*, the urban condominium, not solely limited to real estate, aims to privatise, not only dwellings and their outbuildings but also access routes and gardens. It is worth mentioning a successful Parisian version : the villa, a large allotment served by a private central access road. As early as 1831 in New York, then Boston a few years later, the United States have familiarised themselves with *Common Interest Developments* (CIDs).

The current *gated communities* are a legitimate legacy of residential enclaves**.** Be they individual homes concealed in a country-style environment or luxurious apartments and downtown condominiums, what matters is the careful selection of its dwellers and the enhanced high-security provided by these ensembles. In these 'supervised residencies', the club effect is paramount : these are people sharing the same status, the same culture, willingly abiding by the same rules. There is a particularly wide range of *gated communities* to suit all budgets and for all community- and identity-based 'idiosyncrasies'. In Los Angeles, some only welcome the Asian community, in *Suncity*, close to Phoenix, inhabitants must be over fifty-five. Liberalism allows this diversity in the knowledge that all residents will get their money's worth. Healthcare, paramedic care, boutiques, sports facilities, quality of accommodation, pool size, etc. ultimately depend on purchase price. 'Residential enclaves' are mushrooming all over the world in Cairo, Istanbul, Moscow, Warsaw, Rome, Toulouse or Dijon, Mumbai, Rio, Mexico… No 'urban condition' specialist had contemplated such proliferation, which alters the private/public partnership and privatises – in other words impounds – a portion of networks and

equipment, until now collectively managed. It no longer comes as a surprise to see a neighbourhood association purchasing the road on which members' homes are built.

What had always been accessible and free can no longer be relied upon, thus upsetting a whole way of life : urban living is becoming discriminatory and cohabitation selective. The city-dweller is giving way to the consumer, who wants what money can buy. Does the concept of a shared city already belong to the past ? The danger is tangible. Fortunately, intermediate cities are still full of life, provided that they link up and tap into various networks. Increasingly, planetary urbanisation is separating location from flow patterns and seems to favour the latter. A number of people dream of an 'urbanism built on connections' and imagine the 'city' as a technical hub – high-speed trains, airports, motorways, hotels, leisure centres, shops – which companies would plug into, before relocating.

Broadly, five prerequisites meet the many challenges posed by urbanisation : 'good' land occupation, given the expansion of urban areas and the reduction of cultivated areas, and its legal transposition (land security, in particular for slum-dwellers) ; 'good' mobility or means of travel in a world faced with oil shortages, the multiplication of routine mobility (mass tourism, shopping, sports, etc.) and greenhouse gas emissions ; 'good' minimal urban comfort, by prioritising a reasoned de-growth of consumer goods ; 'good' governance that requires the invention of new democratic practices, and the end of 'sleep democracy' (I vote where I sleep) and finally, 'good' habitability, the interactions between ourselves and the others, or how each of us constructs one's own physical living space and builds one's home here on Earth.

Clearly, these five forms of urbanisation are not mutually exclusive and easily hybridize themselves, intermesh, become inextricably linked [98]. They translate the *urban issue*, one of the four issues that

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[98]   About the five forms of urbanisation please refer to : *Terre urbaine. Cinq défis pour le devenir urbain de la planète* by Thierry Paquot, La Découverte, 2006 (large bibliography with theme-based commentary) ; *Le pire des mondes possibles. De l'explosion urbaine au bidonville global* by Mike Davis, French translation, La Découverte, 2006 ; *La Ville globale. New York, Londres, Tokyo* by Saskia Sassen, French translation, Descartes & Cie, 1996

'earthlings' have to solve at the onset of the twenty-first century. Again, in simple terms, let us define them as follows : the *social issue*, gradually imposing itself with the expansion of the wage system in countries that have opted for mass production based on the machine tool and a technical division of labour related to industrialisation. The *urban issue* resulting from rural flight, housing shortages for the majority, the proliferation of slums, hygiene requirements, difficulties in building composite, heterogeneous cities socially, economically and culturally. The *communicational issue*, which manifests itself with the development of NICTs and specific forms of control, manipulation and exclusion. Finally, the *environmental issue,* a concern for all, both North and South, rich and poor, men and women, young and old…

Admittedly, these four issues emerged chronologically from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present day but have cumulated each other instead of succeeding one another over time. This clearly illustrates their impact. They appear with more or less intensity here and there, but on a planetary scale, though they first came into existence in the Western and industrialised world. They require a mix of local solutions and universal contributions, which shows how intricate it is to formulate and implement them. The balance between these four issues varies according to situations and no case resembles another, in spite of appearances… They are so inextricably linked that it is increasingly unfeasible to address them separately, especially since their nature evolves as they intermingle. Thus the 'traditional' *social issue*, which in the past could be solved through welfare state incentives following negotiations between social partners, now finds itself in an entirely different context (retreat of trade-unions, disappearance of state interventionism…) and other processes, resulting from other issues and their specificities.

Besides, these issues need to be addressed jointly**,** both on a local and planetary level. Instruments, references, modalities, actions, legislations and recommendations are all different but marching to the same tune. On a local level, it is essential to maintain the autonomy of inhabitants – with the widespread use of direct democracy for operating institutions (schools, healthcare, transport, public services, etc.) –

and *Ghettos de riches, tour du monde des enclaves résidentielles sécurisées*, under the supervision of Thierry Paquot, Perrin, 2009.

as well as to maintain the support given to shared initiatives (self construction and renovation of dwellings, shared gardens, etc.). On a planetary level, the harmonisation of programmes will take precedence – with civil disobedience as a legal means of alerting officials of their disaffection with those represented. Thus city *policy* will evolve into cities *policies*, honouring both *the spirit of the city* – urban life, city-dwelling status, gratuitousness, accessibility – and *public debate*. Needless to say, there will be major impediments and numerous opponents but the urban future of humankind and the world is at stake…

Ecological urbanisation :
what form(s) of urbanism ?

No country, no society, can escape ecological sensibility, which will demand a reconciliation of location and flow patterns by redefining new territories with discontinuous borders, and new productive, cultural and existential rationales. It would be presumptuous to suggest a one-size-fits-all body of urbanistic knowledge. Nevertheless, in response to all too rare attempts to devise an 'alternative city', a few de-growth and ecological innovations are breaking through such as the Italian *Slow Food* movement launched in Italy in 1986 by Carlo Petrini, which rapidly became *Slow Life* and spurred *Cittàslow* (or *Slow Cities*). Yet another example in the United States is that of *New Urbanism* – at least Peter Calthorpe's version – some *Smart Growth* actions and the *Slow Growth Movement*. Let us also highlight the network of *Transition towns* in Great Britain, from 'permaculture' (a contraction of *permanent culture*), devised in 1973 in response to the oil crisis and influenced by 'zero growth' advocates ; other examples might be some of the 'eco-neighbourhoods' in Europe (yet, here again, one needs to be cautious as there is an 'ecologically correct' type of urbanism, that has more to do with communication than real convictions…). Of course, the analyses and suggestions put forward by the authors and practitioners of these movements diverge on many levels and it seems absurd to pigeonhole them in the same category, e.g. 'urban growth objectors', particularly in 'third world' countries

(even though this term is endangered), where innovations are often linked to a rigorously defined social movement – the fight to upgrade a slum or to claim property rights – a non-governmental organisation experimenting with a constructive process, the action of a charismatic leader… [99]

This all the more so since it is necessary to reflect on various solutions given the plurality of the five forms of urbanisation operating across the world. Each of these urban 'geotypes' – through the activities they harbour, the populations they bring together, the power and counter-powers they engender – will not start de-growing under the same circumstances or within the same timeframe. It would be futile to elaborate a charter of the 'happy city' that is nondescript, a charter based on a set of universally valid, overarching principles that would guide the reconfiguration and transformation of current urban aggregates. Any urbanistic intervention can only be unique as it is custom-made, unlike the architectural and urban standardisation induced and sustained by the globalisation of legal and administrative procedures, the construction industry, major architecture agencies, accounting firms and 'models' disseminated by specialised journals.

To counter these powerful, seemingly-irreversible processes of homogenisation, I would like to suggest three paths to ecological urbanism, which will steer ongoing urbanisation and correct 'urbanistic errors' resting upon a productivist and consumerist economy in which oil is the driving force. I will take the liberty to put forward the following : chronotopic urbanism, sensory urbanism and participatory urbanism : the need to look after places depending on their temporal use and seasonal rhythms (day is not night, Monday is not Tuesday, summer is not winter…) ; the prioritisation of an architecture, landscape and urbanism, which afford the five senses and four elements in the West or five in the East, the greatest respect and the most delightful combinations ; lastly, involvement of inhabitants in design and completion, by creating the conditions for a form of participation that

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[99]   To investigate further alternative forms of urbanism : "La ville autrement", *Alternatives Économiques*, Hors-série n°39, June 2009, under the supervision of Naïri Nahapétian and Thierry Paquot, *L'urbanisme c'est notre affaire !* by Thierry Paquot, Nantes, L'Atalante, 2010.

is not consensual but responsible. Additionally, such paths will lead to a reversible, recyclable, reusable urbanism, etc …

We see it all around us, *home-making* is an inherent feature of mankind, this readiness to be open to the world and the others. Earth is home to Humans and all forms of Life. Cities provide opportunities for generous urban living, something which non-cities – towers, *gated communities*, large ensembles, urban sprawling – continuously undermine. Protecting the Earth while reinventing cities demands deep reflection, ideas and convictions. Are we excited about HEQ standards or ecotaxes ? No, we take action only to make our world a more welcoming, harmonious and habitable place. Though this appears to be more a dream than a reasonable expectation, let us dream...

As bibliography, to refer to Thierry Paquot's publications : *Le quotidien urbain. Essais sur les temps des villes* (La Découverte, 2001), *Le Toit, seuil du cosmos*, (Alternatives, 2003), *Demeure terrestre. Enquête vagabonde sur l'habiter*, (Les éditions de l'Imprimeur, 2005), *Terre urbaine. Cinq défis pour le devenir urbain du monde* (La Découverte, 2006), *Petit manifeste pour une écologie existentielle* (Bourin-éditeur, 2007), *La Folie des hauteurs, pourquoi s'obstiner à construire des tours ?* (Bourin-éditeur, 2008), *Ghettos de riches. Tour du monde des enclaves résidentielles sécurisées* (under the supervision of Perrin, 2009), *L'Espace public* (La Découverte, 2009), *L'Urbanisme c'est notre affaire* (L'Atalante, 2010) ; *Un Philosophe en ville* (Infolio, 2011) ; *Repenser l'urbanisme* (sous la direction de, Infolio, 2013 ; *Désastres urbains* (La Découverte, 2014), some of the ideas covered in this body of work are included in this article.

End