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Alfred FORKE

**THE
CHINESE SOPHISTS**

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The Chinese Sophists

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THE CHINESE SOPHISTS

par

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p.01 What can we expect from the study of Chinese philosophy ?

« In the philosophical systems of the Hindoos and the Chinese there are still hidden treasures, in which the anticipation of scientific discoveries, the results of thousands of years of occidental research, is most striking.

Such are the words of Edward von Hartmann, the most famous living German philosopher ¹. Much labour has been spent in Europe on the Indian Vedanta philosophy, which had such a marked influence on Arthur Schopenhauer.

« The Upanishads, says the author of the *Parerga and Paralipomena*, are the outcome of the highest human wisdom.... They afford the most remunerative and sublime reading possible in this world, which has been the consolation of my life, as it will be that of my death ².

I do not see why the many germs scattered over the vast field of Chinese philosophy should not have a similar fertilizing influence on some philosophical European mind also. The deep impression caused by the *Tao-tê-king* will support my view. But much work remains to be done before Chinese philosophy will take its

¹ *Philosophy of the Unconscious Mind*, Vol. I, p. 26.

² *Parerga and Paralipomena*, Vol. II, pp. 427 and 428.

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proper place in the history of philosophy. The burden of this task lies with us who are living in China and studying her language and literature, for, while great care is bestowed on all her sister p.02 languages in Europe and America, Chinese, the oldest of all, but the youngest in the curriculum of our high-schools, is treated as a step-child by public opinion. This paper is meant as a move in the direction just indicated.

In the 4th and 3rd centuries B.C. we can distinguish five different schools of thought in China. Their founders are Confucius, the moralist and ritualist, Chuang Tse, the mystic and pantheist, Mê Ti, the philanthropist and optimist, Yang Chu, the Epicurean and pessimist, and the sophists Hui Shih and Kung Sun Lung ¹. The two latter schools must have had a very ephemeral existence. They left scarcely a trace behind them ². Of the three former that of the Mihists for a long time held its own against the orthodox school of Confucius which at last succeeded in supplanting it.

The technical Chinese term for Sophist is *pien shih*, literally a disputant, a debater, a controversialist. The Greeks were wont to connect this same idea of controversy with that of Sophistic. Their sophists were past masters in the art of Eristic. They knew how to defeat their opponents by arguments. Protagoras averred that every proposition might be proved and refuted with equally good reasons, and later on the sophists used to teach their pupils the ordinary sophisms as a means to confound their

¹ *Chuang Tse*, XXIV, 17.

² On Yang Chu [cf. my paper in the *Transactions of the Peking Oriental Society*, Vol. III, No. 3].

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antagonists. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle both opposed and despised the sophists, and their view has been adopted and for many centuries echoed by European scholars.

The Chinese regard their sophists in very much the same light. Chuang Tse ¹ says of them that by specious promises they impose on peoples' minds and drive them into false conclusions, but that though they win the battle in words, p.03 they do not carry conviction into their adversaries' hearts. Of Hui Tse in particular it is stated that he made it his chief object to contradict others, wishing to gain fame by defeating everyone ². Yo Cheng Tse Yü, a disciple of Mencius, utters similar diatribes against Kung Sun Lung ³.

However, in spite of these withering judgments passed by their contemporaries of other schools, neither the Greek nor the Chinese sophists are mere impostors, as their antagonists would have us believe. They are true philosophers, and their standpoint is as good as that of many others. The Greek sophists were the first to philosophize on the subject, its perceptions, opinions and impulses. Most of them maintained the impossibility of a true objective knowledge. Protagoras held that man is the measure of all things [πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπος], of those things which exist that they exist, and of those things without existence that they do not exist. Therein is but a relative truth. Things are as they appear to the observer, and they are so only to him, not to everyone ; because others are differently affected by the

¹ *Chuang Tse*, XXXIII, 26.

² *Chuang Tse*, *ibid.*

³ *Lieh Tse*, IV, 10.

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same things. Gorgias went a step further, and boldly asserted that there is nothing, and that, if there were anything, it could not be perceived.

Hegel and, especially, the historian Grote were the first to do away with the old prejudice that the Greek sophists were mere quibblers and jugglers with words, showing that their teachings are not at all lacking in acumen or originality, and that their rhetorical extravagances are but one side of their philosophy. Their Chinese compeers stand perhaps still more in need of a champion, for their writings are so quaint and paradoxical that at first sight people will feel tempted to condemn them as sheer nonsense. So far as I know, there has been only one foreign scholar who concerned himself with ^{p.04} the Chinese sophists. Balfour devotes some pages to them in his *Scrapbook*, but treats only of Hui Tse, whom he knew from Chuang Tse. He fully endorses the latter's strictures on the 'arch-Sophist' Hui Tse, which he calls dignified and to the point.

In the interesting catalogue of ancient works contained in the *Han-shu* [Cap. XXX] the sophists are very appropriately classed together with the Dialecticians **名家**¹ of which altogether seven are enumerated: **鄧析** Têng Hsi, **尹文子** Yin Wên Tse, **公孫龍子** Kung Sun Lung Tse, **成公生** Chêng Kung Shêng, **惠子** Hui Tse, **黃公** Huang Kung, and **毛公** Mao Kung. The works of the three first-named are still extant, the others lost. Of these dialecticians Têng Hsi, Kung Sun Lung, Hui Tse, and

¹ Mayers' rendering of **名家** [*Manual*, p. 343] as the school of writers on official station is not correct. The discussions of the dialecticians have a much wider scope than official station, which, it is true, is very frequently touched upon by them.

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perhaps Mao Kung, are looked upon as sophists. Mao Kung is said to have lived contemporaneously with Kung Sun Lung, of whom I am going to speak more in detail, and to have professed very similar views. Of Cheng Kung Shêng and Huang Kung we learn that they flourished about the time of Li Sse, the famous minister of Chin Shih Huang Ti [C. B.C. 208]. Huang Kung was a great scholar in Ch'in and wrote poetry which was incorporated in the Collection of Poetry of the Ch'in dynasty published in the Han dynasty.

From Cap. I, divided into two sections, which under the name of *Yin Wen Tse* has come down to us from the Han period and seems to be a genuine production of the philosopher himself or of his disciples, we can form a pretty clear idea of what the so-called dialecticians were like. The term dialectician may appear a little too high-flown. I use it in default of a better one, since it characterizes at least the _{p.05} line of argument peculiar to this philosophical school. Their dialectic is of the most rudimentary kind. From their unsystematical reasoning to the subtle logic of an Aristotle there is still a long way, yet in both cases the principle is the same. The Chinese mind has never risen above these rudiments and developed a complete system of logic, perhaps because it is altogether too illogical in itself.

Yin Wên Tse lived in the reign of king Hsüan of Chi [342-324 B.C.] ¹ and Kung Sun Lung relates an interesting discussion which he had with this prince. His arguments mostly turn on the relation of words 名 to their [real] objects 實. There ought to be

¹ He was not, however, a disciple of King Sun Lung [who lived two centuries later] as Dr. Faber states [*Doctrines of Confucius*, p. 19].

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a perfect harmony between the two. Things must be given their right names : what is good should be called good, and what is bad be named bad ¹. According to this correct standard things are to be treated ; only he who deserves honour is to be honoured, not the unworthy ². Sovereign and subjects must keep within the spheres marked out by their names. That is what Yin Wên Tse understands by the expression 正名 ³, the rectification of names. Truth is always truth and falsehood falsehood ; but, alas, in this world a lie very often takes the place of truth. It is not objective truth which reigns supreme, but that which the general opinion, the *consensus omnium*, declares to be truth, although it be falsehood. And there is one more cause of error, *viz.* individual likes and dislikes, which vitiate our judgment. One man likes sweet things, another sour ones. What appears good to one person appears bad to another, πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπος, as Protagoras says ⁴. So it happens that the same word conveys to different persons quite different ideas.

^{p.06} Yin Wên Tse distinguished three categories of words, or, properly speaking, of attributes : (1) words describing things, such as square and round, white and black ; (2) words approving or disapproving, e. g. good and bad, noble and mean, (3) comparative words, e. g. wise and stupid, to love and to hate ⁵.

¹ *Yin Wên*, p. 1.

² *Loc. cit.* p. 7.

³ *Loc. cit.* p. 5.

⁴ P. 2.

⁵ [...] p. 1.

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There is not much in these distinctions, yet they are remarkable for their tendency. That Yin Wên Tse clearly discriminates between objects and their attributes or between subject and predicate is clear from the following passage :

« In the expression 'a good ox' good is a general designation of things, whereas ox denotes the shape of a thing. . . . If we say 'a good horse', good is again combined with horse. Good therefore is a general term, and not limited to a certain place. If we say 'a good man', good belongs to man. Hence good is not man, and man is not good. Therefore, the expressions good ox, good horse, good man, separate of themselves,

viz. into object and attribute ¹.

We are so familiar now with these categories of subject and predicate that we can hardly realise that their first discovery and enunciation was really a great scientific triumph. In this respect does Yin Wên Tse again resemble the Greek sophists, who likewise made the first grammatical researches. Protagoras distinguished propositions according to their modes and found out the genera of nouns. Prodicus lectured on synonyms.

p.07 A great part of Yin Wên Tse's book is taken up with the usual commonplace reflections on government, that inexhaustible source of the platitudes of the literati.

In order to get a clearer view of the Chinese sophists it would be well to draw a sharp distinction between sophisms and paradoxes. A sophism is a false argument, a faulty syllogism,

¹ [...] p. 2.

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comprising premises and conclusion. Such a sophism or fallacy is *e.g.* the following of the teetotaler :

« That which prompts man to rash and inconsiderate acts and ruins his nervous system is an evil. Wine does this. Therefore wine is an evil ;

or that of the fatalist given by Cicero ¹ :

« If it is man's fate to recover from a certain sickness, whether he employ a physician or not, he recovers. If he is doomed not to recover, whether he employ a physician or not, he does not recover. In both cases there is fate. Therefore it is of no use calling a doctor.

A paradox is a proposition contrary to received opinion, which, though absurd in terms or appearance may yet be true in fact. — [*Webster*]. It is but the result, the conclusion of an argument, the premises being left to the imagination of the hearer. An excellent illustration is the famous dictum of Proudhon, 'Property is theft'. The effect produced by a paradox on the mind of the hearer is very great. It puzzles him and compels him to think. He finds himself in the dilemma of either solving the problem or of admitting his own inability. Therefore many writers make use of paradoxes, some more, some less.

As regards the Chinese sophists, we find fully developed sophisms with major, minor and conclusion only in Kung ^{p.08} Sun Lung. Of Têng Hsi and Hui Tse paradoxes alone have been

¹ Si fatum tibi est, ex hoc morbo convalescere, sive medicum adhibueris sive non, — convalesces ; item : si fatum tibi est, ex hoc morbo non convalescere, sive tu medicum adhibueris sive non, — non convalesces. Et alterum utrum fatum est : medicum ergo adhibere nihil attinet. [*Cicero de fato*, 12].

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preserved. These sophists were not the only inventors of paradoxes. The Taoist literature teems with them. Can there be anything more paradoxical than Lao Tse's saying that

« perfect virtue is not virtue, therefore it is virtue.
Common virtue never parts with virtue, therefore it is
no virtue [*Tao tê ching*, Cap. 38] ¹,

or the assertion that

« not leaving one's house one knows the world, not
looking through the window one sees the ways of
Heaven. The farther one goes, the less one knows. Thus
the Sage knows without going out, names without
seeing, completes without doing anything [*Tao tê ching*,
Cap. 47] ².

We cannot be surprised that the Taoist philosophers uttering such sentiments were also sometimes called sophists by their adversaries.

Besides the sophists already mentioned, *viz.* Têng Hsi, Hui Tse, Kung Sun Lung and Mao Kung, Chuang Tse [Cap. XXXIII, 26] ³ introduces one more, Huan Tuan, probably the same as Han Tan, mentioned by Lieh Tse [Cap. IV, 10] ⁴, of whom nothing more than the name is known. We are no more

¹ [...] This is not quite fair to the compiler of the *Tao teh king*, who has enough sins to answer for. [] and [], in old Chinese when the work was presumably written were identical in form as in sound, *tak*, [see *China Review*, XXIV, 185]. I translate :

The superior (man's) virtue effects nothing for the reason that it has acquired all.

The inferior (man's) virtue, not being free from (a bent towards) grasping, for that reason has not (the ability) to acquire. [css : trad. [Legge](#), [Wieger](#)]

² [css : trad. [Legge](#), [Wieger](#)].

³ [css : trad. [Wieger](#)].

⁴ [css : trad. [Wieger](#)].

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fortunate in regard to another sophist, Tien Pa, who must have lived in Ch'i about the 3rd century B.C. He found fault with the old emperors, and would dispute on the separation of hard and white and on the identity of like and unlike. Hundreds of people believed in him. Lu Chung Lien, the famous minister of Ch'i, ^{p.09} rebuked him, saying that he was like an owl, cursed by everybody. This remonstrance impressed the poor sophist so much that he never dared to talk any more, which is of course nonsense.

It is not improbable, that Chinese Sophistic is a product of Mihism. After Mê-ti died, his school split into three branches, which recognised as their teachers Hsiang Li, Hsiang Fu and Têng Ling ¹. These schools, Chuang Tse informs us ², regarded each other as schismatics, quarrelled over the 'hard and white' the 'like and unlike' and argued over questions of 'odd and even'. Chuang Tse mentions Hsiang Li Chin ³ and Têng Ling Tse, but not Hsiang Fu, and instead of them two others, Ku Huo and Chi Chih. Ku Huo is presumably only another way of writing Ku Kuo. The *Lü-shih-chun-chiu* ⁴ speaks of one Tang Ku Kuo ⁵, a Mihist of the Ch'in state, living at the court of King Hui [B.C. 337-311]. Another Mihist of the West, of the name of Hsieh Tse, went to call upon King Hui. Tang Ku Kuo, afraid lest his colleague should gain more influence over his royal patron than he, warned the king against him as a sophist, a consummate debater and

¹ *Han Fei Tse*, L, 10.

² *Chuang Tse*, XXXIII, 18. [[Wieger](#)]

³ Hsiang Li is the surname, Chin the 名.

⁴ *Lü-shih-chun-chiu*, XVI, 16.

⁵ Tang must be the surname.

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dangerous character. The king then declined to hear him.

I find a further proof that the Mihists had sophistic tendencies in Chapters 40-46 in the work which goes by the name of *Mê Ti*. It was not written by Mê Ti himself any more than the works ascribed to Confucius, Chuang Tse or Lieh Tse were composed by those philosophers, but must have originated in the Mihist school or schools. It requires a ^{p.10} thorough critical revision, for, as it now stands, it is a congeries of at least three masses of heterogeneous writings. The work gives Mê Ti's teachings under three different forms, each chapter or book being divided into three parts, all treating the same subject. Those three corresponding chapters may be compared to the three synoptic Gospels, which also seem to have been derived from some common source. Perhaps we have in these corresponding chapters records of Mê Ti's sayings handed down in the three Mihist schools referred to by Han Fei Tse. The final chapters [51-71, on warfare and tactics] have undoubtedly nothing to do with Mê Ti. Nobody could have denounced war in stronger terms than he has done, and it seems incredible that the same man should have taught the art of fighting and of attacking or defending cities. Neither can chapters 40-46 embody his views, for Mê Ti himself was no sophist at all, as we see from all the other chapters. Besides, he is never called a sophist by other writers, which would have been the case if he really had been one. Chapters 40-46 seem to contain aphorisms of the sophistic followers of Mê Ti. The text of these chapters is now so corrupt that it is almost unintelligible, and the few passages one can make out are absurd and childish. As the other philosophical

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chapters are perfectly consistent, we are perhaps justified in assuming that the pseudo-sophistical part of Mè Ti's work is a clumsy later forgery intended to supplement the original chapters which have been lost. I now propose to give a sketch of the three principal sophists and their doctrines, as far as they have come down to us.

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I

TÊNG HSI TSE

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Our oldest authority about Têng Hsi is Lieh Tse. He tells us that Têng Hsi lived in the Chêng state contemporaneously with Tse Chan, a celebrated Minister of State. ^{p.11} His sayings were very ambiguous, and it was very hard to grasp his meanings. He was a great jurist, and composed the so-called Bamboo Code, which was put into force in Chêng. To the administration of Tse Chan he gave so much trouble that the latter put him to death ¹. Although this fact is confirmed by Yin Wên Tse [p. 8] and Hsün Tse, we had better follow the authority of the *Tso-chuan*, according to which Têng Hsi was not executed by order of Tse Chan but by one of his successors, Sse Chuan, in the 9th year of Duke Ting of Lu, *i.e.* B.C. 501 ². Tse Chan had already died in B.C. 522, the 20th year of Duke Chao of Lu. From Book VII [4 seq.] ³ of *Lieh Tse*, which in fact belongs to Yang Chu, it would appear that Tse Chan and Têng Hsi were, at one time at least, on good terms, since Tse Chan consulted Têng Hsi in his family affairs. That Têng Hsi should have had some friction with other politicians of his country is not to be wondered at, for as the author of a new penal code he must have held a prominent position. In one passage ⁴ Lieh Tse introduces our author in the

¹ *Lieh Tse*, VI, 5. [[Wieger](#)].

² [[Couvreur](#)].

³ [[Wieger](#)].

⁴ *Lieh Tse*, IV, 9. [[Wieger](#)].

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midst of his disciples, taunting another philosopher and his followers on the score of the unproductiveness of their labour. They were, he says, unable to maintain themselves, and a burden to the state, which had to feed them. Dr. Faber seems to infer from this narrative that Têng Hsi held democratic views ¹. I doubt whether this be correct, because in his writing Têng Hsi appears rather to be a votary of absolutism.

In the *Han-shu* [Cap. 30] Têng Hsi, as we have seen, ranks among the dialecticians. The *Chien-lung Catalogue*, however, and the *Collection of Hundred Scholars* consider him as a jurist, probably on account of the Bamboo Code. ^{p.12} The remains of Têng Hsi consist of two chapters ², which are already mentioned in the *Han-shu*. They contain a series of detached aphorisms on various subjects, which have perhaps been collected by his disciples. Chinese critics do not doubt their genuineness as a whole, and I think that we can safely accept their view ³. There are several curious parallelisms of the text with that of the philosopher Kwei Ku Tse and one such with *Chuang Tse* [Cap. X], but I have the impression that it is rather the philosopher of the Dragon Valley who culled from our author. The one parallel with Chuang Tse does not prove much. Besides, it must be remembered that the Chinese, even of our time, being fond of showing their erudition and vast learning, like to quote ancient authors without acknowledging the source. Provided that the work of Kwei Ku Tse is a genuine production, its author may

¹ Faber, *Liclus*, pp. XIV and 94.

² Entitled [], the chapter on 'Unkindness' and [], on 'the turning of names', the theme referring only to the subjects treated at the beginning of each chapter. Cf. *Chuang Tse*.

³ [css : cf. cepondant [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](#)].

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have done so likewise and in good faith.

There is another difficulty, however, namely the inconsistency of some of the aphorisms, which are in some instances very conflicting, one of two controverting and excluding the other. The reason seems to be that some are the outcome of Têng Hsi's philosophical theory, others the expressions of his common-sense. That theory and practice in the same individual mutually clash is not infrequent, even with people other than philosophers. Perhaps these apparent divergencies admit of still another explanation, as will be seen further on.

Why was Têng Hsi then accounted a sophist? Let us hear some of his sayings :

« He who really hears, says he, can hear where there is no sound ; he who really sees, can see where there is no sight ; he can lay his plans conformably to what is not yet manifest, and take the necessary precautions against what has not yet come to pass. *Not* ^{p.12} *hearing with the ear*, he apprehends the inaudible, *not seeing with the eye*, he perceives the immaterial, *not scheming with the mind*, he grasps what is not evident, *not meditating with the intellect*, he conforms to what has not yet come into existence. [[Appendix I, ¶ 3.](#)]

« Looking at what is not there, one obtains that which one sees ; listening to what has no sound, one obtains that which one hears. Hence the immaterial is the root of the material, the soundless is the mother of sound. [[¶ 16.](#)]

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And

« The doctrine *when understood cannot be apprehended*, cannot be practised. He *who knows* the great doctrine *does not know* it, and thus obtains it ; does not practise it, and thus completes it. He has nothing, but nothing fails him. Holding the empty, he finds out the full truth. [¶ 10.]

That Têng Hsi's contemporaries were at a loss how to understand such words, and took them for mere sophistry without either rhyme or reason, intended only to dupe and mystify people, is quite natural. But what does Têng Hsi really mean ? He tells us pretty clearly in the last paragraph.

« The eye is prized for vision, the ear for hearing, the heart for justice. If we see with the *world-eye*, there is nothing which we do not see. If we hear with the *world-ear*, there is nothing which we do not hear. If we think with the *world-intellect*, there is nothing which we do not understand. Possessing these three faculties, one preserves them in inaction. [¶ 27.]

Têng Hsi discriminates between ordinary perceptions, ordinary knowledge and real perceptions or real knowledge.

^{p.14} Real knowledge is of a much higher order than what commonly goes by that name. It enables the knowing to perceive things before they have come into existence. They see the future as if it was present, hearing sounds which have not yet been produced and perceiving forms which are still latent. And whence do they derive these sensations ? Not from their organs of sense — the eye, the ear, not even their mind or

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intellect : — they must see with the *world-eye*, hear with the *world-ear*, think with the *world-intellect*. These three expressions denote one and the same thing, that which by a curious coincidence Schopenhauer also calls 'das ewige Weitauge' (the eternal world-eye). It is nothing else than the Brahman of the Hindoos, the Tao of the Chinese, the Mundane Soul or the Absolute of modern philosophers. In order to see with the world-eye or think with the world-intellect the individual mind must be completely absorbed by it. The soul must be merged in Tao or entirely identify itself with the Absolute. It is impossible to clearly describe this mystical process. Only Mystics know it or at least pretend to do so. Têng Hsi, therefore, may well say that he who knows this great doctrine does not know it, *i.e.* he feels it intuitively, but his mind has no part in it, and he can give no account of it.

We find this same mysticism under different forms all over the world. In *Sadânanda's Vedântasâra* ¹ [188 and 191] we read that after a student has become firmly convinced that he himself is the infinite, undivided Brahman, — by its nature eternal, pure, reasonable, redeemed, true and the highest bliss, — his individual intellect is *overpowered* by the self-shining, highest Brahman, which is identical with the inner soul, just as the light of a lamp is overpowered by the light of the sun.

The effusion of the Holy Ghost in the *Acts of the Apostles* is similarly described. The Spirit *sat upon* the _{p.15} Apostles and filled their minds. Their tongues became fiery and they began to

¹ In Bochtlingek *Sanscrit Chrestomathie* [p. 281].

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preach in other languages, as the Spirit taught them ¹. Peter declared that it was but the fulfilment of a prophecy that God would pour out his Spirit, and that their sons and daughters should *prognosticate* and have *visions*, and their elders *dreams* ². In other passages it is said that the Spirit *fell down* upon the audience ³. The individual minds of the Apostles were overpowered, outshone, effaced by the brilliancy of the Spirit. They could not use their own intellect to speak languages which were absolutely unknown to them, but had recourse to the *world-intellect*, which spoke through them.

The Holy Ghost is the pivot of the speculations of the Mystics in the middle-ages. We have the following curious statement of Jacob Boehme :

« I say before God . . . that I myself do not know what happens to me. Without being pushed I do not know what to write. Whenever I write, the Spirit dictates to me and gives me grand and wonderful knowledge, so that *I often doubt whether I am in this world with my own mind*, and I am full of joy, because I receive true and certain knowledge ; and the more I seek, the more I find.

Bernard de Clairveaux and his school speak of *inward contemplation* as the source of a certain knowledge of the Unseen. This inward revelation is called the deeper mystical knowledge, the illumination of reason by the Spirit, a

¹ Acts, II, 3 and 4 [[trad.](#)].

² Eod. 17 [[trad.](#)].

³ Acts, X, 44 [[trad.](#)] and XI, 15 [[trad.](#)].

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supernatural knowledge and an immediate perception, higher than all reason, therefore obtainable only by a few elect ¹.

The author of the *Philosophy of the Unconscious Mind*, von Hartmann, is the most modern representative of this kind of mysticism. The Unconscious Mind, the Absolute, is ^{p.16} especially at work in all animal and human instincts, in the inspirations of artists and men of genius, in dreams, somnambulism and visions, and besides leads and controls the Conscious Mind.

But let us return to Têng Hsi. Another consequence of his mysticism is his view that everything positive evolves out of its negative,

« Honesty is evolved out of what is not honest, justice is born from what is not just [¶ 10].

« Anger originates from no anger, action from no action [¶ 16].

I presume that in all these cases the negative is the mystical principle, which is devoid of any moral or other human quality, and yet the only source of everything positive. The true mystic does not pay attention to contraries, for in the Absolute there are no contraries, all seeming contrasts are blended into one. The same opinion is expressed by Chuang Tse ².

The practical side of mysticism is inaction and quietism [¶ 10 and ¶ 19]. Contemplation is regarded as the highest virtue. The mystic does nothing by himself on purpose, but is pushed by the

¹ I quote from v. Hartmann, *Philosophy of the Unconscious Mind* [Vol. I, pp. 311, 312], who regards the Mystics as his predecessors.

² *Chuang Tse*, II, 20 [Wieger].

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Spirit, as Jacob Boehme says. He follows his instincts and inspirations. Thus he is not absolutely passive, but only in so far as it is not he who really acts, but the Spirit who acts through him, using him as his tool. With these restrictions Têng Hsi might well set up rules for practical government and discourse on the duties of princes. It is always understood that they must not act of their own accord but be prompted by the Spirit.

The ideal man of Têng Hsi is not only inactive but also dispassionate and contented. He takes everything easy. Owing to his intimate connexion with the mystical principle, he possesses an extraordinary perspicacity, and all his devices are unfailing [¶ 20]. Accordingly Têng Hsi does not think ^{p.17} much of such qualities as intelligence, strength, nobility and wealth, and refuses to bow to people endowed with these gifts which are so much coveted [¶ 23]. The Confucian Sages he heartily despises for being the associates of rascally princes, and holds them accountable for the existence of robbers, vice being in his belief the necessary correlate of worldly virtue [¶ 17].

On the moral state of the world Têng Hsi utters some bitter truths.

« Those who steal property, he says, are put to death, those who steal kingdoms become princes [¶ 17].

And not mankind alone but even Heaven is impeached of injustice and unkindness. Offences are punished even if the culprits have been compelled to do evil by poverty and distress. Heaven has no sympathy with His creatures, for He does not prevent disastrous epidemics or other calamities by which people come to an untimely end, even those who for their virtue ought

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to have a long and happy life [¶ 1]. The critic of the *Chien Lung Catalogue* mildly rebukes Têng Hsi for this remark. The author of the second preface to Têng Hsi's work, who uses the pseudonym of [] (Yen-chou hermit), feels so scandalized that he thinks that Têng Hsi fully deserved the capital punishment meted out to him at the hands of Sse Chuan.

By his dialectical studies Têng Hsi seems to have been induced to establish some distinctions between synonyms [¶ 16]. [That the Greek sophist Prodicus lectured on synonyms has already been mentioned.] These distinctions are, however, quite arbitrary and useless. For debates Têng Hsi gives some practical hints how to defeat the opponent, but repudiates all dialectical tricks [¶ 7]. An adversary of the sophists could not have more earnestly advocated fair play in all discussions.

Têng Hsi's theory of government is in some degree amalgamated with his dialectic. He enjoins upon the rulers ^{p.18} of states to ascertain the truth by verifying all that they hear. Great stress is laid on these inquiries, which Têng Hsi calls investigations of names [¶ 2]. Princes are not only cautioned against over-activity and too much interfering with their subjects [¶ 3], but inaction is held up to them as an ideal [¶ 14]. As we have already seen, this does not mean absolute quietism. The princes must not act of purpose, but spontaneously, following their nature and yielding to their inner voice.

Têng Hsi condemns all artificiality and speaks in high terms of the simplicity and honesty of olden days. Cruel punishments such as tattooing or cutting off the criminal's feet or nose seem to him unnatural and therefore useless, because people are not

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improved thereby but hardened and brutalised. He therefore pleads for mild penalties [¶ 19]. We are perhaps right in assuming that Têng Hsi's penal code introduced reforms in the criminal procedure, mitigating the severe punishments in vogue at that time. The result, however, seems not to have been very beneficial. When Tse Chan died he admonished his successor, Tse Tai Shu, to use severity in governing the people. Tse Tai Shu did not do so, but tried to be mild. The consequence was that the Chêng state was infested with robbers which the Prime Minister then had to suppress by force ¹. Perhaps, later on, Têng Hsi was personally held responsible for the failure of his system, and had to pay with his life.

Politically Têng Hsi is by no means democratic, but an absolutist [¶ 2]. In his state-car the sovereign is the charioteer, his officials are the horses, the people only the cart-wheels [¶ 3].

In conclusion, I may add that Têng Hsi has much in common with the Taoists. Much more paradoxical than Têng Hsi is.

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¹ *Tso-chuan*, B. X. 20. [[Couvreur](#), pp. 328-329]

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II

HUI SHIH ¹

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p.19 He was a contemporary of Chuang Tse, living at the court of King Hui of Liang, whose reign lasted from 370-335 B.C. Liang is another name for Wei, referring to the new capital of the Wei state Ta Liang, the modern Kai-feng-fu in Honan. Owing to constant attacks from the rival kingdoms of Chi and Chao, King Hui removed his capital from An-yi in Shansi to Ta-liang. Hui Tse survived his friend and patron king Hui ² : his lifetime must, therefore, have fallen into the latter part of the 4th century B.C. According to the commentator of the *Lü-shih-chun-chiu*, Kao-yu, of the later Han time, Hui Tse was a native of the Sung state ³.

Hui Tse is generally believed to have held the position of a Minister of State in Liang ⁴, although the *Shi-chi* ⁵, in the chapter on the House of Wei, does not mention it. Hui Tse's influence over King Hui must have been very great. Not only did the latter confer upon him the honorary title of 仲父 Chung Fu, in remembrance of the famous statesman Kuan Chung or Kuan I-Wu ⁶, but he is even reported to have tried hard to yield his kingdom to him, which Hui Tse, however, did not accept. The *Lü-shih-chun-chiu*, which is our authority for this story, says that it

¹ Shih is the 名. The philosopher is generally called Hui Tse.

² *Lü-shih-chun-chiu*, XXI, 1.

³ *Loc. cit.* XVIII, 12.

⁴ *Chuang Tse*, XVII, 17 [[Wieger](#)].

⁵ *Shi-chi*, Cap. 44 [[Chavannes](#)].

⁶ *Lü-shih-chun-chiu*, XVIII, 14.

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was sham on both sides, king and minister wishing to acquire fame by pretending to imitate Yao and Shun. Hui Tse seems to have had some influence with the son and successor of his royal master also. The latter was about to celebrate the funeral of his father, when there was a heavy snowfall. All the dissuasion^{p.20} of the other officials was in vain, and it was Hui Tse alone who prevailed upon the king to postpone the interment¹. At all events Hui Tse was a great man in Liang. We learn that Chuang Tse saw him travelling with a hundred carriages².

Hui Tse worked out new laws for the Liang state, which pleased the people as well as King Hui but were opposed by a certain Ti Chien³, who must have had some standing with the king. The *Lü-shih-chun-chiu* says that the king saved his kingdom by listening to the advice of Ti Chien⁴. During the whole reign of King Hui his state was distracted with war. Out of fifty battles he is said to have lost twenty⁵. In the last year of his reign he invited scholars from all sides, told them how unfortunate in war he had been, and asked their advice. It was then that Mencius had those famous interviews with King Hui which open the first book of Mencius' work⁶.

Perhaps Hui Tse had his share of responsibility in the wars waged by King Hui. Kuang Chang at least, another adversary of his, lays the blame on him in the *Lü-shih-chun-chiu*, where Hui

¹ *Lü-shih-chun-chiu*, XXI, 1.

² *Huai-nan-tse*, XI, 17.

³ *Lü-shih-chun-chiu*, XVIII, 12 and *Huai-nan*, XII, 2.

⁴ *Lü-shih-chun-chiu*, XVIII, 14.

⁵ *Eod*, XVIII, 13.

⁶ *Shih-chi*, Cap. 44 [[Chavannes](#)].

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Tse defends his aggressive policy ¹.

Hui Tse's greatest opponent was the Taoist philosopher Chuang Tse. However different their views, they respected one another. A more generous tribute could not have been paid to the memory of Hui Tse than that paid by Chuang Tse saying that since the death of Hui Tse he had lost his material and had no one left to talk to ². On the other hand, it is too much to say that they were intimate friends, a belief which ^{p.21} appears to have been common in the Han period to judge from the fact that in the *Hou Han-shu* Chuang Tse and Hui Tse were ranked as a couple of friends like Po Ya and Chung Tse Chi ³. They disputed together and were on friendly terms, but nothing more. Chuang Tse went to visit Hui Tse in Liang. Hui Tse was at first afraid that Chuang Tse came with the intention of superseding him as minister ⁴. When Chuang Tse's wife died, Hui Tse went to condole with him ⁵.

The conversations between Chuang Tse and Hui Tse as related in *Chuang Tse* must be taken with great reserve. They were probably never held, but invented by Chuang Tse's pupils with a view to glorify their master. The philosophers of other schools, above all Confucius, seem to have been introduced only as foils for Chuang Tse to make the latter shine more brightly. They cut very poor figures ; either they receive instructions from Chuang Tse or are taken to task by him, but they never say

¹ *Lü-shih-chun-chiu*, XVIII, 13 and XXI, 8 seq.

² *Chuang Tse*, XXIV, 18 [[Wieger](#)].

³ C. Pétilion, *Allusions littéraires*, p. 99.

⁴ *Chuang Tse*, XVII, 17 [[Wieger](#)].

⁵ *Eod.*, XVIII, 20 [[Wieger](#)].

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anything clever on their own account.

The violent attacks upon Hui Tse in the last chapter of *Chuang Tse*¹ do certainly not represent the latter's views. But this chapter is evidently of much later origin than the others, and, as Giles points out, simply a summary by the first editors of *Chuang Tse*. Hui Tse is very hardly dealt with in the *Lü-shih-chun-chiu*². Hsün Tse criticises him and his paradoxes³.

Hui Tse must have been a very prolific writer. His works are said to have been so numerous that they would have filled five carts⁴. It is to be regretted that not a single one has come down to us. They were already lost in the Han dynasty, for the Han Catalogue contains the significant entry: p.22 'Hui Tse one chapter'. What we know of Hui Tse's doctrine are his paradoxes, of which the greater number have been recorded in *Chuang Tse* and some few in *Hsün Tse*.

These paradoxes have been a stumbling-block to the Chinese commentators and the European translators. Some native scholars opine that they are riddles defying any attempt at unravelling them. Legge concurs with this view. Balfour agrees with those who declare these aphorisms to be devoid of sense. Giles ventures to explain their meaning, but his explanations are most of them so forced and unnatural that they cannot be correct. Hui Tse asserts that 'a fowl has three legs'. According to Sse Ma Piao's comment, adopted by Giles, the third leg would be

¹ *Eod.*, XXXIII, 23 seq. [Wieger].

² *Lü-shih-chun-chiu*, XVIII, 14.

³ *Hsün Tse*, XV, 4 ; XVI, 6 ; XVIII, 3.

⁴ *Chuang Tse*, XXXIII, 23 [Wieger].

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volition. 'Ying (the capital of Chu) is the world, because, says Giles, you cannot say it is not the world'. 'A horse lays eggs' would mean only that names are arbitrary. Hui Tse tells us that 'a tortoise is longer than a snake'. The Chinese commentators and Giles submit that longer means longer lived.

To the paradox 'A white dog is black' Sse Ma Piao and Giles add the ridiculous comment that a white dog is black, if his eyes are black, part standing for the whole. Another commentator says that if a dog is not black but white, its whiteness may be regarded as its blackness !

None of these scholars has found the clue to Hui Tse's queer sayings. Although Chuang Tse impresses upon us that Hui Tse's own son searched his works for some clue in vain, and that it is impossible to derive from them a general principle ¹, I presume that I have discovered it. To my mind Hui Tse denies the existence of space and time, in short of the reality of the world ; and his paradoxes serve only to _{p.23} illustrate this idea. My reasons are the following. The paradoxes enumerated in *Chuang Tse* are headed by the fundamental axiom

« The infinitely great, beyond which there is nothing, I call the great Unit. The infinitely small, within which there is nothing, I call the small Unit.

Thus Hui Tse recognises two opposite poles — the unlimited Infinite, beyond which there is nothing, and the Atom, which has no dimensions and within which there is nothing. The conception of the Atom without dimensions as the smallest unit of

¹ *Chuang Tse*, II, 19 [[Wieger](#)].

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Substance leads Hui Tse into a dilemma or an antinomy, which in his paradoxical style he formulates thus :

« That which has no dimensions cannot be heaped up,
and yet it spans a thousand Li.

It means that there is space, there are distances of a thousand Li. The matter filling up these thousand Li is composed of Atoms, but these unsubstantial Atoms heaped up or put together will never measure a thousand Li. One may combine ever so many millions of mathematical points, they never give more than one mathematical point ¹. Out of the multiplication of non-dimensions there can never result a dimension. In this way Hui Tse perceived space practically, but could not construct or conceive it theoretically. Consequently he assumed it to be unreal, a mere illusion of our senses. From his maxim :

« One must love all beings equally, for heaven and earth are one and the same,

it would appear that he believed in some uniform entity. Time being so closely connected with space, *i.e.* with the movement of bodies, Hui Tse while denying the existence of space could not well uphold that of time, and along with space he had to give up things and their attributes or qualities.

That Hui Tse really held these views I infer moreover from the striking resemblance his paradoxes bear to those of ^{p.24} the Greek Eleatic philosophers Parmenides and especially Zeno, who by their arguments attempted to prove that the assumption of a

¹ Giles does not seem to have grasped this simple truth, for in his note to the above paradox he states that mathematical points collectively fill up space.

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multitude of things, of movement and of time, is erroneous. Zeno ¹ argues that if there were a multitude of things, they must be at the same time infinitely small, their constituent particles being without dimensions, and infinitely great owing to their unlimited multitude. Hui Tse's first axiom contains the same idea.

To show the impossibility of movement Zeno reasons as follows : A body moving in a certain direction will never reach a certain goal. In order to finish a certain distance, it must first have finished half of it, and, before this half is finished, half of this half, and so on *ad infinitum*. The given distance can be divided into an infinite number of smallest distances, to pass through all of which would take an infinite time, which amounts to saying that the moving body could never reach its goal ². The same ratiocination is at the bottom of Zeno's famous sophism on 'Achilles and the Tortoise'. Achilles running after a tortoise cannot overtake it, because the moment he reaches the place where the tortoise was, it has already left it again. The two paradoxes of Hui Tse : 'Cart-wheels do not triturate the ground' and 'The finger does not touch, the touching never comes to an end' must be understood in the same sense. The wheel does not touch the ground nor the finger an object by reason of the infinite divisibility of space, an infinite number of atoms still lying between things apparently in touch. Hui Tse's last paradox is very much akin to 'Achilles and the Tortoise' :

¹ In Simplicius ad Aristotle *Phys.*, fol. 30.

² Aristotle *Phys.*, VI, 9.

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« If every day you chop off half of a stick one foot long, you will not have finished with it after ten thousand generations,

i.e. never, you can go on dividing and dividing for ever.

p.25 Zeno asserts that a flying arrow is at rest ¹. Hui Tse shows that the idea of movement is self-contradictory by saying that

« There is a time when a swiftly flying arrow is neither moving nor at rest.

It cannot be at rest, for we see it moving ; and it cannot move, because we do not understand how a movement through a space composed of an infinite number of atoms is possible within a limited time.

Parmenides denies the reality of time. Real entity, as he conceives it, is uncreated, indestructible, a whole, single, *unmoveable* and eternal, *it has not been and it will not be, but it is now*, a continuous *One* ². I may be allowed to quote a modern poet ³ who more paradoxically describes real existence as past and present at the same time :

Ich bin schon lange begraben,
Ich weiss, dass ich einst war.
Ich koste des Lebens Gaben
Und athme immerdar.

Ich gankle, ein lüsterner Falter,
Unsterblich im flüchtigen Schein.
Ich kenne nicht Jugend, nicht Alter,

¹ Heinze-Ueberweg, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. I, p. 78.

² ἀγέννητον ἓν καὶ ἀκάλυθρον ἔστιν, οὐλον, μουνογενές
² τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἢ δ' ἀτέλειστον, Οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ
πάν, Ἐν ἕνεχός.

³ Kart Bleibtren.

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Ich bin das ewige Sein. ¹

Hui Tse does not mean anything else when he says

« The sun sets when it is in the zenith. Creatures die when they are born.

« Going to Yüeh to-day, one arrives there yesterday.

Someone might object that I credit Hui Tse with ideas which may be Greek or modern but are alien to the Chinese _{p.26} mind. To those who think thus I would recommend the study of Chuang Tse, where amongst others they will find the following passage :

« There is nothing under the canopy of heaven greater than the tip of an autumn spikelet. A vast mountain is a small thing. Neither is there any age greater than that of a child cut off in infancy. P'êng Tsu (the Chinese Methusaleh) himself died young. The universe and I came into being together ; and I, and everything therein, are *One* ².

Here Chuang Tse denies the reality of space and time quite evidently, and his paradoxes are very much like those of Hui Tse. He starts, however, from another basis, *viz.* the relativity of all our notions, such as great and small, old and young, good and bad, which induces him to identify and thus dissolve all contraries. Chuang Tse dissents from Hui Tse's atomistic views,

¹ I have been buried long ago. I know that I was once. I enjoy the pleasures of life, and breath evermore.
I flutter, a wanton butterfly, immortal in transient light. I know not youth, nor age, I am Eternal Existence.

² *Chuang Tse*, II, 20 [[Wieger](#)].

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maintaining that the Atom as well as the Universe must possess form and therefore dimensions ¹.

To sum up, I believe that the paradoxes of Hui Tse are intended to illustrate the unreality of space and time and their attributes. A hypothesis is considered a good one if it establishes a general principle which explains things in an easy, natural way. I trust that mine does. It is based upon and evolved out of Hui Tse's own sayings. It shows that the Eleatics, Parmenides and Zeno, as well as Chuang Tse, use the same or very similar arguments to prove that our visible world is sham and illusion.

Against *space* the following paradoxes are directed :

- II. — 'That which has no dimensions cannot be heaped up, but it spans a thousand Li', which has already been mentioned.
- III. — 'Heaven is as low as earth. A mountain is on a level with a lake', which Hsün Tse gives in the following p.27 form : 'Mountains and pools are equally high, heaven and earth are level'. This means to imply that height and depth are imaginary, that their contrast is not real.
- IX. — 'I know that the centre of the world lies north of Yen (the modern Chili) and south of Yüeh (Fukien)'. If such be the case, the distance between these two states cannot exist, which involves the existence of space in general.

¹ *Eod.*, XVII, 10.

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- X. — 'One must love all beings equally, for heaven and earth are one and the same', has been noticed.
- XIII. — 'Ying (the capital of the kingdom of Chu) is the world', then the world cannot have the extension which we see.
- XXII. — 'A tortoise is longer than a snake'. This must not be taken literally. Hui Tse wants to show that the difference in length between the two creatures is only a seeming one. In fact there exists neither length nor shortness.
- II. — Chi (a state in Shantung) and Chili (in the province of Shensi) are conterminous. This is a counterpart to No. IX.

That space is divisible *ad infinitum* is brought home to us in the aphorisms :

- XIX. — 'Cart-wheels do not triturate the grounds.
- XXI. — 'The finger does not touch, the touching never comes to an end', already mentioned.
- XXIV. — 'A handle does not fit in a chisel', there being still innumerable atoms between the chisel and its handle.
- XXXI. — 'If every day you chop off half of a stick one foot long, you will not have finished with it after ten thousand generations', also referred to.

The reality of *time* is negated in the following

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paradoxes :

IV. — 'The sun sets when it is in the zenith.

VII. — 'Going to Yüeh to-day one arrives there yesterday.

XL. — _{p.28} 'There are feathers in an egg', *i.e.* the feathers of the young bird which exists already although it has not yet been born. Future and present are the same.

XXVI. — 'There is a time when a swiftly flying arrow is neither moving nor at rest', mentioned before.

XXX. — 'An orphan colt has not had a mother'. Past and present being the same, the colt was already an orphan when it had its mother.

All things are conditioned by space. Without space things cannot be as they appear to us. They cannot have those qualities which we see in them. This is implied by the following propositions :

VIII. — 'Linked rings can be separated', *i.e.* without breaking them. Connexion and separation have no reality.

XII. — 'A fowl has three legs'. Hui Tse does not mean that a fowl really has three legs, but only wants to refute the illusion that it has two. Being without dimensions it has neither body nor legs.

XXIII. — 'A square is not square, and a circle cannot be considered as round'.

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XXIX. — 'A white dog is black'.

Geometrical forms and colours have no real existence.

That the nature of things is quite different from what we fancy, Hui Tse tries to make clear by the following paradoxes. It must always be borne in mind that they are not to be taken *au pied de la lettre* but *cum grano salis*. They are only negative. The positive and categorical form is nothing but a dialectical *façon de parler* :

XIV. — 'A dog can be regarded as a sheep'.

XV. — 'A horse lays eggs', *i.e.* is a bird.

XVI. — 'A nail has a tail'. IV. 'A hook has a barb'. Then both would be animate beings.

XVIII. — 'Mountains speak'.

XXVII. — p.29 'A dog is no hound', because the categories and species which we use for the classification of things do not exist.

Some few paradoxes — XVII, XX, XXV and XXVIII — do not fall under the above scheme. On XVII 'Fire is not hot' and XX 'The eye does not see', I am going to discourse more fully while speaking of the third sophist.

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III

KUNG SUN LUNG

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There are two philosophers of this name who are frequently confounded. One is Kung Sun Lung, styled Tse Shih, a native of Wei, or, as others say, of Chu. He was a disciple of Confucius and 53 years younger than his master, and must therefore have been born in 498 B.C ¹. The sophist Kung Sun Lung hailed from the Chao state. His honorary title was Tse Ping ². We learn from the *Shi-chi* that Kung Sun Lung lived in the Chao state and argued on hardness and whiteness, like and unlike [Cap. 74], and that the Prince of P'ing-yuan treated him with great consideration until Tsou Yen made his appearance, who discredited him so much with the Prince that he was dismissed [Cap. 76] ³. The Prince of P'ing-yuan played an important part in the struggles which preceded the downfall of the Chou and the establishment of the Ch'in dynasty. His personal name was Shêng. He was a younger brother of King Hui Wên of Chao [B.C. 298-266] and acted as Prime Minister under King Hui Wên and his successor King Hsiao Chêng. P'ing-yuan Chün died in B.C. 250 ⁴. When in the year 256 Han-tan, the _{p.30} capital of Chao, was saved from Ch'in, whose troops had invested it, P'ing-yuan Chün was going to donate Prince Hsin-ling of Wei with some

¹ Cf. the great Cyclopaedia of Surnames.

² Kung Sun is the surname.

³ I wonder on what authority Giles [*Biographical Dictionary*, No. 1031] states that Kung Sun Lung was said by Tsou Yen to be the wisest man in the state of Chao.

⁴ *Vide* Giles, *loc. cit.*, No. 1652.

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territory of Chao in recognition of services rendered during the siege of Han-tan. It is on record that Kung Sun Lung saw his patron on this occasion, and by his remonstrances induced him to give up this scheme ¹. We learn from this that Kung Sun Lung was alive about the middle of the 3rd century B.C. It appears that King Hui of Chao also was disposed to take Kung Sun Lung into his counsels, for we find him at court talking to the king on disarmament and universal love, the ideal of Mê Ti ². Hui Tse, as we have seen, was in favour of war. Kung Sun Lung discussed this same subject with King Chao of Yen ³ [311-279 B.C.], to whom he paid a visit ⁴.

At P'ing-yuan Chün's residence Kung Sun Lung gave a proof of his dialectical skill. The states of Ch'in and Chao had made a covenant to the effect that Chao should help Ch'in to carry out its designs, and that Ch'in would do the same for Chao. Shortly afterwards Ch'in attacked Wei, and Chao wished to come to Wei's assistance. The King of Ch'in sent an envoy to complain of the violation of the treaty, according to which Chao had to cooperate with Ch'in, not to oppose it. At the instigation of Kung Sun Lung, Chao retorted by saying that Ch'in had to help Chao to carry out its designs, that now it wished to aid Wei, and that in not helping Chao in this Ch'in was breaking the agreement ⁵.

It was at the court of P'ing-yuan Chün also that Kung Sun Lung met with his chief opponent 孔穿 K'ung Chuan, a

¹ *Shi-chi*, Cap. 76.

² *Lü-shih-chun-chiu*, XVIII, 2.

³ *Loc. cit.* XVIII, 15.

⁴ *Huai Nan Tse*, XII, 12.

⁵ *Lü-shih-chun-chiu*, XVIII, 10.

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descendant of Confucius in the sixth degree and grandfather of K'ung Fu 孔鮒, the alleged author of the apocryphal ^{p.31} work of 孔叢子 K'ung Tsung Tse. The debates of Kung Sun Lung and K'ung Chuan are found in various forms and in various authors ¹.

Kung Sun Lung was the head of a school and had disciples in Chao ². One of them, 荃母子 Chi Mu Tse, is mentioned in 劉向 Liu Hsiang's 別錄 Pieh-lu, quoted in the commentary 集解 to the *Shi-chi* [Cap. 76].

The two passages referring to Kung Sun Lung in *Lieh Tse* [IV, 11] and *Chuang Tse* [XVII, 15] ³ are both spurious. In both of them Kung Sun Lung is brought into contact with 公子牟, Prince Mou of Wei, a son of the Marquis Wên of Wei [425-357 B.C.] This prince lived about a hundred years anterior to Kung Sun Lung. There is besides internal evidence to show, as Faber and Giles have done ⁴, that these two references to Kung Sun Lung are later additions to the works of *Lieh Tse* and *Chuang Tse* ⁵.

The Han Catalogue mentions a work of Kung Sun Lung in 14 chapters. Of these eight were already lost before the Sung dynasty ⁶, so that now only six chapters remain. They are so peculiar, so entirely different from other productions, and to a great part so cleverly written that we have no reason to call their authenticity as a whole in question. Cap. I contains one lengthy

¹ In *Kung Sun Lung*, [Appendix III, Ch. 1], in Kung Tsung Tse's chapter on Kung Sun Lung, *Lü-shih-chun-chiu*, XVIII, 11 and *Lieh Tse*, IV, 11 [[Wieger](#)].

² *Huai Nan*, XII, 12.

³ [[Wieger](#)].

⁴ Faber, *Licinus*, p. 96 and Giles, *Chuang Tse*, p. 217.

⁵ In addition to those passages already given, Kung Sun Lung is mentioned in *Huai Nan* [XI, 14], where his principal tenets are alluded to, and in Yang Tse's *Fa-yen* [II, 4], where it is said that he put forward many thousands of strange propositions.

⁶ Chien Lung's Catalogue, Cap. 117.

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repetition which ought to be omitted. The greater part of Cap. IV is, I believe, spurious. The reasoning is so puerile and out of keeping with the other chapters that it bears quite the features of a clumsy forgery. ^{p.32} The work is now generally published together with the commentary of 謝希深 Hsieh Hsi Shên of the Sung dynasty, which is not worth much and no great help to the understanding of the very difficult text, because it interprets every clause, though purely logical, in a phantastic moral sense. It is a pity, therefore, that two other commentaries of 陳嗣古 Chên Sse Ku and 賈士隱 Chia Shih I are lost.

According to ancient authors, Kung Sun Lung's discussions chiefly turned on three subjects — the white horse ¹, hardness and whiteness ² or the third in abeyance ³, and like and unlike. The first two subjects are treated in Kung Sun Lung's work but not the last. The last eight chapters were probably partly devoted to it. It is doubtful therefore what Kung Sun Lung's views in regard to like and unlike have been, *Huai Nan Tse* [loc. cit.] says that Kung Sun Lung *discriminated* between like and unlike, and separated hardness and whiteness. Chuang Tse makes Kung Sun Lung say that he knew all about

« the *identification* of like and unlike, the making the not-so so, and the impossible possible ⁴.

Since tradition ascribes to Kung Sun Lung paradoxes very similar

¹ *Kung Tsung Tse* [chapter on Kung Sun Lung].

² *Chuang Tse*, XVII, 15 ; *Huai Nan*, XI, 14 ; *Shi-chi*, Cap. 74.

³ *Kung Tsung Tse*, *loc. cit.*, *Lü-shih-chun-chiu*, XVIII, 11.

⁴ Although this passage is an interpolation, it has nevertheless some value as an old record, probably anterior to the Han period.

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to those of Hui Tse [some are quite the same] ¹, it is very likely that Kung Sun Lung also denied the reality of like and unlike or of contraries, and held that space and time, within which these contraries confront us, are illusive.

Whereas the remaining paradoxes of Hui Tse are only detached fragments from his works, unsubstantiated and unproved, the sophisms propounded in *Kung Sun Lung* are fully developed and abundantly supported by arguments. We ^{p.33} may assume that Hui Tse's works were similarly arranged. The six chapters, except I and VI, are written under the form of a dialogue, Kung Sun Lung defending his views against the attacks of an opponent. Cap. I relates the debate of our philosopher with Kung Chuan, whom he tries to convince of the truth of his thesis that a white horse is no horse, citing Confucius and Yin Wen Tse as his authorities. The same theme is thoroughly discussed in Cap. II, where reasons pro and con are given. From Cap. III we are to learn that all our definitions are wrong. What we see are only phenomena, not real entities. The chapter is highly sophistical, the word definition being used in two different senses, which causes great confusion. One feels quite giddy, when reading it, and it requires much mental concentration to catch the meaning. I will read the beginning of the chapter, which is a good specimen of Kung Sun Lung's way of reasoning.

« *Thesis*. —There are no things which are not *defined*, but those definitions *are* no definitions.

¹ *Lieh Tse*, IV, 11 [[Wieger](#)].

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Antithesis. — So far as there are no definitions on earth, things cannot be called things. If what is on earth is *not* defined, can things be said to *be* defined ?

Thesis. — Definitions there are none on earth, things there are on earth. It is impossible to maintain that what exists on earth is the same as what does not exist.

Antithesis. — If there are no definitions on earth, things cannot be said to be *defined*. If they cannot be said to be defined, they are *not* defined.

Thesis. — Things though not defined are nevertheless *not undefined*. There are no definitions on earth, and things cannot be said to be defined, but that does not mean that they are not *defined*. It does not mean that they are not defined, for there are none but ^{p.34} defined things. There being none but defined things, definitions are not definitions.

Cap. IV opens with the sophism that two does not contain one, nor right nor left. The rest of the chapter is spurious. Its sophisms are too absurd to be taken *au sérieuse*. Cap. V treats of the hard and white, and Cap. VI of words and their objects. It reminds us of the dialectician Yin Wen Tse.

Cap. II on the white horse and Cap. V on the hard and white are by far the most interesting and deserve to be gone into a little more fully.

What Kung Sun Lung means by saying that a white horse is no horse we learn best from himself. Cap. II begins as follows :

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« *Question.* — Is it possible that a white horse is no horse ?

Answer. — Yes.

Question. — How ?

Answer. — A horse denotes a shape, white a colour. Describing a colour one does not describe a shape, therefore I say that a white horse is no horse.

Question. — There being a white horse, one cannot say that there is no horse. If one cannot say that there is no horse, can the existence of the horse be denied ? There being a white horse, one must admit that there is a horse ; how can whiteness bring about the non-existence of a horse ?

Answer. — When a horse is required, yellow and black ones can all be brought, but when a white horse is wanted, there is no room for yellow and black ones. Now let a white horse be a horse ! It is but one kind of those required. Then, one of those required, a white horse would not be different from a horse. Those ^{p.35} required do not differ. Would then yellow and black ones meet the requirement or not ? In so far as they would meet the requirement or not, they would evidently exclude each other. Yellow as well as black horses are each one kind ; they correspond to a call for a horse, but not to a call for a white horse. Hence it results that a white horse cannot be a horse.

Question. — A horse having colour is considered no horse. But there are no colourless horses on earth ! Are there, therefore, no horses on earth ?

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Answer. — Horses of course have colour, therefore there are white horses. If horses had no colour there would be merely horses. But how can we single out white horses, for whiteness is no horse ?

A white horse is a horse and whiteness. Such being the case, I hold that a white horse is no *horse'*. Etc. etc.

Now what is our opinion ? To whom do we award the palm, to Kung Sun Lung's opponent, who very ably advocates the common-sense view that a white horse is a horse, or to Kung Sun Lung contending that a white horse is no horse ? I think that both are right. A white horse is a horse and also no horse. The ambiguity arises from the word horse. Kung Sun Lung takes it in the sense of a horse in general, in the abstract ; his antagonist understands by it a horse in particular. A white horse is a horse in particular, a species of the genus horse, but it is not a horse in general. The idea of a horse includes colour, but not a specific colour like whiteness.

Kung Sun Lung holds that a thing does not remain the same as soon as any of its qualities is insisted upon. The same idea was enunciated in Greece by the Cynic Antisthenes, a disciple of the sophist Gorgias and of Socrates. He maintained that only identical or analytical judgments such as ^{p.36} 'A man is a man' or 'Good is good' are possible, but that one cannot say that a man is good, no subject admitting of any other predicate than itself ¹. Aristotle himself, who made the refutation of fallacies his special study, is very much puzzled by a sophism corresponding exactly

¹ Plato, *Sophist*, 251b, Aristotle, *Metaph.*, V, 29.

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to that of our sophist that a white horse is no horse. There was a musician Koriskus. Now Aristotle asks : Is the musician Koriskus the same as Koriskus ? According to Grote ¹, Aristotle holds that, because the musician Koriskus includes two Categories (Substance and Quality), he cannot be properly compared with Koriskus simply, which is the Category of Substance only. We have seen that Kung Sun Lung had the same doubts about shape (Category of Substance) and colour (Category of Quality) in regard to the white horse. The very simple solution of the sophism, which we have given, escaped both philosophers.

What Kung Sun Lung says on the white horse is ingenious, but not of great philosophical value. His treatise on the hard and white, however, deserves our highest praise unreservedly. Though sophistical in form, its contents are highly philosophical. The qualities of things, such as hardness or whiteness, are, in the belief of Kung Sun Lung, unknown to us. The names we give them do not describe what they really are. They are something indefinable, and cannot therefore be inherent in their objects. If they really were part of their objects, they ought to be always there, which they are not. Consequently they must have separate existences. These existences have the peculiarity that they are intermittent, they vanish when not perceived by us. Whiteness exists only as long as we see it, hardness as long as we touch it. These qualities cease to exist together with our sensations of their existence. Kung Sun Lung says that ^{p.37} when not perceived they *separate* or hide. This is the meaning of the paradox that a stone, hard and white, are together two things.

¹ Grote, *Aristotle*, p. 410.

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At a given moment the mind can be conscious only of the existence of the stone and its hardness, when it has recourse to touch, or of the stone and its whiteness, when it sees it. So it is only aware of two things, not of three. The third is in abeyance, it exists only virtually, but comes into being again when focussed by its proper organ of sense. To bring about the sensation of whiteness there must be light, an eye, a mind, and the colour. If we can rely on Chuang Tse's testimony that Hui Tse already pondered over the hard and white, we must understand his paradoxes that the eye does not see, and that fire is not hot, as meaning that light and warmth are in reality not such as they appear to us. Kung Sun Lung's wonderful critique of our perceptive faculties recalls to us the modern Idealists Kant, Fichte and Schopenhauer, who, more radical than Kung Sun Lung, assert that things and their attributes are nothing but creations of our mind, which have subjective but not objective existence, thus evaporating the whole visible world into nothing.

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APPENDIX I

TENG HSI TSE

CAP. I

Unkindness

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(1) ^{p.38} Heaven is not kind to man, the ruler is not kind to his people, the father to his son, the elder to the younger brother. Why do I say so ? Because Heaven cannot remove disastrous epidemics, nor keep those alive who are cut off in their prime, nor always grant a long life to good people. That is unkindness to the people. Whenever people break holes through walls, and rob or deceive others, and lead them astray, want is at the root of all these offences, and poverty their main spring. Albeit ; yet the ruler takes the law, and punishes the culprits. That is unkindness to the people. Yao and Shun swayed the Empire, whereas Tan Chu and Shang Chün ¹ continued simple citizens. That is unkindness to sons. The duke of Chou put Kuan and Tsai ² to death, that is unkindness to younger brothers. From these examples, which may be multiplied, we see that there is no such thing as kindness.

(2) The duty of the ruler consists in critically examining the

¹ The sons of Yao and Shun said to have been unworthy of the Empire.

² These two brothers of the duke rebelled against their imperial master Chêng Wang, their nephew, and were overpowered by the duke.

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names of things and investigating the truth. His officials are expected to receive the law from him and promulgate his commands. The inferiors must not take the law into their own hands. As long as the sovereign wields his power, ^{p.39} everything is well governed ¹. A prince is confronted with three difficulties ; an official may become guilty of four faults. Which are the three difficulties ? To rely only on one's *entourage* is the first ². To elect scholars for official posts according to their names ³ is the second. To keep up old friendships and take an interest in persons that do not come near one is the third. And which are the four faults ? The first is to be the recipient of extraordinary favours without accomplishing anything extraordinary. The second is to be in a high position, and do nothing in the government. The third is to be unjust in one's official dealings. The fourth is to lead an army into battle, and take to one's heels. If a prince is free from these three difficulties and his officials from the four faults, they will secure tranquillity to their country.

(3) A prince's power is like his carriage, his authority like his whip, the officials are his horses, the people his cart-wheels. If his power is strong, the carriage is safe. If his authority is recognised, the whip hits well. Obedient officials make good horses, and, if the people are peaceful, the wheels turn quickly. Should in a country there be anything amiss in this respect, there will be a disaster. The state-car is upset, the horses bolt, the wheels break, and everything inside the carriage is smashed.

¹ Têng Tse advocates a pure despotism.

² A prince seldom learns the truth, hearing only so much as his councillors think fit.

³ The name *viz.* the character of officials does not always correspond to their real worth.

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A great danger indeed !

For ¹ a long time past like and unlike could not be separated, right and wrong not be determined, white and ^{p.40} black not be divided, pure and unpure not be regulated ². He who really hears, can hear where there is no sound, he who really sees, can see where there is no sight. He can lay his plans, conformably to what is not yet manifest, and take the necessary precautions against what has not yet come to pass. That is the only method. Not hearing with the ear he apprehends the soundless, not seeing with the eye he perceives the immaterial, not scheming with the mind he grasps what is not yet manifest, not meditating with the intellect he conforms to what has not yet come into existence.

If ³ a prince conceals his person and hides himself, the lower classes are all unselfish. If he closes his eyes and shuts his ears, the whole people are in awe of him ⁴.

(4) A wise ruler ascertains the truth by a critical examen of names, and establishes his power by finding and fixing the law, and establishing his authority. Well versed in outward forms, he does not wait to derive his distinctions from events, and when having tested the doings of others, he employs them, he does not lose thereby, but does so to advantage ⁵. When a wise prince has made one investigation ⁶, all things take there fixed

¹ This paragraph has no connexion whatever with the preceding with which it is connected in the text. I therefore have separated it in the translation.

² How this knowledge is to be obtained, we hear in the sequence.

³ The text again connects the two paragraphs.

⁴ The wonderful effect of inaction.

⁵ The meaning of this paragraph is very obscure and mere guesswork.

⁶ Concerning the ultimate cause of everything. When he has attained to that

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place. For names outward things are of no use ¹. Knowledge cannot be merely based on that of others *i.e.* one must search for it in one's own self ².

(5) ^{p.41} In governing the ruler must not exceed his power, and the officials not get into confusion. All the state-functionaries have their special departments and exercise their judicial rights. The sovereign studies names to find out the truth, whereas his inferiors receive his instructions, and do not disobey. What is good, he tries to increase, what is bad, to remove. He does not reward, because he is pleased, or punish, because he is angry. That may be called a government.

(6) A person carrying a heavy load on his shoulders feels oppressed by the length of the road. He whose aim is glory, is distressed, if deserted by the people. The one carrying a heavy load is worn out by the length of the road, and does not attain his purpose. The exalted one, if deserted by the people, may exert himself ever so much, he cannot govern. Therefore, the wise man estimates the length of the road, before he takes up the load, and an intelligent ruler tests the people, before he sets about governing. One does not hunt bears or tigers in kennels or harpoon whales in fresh-water ponds. Why ? Because bears and tigers have not their dens in kennels, and ponds are not the waters where whales live ; just as the people of Chu did not sail against the current, or that of Chên fold up their flags, or as

knowledge, everything becomes clear and settled to him.

¹ It is essential to have one general principle, from which all relations expressed by words can be deduced. Outward things alone, as we perceive them, do not teach us what they really are, and how therefore they must be called.

² Knowledge comes from within, not from without, is subjective, not objective.

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Chang Lu did not become an official and Lü Tse covered his face for shame ¹.

(7) If anybody is not treated with consideration abroad, it is because he is not polite. If anybody is not beloved where he lives, he does not show himself kind. He who does not find employment despite all his talk, is not trustworthy. He who seeks without finding, has not made a good beginning to start from. He who plans without the approval of others, has no principles, who finds no adherents in his projects has lost the true path ².

Since praise is bestowed according to circumstances, the deeds may be the same, but they are called by different names ³. If of two persons who are alike one uses his opportunity, the energy exerted by him is only equal to that of the other, but his glory is double. The reason is that he relies upon influence beyond himself.

Disputations are not listened to ⁴. Empty words did not yet find an echo. Actions which do not improve an unsatisfactory state of things are not belauded. Hence in discussions one merely discriminates various categories, lest they injure one

¹ I have only been able to trace one of these four allusions. In *Mê-ti*, Chapter 49, towards the end, we learn that the people of Chu when fighting that of Yüeh on the Yangtse would always attack with the current. These allusions are evidently meant to show that what is not appropriate must not be done. Chang Lu and Lü Tse are proper names, but nothing is known about them. Probably we must insert [], 'not' before [] 'did not cover his face for shame', because all the preceding clauses are in the negative. Why Chang Lu and Lü Tse behaved, as they did, we do not know.

² People are to a great extent themselves responsible for their misfortunes or the failure of their projects, something being wrong with them.

³ This paragraph must be separated from the preceding, which is not done in the Chinese text.

⁴ A new clause again.

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another. One arranges how different classes have to follow each other, so that they are not mixed up. One elucidates purposes and explains meanings, but does not aim at contradictions. To adorn one's speech with a view to create confusion or to use ambiguous words in order to shift the ground of the discussion is not the ancient method of dialectic ¹.

Without forethought one is unable to cope with sudden emergencies, just as soldiers, who have not drilled when at leisure, are unfit to oppose the enemy. If in the palace ^{p.43} schemes are prepared for an area of a thousand li, and admirable plans made in the commander's tent, then a hundred battles give a hundred victories, and we have an army like that of Huang Ti ².

(g) Life and death depend on fate, wealth and poverty on time. He who sorrows over an untimely death, does not understand fate, and he who frets over poverty and misery, does not understand time. If a man feels no fear in danger, he knows Heaven's fate, if he is not oppressed by poverty and want, he is aware of the regular change of time.

If in a year of famine the father dies in the house, and the son expires near the door, they do not complain, because they do not see each other. If people go to sea in the same boat, and have a storm on their way, their chances to be rescued and their dangers are about equal, and their sorrows the same. Persons spreading the nets and hunting together cry out and regularly

¹ Teng Tse here distinctly repudiates those dialectical tricks with which he himself is charged as a sophist, and states in plain words the aim and method of a true logic.

² Huang Ti is credited with having organised wild beasts into an army by which he routed his opponent Yen Ti (*Wang Chang*, Book II, Chapter 4).

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answer the calls, and their booty will be nearly equal. Feeling bodily pain one cannot but cry out, and, if a man is full of joy, his face will laugh ¹.

To give a weak person a thousand stone to carry, to direct a lame one to catch a running horse, to chase a swift-footed animal in a parlour, or to wish a monkey to show its quickness in a cage, all this is against reason. He who acts in such a way nevertheless, is like a man who puts his clothes on upside down, and then cannot find the collar.

To treat as intimate friends those whom their deeds place at a great distance from us, but as strangers those who are near us ; not to employ people, when they are there, but to ^{p.44} run after them, when they are away ² ; these four follies ³ are a source of much pain to a wise sovereign.

(9) In muddy water there are no fish swimming about, moving their tails, under an oppressive government there are no gay and jolly scholars. The commands being too numerous, the people have recourse to deceit, the administration interfering too much, the people begin to be unsettled. To have only the end in view, and not care for the root is like helping a man about to be drowned by throwing stones upon him, or like putting out fire by throwing in fire-wood.

(10) The doctrine when understood ⁴ cannot be apprehended ¹,

¹ People suffering (as in the case of the common sea-voyage) or enjoying themselves together (as when hunting) will give vent to the common feeling.

² This passage occurs in *Kuei Ku Tse*, III, 3, but the subsequent argumentation is quite different.

³ They are as devoid of sense as the instances given in the first part of this paragraph.

⁴ Mystically understood.

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cannot be practised. He who knows the great doctrine ², does not know it ³, and thus obtains it ; does not practise it, and thus completes it ⁴. He has nothing, but nothing fails him ; holding the empty ⁵, he finds out the full truth. Thus all things are done. Honesty is evolved ⁶ out of what is not honest, justice is born from what is not just ⁷.

Talking without restraint is called recklessness, and speaking without controlling one's words ignorance. From looking at their shapes, one learns to know bodies. Following ^{p.45} up their principles, one gives things their correct names. Finding out their reasons, one understands the feelings of others. Is there anything that could not be accomplished or, if spoiled, be made good again in this way ?

That which has objects, is purpose, that which has no externals, is virtue. What requires others, is action, what requires nobody, is the right way. Thus virtue is not active ⁸. Stopping in a place, where one must not stop, one is lost. Taking for the right way, what is not the right way, one is not on the right way, and falls into traps ⁹. Though one's purposes be not

¹ By the intellect.

² By intuition.

³ In the ordinary sense of the word.

⁴ Inaction and quietism are practical mysticism.

⁵ The terms : 'nothing' and 'empty' describe the nature of the mystic principle.

⁶ The text has 忠言, evidently a misprint for 忠由 or 忠生, as shown by the corresponding clause.

⁷ The mystical principle is the source of all virtues, though itself devoid of any moral quality, therefore neither honest nor just.

⁸ The virtue of the mystic is purely contemplative and emotional, not the ordinary practical virtue which requires objects to work upon.

⁹ I read 陷 instead of 譖 which is out of place here.

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good, one's aspirations not honest, one's deeds not correct ¹, one's words empty, yet one can do everything, provided one gets hold of the truth.

(11) To say that honour is not like disgrace is no correct statement, and to pretend that obtaining is not like losing no true saying. Not advancing one goes back ; not enjoying one's self, one is sad ; not being present, one is absent. This is what common people always think. The true sage changes ² all these ten predicates into one ³.

The great dialecticians distinguish between actions in general, and embrace all the things of the world. They choose ^{p.46} what is good, and reject what is bad. They do what must be done in the right moment, and thus become successful and virtuous. The small dialecticians are otherwise. They distinguish between words and establish heterogeneous principles. With their words they hit each other, and crush one another by their actions. They do not let people know what is of importance. There is no other reason for this than their own shallow knowledge. The ideal man ⁴, on the other hand, takes all the things together and joins them, combines all the different ways and uses them. The five

¹ Not good, not honest is not equivalent to bad or dishonest. A mystic has no purposes, no aspirations like ordinary people. The statement that his purposes are not good is a *pars pro toto*, his purposes are neither good nor bad, for he has none. His sole aim is to get hold of what he believes to be the truth. Having obtained that, he is perfect, and can do everything without the slightest effort, spontaneously.

² I take 危 to be an abbreviation for 愧 'to alter'.

³ The true sage does not care the least for honour and disgrace, obtaining or losing and all these contraries, which play such an important rôle in the world. To him they are all one and the same.

⁴ The bad dialecticians and controversialists multiply distinctions and differences, which exist but in their imagination, the great dialecticians distinguish only between some few general principles. The ideal man, *i.e.*, the mystic does not make any distinctions at all. He has no fixed purpose, but instinctively always hits the right and knows things, which others do not understand after long study.

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flavours, he discerns in his mouth, before he has tasted them. The five virtues, though residing in his body, are nevertheless extended to others. There is no certain direction which he follows. He rejects justice before the eyes. Measures to suppress disorder, he does not take. He is contented, having no desires ; serene, for he takes everything easy. His devices are unfailing, his perspicacity enters into the smallest minutiae.

(12) A ship floats on the water, a cart rolls on the earth. That is their natural movement. Those who do not govern know that they need not prepare for the future ¹.

(13) When a stone breaks the axle-top or the waves shatter a ship, one is not angry with the stones or the waves, but one blames the workman for his lack of skill ², and does not use p.47 his vehicle any more. Thus the knowing fall into errors, the prudent skirt danger, and those who have eyes are dazed. Therefore there is only one rule which does not change. Not relaxing in one's principles for Chin's or Chu's sake, not altering one's appearance for Hu or Yueh ³ ; bent on one aim, unwavering ⁴, walking straight on, never at random : if one practises that one day, the whole world will follow suit, and there will be the doing of the non-doing.

(14) Seeing with one's own eyes, one sees, borrowing other

¹ They follow the natural course of things, by which everything is settled of itself without the interference of any government or administration.

² The text 木擊折 輅水 戾破舟不怨木石而罪巧拙 must be corrupt giving no reasonable sense, I would read 石 擊折輅水 戾破舟不怨石水, etc.

³ Old Chinese states not quite as civilised as the others. The Hu (Mongols) and the Yüeh in Chekiang did not dress like the Chinese proper.

⁴ The identification of the individual with the mystical Unknown by meditation.

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people's, one is blind. Hearing with one's own ears, one hears, borrowing other people's one is deaf. A wise ruler knows that, and accordingly clearly distinguishes between what he has to do and what he has to avoid.

A prince must be like the sunshine on a winter-day, or the shade in summer ¹. Then all creatures will obey him unforced ². While he quietly lies down, his deeds are done of themselves, and while he amuses himself walking about, his government works spontaneously. The rolling of eyes, grasping of hands, and flourishing of whips and sticks are not its necessary premises ³.

(15) If persons around a prince do not stand by him, the reason is his knowing and not knowing. Those who though connected with are not addicted to him, are to all outward _{p.48} appearance his intimate friends, but inwardly they are strangers to him. His real friends, if far away, forget to respond to his call, and strangers, who are near him, forget that nothing connects them with him.

If people while near do not find employment, their plans are frustrated ⁴. If they are wanted after they have gone, they do not forget that they have gone ⁵. In case a prince does not condescend to those near, their hearts become estranged from him, and if he thinks of them when far away, he furthers their

¹ The sun gives its warmth spontaneously, not on purpose, and so does the shade its freshness.

² Feeling his benign influence.

³ There is not absolute inaction, but the ruler does not bustle about. He does not scheme or use artificial means, his only guide being the inspiration of the mystical principle.

⁴ *Kuei Ku Tse*, III, 3 has the same passage, but in a different context.

⁵ The latter half of this clause *Kuei Ku Tse loc. cit.*, reads as 事中來世 instead of 無遠行也.

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aims ¹. Therefore does an intelligent ruler take great care in choosing his men, and the scholar likewise in offering his services.

CAP. II

The turning of words

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(16) For a long time the world has been led astray by the words grief and despair, pleasure and joy, anger and wrath, sadness and melancholy. Now I propose to restrict despair, joy, anger and melancholy to self, and grief, pleasure, wrath and sadness to others ². Between supporting and leading, p.49 declining and blaming, reason and right, agreeing and self there is the greatest difference ³.

The art of speech consists in the following : With the intelligent speech must be based on vast learning, with the learned on dialectic, with dialecticians on equanimity ⁴, with the noble on power, with the wealthy on influence, with the poor on profit, with the brave on boldness, with the stupid on demonstration. That is the art of speech ⁵. One does not

¹ Not forgetting the slight they have received first, they take their revenge when the prince is in need of them.

² I fail to see how people can be led astray by these synonyms, and how the arbitrary limitations proposed by Têng Tse could be of any use.

³ The entire passage seems to be corrupt and devoid of sense.

⁴ With an able adversary one must never lose one's temper, always keeping clear-headed.

⁵ For a parallel cf. *Kuei Ku Tse* IX, 8.

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succeed, if one starts before having thought the matter over ; one reaps very little, if one begins the harvest too soon.

One must not say what is not proper, nor do what is not correct to avoid danger. Nor must one take away anything, if not allowed to do so for fear of punishment, nor dispute on things which are not debatable, lest the word escape. The swiftest horse does not bring back a wrong utterance nor overtake a rash word. Therefore he is called an ideal man who never utters bad words nor listens to wicked talk.

When officials are appointed, the unintelligent are unable to fill a post, the clever are not compliant, the benevolent not attached to one person, the bold do not make advances, those who trust others cannot be trusted. Not to be guided by men's human qualities when employing them is what I call divine ¹.

^{p.50} Anger originates from no anger, action from no action. Looking at what is not there, one obtains that which one sees, listening to what has no sound, one obtains that which one hears. Hence the immaterial is the root of the material, the soundless is the mother of sound.

The truth discovered through researches into names is the highest truth, and names given in accordance with truth are perfect names. By combining those two methods to an equal degree so that they complete one another one finds objects and their names.

(17) When the rivers are dried up, the valleys become empty, when the hills fall down, the streams are blocked with the *débris*.

¹ Choosing the right man instinctively is the proper thing.

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The sages being dead, the big robbers do not come to the front, and the land enjoys peace. If the sages do not die, the big robbers do not stop ¹. How do we know that it is so ? If one measures something with pecks and bushels, it is stolen together with the pecks and bushels. If one weighs it with balance and scales, the balance and scales are stolen too. If one relies on something owing to a token or a seal, it is stolen with the token and seal. What is instructed in benevolence and justice is stolen with benevolence and justice to-boot. How so ? Those who steal property, are put to death, those who steal kingdoms, become princes. Since in the palaces of such princes benevolence and justice are still to be found, have they not been stolen likewise ? That big robbers usurp princely rights is a great success, of which robber Chê could not boast. The sages are responsible for it ².

p.51 Likes and dislikes, goodness and wickedness, any attempts at reforming these four are useless. Courtesy and bad manners, politeness and arrogance, any offence in regard to these four can be made good. Those who are simple and honest and know how to endure pain and disappointments do not offend, and have not to make amends. That is everlasting virtue. With those who always talk about trust, but cannot be trusted in what they do, or who will discourse on goodness, but do nothing good, one must be on one's guard.

¹ The existence of sages calls forth robbers (of which princes and conquerors are the worst) just as dried up rivers make the valleys empty or crumbling hills block the streams.

² This paragraph with some unimportant variations towards the end is to be found in *Chuang Tse*, Cap. X [[Wieger](#)].

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(18) The first principle of government is not to allow private interests to prevail. The greatest success consists in restraining the people from quarrelling. In the government which we have now, there is action : individual interests are in conflict with the government, and the confusion is worse than as if there was no government. A ruler is set up, and there the strife begins. The stupid people fight with the ruler, and the confusion is worse than it would be without a ruler ¹. Therefore in a well principled state no actions, neither selfish nor altruistic are done. A ruler is elected, and the stupid people do not oppose him. They are one with their sovereign, things are decided according to law. That is the proper way for a state. A wise ruler at the head of his ministers finds out people's reputation by inquiring into their conduct. From their reputation he learns how they appear to others, and from their appearance how they really are. Afraid of severe punishments, his subjects dare not yield to their selfishness.

(19) The heart is fond of quietude, the intellect likes to roam far and wide ². When the heart is quiet, it obtains what it ^{p.52} wants, when the intellect roams far and wide, schemes and plans are laid. The heart dislikes agitation, and the intellect narrowness. The heart being agitated, one loses one's temper ; the intellect being narrow, its many projects fail ³.

In good times the manners are free and easy, in troublesome times they are very ceremonious and difficult to observe. In

¹ This was the state of affairs during the Spring and Autumn period, an incessant series of struggles of the different states and of the different factions in each state.

² Têng Tse remarks on a certain antagonism between thought and sentiment.

³ A parallel *Kuei Ku Tse* XIII, 12, but differently argued.

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remote antiquity the music was sound and not plaintive, now it is depraved and licentious. In remote antiquity the people were honest and simple, now they are deceitful and over-active. Once exemplary punishments ¹ were used, and nobody committed an offence ². As soon as an attempt is made to better by tattooing and cutting off people's noses they lose all sense of shame. Then there is more disorder than order.

Yao put up a drum for those who had to made complaints, Shun a wood for those who wanted to impeach some one. Tang had censors, Wu warnings engraved in metal. These four sovereigns were sages, and yet they took all these pains.

Li Lu killed Tung Li Tse, and Su Sha ³ murdered Chi Wên, Chieh executed Lung Fêng, and Chao ⁴ disembowelled Pi-Kan. These four princes were criminal rulers, therefore they hated sages like enemies. Hence there is as much distance between the wise and the stupid as between a valley several ^{p.53} thousand feet deep and a mountain several ten thousand high, or between the deepest Hades and the loftiest mountain peak.

(20) A wise ruler leads his people as a charioteer his coursers, without a bridle, and as a man walks over ice with a heavy burden on his shoulders ⁵. Those near him he treats like strangers, and strangers like near relatives. If he is prudent and

¹ On exemplary punishment 象刑 see Edkins, 'Siün King, the *Philosopher*' in J. R. As. Soc. Vol. XXXIII page 49. They consisted merely in a change of dress, the criminals having to dress in a certain way according to their offences.

² The usual praise of the good old time.

³ Legendary rulers. Li Lu is mentioned in *Chuang Tse*, Chapter 10, of Su Sha I found no trace.

⁴ The tyrants Chieh and Chao are well-known and used by the Chinese as typical representatives of wickedness.

⁵ *i.e.*, with the utmost care.

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thrifty, he is blessed with happiness, if extravagant and dissipated, misfortune arises.

A sage leads an easy life. In his own generation he seldom finds his peer. The nature of all things is repose (it needs no punishments with whips and sticks) — silence (there is no noise, no cries). Then the families are well supplied, and so are the individuals, and the whole world enjoys universal peace. One sees everything clearly and distinctly, and knows what is hidden ¹. One surmises what has not yet happened, and beholds what has not yet come to pass. That is what is called the invisible spirit and the invisible mystery.

(21) If a sovereign cannot keep his independence and likes to rely on his subordinates, his knowledge becomes more and more narrowed and his position more and more precarious. Pressed from below he has not his hands free, and conforming in all to the people, he cannot uphold his dignity. His knowledge is not sufficient for the administration, his power to mete out punishment, and there is no link between him and the people. If then a sovereign gives rewards, because he is pleased, one must not imagine that one has done something meritorious, and if he punishes, because he is angry, one must not consider it a condign penalty. Because sovereigns will not control their pleasure and anger, rewarding and punishing at will, and like to leave all the ^{p.54} responsibility to their officials, one kingdom after the other has been lost, and many a prince has been assassinated. The ancients had a saying that many mouths can

¹ By inspiration from the invisible spirit or mystery.

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melt metal ¹, and that three men are as dangerous as a tiger. That ought to be a warning.

(22) The nature of man is such that in discussions he desires to have the last word, and what he has begun he likes to put through. A wise man does not envy others for their excellence on account of his own shortcomings, nor is he jealous of other people's successes, because he himself failed ².

If a prince follows those who give good advice and rewards them, and exposes them who give bad advice and punishes them, thus cutting off the way of depravity and evil, and doing away with all licentious talk, his subjects will take the key, and his attendants hold their tongues, and he can be called an intelligent ruler. Those who do good, the prince rewards, those who do evil, he punishes. He treats the people according to the manner in which they show themselves, and requites them conformably to their accomplishments. He follows a sage, and therefore can make use of him. He does so in a reasonable way, and therefore can go on for a long time. The sovereigns of the present day have not the ability of Yao and Shun, but are anxious to have the same government. That plunges them in utter confusion and darkness, and things are not cleared up at p.55 all. In vain they strive for the semblance of a government, but are incapable of bringing order into the general confusion.

(23) Sorrows begin after one has obtained an appointment. A

¹ Quoted by *Kuei Ku Tse* IX, 8.

² *Kuei Ku Tse* has the following parallel which is much less reasonable : [...] 'A wise man does not put forward his own shortcomings but stupid people's accomplishments, not his own deficiencies, but the successes of those stupid people. Therefore he does not get into trouble.' (?)

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disease breaks out, when the patient has already recovered a little. Misfortune is the outcome of idleness. Filial conduct is lost through the wife. Of these four things one must take great care at the end as much as at the beginning.

The wealthy must help the poor, the young and strong the old. Those who are dominated by their propensities and yield to their desires, will become extravagant and brutal. Therefore I hold that there is no reason, why we should esteem people for their nobility, or think much of them for their talents, why we should look up to them, because they have money, or bow to them, because they are strong and bold. He who acts up to this, deserves the name of a perfect man.

(24) For those who have a proposition to make the greatest difficulty is to get a hearing, for those who want to do something, to carry it through. To carry through something the circumstances must be favourable, to get a hearing the hearer must be favourably predisposed. Therefore throwing a heap of fuel on a fire, one must first light it, and watering a level ground, one first soaks it. Touching a kindred note one always gets a response ¹. That is the only practical way ².

(25) If, after a prince has established his laws, those who abide by them are rewarded, and those who break through _{p.56} the restrictions are punished, such a prince is called a silly ruler and

¹ Wishing to perform something one must make the necessary preparations, as the circumstances may require. One seldom attains one's aim directly, one must prepare one's way, as when making a fire or watering a field.

² *Kuei Ku Tse* VIII, 7 gives this whole paragraph, but in a much more diffuse style. His lucubrations make the impression of a clumsy paraphrase of our passage, which he did not understand well.

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his state a lost state ¹.

(26) A wise man stands quietly between right and wrong, and good and evil are distinguished ². A prudent man keeps quiet between what is desirable and what is not, and going forward and backward are well defined. If a wise man cannot distinguish between right and wrong or a prudent one between what is desirable and what is not, they are frauds.

(27) The eye is prized for vision, the ear for hearing, the heart for justice. If we see with the world eye, there is nothing which we do not see. If we hear with the world ear, there is nothing which we do not hear. If we think with the world intellect, there is nothing which we do not understand ³. Possessing these three faculties one preserves them in inaction.

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¹ Only a mystic can say so. In many other aphorisms Têng Tse himself says the contrary.

² He does not use his reasoning power like other mortals, but distinguishes between good and evil intuitively.

³ The same passage with slight changes occurs in *Kuei Ku Tse* XII, 10.

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APPENDIX II

CHUANG-TSE

CAP. XXXIII ¹

The Empire = Tien-hsia

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p.57 Hui Shih was a man full of ideas. His writings would fill five carts. But his doctrines were contradictory, and what he said not to the point. Trying to explain the meaning of things he said :

- I ² The infinitely great, beyond which there is nothing, I call the great Unit. The infinitely small, within which there is nothing, I call the small Unit.
- II ³ That which has no dimensions cannot be heaped up, but it measures a thousand li.
- III ⁴ Heaven is as low as earth. A mountain is on a level with a lake.
- IV ⁵ The sun sets, when it is in the zenith. Creatures die, when

¹ [[Wieger](#)] [[Legge](#)] [[Giles](#)] [[Chinese text](#)]

² I. The Chinese commentators quite misunderstand this and the next fundamental proposition.

³ II. Balfour's translation : 'The whole Universe may be filled with matter, even though there be no foundation for anything to rest upon' is a great mistake. Giles omits the important part 'cannot be heaped up', which Legge renders by 'will not admit of being repeated'.

⁴ III. The statement is quite categorical, therefore Legge's repeated 'may be's' are superfluous.

⁵ IV. Balfour's 'that sunset is the same as the meridian', to which he adds 'in that one

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they are born.

V ¹ p.58 Great likeness is different from small likeness, both I call small likeness and small difference. If things are completely alike or completely different, I speak of great likeness or great difference.

VI ² Although there is no limit in the South, there is a limit.

VII ³ Going to Yueh to-day, one arrives there yesterday.

VIII Linked rings can be separated.

IX ⁴ I know that the centre of the world lies north of Yen and south of Yüeh.

X One must love all beings equally, for heaven and earth are one and the same.

Hui Shih believed that this sort of thing was looked upon by the world as a great performance, and would enlighten the dialecticians, and the dialecticians of the day were delighted with it. He said further :

XI ⁵ There are feathers in an egg.

is the result of the other', as well as Legge's 'the sun in the meridian may be the sun declining', are both wrong. Their renderings would be no sophisms, which we must have here. The same applies to Balfour's 'that animal life comes from death, and death from life', which besides is at variance with the Chinese text.

¹ V. This is a definition very similar to No I. Hui-Tse says that all relative similarities and differences, even those commonly called great, are small, absolute likeness and absolute difference he calls great. The text is ambiguous, hence every new translator gives a new version. Balfour and Giles are far from the mark, as are the Chinese commentators.

² VI. This is the first antinomy in Kant's 'Critic of Pure Reason'. Kant tries to show that the infinity of time and space can as well be proved as the reverse.

³ VII. There is nothing said about the *intention* to go which Balfour interpolates.

⁴ IX. Yen is in Chili, Yüeh in Fukien. There is a great distance between the two, which must be denied if the middle of the universe is to be near these two states.

⁵ XI. Not upon an egg (Balfour).

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- XII ¹ p.59 A fowl has three legs.
- XIII ² Ying is the world.
- XIV A dog can be regarded as a sheep.
- XV A horse lays eggs.
- XVI ³ A nail has a tail.
- XVII ⁴ Fire is not hot.
- XVIII⁵ Mountains speak.
- XIX ⁶ Cart wheels do not triturate the ground.
- XX The eye does not see.
- XXI ⁷ The finger does not touch, the touching never comes to an end.
- XXII ⁸ A tortoise is longer than a snake.

¹ XII. Cf. the sophistic reasons given by Kung Sun Lung, page 75 Sse Ma Piao's explanation, adapted by Giles, that the third leg is 'volition' is very poor.

² XIII. Ying is the capital of the kingdom of Chu, an insignificant place.

³ XVI. I translate 'nail' with Balfour and Giles, not 'tadpole' as Legge does, who has the authority of several Chinese commentators on his side. It appears to me that this paradox must be analogous to that given by Hsün-tse II, 7 'A hook has a barb'. The explanation given by some Chinese, that 'tail' refers to the shape of the Chinese characters : 丁子 is forced.

⁴ XVII. This proposition, quite familiar to the modern philosopher, is a stumbling-block to the Chinese commentators. Sse Ma Piao submits that heat is not the only quality of fire, another writer speaks of insects or reptiles, said to live in fire, in which case it cannot be hot, a third suggests that in wet and cold places one does not feel the heat.

⁵ XVIII. This does not refer to echoes, for that would be no sophism. Mountains speak like living beings.

⁶ XIX. Cf. Kung Sun Lung.

⁷ XXI. The idea is the same as of No. XX. viz. that an object, moving against another, never reaches it owing to the infinity of space. Legge's translation that 'the finger indicates, but need not touch' is meaningless. Balfour and Giles make the mistake of dividing the one sentence into two separate ones. Balfour moreover mistranslates : 'the finger does not point'.

⁸ XXII. The Chinese explanation, that a tortoise is longer than a snake, because longer lived, repeated by Giles, or because it surpasses the snakes in its knowledge of future events, is very unsatisfactory, 'Longer' without further addition does not signify 'longer lived' or 'cleverer' in Chinese any more than in English.

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XXIII ^{p.60} A square is not square, and a circle cannot be considered as round.

XXIV ¹ A handle does not fit in a chisel.

XXV ² The shadow of a flying bird has never yet moved.

XXVI There is a time, when a swiftly flying arrow is neither moving nor at rest.

XXVII ³ A dog is no hound.

XXVIII ⁴ A yellow horse and a black cow are three.

XXIX ⁵ A white dog is black.

XXX ⁶ An orphan colt has not had a mother.

XXXI ⁷ If every day you chop off half of a stick one foot long, you will not have finished with it after ten thousand generations.

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¹ XXIV Cf. Nos. XX and XXII, Giles reads : — 'A round hole will not surround a square handle', but the text says nothing about round or square. Besides a handle sticking in a hole is *never* surrounded by it, but by the object containing the hole.

² XXV. The shadow does not move, at every movement a new shadow is created. The different shadows following one another make the impression of one and the same shadow moving.

³ XXVII. This is the reverse of No XIV.

⁴ XXVIII. Cf. *Kung Sun Lung*, Cap. V.

⁵ XXIX. The explanation that a white dog is black, if his eyes are black, part standing for the whole (Sse Ma Piao and Giles) is as ridiculous as that of Lu Shu Chih saying that, if a dog is not black, but white, its whiteness may be regarded as its blackness.

⁶ XXX. This paradox may have a deeper metaphysical sense, or be based only on the sophism, that an orphan could not have a mother, because then it would not be an orphan. Present and passed time are wrongly identified.

⁷ XXXI. Balfour misinterpreted this remarkable apophthegm, saying, that after ten thousand generations nothing will be left. Just the contrary, there will be something left for ever.

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APPENDIX III

KUNG SUN LUNG TSE

CAP. I

Investigations = Chi-fu

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p.61 [Kung Sun Lung ¹ was a dialectician of the time of the Six Kingdoms ². Dissatisfied with the divergence and the confusion between words and their real objects, he used his peculiar talent to discuss the alleged inseparability of whiteness. Pointing out analogies in other objects, he argued on this theme of whiteness.]

(1) He said,

— A white horse is no true horse. That means, the word 'white' serves to designate a colour, and the word 'horse' to designate a shape. Colour is not shape, and shape not colour. Therefore in speaking of colour one must not adjoin shape, and in speaking of shape one must not add colour. Now, to make one object out of the combination of both is not correct.

¹ This first paragraph, giving a short sketch of our author, seems to be a later addition, and introductory remark, which has crept into the text. In Kung Sun Lung's own school, where his book undoubtedly originated, he would not have been called a dialectician of the time of the Six Kingdoms. This must be an addition of a later editor. I therefore put it in brackets.

² The Six Kingdoms are : Chi, Chu, Yen, Chao, Wei and Han, which had formed an alliance in the third century B.C.

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(2) If you look for a white horse in a stable, and there are none but black-coloured ones, they cannot satisfy your demand for a white horse. Since they cannot satisfy that ^{p.62} demand, the horse sought for is not at hand. Because it is not at hand, a white horse is indeed no horse.

An extension of this method of discrimination would set words and objects right, and thereby change the aspect of the whole world ¹.

Kung Sun Lung met with Kung Chuan ² in the house of the prince of P'ing-yuan in Chao ³. Kung Chuan said,

— I always heard that you were a very reasonable man, and for a long time already wished to become your pupil. Only I cannot accept your doctrine that a white horse is no true horse. Please discard this theory, and I will be very glad to become your pupil.

Kung Sun Lung replied,

— What you say there, Sir, is preposterous. The disputation on the white horse is just what makes my fame. Now, if you bid me to give it up, I would have nothing to teach. Besides, he who wishes to learn, is, as

¹ The world indeed would be changed, if all the words spoken corresponded to real objects, and there would be no more lies, no errors. But Kung Sun Lung is mistaken, if he supposes that his attempts at logical discriminations could bring about such a radical change.

² Grandson of Confucius in the 6th degree, grandfather of Kung Fu, the alleged author of the work passing under the name of Kung Tsung Tse. Cf. the Genealogy of Confucius.

³ The prince of P'ing-yuan was son to King Hsiao Chêng of Chao. He died in B.C. 250. The *Shi-chi* devotes to him a special chapter, Book 75.

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a rule, in knowledge and wisdom inferior to the teacher. Your request would be nothing else than that you teach me first, before you learn from me. To teach the same man first, from whom you are going to learn afterwards, is illogical.

- (3) Moreover, even Confucius accepts my view, that a white horse is no horse ¹. I have heard that the king of Chu drew his bow, and put on arrows to shoot snakes and rhinoceroses in the Yün-mêng Park. But he lost his bow. _{p.63} His attendants wished to search for it, but the king stopped them, saying,

— The king of Chu has lost the bow, and a man of Chu will get it, what need to search for it ?

When Confucius heard of this, he said,

— The king of Chu is good and kind, but not quite perfect.

And he went on saying,

— When a man gets rid of his bow, and another man finds it, it is all right. But why must it be a man of Chu ?

Confucius thus makes a difference between a man of Chu, and what is called a man ². Therefore, it is wrong

¹ The following story with almost the same words is inserted in Kung Tsung Tse's chapter on Kung Sun Lung.

² Kung Sun Lung would make us believe that Confucius agrees with him in saying that a man of Chu is no man, whereas his real meaning is, that a man is no man of Chu, *i.e.* that the category of man is not limited to the State of Chu, but embraces all mankind. Confucius objects to the 'Lokalpatriotismus' of the king of Chu, who would leave his bow to an inhabitant of Chu only, if the king's words must be understood in this way.

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to impugn my distinction between a white horse and what is called a horse. You, Sir, are versed in the teachings of the literati, but reject what is admitted by Confucius. You are desirous to learn, but would fain induce me to discard what I might teach. Under such conditions men a hundred times as clever as I would not be able to undertake the task.

Kung Chuan could say nothing against this.

(4) [Kung Sun Lung ¹ was the guest of the prince of P'ing-yuan in Chao. Kung Chuan was a descendant of Confucius. When both met, Kung Chuan said to Kung Sun Lung :

— While living on the borders of Lu, I heard of you. p.64 I greatly admired you for your wisdom, and was much pleased with your conduct. To receive your instructions has been my desire for a long time. Now, at last, I have the pleasure of meeting you. There is only one thing, which I cannot accept ², that is your theory of a white horse not being a true horse. I beseech you to drop this doctrine, and I am willing to become your disciple.

Kung Sun Ling rejoined,

¹ This passage, which I put in brackets, must be an interpolation, because it is nothing else than a paraphrase of the preceding paragraph. Since Kung Tsung Tse in his chapter on Kung Sun Lung has this same passage almost verbatim, I imagine that he took it from the text of our author, and that afterwards some reader added it again to Kung Sun Lung as a parallel passage. First a note, it was later on by inadvertence incorporated into the text.

The disputations of Kung Sun Lung and Kung Chuan at the court of the prince of P'ing-yuan are alluded to in *Lieh-Tse*, B. IV, 11 [[Wieger](#)], *Lü Shih Chun Chiu*, B. 18.

² Kung Tsung Tse spoils everything by writing [...] 'that a white horse is no white horse'. Such a thing Kung Sun Lung never said. Kung Tsung Tse completely misunderstood him. This makes it evident that the original passage belongs to Kung Sun Lung, not to Kung Tsung Tse.

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— What you say there, Sir, is preposterous. My system is based on the thesis, that a white horse is no true horse. If you deprive me of that, I have nothing to impart. To learn from me when I have nothing to teach, would be unreasonable. Moreover, only he could wish to learn from me, whose knowledge and wisdom is not equal to mine. Now, to demand that I should give up my view, that a white horse is no true horse, would be first to teach me and afterwards to learn from me. First to instruct me, and then to use me as a teacher would not be admissible. What you ask of me is like what the king of Chi said to Yin Wên ¹.

(5) The king of Chi ² spoke to Yin Wên as follows,

— I am very fond of accomplished men, how is it that in Chi there are none ?

p.65 Yin Wên replied,

— I should like to know what Your Majesty understands by an accomplished man.

The king of Chi could not say. Yin Wên went on,

— Let us suppose that here we have a man, who serves his sovereign loyally and his parents filially, who is faithful to his friends, and at peace with his fellow-

¹ Kung Tsung Tse, *loc. cit.*, tells the interview of the king of Chi with Yin Wên Tse, though in a somewhat abridged form, having most likely culled it from Kung Sun Lung.

² Yin Wên lived under king Hsüan of Chi, B.C. 342-324. Dr. Faber fixes his reign at B.C. 454-404 (*Doctrines of Confucius*). His statements *loc. cit.* that Yin Wên Tse was a disciple of Kung Sun Lung, and that the latter was a pupil of Confucius, are both wrong.

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citizens. Endowed with those four qualities, can he be styled an accomplished man ?

The king of Chi rejoined,

— Exactly, that is just what I call an accomplished man.

Yin Wên said,

— If you had such a man, would you employ him in an official capacity ?

The king replied,

— I would be only too glad, but I cannot find such a man.

All that time the king of Chi set high store upon courage. Therefore Yin Wên asked him saying,

— Supposing such a man was insulted in open court amidst a crowd of people, but did not dare to fight, would you use him as an official ?

(6) — If a great lord, quoth the king, does not avenge an insult with his sword, he is dishonoured. A dishonoured man I would not like to have in my employ.

Yin Wên remarked,

— However, he who, when insulted, does not draw his sword, does not lose thereby the four above-mentioned qualities. Not having lost these, he is still a gentleman. But Your Majesty would first take him into your service, and afterwards not. Is then a gentleman, as described before, no gentleman ?

The king could not answer. Yin Wên said,

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— Now, there is a prince, who wishes to govern his State. If anyone is guilty, he condemns him, and if he is not, he condemns him nevertheless. If a man has distinguished himself, he rewards him, and if he has no special deserts, he rewards him also. Yet he complains of his people not being well behaved. Can he rightly do that ?

p.66 The king of Chi answered in the negative. Yin Wên observed,

— It appears to me that your officials in governing Chi used this method.

The king said,

— I believe that my administration is as you say. Therefore, although my people are not well regulated, I dare not complain. Is it that my mind has not thought deeply enough ?

Yin Wên said,

— If you admit it, why should I not be outspoken ? Your commands state, that whoever kills a man, must die, and who injures him, has to suffer bodily punishment. People in awe of your commands, do not venture to fight when insulted, thus upholding the royal commands. But the king himself says that, whoever does not resent an affront with his sword, is dishonoured, which word means a censure. You disgrace him, although he is not to be blamed, and accordingly would strike his name from the official lists.

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Not to use him any more as an official is a punishment. Thus somebody not guilty is punished by Your Majesty. And in case you disgrace a man, who dares not fight, you must honour him, who does. The distinctions conferred upon him are marks of approval. Approving of him, you will give him an official post, which means a reward. You reward the undeserving. Those rewarded by you are the same whom your officials put to death. What the sovereign approves of, is condemned by the law ¹. Thus rewards and punishments, approval and condemnation, are confounded one with the other. Under these circumstances, even a man ten times as able as Huang Ti ² could not keep order.

p.67 The king of Chi did not know what to answer.

I regard your words as like those of the king of Chi. You object to the white horse being no horse, but cannot give satisfactory reasons for doing so, therein acting in a way similar to the king of Chi, who could express his partiality for accomplished men, but was unable to distinguish between gentlemen and no gentlemen.

¹ Yin Wên Tse's criticism can even nowadays still be applied to those countries where duelling is forbidden by law and punished, but where at the same time officers, who do not avenge an insult sword in hand, are dismissed from the service.

² The mythical emperor.

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CAP. II

On the white horse = Pai-ma

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Question. — Is it possible that a white horse is no horse ?

Answer. — Yes ¹.

Question. — How ?

Answer. — A horse denotes a shape, white a colour. Describing a colour, one does not describe a shape, therefore I say that a white horse is no horse ².

Question. — There being a white horse, one cannot say that there is no horse. If one cannot say that there is no horse, can the existence of the horse be denied ? There being a white horse, one must admit that there is a horse, how can whiteness bring about the non-existence of a horse ?

p.68 Answer. — When a horse is required, yellow and black ones can all be brought, but when a white horse is wanted, there is no room for yellow and black ones. Now, let a white horse be a horse ³. It is but one kind of those required. Then one of those required, a white horse, would not be different from a horse. Those

¹ The respondent is Kung Sun Lung ; the questioner is the champion of common sense.

² A horse is a shape only, a white horse a colour and a shape. A shape cannot be identical with a shape and a colour.

³ A horse in general.

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required do not differ. Would then yellow and black ones meet the requirement or not? In so far as they would meet the requirement or not, they evidently exclude each other. Yellow as well as black horses are each one kind, they correspond to a call for a horse, but not to a call for a white horse. Hence it results that a white horse cannot be a horse.

Question. — A horse having colour is considered no horse. But there are no colourless horses on earth! Are there therefore no horses on earth.

Answer. — Horses of course have colour, therefore there are white horses. If horses had no colour, there would be merely horses. But how can we single out white horses, for whiteness is no horse?

A white horse is a horse and whiteness. Such being the case ¹ I hold that a white horse is no horse ².

Question. — A horse not yet connected with whiteness, is a horse, and whiteness not yet connected with ^{p.69} a horse, is whiteness. When horse and whiteness are combined, one speaks of a white horse, which means that they are united. If they were not, one could not

¹ The text reads : 白馬者馬與白也馬與白馬也故曰白馬非馬也. I presume that in the second clause the second character 馬 must have been interpolated. Kung Sun Lung after having maintained that colour is not shape, cannot suddenly say that a white horse is a horse and whiteness, *i.e.* a horse and a white horse. Either the whole second clause 馬與白馬也 is a later addition, or the 馬 before 也 is interpolated. In that case the second clause is only a repetition of the first, a mode of speech not infrequent in deductions, which I try to express in my translation.

² See p. 67 note 2.

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give them such a name. Ergo it is not right to say that a white horse is no horse.

Counter-question (Kung Sun Lung). — If we regard a white horse as being a horse, can it be said that a white horse is a yellow horse ¹ ?

Answer. — No.

Answer (Kung Sun Lung). — The idea of a horse ² being different from that of a yellow horse, there must be a difference between a yellow horse and a horse. A yellow horse being different from a horse, a yellow horse cannot be a horse. If a yellow horse is no horse, to hold that a white horse is a horse, would be like flying in a lake or placing the inner and the outer coffins in different places ³. This would be very illogical reasoning and random talk.

Question. — If there is a white horse, one cannot say that there is no horse, *viz.* without white colour. In case the idea of a white horse is eliminated, then indeed one cannot speak of a horse. Should, therefore, only a horse correspond to the idea of a horse, and should a white horse not be accounted a horse, then, when we believe, that there is a horse, we could not say that this horse is a horse.

¹ If a white horse were a horse, it ought to be a yellow horse too, for a yellow horse is also considered a horse. This is at the root of Kung Sun Lung's question.

² Which Kung Sun Lung in his counter-question has assumed, *e.g.* to be equivalent to that of a white horse.

³ Two very unreasonable things.

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Answer. — If with white things whiteness is not emphasized but forgotten, all is right. If in reference ^{p.70} to a white horse one speaks of whiteness, and emphasizes it, it is no whiteness ¹.

The idea of a horse neither excludes nor includes any colour. Therefore, yellow and black ones are all welcome. The idea of a white horse excludes and includes colour ². Yellow and black ones are all excluded owing to their colour. White horses alone correspond. If there is nothing that excludes, none are excluded. Ergo a white horse is no horse ³.

CAP. III

On definitions = Chih wu

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Thesis ⁴. — There are no things which are not defined, but those definitions are no definitions ⁵.

¹ I presume that the somewhat eccentric idea of our author is, that there are white things and white horses, but that their whiteness must not be touched upon, for as soon as one speaks of the whiteness of a horse, the subject of the remark is no longer horse and there being no horse, whiteness perishes also.

² It includes whiteness and excludes all the other colours.

³ Because it would exclude all the other different coloured horses. The idea of a horse must include every variety of horses, and therefore cannot have any specified colour as whiteness.

⁴ Kung Sun Lung's view is given in the 'thesis', his opponent's in the 'antithesis'. It is not very easy to correctly separate thesis and antithesis in the text, as the characteristic word 曰 'he replied' is wanting.

⁵ Men define all things by specifying their attributes, such as whiteness and hardness (colour and cohesion), but these definitions are no definitions, *i.e.* they are not correct definitions, because all the attributes of things are in reality not such as they appear to us. Hardness and whiteness for instance are not hardness and whiteness in the sense in which an unsophisticated mind regards them. They exist only, while we

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p.71 *Antithesis*. — So far as there are no definitions on earth, things cannot be called things ¹. If what is on earth, is not defined, can things be said to be defined ? ²

Thesis. — Definitions there are none on earth ³, things there are on earth. It is impossible to maintain that, what exists on earth ⁴, is the same with what does not exist ⁵.

Antithesis. — If there are no definitions on earth, things cannot be said to be defined. If they cannot be said to be defined, they are not defined ⁶.

Thesis. — Things though not defined are nevertheless not undefined. There are no definitions on earth ⁷, and things cannot be said to be defined, but that does not mean that they are not defined ⁸. It does not mean that they are not defined, for there are none but defined things. There being none but defined things, definitions are not definitions ⁹.

perceive them, otherwise they hide or vanish *i.e.* do not exist, as shown in Cap. 5.

¹ The opponent takes the common view that things which are not definable, are not real things, all real things being definable.

² This contradiction the opponent will not admit.

³ True and correct definitions.

⁴ Things.

⁵ Definitions.

⁶ The opponent takes the word definition always in one sense, not in two : 'definition' and 'correct definition' as Kung Sun Lung does.

⁷ Defined though not correctly, since all soi-disant definitions are wrong.

⁸ The common definitions are not real definitions.

⁹ As Kung Sun Lung apparently does, for his antagonist is not aware of his taking the word definition in two quite opposed meanings, the one negating the other.

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Antithesis. — There being no definitions on earth, all that is produced from things, though having its proper name, is not to be considered as defined. To call things defined, which are not considered defined, would lead to the co-existence of definiteness ^{p.72} and indefiniteness. It is impossible to assert that, what is thought not to be defined, is not undefined. Definitions, moreover ¹, are connected with the world.

Thesis. — Because there are no definitions on earth, one must not pretend that things are not defined. Since they cannot be said to be not defined, there are none not defined. There being none undefined, all things are defined.

A definition ² is not no definition, but a definition referred to an object is no definition.

Antithesis. — Supposing there are no definitions of objects in the world, who would boldly say that there are no definitions? And if there are no objects, who could boldly say that there are definitions? ³

Thesis. — There are definitions in this world, but no definitions of objects ⁴. Who would flatly assert that they are not definitions, contending that without objects there are no definitions? ⁵ Besides, definitions are of

¹ See p. 71, note 1.

² A definition *in se*, in the abstract.

³ Objects are the necessary substrata for definitions.

⁴ The so-called definitions do not define their objects.

⁵ Definitions cannot derive their truth from objects.

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themselves not definitions, they do not become definitions, when they have been referred to an object.

CAP. IV

On accommodation = Tung-pien

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(1) *Question.* — Does two contain one ?

*Answer*¹. — Two does not contain one².

Question. — Does two contain right ?

Answer. — Two has no right.

Question. — Does two contain left ?

Answer. — Two has no left.

Question. — Can right be called two ?

Answer. — No.

Question. — Can left be called two ?

Answer. — No.

Question. — Can right and left together be called two ?³

Answer. — Yes.

Question. — Is it allowed to say that a change is not no change ?

Answer. — Yes.

¹ Kung Sun Lung is the respondent.

² One is contained in two practically, but it does not form a constituent part of the general notion of two. This is more evident in the proposition that two has no right ; it may have, but it is not necessary, *e.g.* in saying two days or two kings, there is not a right and a left day, or a right and a left king.

³ Right and left together are two, but two is not always right and left, as we have seen. Subject and predicate cannot be simply transposed. Every horse in an animal, but every animal is not a horse.

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Question. — Can one speak of a change, if one part is right ?

Answer. — Certainly.

Question. — If you interchange one part of a pair [which part is affected thereby ?] ¹

p.74 *Answer.* — The right.

Question. — When the right has been changed, how can you still call it right ? And, if it has not been changed, how can you speak of a change ? ²

Answer. — If two [as you say] has no right nor left, how is it, that right and left are two ? ³

(2) [*Thesis* ⁴. — A ram and an ox joined are not a horse. An ox and a ram are not a fowl.

[*Question.* — How so ?

[*Answer.* — A ram is only different from an ox. A ram has upper front-teeth, an ox not. Yet this alone does not entitle us to say, that an ox is not a ram, and a ram not an ox. They might not both have those particular teeth, and still belong to the same species. A ram has horns, and an ox has horns. Yet one cannot say,

¹ There seems to be a lacuna in the text, which I have tried to fill in the translation. Perhaps still more words have been left out.

² When the right and left of a pair are interchanged, they change their names, right becomes left, and left right. I do not see anything particular in that.

³ If two is composed of right and left, it has, of course, right and left. But there are many twos not so formed, therefore Kung Sun Lung argues that two in the abstract contains neither right nor left.

⁴ The end of this chapter I consider as spurious. The reasoning is so inept that the whole appears to me as a very clumsy forgery. There is not a particle of Kung Sun Lung's dialectical acumen in it. The interpolator must have thought that every queer and paradoxical statement is considered very profound by the public, even if devoid of sense. The two parts forming the bulk of this chapter, differ in form from the others. The dialogue is a sham, for the opponent, who might easily expose the imbecility of his adversary's argument, says nothing.

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therefore, that an ox is a ram, or a ram an ox. They might both have horns, and yet belong to quite different classes. Rams and oxen have both horns, horses not, whereas horses have long tails, of which rams and oxen are destitute. Therefore, I say that a ram and an ox joined are not a horse. That ^{p.75} means that there is no horse. Consequently, a ram is not two, and an ox is not two, but a ram and an ox are two, that shows that a ram and an ox are not a horse ¹. If they were considered to be, then such statement would be made with regard to two animals belonging to two quite different classes like right and left.

[A ram has wool, and a fowl has feathers. One can certainly say that a fowl has one leg. Its legs are two. Two and one make three. One may also contend, that an ox and a ram have each one leg. Their legs number four. Four and one make five. Thus oxen and fowls have five feet each, and fowls three ². Therefore I hold that an ox and a ram do not make up a fowl. Because there is no fowl, they are no fowl ³. Between a horse and a fowl it is better to decide in favour of the well-gifted horse ⁴. It is evident that the non-gifted animal cannot belong to the same category. To place it there would cause a confusion of words and be a senseless undertaking.

¹ Much ado about nothing. We do not want a proof that an ox and a ram are not a horse, and certainly not such a stupid one.

² The technical terms for this sort of sophism is *fallacia sensus compositi et devisi*.

³ Utter nonsense.

⁴ Why ? There is no question of superiority.

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(3) [*Question.* — Take some other objects to discuss.

[*Thesis.* — Green with white is not yellow ¹, white with green not jade-colour ².

[*Question.* — How so ?

[*Answer.* — Green and white do not mix together ³. When mixed they keep aloof from one another. They ^{p.76} do not approach each other. When brought together, neither loses its position. Not losing its respective position each stands apart, keeping its own place. Right and left are not blended. Thus they do not become one in green, nor one in white. How then should they become yellow ? ⁴

[Yellow is the right colour ⁵. It is the right thing. It means that in a state there are a prince and his ministers ⁶, and that therefore there will be power and longevity.

[Furthermore, if green is blended with white, white does not overpower it, which it would, if it could. Since it does not triumph, wood injures metal ⁷. Wood injuring metal, jade-colour is produced, which is not the proper thing.

¹ Of course not.

² Yes, it is.

³ They do mix.

⁴ Rubbish.

⁵ It is the colour of earth and therefore much appreciated.

⁶ The commentary says that a state (land) corresponds with yellow, a prince with white and the ministers with green. If they all keep in their proper spheres (colour), things are quite right.

⁷ Wood corresponds with green, metal with white. There is a fixed system of permutations, according to which the five elements with their attributes are thought to overcome each other.

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[Green and white do not mix. When mixed, they do not overcome one another, and consequently are both in evidence. If they fight for being seen, the colour becomes like jade.

[Better than jade-colour is yellow. The horse is yellow. Could it be classed together with jade-colour? The fowl has jade-colour. Could the fowl be said to be opposed to jade colour?

[When there is tyranny, prince and minister quarrel, and both wish to shine. Both wishing to shine, there is darkness. When there is no light, the ^{p.77} government is not properly conducted. In default of proper conduct, words and their objects do not correspond, and a mixed colour prevails. Therefore, I say that both shine. When both shine, and the way is lost, it is hardly possible to find it again.]

CAP. V

(1) On the hard and white = Chien pai

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Question. — Are hard, white and stone three?

Answer ¹. — No.

Question. — Are they two?

Answer. — Yes.

Question. — How?

¹ Kung Sun Lung is the respondent.

The Chinese Sophists

Answer. — There being no hardness, one finds whiteness, which process gives two, and there being no whiteness, one finds hardness, which gives two likewise ¹.

Question. — Upon finding whiteness one cannot say that there is no whiteness, and on finding hardness one cannot say that there is no hardness. A _{p.78} stone being thus conditioned, are there not three things ? ²

Answer. — When seeing, one does not perceive hardness ; perceiving whiteness, one finds no hardness. When touching, one does not perceive whiteness, but hardness. In perceiving hardness one does not find whiteness ³.

(2) *Question.* — If there were no whiteness on earth, one could not see a stone, and if there were no hardness on earth, one could not speak of a stone. The hard, the white and the stone do not exclude one another, how could the third ⁴ be hidden ?

Answer. — It hides itself, not influenced by any alien agent ⁵.

¹ In his next answer our philosopher explains that by 'there being no hardness', 'there being no whiteness' he denotes the state, when the mind has no perception of hardness or whiteness. At a given moment it has only the sensation of the existence of the stone and of one of its attributes of hardness, when it has recourse to touch, or of whiteness, when it has recourse to sight. So we are at that moment only aware of two, not three things.

² The questioner is of opinion that hardness and whiteness have both objective existence, and that they are not creations of our mind.

³ They are sensations produced by different senses.

⁴ The third entity, either whiteness or hardness.

⁵ There is nobody who takes it away. It is the nature of those entities to disappear, to enter into non-existence, when not perceived by sight or touch.

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Question. — Whiteness and hardness are indispensable constituents of a stone pervading each other. How do they hide themselves spontaneously ?

Answer. — One perceives whiteness, and one perceives hardness, but seeing and not seeing ¹ separate ². The not seeing separates. The two do not pervade each other there being separation. That which separates, hides ³.

p.79 *Question.* — The whiteness of a stone and the hardness of a stone, seeing and not seeing are two things, and together with a stone three things. They permeate one another like width and length. And how should they not be in evidence ?

Answer. — When a thing is white, its whiteness is something indefinable, and when it is hard, its hardness is indefinable ⁴. If something unknown and indefinable is added, it cannot be inherent in the stone.

Question. — If round about the stone there is not that quality of hardness, there is no stone, and without a stone, one cannot speak of its whiteness. Those qualities which cannot be separated from the stone must have real existence, and cannot perish.

¹ No seeing is touch.

² Sight and touch are something radically different.

³ That sensation, which is not at work, separates, from that, which is just felt by the sentient being. Separation means that it is not perceptible, but absent for the time being.

⁴ This recalls chapter III.

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Answer. — A stone is one, hard and white are two, but as far as they are in the stone, they are either tangible or intangible, visible or invisible. The intangible ¹ separates from the tangible, the invisible ² hides from the visible. Who will say, that hiding is not the same as separation ?

(3) *Question.* — Because the eye cannot behold hardness nor the hand grasp whiteness, one cannot urge that there is no hardness or whiteness. Their organs of perception are not the same, and cannot be interchanged. Hard and white have different spheres in the stone, how shall they separate ?

Answer. — Hardness is hardness, not through its connexion with the stone or with any other thing. That which does not own its hardness to any combination with something else, must be hard of itself. It does not harden stones, etc. but is hard. p.80 Whenever such hardness cannot be found on earth, it is hidden ³.

If whiteness is really not white of itself, how could it whiten stones, etc. ? If whiteness is necessarily white, it is so without causing things to be white. With yellow and black colour it is the same. As long as a stone is not provided with whiteness ⁴, one cannot speak of a hard

¹ Or visible.

² Or tangible.

³ Hardness and whiteness are not inherent in the object, but have separate existences. Yet their independent self-existence are intermittent, they vanish, when not perceived.

⁴ *i.e.* as long as it is not looked at.

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and white stone. Hence whiteness ceases. Cessation means that it usually adheres to the objects. It is much better to follow this natural course than to connect these qualities with their objects by force in order to find out their nature.

Furthermore, when whiteness is beheld by the eye, it is seen by means of light. When it cannot be seen by light, both light and eye do not give a vision. Then the mind might still see it. But when the mind does not see it either, vision ceases ¹.

Hardness is perceived with the hand, which knocks against something. Thus knowledge is derived through the hand and knocking. In default of such knowledge the mind does not know either. In such a case one speaks of absence of the mind. When the mind is absent, the world is left alone, and all is right ².

CAP. VI ³

Words and reality ⁴ = Ming-shih

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p.81 Heaven and earth together with their productions are things. If they are treated as things, and nothing more, there is reality. If what is real is treated as real without any wild

¹ And the colour disappears.

² The real objective world.

³ [[chinese text](#)]

⁴ There is not much in this chapter. Nearly all the propositions are tautologies.

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speculation, there is order. By getting out of order you fall into disorder. By observing order one obtains correctness.

By calling right, what is not right, you cast suspicion on what is right. If you call right what is real, in doing so you give it a correct name.

When the name is correct, it responds to this and that. If you call it by this name, but this thing does not respond, then this denomination is a mistaken one. If you call it by that name, but that thing does not respond, then that denomination is a mistaken one. If you represent what disagrees as what agrees, you will have disagreement and confusion.

If that is called that, and agrees with that, it responds to that, and name and object are that. If this is called this, and agrees with this, it responds to this, and name and object are this. Thus we make that agree which agrees. Making that agree which agrees, is correct.

Calling that that, we confine ourselves to that, and calling this this, we confine ourselves to this, which is right. Making this that, one has that and ^{p.82} this, and making that this, one has this and that, which is wrong.

A word ought to correspond to its object. Knowing that this is not this, one knows that this is not in this, and therefore ¹ does not call it so. Knowing that that is not that, one knows that that is not in that, and consequently one does not give it that name. That is the highest aim ! The sage emperors of old would

¹ The character [] must be altered into [..]. The parallelism with the following clause necessitates these corrections.

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thoroughly examine words, and their real objects, and be careful in what they said. Excellent, indeed, those sage old emperors !

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APPENDICE IV

LIEH TSE, Book IV, 11 ¹

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« p.83 Yo Chên Tse Yü ² said [to Prince Mao of Chung-shan ³] :

— How should a pupil of Kung Sun Lung not gloss over his short-comings ? But I will tell you some more fallacies of his. He mystified the king of Wei saying that :

- I ⁴ Thoughts are not from the heart.
- II ⁵ Definitions do not hit the point.
- III ⁶ Things can never be reduced to naught.
- IV ⁷ A shadow does not move.
- V A hair will lift 300 piculs.
- VI ⁸ A white horse is no horse.
- VII ⁹ An orphan colt has not had a mother.

¹ [Wieger] [[chinese text](#)].

² A disciple of Mencius.

³ A son of the Marquis Wên of Wei (425-387 B.C.) Chung-shan was the name of his principality. He is quoted as the author of a small work in four chapters in the Han Catalogue.

⁴ I. *i.e.* from the material heart. They are the work of the immaterial mind. Cf. *Kung Sun Lung* Cap. V., p. 77, where it is said that the eye does not see, but the mind.

⁵ II. As show in Cap. III.

⁶ III. See Hui Tse's paradox, No. XXXI.

⁷ IV. Hui Tse, No. XXV.

⁸ VI. Cf. Cap. I. and II.

⁹ VII. Hui Tse No. XXX.

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Words fail me to describe how he mixes up all categories, and turns all relations upside down.

Prince Mao rejoined,

— You do not understand his excellent words, and think them wrong, but you are in the wrong yourself ¹.

^{p.84} Without thoughts hearts are all equal ². Without defining one always hits the mark ³. That things are reduced to naught, is what always happens ⁴. That the shadow does not move, means that it changes. A hair will lift 300 piculs, if they are exactly balanced ⁵. A white horse is no horse, because shape and attribute are at variance.

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¹ The first three explanations given by the Prince are very unsatisfactory.

² What does that prove ?

³ That is a Taoistic way of putting things, but not in accordance with either Kung Sun Lung's or Hui Tse's views.

⁴ Kung Sun Lung and Hui Tse just maintain the contrary.

⁵ Exactly balanced, 300 piculs on either side of a balance, when the smallest plus placed on one side will make it go down.

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Appendix V ¹

HSÜN TSE. Cap. II, 1

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- I ² Mountains and pools are equally high, heaven and earth are level.
- II ³ Chi and Chin are conterminous.
- III ⁴ That which enters by the ear issues from the mouth.
- IV A hook has a barb.
- V ⁵ There are feathers in an egg.

Utterances like this are difficult to uphold, nevertheless Hui Shih and Têng Hsi were bold enough to undertake their defence.

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¹ [[chinese text](#)]

² I. Cf. page 57, No. III.

³ II. The Chi State was in Shantung, Chin in the province of Shensi, both wide apart.

⁴ III. This dictum is very puzzling. Does it mean that every sound heard penetrates into the ear, and from there goes out again by the mouth? Or does it convey the idea that every answer, given by word of mouth, has been evoked by what we have heard? The Chinese scholiasts refer to echoes, but no mention is made of mountains.

⁵ V. See page 58, No. XI.

周 鄧析撰

無厚篇

(1) 天於人無厚也君於民無厚也父於子無厚也兄於弟無厚也何以言之天不能屏勃厲之氣全天折之人使爲善之民必壽此於民無厚也凡民有穿窬爲盜者有詐僞相迷者此皆生於不足起於貧窮而君必執法誅之此於民無厚也堯舜位爲天子而丹朱商均爲布衣此於子無厚也周公誅管蔡此於弟無厚也推此言之何厚之有

(2) 循名責實君之事也奉法宣令臣之職也下不得自擅上操其柄而不理者未之有也君有三累臣有四責何謂三累惟親所信一累以名取士二累近故親疏三累何謂四責受重賞而無功一責居大位而不治二責理官而不平三責御軍陣而奔北四責君無三累臣無四責可以安國

(3) 勢者君之輿威者君之策臣者君之馬民者君之輪勢固則輿安威定則策勁臣順則馬良民和則輪利爲國失此必有覆車奔馬折輪敗載之患安得不危異同之不可別是非之不可定白黑之不可分清濁之不可理久矣誠聽能聞於無聲視能見於無形計能規於未兆慮能防於未然斯無他也不以耳聽則通於無聲矣不以目視則昭於無形矣不以心計則達於無兆矣不以智慮則合於未然矣君者藏形匿形羣下無私掩目塞耳萬民恐震

TENG TSE

(4) 循名責實察法立威是明王也夫明於形者分不遇於事察於動者用不失則利故明君審一萬物自定名不可以外務智不可以從他求諸己之謂也

(5) 治世位不可越職不可亂百官有司各務其刑上循名以督實下奉教而不違所美觀其所終所惡計其所窮喜不以賞怒不以罰可謂治世

(6) 夫負重者患塗遠據貴者憂民離負重塗遠者身疲而無功在上離民者雖勞而不治故智者量塗而後負明君視民而出政獵罷虎者不於外國釣鯨鯢者不於清池何則園非羆虎之窟也池非鯨鯢之泉也楚之不沂流陳之不束麾長盧之士呂子之蒙恥

(7) 夫游而不見敬不恭也居而不見愛不仁也言而不見用不信也求而不能得無始也謀而不見喜無理也計而不見從遺道也因勢而發譽則行等而名殊人齊而得時則力敵而功倍其所以然者乘勢之在外推辯說所非聽也虛言向非所應也無益亂非舉也故談者別殊類使不相害序異端使不相亂諭志通意非務相乖也若飾詞以相亂匿詞以相移非古之辯也慮不先定不可以應卒兵不閑習不可以當敵廟算千里帷幄之奇百戰百勝黃帝之師

(8) 死生自命貧富自時怨天折者不知命也怨貧賤者不知時也故臨難不懼知天命也貧窮無懾達時序也凶饑之歲父死於室子死於戶而不相怨者無所顧也同舟渡海中流遇風救患若一所憂同也張羅而啖唱和不差者其利等也故體痛者口不能不呼心悅者顏不能不笑責疲者以舉千鈞責兀者以及走兔驅逸足於庭求獲捷於檻斯逆理而求之猶倒裳而索領事有遠而親近而疎就而不用去而反求風此四行明主大憂也

TENG TSE

(9) 夫水濁則無掉尾之魚政苛則無逸樂之士故令煩則民詐政擾則民不定不治其本而務其末譬如拯溺鍾之以石救火投之以薪

(10) 夫達道者無知之道也無能之道也是知大道不知而中不能而成無有而足守虛責實而萬事畢忠由於不忠義生於不義音而不收謂之放言出而不督謂之闢故見其象致其形循其理正其名得其端知其情若此何往不復何事不成有物者意也無外者德也有人者行也無人者道也故德非所履處非所處則失道非其道不道則誣意無賢慮無忠行無道言虛如受實萬事畢

(11) 夫言榮不若辱非誠辭也得不得不若失非實談也不進則退不喜則憂不得則亡此世人之常真人危斯十者而爲一矣所謂大辯者別天下之行具天下之物選善退惡時措其宜而功立德至矣小辯則不然別言異道以言相射以行相伐使民不知其要無他故焉故淺知也君子并物而錯之兼塗而用之五味未嘗而辨於口五行在身而布於人故何方之道不從面從之義不行治亂之法不用惓然寬裕蕩然簡易略而無失精詳入纖微也

(12) 夫舟浮於水車轉於陸此自然道也有不治者知不豫焉

(13) 夫木擊折轄水戾破舟不怨木石而罪巧拙故不載焉故有知則惑有心則嶮有目則眩是以規矩一而不易不爲秦楚緩節不爲胡越改容一而不邪方行而不流一日形之萬世傳之無爲爲之也

(14) 夫自見之明借人見之闇也自聞之聰借人聞之聾也明君知此則去就之分定矣爲君當若冬日之陽夏日之陰萬物自歸莫之使也恬臥而功自成優游而政自治豈在振目搔腕手據鞭朴而後爲治歟

TENG TSE

(15) 夫合事有不合者知與未知也合而不結者陽親而陰疎故遠而親者忘相應也近而疎者忘不合也就而不用者策不得也去而反求者無違行也近而不御者心相乖也遠而相思者合其謀也故明君擇人不可不審士之進趣亦不可不詳

轉辭篇

(16) 世間悲哀喜樂嗔怒憂愁久惑於此今轉之在己爲哀在他爲悲在己爲樂在他爲喜在己爲嗔在他爲怒在己爲愁在他爲憂在己若扶之與攜謝之與議故之與右諾之與己相去千里也夫言之術與智者言依於博與博者言依於辯與辯者言依於安與貴者言依於勢與富者言依於豪與貧者言依於利與勇者言依於敢與愚者言依於說此言之術也不用在早圖不窮在早稼非所宜言勿言非所宜爲勿爲以避其危非所宜取勿取以避其咎非所宜爭勿爭以避其聲一聲而非駟馬勿追一言而急駟馬不及故惡言不出口苟語不留耳此謂君子也夫任臣之法闇則不任也慧則不從也仁則不親也勇則不近也信則不信也不以人用人故謂之神怒出於不怒爲出於不爲視於無有則得其所見聽於無聲則得其所聞故無形者有形之本無聲者有聲之母循名責實實之極也按實定名名之極也參以相平轉而相成故得之形名

(17) 夫川竭而谷虛丘夷而淵實聖人以死大盜不起天下平而故也聖人不死大盜不止何以知其然爲之斗斛而量之則并斗斛而竊之爲之權衡以平之則并與權衡而竊之爲之符璽以信之則并與符璽而竊之爲之仁義以教之則并仁義而竊之何以知其然彼竊財誅竊國者爲諸侯諸侯之門仁義存焉是非竊仁義邪故遂於大

TENG TSE

(18) 盜霸諸侯此重利也盜趾所不可桀者乃聖人之罪也欲之與惡善之與惡四者變之失恭之與儉敬之與傲四者失之修故善素朴任憐憂而無失未有修焉此德之永也言有信而不爲信言有善而不爲善者不可不察也其治之法莫大於私不行功莫大於使民不爭今也立法而行私與法爭其亂也甚於無法立君而爭愚與君爭夫亂也甚於無君故有道之國則私善不行君立而愚者不尊民一於君事斷於法此國之道也明君之督大臣緣身而責名緣名而責形緣形而責實臣懼其重誅之至於是不敢行其私矣

(19) 心欲安靜慮欲深遠心安靜則心策生慮深遠則計謀成心不欲躁慮不欲淺心躁則精神滑慮淺則百事傾治世之禮簡而易行亂世之禮煩而難遵上古之樂質而不悲當今之樂邪而爲淫上古之民質而敦朴今世之民詐而多行上古象形而民不犯教有墨劓不以爲恥斯民所以亂多治少也堯置敢諫之鼓舜立誹謗之木湯有司直之人武有戒愼之銘此四君子者聖人也而猶若此之勤至於栗陸氏殺東里子宿沙氏戮箕文桀誅龍逢紂剗比干四主者亂君故其疾賢若仇是以賢愚之相覺若百丈之谿與萬仞之山若九地之下與重山之顛

(20) 明君之御民若御奔而無轡履冰而負重親而疎而親之故畏儉則福生驕奢則禍起聖人逍遙一世罕匹萬物之形寂然無鞭朴之罰莫然無叱咤之聲而家給人足天下太平視昭昭知冥冥推未運視未然故神而不可見幽而不可見此之謂也

(21) 君人者不能自專而好任下則智日困而數日窮迫於下則不能申行隨於國則不能持知不足以爲治威不足以行誅無以與下交矣故喜而使賞不必當功怒而使誅不必值罪不慎喜怒誅賞從其意而欲委任臣下故亡國相繼殺君不絕古人有言衆口鑠金三人成虎不可不察也

TENG TSE

- (22) 夫人情發言欲勝舉事欲成故明者不以其短疾人之長不以其拙病人之工言有善者則而賞之言有非者顯而罰之塞邪枉之路蕩淫辭之端臣下閱之左右結舌可謂明君爲善者君與之賞爲惡者君與之罰因其所以來而報之循其所以進而答之聖人因之故能用之因之循理故能長久今之爲君無堯舜之才而慕堯舜之治故終顛殞乎混冥之中而事不覺於昭明之術是以虛慕欲治之名無益亂世之理也
- (23) 患生於官成病始於少瘳禍生於懈慢孝衰於妻子此四者慎終如始也富必給資壯必給老快情恣欲必多侈侮故曰尊貴無以高人聰明無以籠人資給無以先人剛勇無以勝人能履行此可以爲天下君
- (24) 夫謀莫難於必聽事莫難於必成成必合於數聽必合於情故抱薪加火爍者必先燃平地注水濕者必先濡故曰動之以其類安有不應者獨行之術也
- (25) 明君立法之後中程者賞缺繩者誅此之謂君曰亂君國曰亡國
- (26) 智者寂於是非故善惡有別明者寂於去就故進退無類若智不能察是非明不能審去就斯謂虛妄
- (27) 目貴明耳貴聽心貴公以天下之目視則無不見以天下之耳聽則無不聞以天下之智慮則無不知得此三術則存於不爲也
- TENG TSE

CHUANG TSE

莊子天下篇

CHUANG TSE—CHINESE TEXT.

惠施多方其書五車其道舛駁其言也不中歷物之意曰至大無外謂之大一至小無內謂之小一無厚不可積也其大千里天與地卑山與澤平日方中方睨物方生方死大同而與小同異此之謂小同異萬物畢同畢異此之謂大同異南方無窮而有窮今日適越而昔來連環可解也我知天之中央燕之北越之南是也汜愛萬物天地一體也施惠以此爲大觀於天下而曉辯者天下之辯者相與樂之卵有毛鷄三足郢有天下犬可以爲羊馬有卵丁子有尾火不熱山出口輪不蹶地目不見指不至至不絕龜長於蛇矩不方規不可以爲圓鑿不圜枘飛鳥之景未嘗動也鏃矢之疾而有不行不止之時狗非犬黃馬驪牛三白狗黑孤駒未嘗有母一尺之極日取其半萬世不竭

KUNG SUN LUNG TSE

公孫龍子

KUNG SUN LUNG TSE—CHINESE TEXT.

CAP. I. 跡府第一

公孫龍六國時辯士也疾名實之散亂因資材之所長爲守白之論假物取譬以守白辯

(1) 謂白馬爲非馬也白馬爲非馬者言白所以名色言馬所以名形也色非形形非色也夫言色則形不當與言形則色不宜從今合以爲物非也

(2) 如求白馬於廐中無有而有驪色之馬然不可以應有白馬也不可以應有白馬則所求之馬亡矣亡則白馬竟非馬欲推是辯以正名實而化天下焉龍與孔穿會趙平原君家穿曰素聞先生高誼願爲弟子久但不取先生以白馬爲非馬耳請去此術則穿請爲弟子龍曰先生之言悖龍之所以爲名者乃以白馬之論爾今使龍去之則無以教焉且欲師之者以智與學不如也今使龍去之此先教而後師之也先教而後師之者悖且

(3) 白馬非馬乃仲尼之所取龍聞楚王張繁弱之弓載忘歸之矢以射蛟兕於雲夢之圃而喪其弓左右請求之王曰止楚王遺弓楚人得之又何求乎仲尼聞之曰楚王仁義而未遂也亦曰人亡弓人得之而已何必楚若此仲尼異楚人於所謂人夫是仲尼異楚人於所謂人而非龍異白馬於所謂馬悖先生修儒術而非仲尼之所取欲學而使龍去所教則雖百龍固不能當前矣孔穿無以應焉

(4) 公孫龍趙平原君之客也孔穿孔子之葉也穿與龍會穿謂龍曰臣居魯側聞下風高先生之智說先生之行願受業之日久矣乃今得見然所不取先生者獨不取先生之以白馬爲非馬耳請去白馬非馬之學穿請爲弟子公孫龍曰先生之言悖龍之學以白馬爲非馬者也使龍去之則龍無以教無以教而乃學於龍也者悖且夫欲

KUNG SUN LUNG TSE

學於龍者以智與學焉爲不逮也今教龍去白馬非馬是先教而後師之也先教而後師之不可先生之所以教龍者似齊王之謂尹文也

(5) 齊王之謂尹文曰寡人甚好士以齊國無士何也尹文曰願聞大王之所謂士者齊王無以應尹文曰今有人於此事君則忠事親則孝交友則信處鄉則順有此四行可謂士乎齊王曰善此真吾所謂士也尹文曰王得此人肯以爲臣乎王曰所願而不可得也是時齊王好勇於是尹文曰使此人廣庭大衆之中見侵侮而終不敢鬪王將以爲臣乎

(6) 王曰鉅士也見侮而不鬪辱也辱則寡人不以爲臣矣尹文曰唯見侮而不鬪未失其四行也是人未失其四行其所以爲士也然而王一以爲臣一不以爲臣則向之所謂士者乃非士乎齊王無以應尹文曰今有人君將理其國人有非則非之無非則亦非之有功則賞之無功則亦賞之而怨人之不理也可乎齊王曰不可尹文曰臣竊觀下吏之理齊其方若此矣王曰寡人理國信若先生之言人雖不理寡人不敢怨也意未至然與尹文曰言之敢無說乎王之令曰殺人者死傷人者刑人有畏王之令者見侮而終不敢鬪是全王之令也而王曰見侮而不鬪者辱也謂之辱非之也無非而王辱之故因除其籍不以爲臣也不以爲臣者罰之也此無罪而王罰之也且王辱不敢鬪者必榮敢鬪者也榮敢鬪者是而王之必以爲臣矣必以爲臣者賞之也彼無功而王賞之王之所賞吏之所誅也上之所是而法之所非也賞罰是非相與四謬雖十黃帝不能理也齊王無以應焉故龍以子之言有似齊王子知難白馬之非馬不知所以難之說以此猶知好士之名而不知察士之類

CAP.

二 白馬論第二

白馬非馬可乎曰可曰何哉曰馬者所以命形也白者所以命色也命色者非命形也故曰白馬非馬曰有白馬不可謂無馬也不可謂無馬者非馬也有白馬爲有馬白之非馬何也曰求馬黃黑馬皆可致求白馬黃黑馬不可致使白馬乃馬也是所求一也所求一者白者不異馬也所求不異如黃黑馬有可有不可何也可與不可其相非明故黃黑馬一也而可以應有馬而不可以應有白馬是非馬審矣曰以馬之有色爲非馬天下非有無色之馬也天下無馬可乎曰馬固有色故有白馬使馬無色有馬而已耳安取白馬故白者非馬也白馬者馬與白也馬與白馬也故曰白馬非馬也曰馬未與白爲馬白未與馬爲白合馬與白復名白馬是相與以不相與爲名未可故曰白馬非馬未可曰以有白馬爲有馬謂有白馬爲有黃馬可乎曰未可曰以有馬爲異有黃馬是異黃馬於馬也異黃馬於馬是以黃馬爲非馬以黃馬爲非馬而以白馬爲有馬此飛者入池而棺槨異處此天下之悖言亂辭也曰有白馬不可謂無馬者離白之謂也是離者有白馬不可謂有馬也故所以爲有馬者獨以馬爲有馬耳非有白馬爲有馬故其爲有馬也不可以謂馬也曰白者不定所白忘之而可也白馬者言白定所白也定所白者非白也馬者無去取於色故黃黑皆所以應白馬者有去取於色黃黑馬皆所以色去故唯白馬獨可以應耳無去者非有去也故曰白馬非馬

CAP.

三 指物論第三

物莫非指而指非指天下無指物無可以謂物非指者天下而物可謂指乎指也者天下之所無也物也者天下之所有也以天下之所有爲天下之所無未可天下無指而物不可謂指也不可謂指者非指也非指者物莫非

KUNG SUN LUNG TSE (3)

指也天下無指而物不可謂指者非有非指也非有非指者物莫非指也物莫非指者而指非指也天下無指者生於物之各有名不爲指也不爲指而謂之指是兼不爲指以有不爲指之無不爲指未可且指者天下之所兼天下無指者物不可謂無指也不可謂無指者非有非指也非有非指者物莫非指指非非指也指與物非指也使天下無物指誰徑謂非指天下無物誰徑謂指天下有指無物指誰徑謂非指徑謂無物非指且夫指固自爲非指奚待於物而乃與爲指

IV. 通變論第四

(1) CAP. 曰二有一乎曰二無一曰二有右乎曰二無右曰二有左乎曰二無左曰右可謂二乎曰不可曰左可謂二乎曰不可曰左與右可謂二乎曰可曰謂變非不變可乎曰可曰右有與可謂變乎曰可曰變隻曰右曰右苟變安可謂右苟不變安可謂變曰二苟無左又無右二者左與右奈何

(2) 羊合牛非馬牛合羊非雞曰何哉曰羊與牛唯異羊有齒牛無齒而牛之非羊也羊之非牛也未可是俱有而或類焉羊有角牛有角牛之而羊也羊之而牛也未可是俱有而類之不同也羊牛有角馬無角馬有尾羊牛無尾故曰羊合牛非馬也非馬者無馬也無馬者羊不二牛不二而羊牛二是而羊而牛非馬可也若舉而以是類之不同若左右猶是舉牛羊有毛雞有羽謂雞足一數足二二而一故三謂牛羊足一數足四四而一故五牛羊足五雞足三故曰牛合羊非雞非有以非雞也與馬以雞寧馬材不材其無以類審矣舉是謂亂名是狂

(3) 舉曰他辯曰青以白非黃白以青非碧曰何哉曰青白不相與而相與反對也不相鄰而相鄰不害其方也不害其方者反而對各當其所左右不驪故一於青不可一於白不可惡乎其有黃矣哉黃其正矣是正舉也其有君

KUNG SUN LUNG TSE

臣之於國焉故強壽矣而且青驪乎白而白不勝也白足之勝矣而不勝是木賊金也木賊金者碧碧則非正舉青白不相與而相與不相勝則兩明也爭而明其色碧也與其碧寧黃黃其馬也其與類乎碧其鷄也其與暴乎暴則君臣爭而兩明也兩明者昏不明非正舉也非正舉者名實無當驪色章焉故曰兩明也兩明而道喪其無有以正焉

▽ 堅白論第五

(1) CAP 堅白石三可乎曰不可曰二可乎曰可曰何哉曰無堅得白其舉也二無白得堅其舉也二曰得其所白不可謂無白得其所堅不可謂無堅而之石也之於然也非三也曰視不得其所堅而得其所白者無堅也拊不得其所白而得其所堅得其堅也無白也

(2) 曰天下無白不可以視石天下無堅不可以謂石堅白石不相外藏三可乎曰有自藏也非藏而藏也曰其白也其堅也而石必得以相盛盈其自藏奈何曰得其白得其堅見與不見離不見離一一不相盈故離離也者藏也曰石之白石之堅見與不見二與三若廣修而相盈也其非舉乎曰物白焉不定其所白物堅焉不定其所堅不定者兼惡乎其石也曰循石非彼無石非石無所取乎白石不相離者固乎然其無己曰於石一也堅白二也而在於石故有知焉有不知焉有見焉有不見焉故知與不知相與離見與不見相與藏藏故孰謂之不離

(3) 曰目不能堅手不能白不可謂無堅不可謂無白其異任也其無以代也堅白域於石惡乎離曰堅未與石爲堅而物兼未與爲堅而堅必堅其不堅石物而堅天下未有若堅而堅藏白固不能自白惡能白石物乎若白者必白則不白物而白焉黃黑與之然石其無有惡取堅白石乎故離也離也者因是力與知果不若因是且猶白以

KUNG SUN LUNG TSE

公孫龍子終

目以火見而火不見則火與目不見而神見神不見而見離堅以手而手以捶是捶與手知而不知而神與不知神乎是之謂離焉離也者天下故獨而正

CAP
VI. 名實論第六

天地與其所產焉物也物以物其所物而不過焉實也實以實其所實不曠焉位也出其所位非位位其所位焉正也以其所正正其所不正疑其所正其正者正其所實也正其所實者正其名也其名正則唯乎其彼此焉謂彼而彼不唯乎彼則彼謂不行謂此而此不唯乎此則此謂不行其以當不當也不當而亂也故彼彼當乎彼則唯乎彼其謂行彼此此當乎此則唯乎此其謂行此其以當而當也以當而當正也故彼彼止於彼此此止於此可彼此而彼且此此彼而此且彼不可夫名實謂也知此之非此知此之不在此也則不謂也知彼之非彼也知彼之不在彼也則不謂也至矣哉古之明王審其名實慎其所謂至矣哉古之明王

LIEH TSE

Bk

列子仲尼

LIEH TSE--CHINESE TEXT.

樂正子輿曰子龍之徒焉得不飾其闕吾又言其尤者龍誑魏王曰有意不心有指
不至有物不盡有影不移髮引千鈞白馬非馬孤犢未嘗有母其負類反倫不可勝
言也公子牟曰子不諭至言而以爲尤也尤其在子矣夫無意則心同無指則皆至
盡物者常有影不移者說在改也髮引千鈞勢至等也白馬非馬形名離也孤犢未
嘗有母非孤犢也

HSÜN TSE

能之 山淵平天地比齊秦襲入乎耳出乎口鉤有須卵有毛是說之難持者也而惠施鄧析

荀子不苟篇

HSÜN TSE—CHINESE TEXT.

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